The founders of the mises-libertarianism movement have a lot of good consequentialist arguments against central planning and the like. Privatize everything etc etc because the government will be inefficient and destroy wealth.But what about issues that don't have an obvious free market advantage? People who say that video game violence should be censored or children should be forced to learn about drugs and STDs do little or no obvious economic harms. So how do we counter these arguments?Of course, these moralistic arguments are in violation of the NAP. But that's not what I want to talk about. I want to know if there is a good utilitarian case for having the freedom to be stupid/uneducated/etc. Cus what if someone raised their kids to be racist. That would be bad, so we should force everyone's kids to learn about racial equality in school. Barf.I have a few ideas, but would like everyone's own opinions too.I was listening to Tom Dilorenzo talk about how sometimes mergers between companies failed, and that the anti-trust people were trying to use this as an argument for why there should be more stringent anti-trust laws. Dilorenzo countered saying that only the market could demonstrate what sorts of mergers were good or bad. I.e. freedom is a discovery process that teaches us about how markets work. It seems that this position is not quite enough to defeat the statists though, because if 100% of mergers between industry X and industry Y fail over a period of time, the statists can come in and say "well we've given the market long enough to figure it out, so now we'll prohibit industries X and Y from merging"Dilorenzo made the claim that when mergers go through, people are putting their money and careers on the line, which is supposed to act as a check. I kind of doubt statists will buy this. For some reason they trust politicians more than people playing with their own money, but what do I know.
Anyway, applying this logic to violent videogaming, it seems that we might not want experimentation since teenagers might go around killing people, and nothing good can come of violent videogames anyway so why not just do away with them? We already know meth is bad so why make it illegal too?I'm well aware of all the individualist/NAP arguments here. What I want are utilitarian/consequentialist arguments. Why? Because I don't think that liberty flies with most people. They already know what the right answer is: that X is bad for society. The only way you can tell them they're wrong is by making the utilitarian case right back at them. Note: Assuming I were in an argument with a statist and forced to admit that violence was necessary to prevent people from playing bad videogames, I would never give up the ground that a state is necessary to do so. So I'd like the arguments here to focus on why there should be a prohibition of all aggression rather than just state aggression.
Take for instance the situation in which you have traveled back in time to the prehistoric ages. You can bring about the industrial revolution with all your science knowledge, but no one listens to you because they think you're crazy. If you could force them to obey you with violence, you could help them out of their poverty. Is there any way we can argue against this without the NAP?
Thanks!
They already know what the right answer is: that X is bad for society. The only way you can tell them they're wrong is by making the utilitarian case right back at them.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan: And hopefully you will realize that utilitarianism is bankrupt, both intellectually and morally.
Juan: And hopefully you will realize that utilitarianism is bankrupt, both intellectually and morally. ...Or else you'll become a good socialist claiming that the 'good' is whatever is 'good' for society. "barf".
And hopefully you will realize that utilitarianism is bankrupt, both intellectually and morally. ...Or else you'll become a good socialist claiming that the 'good' is whatever is 'good' for society. "barf".
1. If "utilitarianism" means a doctrine which advocates that we decide ad-hoc what action to do as a function of which action, if performed, would provide the most happiness to the most people, I say, yes, it is "bankrupt". But I do not think that that definition is the definition which the original poster meant to use.
2. Do you believe that consequentialism is "intellectually [...] bankrupt"? Do you believe that the claim "we should not expand the supply of credit because such action would cause economic recessions and depressions" is "intellectually" bankrupt?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan:If "utilitarianism" means a doctrine which advocates that we decide ad-hoc what action to do as a function of which action, if performed, would provide the most happiness to the most people,
I. Ryan:I say, yes, it is "bankrupt". But I do not think that that definition is the definition which the original poster meant to use.
Snowflake:Explanation/link? I've only heard R Long talk about how its praxeologically unstable.
So what were mises and friends doing when they made arguments against the efficiency of the state if not being utilitarian?
I. Ryan:1. If "utilitarianism" means a doctrine which advocates that we decide ad-hoc what action to do as a function of which action, if performed, would provide the most happiness to the most people, I say, yes, it is "bankrupt".
Do you believe that the claim "we should not expand the supply of credit because such action would cause economic recessions and depressions" is "intellectually" bankrupt?
Juan:Well, utilitarianism says nothing definitive about individual rights.
Juan:Only that such rights may be legitimate IF they help promote 'social cooperation'
Snowflake: Well more generally the greatest good for the greatest number. Obviously this runs into problems of comparison of interpersonal utility, but just because there is grey area doesn't mean you discard the concept. So giving a chocolate bar to A vs B is unclear, but giving a choco bar to A vs killing B has an obvious utilitarian solution 99% of the time.
Comparing interpersonal utility is a pretty big problem. Also, an action may make me happy in the short term, yet it will negatively effect my happiness in the long term. So now you need some arbitrary stopping point where we stop measuring utility. Or do we take into account the happiness of every person effected by an action for the duration of his or her life? Not to mention that one could possibly justify atrocities such as slavery with utilitarian arguments. You can resort to rule utilitarianism, but that doesn't cut it either in my opinion.
Snowflake:mises-libertarianism movement
What movement? The only movement I see has basically been completely founded on the argument from morality and natural rights etc, following Rothbard's caucus' 10 points.
Why Be Libertarian? - Rothbard
Snowflake:The only way you can tell them they're wrong is by making the utilitarian case right back at them.
