Imagine there is a guy who is a psychopathic serial killer wannabe.
One day he attacks me with an obvious intent to kill. According to NAP and AE, what am I allowed to do? Presumably, I am allowed to defend myself, even if it means killing him. (1)
Am I allowed to do something else? Can I knock him out? Presumably yes, if (1). So, I am allowed to knock him out. (2)
Imagine he wakes up in a cage, where I put him for safety (his and mine). He starts pleading with me to let him go. Am I still allowed to kill him? (3) Am I allowed to keep him in a cage? Am I allowed to torture him or force him to work for me as a slave? (4)
Imagine that I decided that I am not allowed to do (3) and (4). I let him go (maybe he paid my back for whatever damage). But then, next day the story repeats itself. Am I allowed to kill him in self-defense the second time? Am I allowed to knock him out? Am I allowed to kill him once he is in a cage? To torture him? To enslave him?
Or am I obligated to release a clearly deranged dangerous repeat-offender thus clearly endangering my life and that of others?
I am not asking "what might happen" under anarcho-capitalist society. I am asking: according to Rothbardian or Hoppean concepts, what am I allowed to do with this guy?
Rothbard's answer is two teeth for a tooth. I don't know what Hoppe would say.
Bring back the Circus Maximus.
gotlucky: Rothbard's answer is two teeth for a tooth. I don't know what Hoppe would say. Two teeth for what tooth? The maniac never damaged me. I disabled him every time he attacked. But if he attacks my wife or my son, they may not be able to. Should I release him? Can I kill him? Can I keep him as a slave instead? | Post Points: 20
Rothbard requires threats to be "palpable, immediate, and direct". If this maniac attacks you with deadly intent, of course you may kill him in the moment. If you knock him out and imprison him, and he still has deadly intent, then of course you may kill him. I don't see how this is morally questionable. You are not murdering some drunk kid who broke into your house by mistake. You are killing someone who is actively trying to murder you. Haven't you read Rothbard's chapter on Self-Defense from The Ethics of Liberty? You'll find most of Rothbard's views in that book.
If you are allowed to kill him, are you allowed to enslave him, as long ad he displays the murderous intent? Did you not read my question?
Again: a clearly dangerous person is sitting in your cage. He has displayed intent in being a murderous psychopath. Or simply being a burglar who kills those who resist. Or a serial rapist. Are you allowed to kill him now (in the cage). Are you allowed to enslave him? Are you forced to release him? All according to AE/NAP.
I'm not clear if in fact you are allowed to kill him, or if you need the consent of the heirs of the people he has murdered. If you murder him you prevent any restitution from taking place... aside from by his estate. But my idea is that anyone can murder a murderer (i.e. partake in vigilante justice) it doesn't be in self defense to be a righteous killing.
... just as the State has no money of its own, so it has no power of its own - Albert Jay Nock
Wait - is he a psychopathic killer wannabee? Or a psychopathic killer? If his only crime is assault then you most certainly cannot kill him.
Flying Axe,
In my opinion you are co-mingling two different arguments.
One question might be what do Murray Rothbard and Hoppe believe is the correct response to a sane and coherent person who is able to distinguish right from wrong, who:
a. attempts murder and/or
b. succeeds at murder.
You scenario assumes that after two or three strikes your transgressor will have access to enter your private property again and again to keep harassing you. That is possible, even likely under statist laws of today but less and less likely under libertarian law..
An insane person (your non-repentant likely insane psychopathic serial killer) is a different argument altogether. The same rules of self defense and punshment theory cannot be applied without further investigation.
For instance is your attempted murderer aware of his actions or consequences or not? Is he acting with a motive or randomly? How mentally capable is he? As incapable as a squirrel that keeps chewing off electrical cords? a newborn baby who's mother dies in childbirth? An abused seven year old that kills his father to protect his mother? Each scenario is different.
Maybe on a different thread we should discuss whether libertarian law allows you to involuntary enslave a person beyond a certan point of insanity for "his own and the public protection" This is a fascinating subject but does not fall under this discussion of libertarian law.
Was he under the influence of a drug? Was that drug self administered or prescribed by a professional? Has he had a brain injury or brain tumor?
The answer to these questions would lead you to some sort of libertarian theory on how to handle the insane or mentally impaired - which is different from how to handle mentally competent criminals.
Second part of the argument.
If a person was mentally capable but nevertheless a repeat offender- may you kill him or enslave him?
In my opinion when he attacks you the first time, you may defend yourself with force, but no more because at that stage he is not a serial offender. If you can subdue him, you may not now kill him in self defense (just because you assume he will be released to come kill you - that is a statist scenario that clouds the argument..). You hand it over to private courts, private property owners, private insurance agencies etc.
Now if he already is known to be a serial offender it is different. I know you may not enslave him just because you think he might offend (preemptive strike) but libertarian law allows you to ban him from your private property or have him sign a contractr allowing you to enslave him if he transgresses.
But if you are talking about our current statist society, they may have released him into the public domain so libertarian principles are difficult to enforce. You say to not talk about "what would ghappen in a libertarian society" but that is of paramount importance to the argument because Rothbard and Hoppe assume a certain libertarian environment for their ideas to be applied in.