No. You just need to make it more clear that they have the gun in the room, and it's aimed at your skull.
Make it more personal. Ask them if they would hire a gang to stop that person from doing what they are doing "smoking, playing video games"...
If they say yes / no, then ask would they do it themselves? Then if yes, ask if they would pull the trigger?
If they say yes, then there is no rational argument that is going to sway a person like that. Don't debate with them. If there are others listening, that person is going to think they "won", but it'll be clear to everyone else they lost.
Conza88:What movement? The only movement I see has basically been completely founded on the argument from morality and natural rights etc, following Rothbard's caucus' 10 points.
Conza88: No. You just need to make it more clear that they have the gun in the room, and it's aimed at your skull. Make it more personal. Ask them if they would hire a gang to stop that person from doing what they are doing "smoking, playing video games"... If they say yes / no, then ask would they do it themselves? Then if yes, ask if they would pull the trigger? If they say yes, then there is no rational argument that is going to sway a person like that. Don't debate with them. If there are others listening, that person is going to think they "won", but it'll be clear to everyone else they lost.
I dont usually like to bump threads, but this one is important to me...
Snowflake: I'm well aware of all the individualist/NAP arguments here. What I want are utilitarian/consequentialist arguments. Why? Because I don't think that liberty flies with most people. They already know what the right answer is: that X is bad for society. The only way you can tell them they're wrong is by making the utilitarian case right back at them.
I'm well aware of all the individualist/NAP arguments here. What I want are utilitarian/consequentialist arguments. Why? Because I don't think that liberty flies with most people. They already know what the right answer is: that X is bad for society. The only way you can tell them they're wrong is by making the utilitarian case right back at them.
Snowflake:
The answer is to be found here:
"Universalistic utilitarianism's ethical criterion is the welfare of society as a whole; egoistic utilitarianism's ethical criterion is the individual agent's own welfare."
(Quote is from R.Long in his critique of Yeager's book)(my bold and italics)
Thus, before entering into a discussion about utilitarianism, there is the issue of which definition of utilitarianism one is discussing. Mises was a utilitarian in the latter sense, which flows naturally from the methodological individualism at the base of Austrian economics and the law of marginal utility.
A utilitarian argument in favor of libertarianism from this point of view, would seek to show or demonstrate how a nonlibertarian society is detrimental to the interests of the one seeking or proposing it.
In economics, one says to the nonlibertarian: If you increase the legal minimum wage significantly, there will be significant unemployment.
Thus, the nonlibertarian (the democrat or socialist for example) who doesn't want significant unemployment, abstains from advocating a minimum wage of $17 per hour (for example).
He abstains, because he is convinced that doing so (increasing the minimum wage to $17 per hour), harms his own interests. (i.e., harms things or people he himself cares about)
And thus, libertarian social science (in this case economics), affects nonlibertarian ethical practices or actions, by showing how acts the nonlibertarian planned to take harm his own interests.
This is an example of the egoistic utilitarianism practiced by Mises, and which Long is referring to.
The problem for libertarians is, this kind of utilitarian science only exists in the economic realm of human action, and not in the ethical realm of human action.
As Mises often wrote, economics is the best elaborated branch of praxeology. There are other potential branches of praxeology which remain un-elaborated. Human ethical acts are acts; the kind of acts praxeology studies. But there is no generally acknowledged science of human ethical acts as there is one for economic acts (the science of economics, or catallactics).
There is no utilitarian science of ethics (praxeology), and thus, one cannot demonstrate to the nonlibertarian how ethical acts he plans to take (as opposed to economic acts) harm his own interests.
Thus, libertarians propose various forms of objective ethics instead: the value objectivism of Rand and Rothbard, eudaimonia or flourishing or virtue ethics, argumentation ethics, theistic ethics, etc.
In utilitarian ethics of the kind Mises practices, the goal is to show or demonstrate how various actions the individual planned to initiate are harmful to his own interests. If this can be successfully accomplished, a nonlibertarian abstains from various acts, not because we tell him to, and not because we threaten him with punishment, but because he believes the act he intended would actually harm his own interests (as the minimum wage example).
To construct the type of social theory Mises does, the idea of exact laws, or apodictically certain knowledge is key.
Obviously, it makes a huge difference if we say to someone:
If you do X, Y might happen.
or:
If you do X, Y will certainly happen.
That is the significance of Mengerian exact science and Misesian praxeology. Both visions aim to arrive at such exact or necessary knowledge. And thus Austrian social science in the Mengerian/Misesian conception is able to say to the nonlibertarian: If you do X, Y will certainly happen.
This is the utilitarian/consequentialist argument you are referring to. In Austrian social science, utilitarianism is egoistic utilitarianism. It is based on methodological individualism and the subjective value of things to each individual actor.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Adam Knott:Thus, before entering into a discussion about utilitarianism, there is the issue of which definition of utilitarianism one is discussing.
Adam Knott:Mises was a utilitarian in the latter sense, which flows naturally from the methodological individualism at the base of Austrian economics and the law of marginal utility.
Adam Knott: He abstains, because he is convinced that doing so (increasing the minimum wage to $17 per hour), harms his own interests. (i.e., harms things or people he himself cares about)
Adam Knott:Thus, libertarians propose various forms of objective ethics instead: the value objectivism of Rand and Rothbard, eudaimonia or flourishing or virtue ethics, argumentation ethics, theistic ethics, etc.
Adam Knott: Obviously, it makes a huge difference if we say to someone: If you do X, Y might happen. or: If you do X, Y will certainly happen.
Adam Knott:In Austrian social science, utilitarianism is egoistic utilitarianism. It is based on methodological individualism and the subjective value of things to each individual actor.
human action: But the teachings of utilitarian philosophy and classical economics have nothing at all to do with the doctrine of natural right. With them the only point that matters is social utility. They recommend popular government, private property, tolerance, and freedom not because they are natural and just, but because they are beneficial. The core of Ricardo's philosophy is the demonstration that social cooperation and division of labor between men who are in every regard superior and more efficient and men who are in every regard inferior and less efficient is beneficial to both groups. Bentham, the radical, shouted: "Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense." [10] With him "the sole object of government ought to be the greatest happiness of the greatest possible number of the community."
I'd still invite him to dinner and attend all his lectures
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Juan:Mises is just the typical bankrupt utilitarian (and pro conscription too!)
Juan: Yes, Mises was a utilitarian. That doesn't mean utilitarianism is an unconditionally good thing. Yes, libertarians can make utilitarian arguments against government and other people can make utilitarian arguments for government... As a matter of fact, Mises himself advocated, for instance, conscription...
Yes, Mises was a utilitarian. That doesn't mean utilitarianism is an unconditionally good thing. Yes, libertarians can make utilitarian arguments against government and other people can make utilitarian arguments for government...
As a matter of fact, Mises himself advocated, for instance, conscription...
If a physicist uses the standard scientific method and develops an incorrect theory, does that convey to us that we should discard the standard scientific method? If I use my legs to run but I am a terrible runner, does that mean that you should instead use your hands to run?
Juan: No, that's an observation on how some economic mechanisms work.
No, that's an observation on how some economic mechanisms work.
No; it is not just "an observation on how some economic mechanisms work". In it, I used the word "should". In all cases, a speaker who says the word "should" assumes that the subject of the sentence which contains the word "should" possesses some sort of desire. In the example which I provided, I assumed that the subject, "we", desires not to experience an economic recession or depression. If, contrariwise, you were to somehow enjoy to experience economic recessions and depression, you would have been able to legitimately respond to my assertion via a sentence similar to "but I desire to experience an economic recession or depression!". In the entirety of the system which Mises enacted, such reasoning is the only reasoning which he intended to lead to any implications about policy.
Juan: But the thing is, the people who benefit from credit expansion might argue that it's 'good' for 'society'...
But the thing is, the people who benefit from credit expansion might argue that it's 'good' for 'society'...
If I use the techniques of infinitesimal calculus but I, because I misused those techniques, derive an incorrect answer, does that invalidate the expediency of those techniques?
Juan: And proving that there's a direct link between credit expansion and the business cycle is, for some reason, not that easy (just witness the current economic debates, even in this forum).
And proving that there's a direct link between credit expansion and the business cycle is, for some reason, not that easy (just witness the current economic debates, even in this forum).
I consider that to be the main reason why many radically anti-government, pro-market advocates uphold some sort of overarching moral principle, such as the non-aggression principle et cetera. For, in order to justify such a radical position via a consequentialist method, one would have to enact an expansive, detailed system. But, in order to justify such a radical position via a intuitivist method, one would merely have to, as an example, feel that aggression is "wrong" and apply such a principle consistently.
Snowflake:I just don't understand how libertarians can have so many consequentialist arguments about the greater good and somehow not cross over into evil "bankrupt" utilitarianism. Is it that the markets are "useful" enough? They are more useful than the state so utilitarians ought to be appeased by libertarianism?
People justify Libertarianism using utilitarian arguments all the time. But still, both act and rule utilitarianism are flawed doctrines. If your goal is to develop a coherent and acceptable morality, utilitarianism won't cut it.
Notice, utilitarian arguments have aggregate functions.
Marginalists are not neccesarrilly utilitarian, whereas socialists are.
Neither Lloyd, nor Condillac, nor Gossen, who used the word Utility in place of Value, ever had sums of utilities of two people (Gossen only showed that each person had more utility after barter, but only because he valued the other good more than the surplus he had).
Utilitarians, ion the other hand, often talk about maximizing personal utility and society's utility function, which Menger and Condillac and Gossen all argued against. As Gossen said, there is only the person who can succeed, and this by the greatest removal of impediments to making choices and monetary transactions.
thelion:Utilitarians, ion the other hand, often talk about maximizing personal utility and society's utility function, which Menger and Condillac and Gossen all argued against. As Gossen said, there is only the person who can succeed, and this by the greatest removal of impediments to making choices and monetary transactions.
Snowflake: Conza88:What movement? The only movement I see has basically been completely founded on the argument from morality and natural rights etc, following Rothbard's caucus' 10 points. The calculation argument is made on utilitarian, not individual rights grounds.
And it is used as one refutation of socialism. It is negative in nature, not positive. There are also some insights that apply to private firms, i.e knowledge.
That's all besides the point - the movement wasn't built on the socialist calculation debate.
Snowflake: I'm well aware of this strategy. I don't like it.
That's unfortunate. I don't think you'll be any where near as effective then at spreading Libertarian ideas.
Snowflake:I feel that even if dumb statists can't counter it that smarter ones can at least spin it to make them look good, that what if someone were teaching their children to be racist, it would be okay to force them to stop using a gun if you have to.
What? No it wouldn't.