FlyingAxe: If you are allowed to kill him, are you allowed to enslave him, as long ad he displays the murderous intent? Did you not read my question?
I know that you have read both Punishment and Propotionality and Self-Defense by Rothbard. Or rather, I know that you have claimed to read them. If you are so interested in Rothbard's opinion, maybe you should spend a little more time reading him and less time wondering if I read you:
Punishment and Proportionality: If, then, proportionality sets the upper bound to punishment, how may we establish proportionality itself? The first point is that the emphasis in punishment must be not on paying one’s debt to “society,” whatever that may mean, but in paying one’s “debt” to the victim. Certainly, the initial part of that debt is restitution. This works clearly in cases of theft. If A has stolen $15,000 from B, then the first, or initial, part of A’s punishment must be to restore that $15,000 to the hands of B (plus damages, judicial and police costs, and interest foregone). Suppose that, as in most cases, the thief has already spent the money. In that case, the first step of proper libertarian punishment is to force the thief to work, and to allocate the ensuing income to the victim until the victim has been repaid. The ideal situation, then, puts the criminal frankly into a state of enslavement to his victim, the criminal continuing in that condition of just slavery until he has redressed the grievance of the man he has wronged.
If, then, proportionality sets the upper bound to punishment, how may we establish proportionality itself? The first point is that the emphasis in punishment must be not on paying one’s debt to “society,” whatever that may mean, but in paying one’s “debt” to the victim. Certainly, the initial part of that debt is restitution. This works clearly in cases of theft. If A has stolen $15,000 from B, then the first, or initial, part of A’s punishment must be to restore that $15,000 to the hands of B (plus damages, judicial and police costs, and interest foregone). Suppose that, as in most cases, the thief has already spent the money. In that case, the first step of proper libertarian punishment is to force the thief to work, and to allocate the ensuing income to the victim until the victim has been repaid. The ideal situation, then, puts the criminal frankly into a state of enslavement to his victim, the criminal continuing in that condition of just slavery until he has redressed the grievance of the man he has wronged.
Self-Defense: We may qualify this discussion in one important sense: police may use such coercive methods provided that the suspect turns out to be guilty, and provided that the police are treated as themselves criminal if the suspect is not proven guilty. For, in that case, the rule of no force against non-criminals would still apply. Suppose, for example, that police beat and torture a suspected murderer to find information (not to wring a confession, since obviously a coerced confession could never be considered valid). If the suspect turns out to be guilty, then the police should be exonerated, for then they have only ladled out to the murderer a parcel of what he deserves in return; his rights had already been forfeited by more than that extent. But if the suspect is not convicted, then that means that the police have beaten and tortured an innocent man, and that they in turn must be put into the dock for criminal assault. In short, in all cases, police must be treated in precisely the same way as anyone else; in a libertarian world, every man has equal liberty, equal rights under the libertarian law. There can be no special immunities, special licenses to commit crime. That means that police, in a libertarian society, must take their chances like anyone else; if they commit an act of invasion against someone, that someone had better turn out to deserve it, otherwise they are the criminals.
We may qualify this discussion in one important sense: police may use such coercive methods provided that the suspect turns out to be guilty, and provided that the police are treated as themselves criminal if the suspect is not proven guilty. For, in that case, the rule of no force against non-criminals would still apply. Suppose, for example, that police beat and torture a suspected murderer to find information (not to wring a confession, since obviously a coerced confession could never be considered valid). If the suspect turns out to be guilty, then the police should be exonerated, for then they have only ladled out to the murderer a parcel of what he deserves in return; his rights had already been forfeited by more than that extent. But if the suspect is not convicted, then that means that the police have beaten and tortured an innocent man, and that they in turn must be put into the dock for criminal assault. In short, in all cases, police must be treated in precisely the same way as anyone else; in a libertarian world, every man has equal liberty, equal rights under the libertarian law. There can be no special immunities, special licenses to commit crime. That means that police, in a libertarian society, must take their chances like anyone else; if they commit an act of invasion against someone, that someone had better turn out to deserve it, otherwise they are the criminals.
Clearly, Rothbard supports enslaving criminals until they have righted their wrongs. Rothbard also clearly believes that torture is acceptable so long as it is within proportion to the crime. For how long can you enslave the man in your particular scenario according to Rothbard? I don't care, and it wasn't your question. How much can you torture him? I don't care, and it wasn't your question. All you asked was whether Rothbard believed that you would be justified either in torturing this particular man or in enslaving him. If you take the time to read Rothbard, you can clearly see that the answer is yes, so long as it is in proportion to his crimes, whatever they may be.
FlyingAxe: Again: a clearly dangerous person is sitting in your cage. He has displayed intent in being a murderous psychopath. Or simply being a burglar who kills those who resist. Or a serial rapist. Are you allowed to kill him now (in the cage). Are you allowed to enslave him? Are you forced to release him? All according to AE/NAP.
Do you read what I wrote? I answered this already. I guess I'll break it down for you:
FlyingAxe: Again: a clearly dangerous person is sitting in your cage. He has displayed intent in being a murderous psychopath.