Conza88: Snowflake:I feel that even if dumb statists can't counter it that smarter ones can at least spin it to make them look good, that what if someone were teaching their children to be racist, it would be okay to force them to stop using a gun if you have to. What? No it wouldn't.
Snowflake: I don't think our instincts were developed to be rationally compatible. It shouldn't be a surprise if our innate intuitions conflict when we take them to their logical conclusions.
I don't think our instincts were developed to be rationally compatible. It shouldn't be a surprise if our innate intuitions conflict when we take them to their logical conclusions.
I don't know if I grasp what you mean here exactly.
Our "innate intuitions" always conflict with the intellect means (A) intellect and intution remain distinct and the conflict is in their unique identity: intuition is intuition and intellect is intellect, or (B) intution and intellect conflict and disturb each other and can't resolve what they each bring up and share from their unique nature.
maybe there is a (C)... idk.
?
wilderness:Our "innate intuitions" always conflict with the intellect means
Snowflake: wilderness:Our "innate intuitions" always conflict with the intellect means No I didn't say that. I said that I didn't think our instincts were developed to be rationally compatible.
then you stated they conflict with logic (i substituted logic with intellect in my response). maybe that's besides the point.
Snowflake: I'm saying that I won't be surprised if there is an unresolvable schism between valuing the greater good vs individual liberty. I was saying I think they are both innate, and may contradict on some levels, and that this doesn't surprise me.
this brings me back to what I was asking. when you they "contradict on some levels" do you mean because greater good and individual liberty are separate identities, thus, have a distinct nature/definition? And since they are both innate are you saying an individual performs/values for the greater good and for their individual liberty at the same time, yet, they contradict each other creating turmoil in any particular individual (since they are innate I assume you mean each person has this turmoil/contradiction).
Snowflake: Though it does disappoint me, since it would be awfully convenient to kill 2 birds with 1 stone using anarchism. Though it seems we can only fully capture individualist ethics, while covering about 99% of utilitarian concerns.
ah, maybe your trying to show how the greater good and individualism unite in some form of an explanation? Thus trying to come up with an explanation that speaks to an individual as well as large amounts of people (greater good)? Isn't the "uniquness of each person" both a statement that speaks to the individual as well as to each, thus, any one person which could be all or fewer people? I say yes.
wilderness:this brings me back to what I was asking. when you they "contradict on some levels" do you mean because greater good and individual liberty are separate identities, thus, have a distinct nature/definition?
wilderness: yet, they contradict each other creating turmoil in any particular individual (since they are innate I assume you mean each person has this turmoil/contradiction).
wilderness:ah, maybe your trying to show how the greater good and individualism unite in some form of an explanation? Thus trying to come up with an explanation that speaks to an individual as well as large amounts of people (greater good)?
Snowflake: wilderness:this brings me back to what I was asking. when you they "contradict on some levels" do you mean because greater good and individual liberty are separate identities, thus, have a distinct nature/definition? Its like if my favorite color were blue, and my favorite icecream was chocolate, I could never have blue chocolate icecream, and I shouldn't be surprised about it.
So they are separate things, definitions, identities? I'm asking a question not because I'm a skeptic, but I really wouldn't mind the feedback on what I'm directly asking you. I am well aware of what info. I'm lacking in what you are trying to communicate to me, I believe I am well aware, and if I could simply get an answer to this question then maybe you don't have to keep coming up with abstracts. A simple yes or no may suffice.
Snowflake: wilderness: yet, they contradict each other creating turmoil in any particular individual (since they are innate I assume you mean each person has this turmoil/contradiction).I think turmoil is too strong a word. I personally feel very strongly for utility and liberty. It doesn't really bother me if they conflict.
So they are then separate identities that can't mix? I asked this three posts ago, in the last post, and now this post again. So without a yes or no on this question I'll keep guessing on what you are talking about.
Snowflake: wilderness:ah, maybe your trying to show how the greater good and individualism unite in some form of an explanation? Thus trying to come up with an explanation that speaks to an individual as well as large amounts of people (greater good)? Well I'm trying to see if there's always a way to defend both individuality and the greater good at the same time. The free market does that for all economic cases. What I'm worried about is the non-economic cases like banning videogame violence. It seems like I have to make the individualist case on its own.
I don't even know if "banning videogame violence" for one individual would do anything for that one individual, thus, why it probably wouldn't even expand to the "greater good". If it does do something for an individual, then it could expand to the greater good, but then it gets into method of intervention and the kind of intervention itself to ban it.
wilderness:So they are separate things, definitions, identities? I'm asking a question not because I'm a skeptic, but I really wouldn't mind the feedback on what I'm directly asking you. I am well aware of what info. I'm lacking in what you are trying to communicate to me, I believe I am well aware, and if I could simply get an answer to this question then maybe you don't have to keep coming up with abstracts. A simple yes or no may suffice.
wilderness:I don't even know if "banning videogame violence" for one individual would do anything for that one individual, thus, why it probably wouldn't even expand to the "greater good". If it does do something for an individual, then it could expand to the greater good, but then it gets into method of intervention and the kind of intervention itself to ban it.
Snowflake:And yet no one has really sold me that utility is really evil.
I just don't understand how libertarians can have so many consequentialist arguments about the greater good and somehow not cross over into evil "bankrupt" utilitarianism.
Is it that the markets are "useful" enough? They are more useful than the state so utilitarians ought to be appeased by libertarianism?
Juan: Doing what's morally good (respecting individuals qua individuals) leads to good 'consequences' - they are sides of the same coin.
Doing what's morally good (respecting individuals qua individuals) leads to good 'consequences' - they are sides of the same coin.
YES!
I. Ryan:If a physicist uses the standard scientific method and develops an incorrect theory, does that convey to us that we should discard the standard scientific method?
I. Ryan: Juan: And proving that there's a direct link between credit expansion and the business cycle is, for some reason, not that easy (just witness the current economic debates, even in this forum). I consider that to be the main reason why many radically anti-government, pro-market advocates uphold some sort of overarching moral principle, such as the non-aggression principle et cetera. For, in order to justify such a radical position via a consequentialist method, one would have to enact an expansive, detailed system.
But, in order to justify such a radical position via a intuitivist method, one would merely have to, as an example, feel that aggression is "wrong" and apply such a principle consistently.
Snowflake: What if there were a drug that had a chance...
What if there were a drug that had a chance...
people can blame their aggression on anything in the world when it comes to chance.
Juan: I don't think the analogy utilitarianism-scientific method is valid. In the case of Mises he's bent on ridiculing natural rights and then, despite his libertarian sympathies, he adopts a wholly pro-slavery position such as conscription. You might want to see that as an intellectual mistake but to me it's a logical consequence of his 'pro greater good' philosophy.
I don't think the analogy utilitarianism-scientific method is valid. In the case of Mises he's bent on ridiculing natural rights and then, despite his libertarian sympathies, he adopts a wholly pro-slavery position such as conscription. You might want to see that as an intellectual mistake but to me it's a logical consequence of his 'pro greater good' philosophy.
1. It is completely analogous. In many instances throughout this thread, you attempted, via the exemplification of some objectionable conclusions which Mises expressed, to disprove or atleast doubt that "utilitarianism" is the or a correct method.
If you desire to show that his method, via no erroneous usage of that method, led to those objectionable conclusions, that would, if you were to succeed, be a devastating attack. But you did not even attempt to do that.
2. I do not believe that you understand what Mises meant when he used the term "utilitarianism". It does not represent a doctrine even remotely close to either a "pro greater good philosophy" or to what I wrote here:
I. Ryan: 1. If "utilitarianism" means a doctrine which advocates that we decide ad-hoc what action to do as a function of which action, if performed, would provide the most happiness to the most people, I say, yes, it is "bankrupt". Juan: That's roughly what I'm referring to.
1. If "utilitarianism" means a doctrine which advocates that we decide ad-hoc what action to do as a function of which action, if performed, would provide the most happiness to the most people, I say, yes, it is "bankrupt".
Juan: That's roughly what I'm referring to.
That's roughly what I'm referring to.
In his system, the doctrine "utilitarianism" merely states that (a) the existence of the division of labor along with any further intensification of the division of labor benefits each individual involved and (b) that, therefore, it is a means, not an ends, and (c) that, therefore, the self-interest of an individual translates to the social-interest of the individual. In other words, one should desire to strengthen society because one desires to strengthen oneself.
Ludwig von Mises; Theory and History, pp. 54-60, added boldfaced print: The essential teachings of utilitarian philosophy as applied to the problems of society can be restated as follows: Human effort exerted under the principle of the division of labor in social cooperation achieves, other things remaining equal, a greater output per unit of input than the isolated efforts of solitary individuals. Man's reason is capable of recognizing this fact and of adapting his conduct accordingly. Thus social cooperation becomes for almost every man the great means for the attainment of all ends. An eminently human common interest, the preservation and intensification of social bonds, is substituted for pitiless biological competition, the significant mark of animal and plant life. Man becomes a social being. He is no longer forced by the inevitable laws of nature to look upon all other specimens of his animal species as deadly foes. Other people become his fellows. For animals the generation of every new member of the species means the appearance of a new rival in the struggle for life. For man, until the optimum size of population is reached, it means rather an improvement than a deterioration in his quest for material well-being. Notwithstanding all his social achievements man remains in biological structure a mammal. His most urgent needs are nourishment, warmth, and shelter. Only when these wants are satisfied can he concern himself with other needs, peculiar to the human species and therefore called specifically human or higher needs. Also the satisfaction of these depends as a rule, at least to some extent, on the availability of various material tangible things. As social cooperation is for acting man a means and not an end, no unanimity with regard to value judgments is required to make it work. It is a fact that almost all men agree in aiming at certain ends, at those pleasures which ivory-tower moralists disdain as base and shabby. But it is no less a fact that even the most sublime ends cannot be sought by people who have not first satisfied the wants of their animal body. The loftiest exploits of philosophy, art, and literature would never have been performed by men living outside of society. Moralists praise the nobility of people who seek a thing for its own sake. "Deutsch sein heisst eine Sache um ihrer selbst willen tun," declared Richard Wagner,[1] and the Nazis, of all people, adopted the dictum as a fundamental principle of their creed. Now what is sought as an ultimate end is valued according to the immediate satisfaction to be derived from its attainment. There is no harm in declaring elliptically that it is sought for its own sake. Then Wagner's phrase is reduced to the truism: Ultimate ends are ends and not means for the attainment of other ends. Moralists furthermore level against utilitarianism the charge of (ethical) materialism. Here too they misconstrue the utilitarian doctrine. Its gist is the cognition that action pursues definite chosen ends and that consequently there can be no other standard for appraising conduct but the desirability or undesirability of its effects. The precepts of ethics are designed to preserve, not to destroy, the "world." They may call upon people to put up with undesirable short-run effects in order to avoid producing still more undesirable long-run effects. But they must never recommend actions whose effects they themselves deem