Again: a clearly dangerous person is sitting in your cage. He has displayed intent in being a murderous psychopath.
Rothbard: Is the threat palpable? Check. Immediate? Check. Direct? Check. Yes, you may use deadly force.
FlyingAxe: He has displayed intent in being a murderous psychopath. Or simply being a burglar who kills those who resist.
He has displayed intent in being a murderous psychopath. Or simply being a burglar who kills those who resist.
FlyingAxe: Or a serial rapist.
Or a serial rapist.
Rape can be in a different category than murder, as not all rapists use direct violence in order to rape. I can't say what Rothbard would have said about a serial rapist without more information. I know what I think, but my answer is different than Rothbard's.
FlyingAxe: Are you allowed to kill him now (in the cage). Are you allowed to enslave him? Are you forced to release him? All according to AE/NAP.
Are you allowed to kill him now (in the cage). Are you allowed to enslave him? Are you forced to release him? All according to AE/NAP.
You have already stated that this man is trying to murder you, so AE has nothing to do with this situation. As far as the NAP goes, yes you can kill him or enslave him, though I think it would be far more prudent to kill him instead of running the risk of him breaking free and then murdering you. I have already stated this, so I don't know why you keep asking.
So, do you think Rothbard's conclusion that you can enslave someone and keep him this way until he pays back the damages contradict Hoppe's AE?
Also, if, when we capture the dangerous criminal, he intends to engage in argumentation with us, what do we say? We simply refuse to engage back. We may interact with him (for instance, I may ask him what he wants for supper), but we will not argue with him over the issue of whom his body belongs to.
But this is exactly the attitude of any slaver to his slave.
It also seems like Rothbard is contradicting himself. On the one hand he says we cannot force anyone to honor a past contract. On the other hand, he says we can keep someone enslaved until he pays back what he owes to us.
No, neither one has much to do with the other. First, though Rothbard did say that you can enslave someone to right a wrong, I'm not convinced that he is talking about chattel slavery. Considering his writings in general, it's likely that he means that you may enslave someone to that end only. For example, should a thief want to right his wrongs and pay restitution, Rothbard would be against kidnapping him and forcing him to work in a factory or whatever. Second, AE only pertains to argumentation. If you kidnap and enslave a thief in order to force him to pay restitution, then AE has nothing to say about this. AE is limited in application because it is meant to expose logical contradictions in argumentation, not in everything.
Well, this is a different scenario, because the criminal in the original scenario was trying to kill you every chance he got. Nothing forces you to engage the criminal in argumentation. If you would prefer to remain in open conflict, then that is your choice. Neither AE nor Rothbard have anything to say about this situation. AE is irrelevant to it, and Rothbard already had his views as to what proper justice was.
So what? Hitler didn't drink alcohol. Neither do Mormons. Is this why libertarians don't like Mitt Romney?
Rothbard says that you cannot force someone to honor a promise. I have never seen him say anything like that about contracts.
The point is that for all intents and purposes you could own another person if he were a criminal, for instance, and that would not contradict AE or NAP.
You might be able to reach that conclusion with a Rothbardian interpretation of the NAP, but his is not the only interpretation.
Well, I know that Kinsella, for instance, holds that you can't enforce contracts or debts. And if a thief stole money and them used them on drink or food, there is nothing to return, and he doesn't owe you anything.
This is flat out false. Please read A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability by Kinsella, specifically sections "Conditional Transfers of Title" (page 22) and "Theft and Debtors' Prison" (page 32). Kinsella is specifically talking about future transfers of title, which "are necessarily conditioned upon the item to be transferred existing at the designated time of transfer. Title to something that does not exist cannot be transferred." This is distinct from a thief who steals existing money and spends it on whatever. They are based on two wholly different principles.
"There is nothing in this world I hate more than an unlocked footlocker! If it werent for idiots like you there wouldnt be such a thing as thievery in this world!" - Gunnery Sgt Hartman, Full Metal Jacket
FlyingAxe: Or am I obligated to release a clearly deranged dangerous repeat-offender thus clearly endangering my life and that of others?
After releasing him, you would shoot him if he looked back at you and then you would claim self-defense and nobody would know any better.
FlyingAxe: I am not asking "what might happen" under anarcho-capitalist society. I am asking: according to Rothbardian or Hoppean concepts, what am I allowed to do with this guy?
gotlucky: I am basing my assertion on what Kinsella himself told Block in an online-posted conversation (about voluntary slavery). If I borrowed a watch from you and lost it, I don't owe you anything because I don't have that watch in my posession anymore. The same if I promised you a watch or transfered a title to it starting from some future point: if I don't have the watch in my posession anymore, I have nothing to give you, and I don't owe you anything. That's Kinsella's view.
Please reproduce that conversation. That conflicts with Kinsella's other writings. Furthermore, that would mean that Kinsella sees no problem with arson. I highly doubt this is Kinsella's position.
No, it wouldn't mean that. I don't see how that follows at all.
This is the conversation: http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/?p=132588
Also see this interesting post about it: http://goo.gl/T1rBL