undesirable for the sole purpose of not defying an arbitrary rule derived from intuition. The formula fiat justitia, pereat mundus is exploded as sheer nonsense. An ethical doctrine that does not take into full account the effects of action is mere fancy. Utilitarianism does not teach that people should strive only after sensuous pleasure (though it recognizes that most or at least many people behave in this way). Neither does it indulge in judgments of value. By its recognition that social cooperation is for the immense majority a means for attaining all their ends, it dispels the notion that society, the state, the nation, or any other social entity is an ultimate end and that individual men are the slaves of that entity. It rejects the philosophies of universalism, collectivism, and totalitarianism. In this sense it is meaningful to call utilitarianism a philosophy of individualism. The collectivist doctrine fails to recognize that social cooperation is for man a means for the attainment of all his ends. It assumes that irreconcilable conflict prevails between the interests of the collective and those of individuals, and in this conflict it sides unconditionally with the collective entity. The collective alone has real existence; the individuals' existence is conditioned by that of the collective. The collective is perfect and can do no wrong. Individuals are wretched and refractory; their obstinacy must be curbed by the authority to which God or nature has entrusted the conduct of society's affairs. The powers that be, says the Apostle Paul, are ordained of God.[2] They are ordained by nature or by the superhuman factor that directs the course of all cosmic events, says the atheist collectivist. Two questions immediately arise. First: If it were true that the interests of the collective and those of individuals are implacably opposed to one another, how could society function? One may assume that the individuals would be prevented by force of arms from resorting to open rebellion. But it cannot be assumed that their active cooperation could be secured by mere compulsion. A system of production in which the only incentive to work is the fear of punishment cannot last. It was this fact that made slavery disappear as a system of managing production. Second: If the collective is not a means by which individuals may achieve their ends, if the collective's flowering requires sacrifices by the individuals which are not outweighed by advantages derived from social cooperation, what prompts the advocate of collectivism to assign to the concerns of the collective precedence over the personal wishes of the individuals? Can any argument be advanced for such exaltation of the collective but personal judgments of value? Of course, everybody's judgments of value are personal. If a man assigns a higher value to the concerns of a collective than to his other concerns, and acts accordingly, that is his affair. So long as the collectivist philosophers proceed in this way, no objection can be raised. But they argue differently. They elevate their personal judgments of value to the dignity of an absolute standard of value. They urge other people to stop valuing according to their own will and to adopt unconditionally the precepts to which collectivism has assigned absolute eternal validity. The futility and arbitrariness of the collectivist point of view become still more evident when one recalls that various collectivist parties compete for the exclusive allegiance of the individuals. Even if they employ the same word for their collectivist ideal, various writers and leaders disagree on the essential features of the thing they have in mind. The state which Ferdinand Lassalle called god and to which he assigned paramountcy was not precisely the collectivist idol of Hegel and Stahl, the state of the Hohenzollern. Is mankind as a whole the sole legitimate collective or is each of the various nations? Is the collective to which the German-speaking Swiss owe exclusive allegiance the Swiss Confederacy or the Volksgemeinschaft comprising all German-speaking men? All major social entities such as nations, linguistic groups, religious communities, party organizations have been elevated to the dignity of the supreme collective that overshadows all other collectives and claims the submission of the whole personality of all right-thinking men. But an individual can renounce autonomous action and unconditionally surrender his self only in favor of one collective. Which collective this ought to be can be determined Only by a quite arbitrary decision. The collective creed is by necessity exclusive and totalitarian. It craves the whole man and does not want to share him with any other collective. It seeks to establish the exclusive supreme validity of only one system of values. There is, of course, but one way to make one's own judgments of value supreme. One must beat into submission all those dissenting. This is what all representatives of the various collectivist doctrines are striving for. They ultimately recommend the use of violence and pitiless annihilation of all those whom they condemn as heretics. Collectivism is a doctrine of war, intolerance, and persecution. If any of the collectivist creeds should succeed in its endeavors, all people but the great dictator would be deprived of their essential human quality. They would become mere soulless pawns in the hands of a monster. The characteristic feature of a free society is that it can function in spite of the fact that its members disagree in many judgments of value. In the market economy business serves not only the majority but also various minorities, provided they are not too small in respect of the economic goods which satisfying their special wishes would require. Philosophical treatises are published-though few people read them, and the masses prefer other books or non-if enough readers are foreseen to recover the costs.
The essential teachings of utilitarian philosophy as applied to the problems of society can be restated as follows:
Human effort exerted under the principle of the division of labor in social cooperation achieves, other things remaining equal, a greater output per unit of input than the isolated efforts of solitary individuals. Man's reason is capable of recognizing this fact and of adapting his conduct accordingly. Thus social cooperation becomes for almost every man the great means for the attainment of all ends. An eminently human common interest, the preservation and intensification of social bonds, is substituted for pitiless biological competition, the significant mark of animal and plant life. Man becomes a social being. He is no longer forced by the inevitable laws of nature to look upon all other specimens of his animal species as deadly foes. Other people become his fellows. For animals the generation of every new member of the species means the appearance of a new rival in the struggle for life. For man, until the optimum size of population is reached, it means rather an improvement than a deterioration in his quest for material well-being.
Notwithstanding all his social achievements man remains in biological structure a mammal. His most urgent needs are nourishment, warmth, and shelter. Only when these wants are satisfied can he concern himself with other needs, peculiar to the human species and therefore called specifically human or higher needs. Also the satisfaction of these depends as a rule, at least to some extent, on the availability of various material tangible things.
As social cooperation is for acting man a means and not an end, no unanimity with regard to value judgments is required to make it work. It is a fact that almost all men agree in aiming at certain ends, at those pleasures which ivory-tower moralists disdain as base and shabby. But it is no less a fact that even the most sublime ends cannot be sought by people who have not first satisfied the wants of their animal body. The loftiest exploits of philosophy, art, and literature would never have been performed by men living outside of society.
Moralists praise the nobility of people who seek a thing for its own sake. "Deutsch sein heisst eine Sache um ihrer selbst willen tun," declared Richard Wagner,[1] and the Nazis, of all people, adopted the dictum as a fundamental principle of their creed. Now what is sought as an ultimate end is valued according to the immediate satisfaction to be derived from its attainment. There is no harm in declaring elliptically that it is sought for its own sake. Then Wagner's phrase is reduced to the truism: Ultimate ends are ends and not means for the attainment of other ends.
Moralists furthermore level against utilitarianism the charge of (ethical) materialism. Here too they misconstrue the utilitarian doctrine. Its gist is the cognition that action pursues definite chosen ends and that consequently there can be no other standard for appraising conduct but the desirability or undesirability of its effects. The precepts of ethics are designed to preserve, not to destroy, the "world." They may call upon people to put up with undesirable short-run effects in order to avoid producing still more undesirable long-run effects. But they must never recommend actions whose effects they themselves deem undesirable for the sole purpose of not defying an arbitrary rule derived from intuition. The formula fiat justitia, pereat mundus is exploded as sheer nonsense. An ethical doctrine that does not take into full account the effects of action is mere fancy.
Utilitarianism does not teach that people should strive only after sensuous pleasure (though it recognizes that most or at least many people behave in this way). Neither does it indulge in judgments of value. By its recognition that social cooperation is for the immense majority a means for attaining all their ends, it dispels the notion that society, the state, the nation, or any other social entity is an ultimate end and that individual men are the slaves of that entity. It rejects the philosophies of universalism, collectivism, and totalitarianism. In this sense it is meaningful to call utilitarianism a philosophy of individualism.
The collectivist doctrine fails to recognize that social cooperation is for man a means for the attainment of all his ends. It assumes that irreconcilable conflict prevails between the interests of the collective and those of individuals, and in this conflict it sides unconditionally with the collective entity. The collective alone has real existence; the individuals' existence is conditioned by that of the collective. The collective is perfect and can do no wrong. Individuals are wretched and refractory; their obstinacy must be curbed by the authority to which God or nature has entrusted the conduct of society's affairs. The powers that be, says the Apostle Paul, are ordained of God.[2] They are ordained by nature or by the superhuman factor that directs the course of all cosmic events, says the atheist collectivist.
Two questions immediately arise. First: If it were true that the interests of the collective and those of individuals are implacably opposed to one another, how could society function? One may assume that the individuals would be prevented by force of arms from resorting to open rebellion. But it cannot be assumed that their active cooperation could be secured by mere compulsion. A system of production in which the only incentive to work is the fear of punishment cannot last. It was this fact that made slavery disappear as a system of managing production.
Second: If the collective is not a means by which individuals may achieve their ends, if the collective's flowering requires sacrifices by the individuals which are not outweighed by advantages derived from social cooperation, what prompts the advocate of collectivism to assign to the concerns of the collective precedence over the personal wishes of the individuals? Can any argument be advanced for such exaltation of the collective but personal judgments of value?
Of course, everybody's judgments of value are personal. If a man assigns a higher value to the concerns of a collective than to his other concerns, and acts accordingly, that is his affair. So long as the collectivist philosophers proceed in this way, no objection can be raised. But they argue differently. They elevate their personal judgments of value to the dignity of an absolute standard of value. They urge other people to stop valuing according to their own will and to adopt unconditionally the precepts to which collectivism has assigned absolute eternal validity.
The futility and arbitrariness of the collectivist point of view become still more evident when one recalls that various collectivist parties compete for the exclusive allegiance of the individuals. Even if they employ the same word for their collectivist ideal, various writers and leaders disagree on the essential features of the thing they have in mind. The state which Ferdinand Lassalle called god and to which he assigned paramountcy was not precisely the collectivist idol of Hegel and Stahl, the state of the Hohenzollern. Is mankind as a whole the sole legitimate collective or is each of the various nations? Is the collective to which the German-speaking Swiss owe exclusive allegiance the Swiss Confederacy or the Volksgemeinschaft comprising all German-speaking men? All major social entities such as nations, linguistic groups, religious communities, party organizations have been elevated to the dignity of the supreme collective that overshadows all other collectives and claims the submission of the whole personality of all right-thinking men. But an individual can renounce autonomous action and unconditionally surrender his self only in favor of one collective. Which collective this ought to be can be determined Only by a quite arbitrary decision. The collective creed is by necessity exclusive and totalitarian. It craves the whole man and does not want to share him with any other collective. It seeks to establish the exclusive supreme validity of only one system of values.
There is, of course, but one way to make one's own judgments of value supreme. One must beat into submission all those dissenting. This is what all representatives of the various collectivist doctrines are striving for. They ultimately recommend the use of violence and pitiless annihilation of all those whom they condemn as heretics. Collectivism is a doctrine of war, intolerance, and persecution. If any of the collectivist creeds should succeed in its endeavors, all people but the great dictator would be deprived of their essential human quality. They would become mere soulless pawns in the hands of a monster.
The characteristic feature of a free society is that it can function in spite of the fact that its members disagree in many judgments of value. In the market economy business serves not only the majority but also various minorities, provided they are not too small in respect of the economic goods which satisfying their special wishes would require. Philosophical treatises are published-though few people read them, and the masses prefer other books or non-if enough readers are foreseen to recover the costs.
Ludwig von Mises; Theory and History, p. 61: In ethics a common ground for the choice of rules of conduct is given so far as people agree in considering the preservation of social cooperation the foremost means for attaining all their ends. Thus virtually any controversy concerning the rules of conduct refers to means and not to ends. It is consequently possible to appraise these rules from the point of view of their adequacy for the peaceful functioning of society. Even rigid supporters of an intuitionist ethics could not help eventually resorting to an appraisal of conduct from the point of view of its effects upon human happiness.
In ethics a common ground for the choice of rules of conduct is given so far as people agree in considering the preservation of social cooperation the foremost means for attaining all their ends. Thus virtually any controversy concerning the rules of conduct refers to means and not to ends. It is consequently possible to appraise these rules from the point of view of their adequacy for the peaceful functioning of society. Even rigid supporters of an intuitionist ethics could not help eventually resorting to an appraisal of conduct from the point of view of its effects upon human happiness.
Ludwig von Mises; Human Action, pp. 143-144, added boldfaced print: Within the frame of social cooperation there can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friendship and a sense of belonging together. These feelings are the source of man's most delightful and most sublime experiences. They are the most precious adornment of life; they lift the animal species man to the heights of a really human existence. However, they are not, as some have asserted, the agents that have brought about social relationships. They are fruits of social cooperation, they thrive only within its frame; they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring. The fundamental facts that brought about cooperation, society, and civilization and transformed the animal man into a human being are the facts that work performed under the division of labor is more productive than isolated work and that man's reason is capable of recognizing this truth. But for these facts men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another, irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.
Within the frame of social cooperation there can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friendship and a sense of belonging together. These feelings are the source of man's most delightful and most sublime experiences. They are the most precious adornment of life; they lift the animal species man to the heights of a really human existence. However, they are not, as some have asserted, the agents that have brought about social relationships. They are fruits of social cooperation, they thrive only within its frame; they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring.
The fundamental facts that brought about cooperation, society, and civilization and transformed the animal man into a human being are the facts that work performed under the division of labor is more productive than isolated work and that man's reason is capable of recognizing this truth. But for these facts men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another, irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.
Juan: I'm not sure what you are getting at. If "we" don't want business cycles, "we" should not create money and 'credit' out of thin air - agreed. But that's not a moral "should" but a means/ends "should".
I'm not sure what you are getting at. If "we" don't want business cycles, "we" should not create money and 'credit' out of thin air - agreed. But that's not a moral "should" but a means/ends "should".
In the system which Mises enacted, the "means/ends "should"" is the only "should" which exists.
Ludwig von Mises; Theory and History, p. 48: Utilitarianism, on the other hand, does not deal at all with ultimate ends and judgments of value. It invariably refers only to means.
Utilitarianism, on the other hand, does not deal at all with ultimate ends and judgments of value. It invariably refers only to means.
Juan: And who is "we" anyway ?
And who is "we" anyway ?
It is just an example.
Juan: Utilitarianism can easily be used to 'justify' evil. I didn't say that utility per se is evil (and I'm not really sure what's meant by utility either...)
Juan: So, why is it that they [statists] aren't ?
wilderness: Snowflake: What if there were a drug that had a chance... people can blame their aggression on anything in the world when it comes to chance.
to answer the op. i think the problem is that the libertarians get cionfused and try to make consequentialist arguments because it would take too much time to expound deontological philosophy in every econ paper. even if free enterprise deliversers the goods better than planned economy, socialists still have a problem with the largely subordinate position of average workers. even r. long cannot argue that in libertarian utopia workers are supreme, because firms compete to please consumers- not to hold slumber parties for their workers. so you have to worry not just about the results but also the means.
Snowflake: wilderness: Snowflake: What if there were a drug that had a chance... people can blame their aggression on anything in the world when it comes to chance. Or had 100% probability of making someone go crazy and kill the first person they see. Also you can't bring people back to life or travel backwards in time.
Or had 100% probability of making someone go crazy and kill the first person they see. Also you can't bring people back to life or travel backwards in time.
lol no time travel?
Anyways, this is too complicated. How would anybody know if a drug and not their will power, even very, very slightly, is totatlly involved in them killing somebody? How do we measure will power and then separate that from the drug effects?
Snowflake: The pt of the example was to try to demonstrate a conflict between utilitarian/consequentialist recommendations (to stop ppl from taking the drug) vs Libertarian philosophy to let people do the drug and just assert your right to self defense if it comes down to that.
The pt of the example was to try to demonstrate a conflict between utilitarian/consequentialist recommendations (to stop ppl from taking the drug) vs Libertarian philosophy to let people do the drug and just assert your right to self defense if it comes down to that.
I don't think the example achieves a demonstration of the conflict between the two. As my questioning above in this post comes about.
wilderness:Anyways, this is too complicated.
wilderness:How would anybody know if a drug and not their will power, even very, very slightly, is totatlly involved in them killing somebody?