Libertarianism may supposedly be accepted on either of these approaches.
However, the two can definitely clash.
For example, say that all individuals in a society enter into a contract to not trade with anyone from outside. From a utilitarian perspective, this creates inefficiencies by not allowing comparative advantage to work its magic. Hence, this should be prevented from happening.
From a natural rights perspective, however, since the contract is voluntary (and say that it is de-facto enforceable due to property interests), it should be followed and if broken restitution as spelled out in the contract should be paid out.
The two approaches to libertarianism clash. Am I wrong, or must we choose between the two?
Huh? This seems to be assuming certain values, values which conflict with those of the individuals in this society. Old-fashioned Benthamite utilitarianism may say greatest good for the greatest number, but the broader utilitarian method (particularly in contrast to a natural rights method) does not assume such an end. The individuals cutting themselves off from the rest of the world bear the costs of their narrower division of labor, but so long as they value their isolation more than they do the additional wealth, a utilitarian would tell them they have adopted the right program. They are maximizing their 'utility.'
Certainly, the rest of the world is burdened by a slightly smaller division of labor as well, but that does not mean the utilitarian is compelled to side with them and advocate forcing the isolationists to adopt free trade. A utilitarian can have his own moral values, other than pure wealth maximization, and these values don't need to be derived from a natural rights argument.
Natural Rights would trump utilitarianism. For example, it might be discovered that killing a few people might be the thing that will provide the most utility for the rest of the population at some point in time. That would be when we say natural rights or natural law come into play.
Good point, Michael. But what if the society discovers that the separation is not in their favor, yet are still bound by the contract? Of course, if they decide not to break the contract then they value the property they would lose more than the benefit of interaction with the rest of the world, but it may be argued that if this had been prevented from the beginning the utility would in fact have been increased over the scenario that actually happened.
Natural Rights would trump utilitarianism
I used to think so and I'd like to think so, yet the argument against an objective set of ethics is a bit too compelling (after I've read critiques of Hoppe). That's why I am currently advocating a deconstructionist approach to libertarianism where you don't have to build morality from the ground up but simply deconstruct the state within the moral framework of the public by showing inconsistencies (theft bad, taxation acceptable; coercion bad, regulation favorable).
I'm still open, however, to the idea of a "provable" set of ethics or at least one which can show that anything else would be a reductio ad absurdum.
my personal utility could also be increased if instead I could go back and bet on red instead of black. People make decisions based on what they EXPECT will maximize thier utility. You can't really do much about Ex-post regrets other than 'learn from your mistakes and try better next time'
And like you allued to, if people wish to go back on it they simply have to weigh in the cost of breaking the contract from their EXPECTED benefit of being able to trade with the rest of the world.
I'm a natural rights Libertarian. That contract would be a slave contract, and hence unenforceable. No one could be forced to abide by it, since the will of man is inalienable. However, if there was a title transfer stipulated in the contract for breaking the arrangement, that would be legally enforceable. If the contract stipulated a promise to pay money upom breaking the pact, that would not be legally enforceable.
In conlusion, no, you cannot be forced into not trading with people, even if you voluntary agreed to it.
Wheylous:I'm still open, however, to the idea of a "provable" set of ethics or at least one which can show that anything else would be a reductio ad absurdum.
You may find these resources useful.
First, Rasmussen's seminal 1980 paper on the subject, which first attracted me to the notion of natural rights, and the debate that ensued in the JLS.
A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End The Natural Rights Debate: A Comment on a Reply In Defense of Natural End Ethics: A Rejoinder to O'Neil and Osterfeld
Some other interesting papers, which elaborate on and explore the notion of ultimate ends:
The Randian Argument Reconsidered: A Reply to Charles King Regarding Choice and the Foundation of Morality: Reflections on Rand’s Ethics Rand on Obligation and Value The Ideas of Ayn Rand Comments on Tara Smith's Viable Values
The following books helped convinced me of ethical egoism:
Metaethics, Egoism, and Virtue: Studies in Ayn Rand's Normative Theory Viable Values: The Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics (this one isn't exactly Randian but is still a great read) The Virtue of Selfishness (classic, can't leave it out)
"yet the argument against an objective set of ethics is a bit too compelling"
What argument is that?
First and foremost, that no one has ever been able give a coherent definition of "objectively right," "objectively good/bad," "objective value," etc. Hoppe, Rasmussen, Den Uyl, Rand, Rothbard, and all the rest fail on this count every time, or else they merely boil down to roundabout versions of utilitarianism (Mises's individualist utilitarianism, not greatest good for greatest number utilitarianism) or other mundane observations that one would hardly want to call ethics. It may be a fact that there are universal values, but certainly not objective ones, unless we define objective =universal and dissolve the entire controversy.
Why anarchy fails
@RothbardsDisciple: By that reasoning, all contracts that force someone to pay upon breach are "slave contracts."
By that reasoning, all contracts that force someone to pay upon breach are "slave contracts."
That's what I used to think too, until Clayton explained to me the idea of a title transfer on condition of breaking a contract (what Rothbard called performance bonds).
Consider these two scenarios. #1 is not enforceable in my view, while #2 is:
1). If I fail to act in your movie, I promise to pay you $1000. 2). If I fail to act in your movie, I thereby transfer to you title to $1000.
1). If I fail to act in your movie, I promise to pay you $1000.
2). If I fail to act in your movie, I thereby transfer to you title to $1000.
In neither case may the actor be forced to act in the movie, however.
Those two scenarios are the same. They both promise future action under future conditions.
Actually, I think "transfer of title" may be somewhat inaccurate. More accurate in my view is "change of title". With that in mind, I think an actually enforceable version of your second scenario would be as follows:
The title to this $1000 is hereby changed such that, should I fail to act in your movie, you will then have title to it.
In other words, you can think of the title becoming conditional once the contract has been agreed to. Furthermore, the change of title is a present action.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Libertarianism and free markets specifically, strives towards efficiency as a result of the pursuit of profit. So in comparison to other systems it could be considered more utilitarian in general. That is to say that utilitarianism does not have to be the result of central planning. But of course at times these efforts towards efficiency can have detrimental effects that might not be considered utilitarian. That does not mean that the opposite is true that free markets result in the worse case scenario for all parties in involved at all times.
You can't really do much about Ex-post regrets other than 'learn from your mistakes and try better next time'
Right, but then the argument is that a wise government may be able to prevent such things from happening in the first place.
That contract would be a slave contract, and hence unenforceable.
That's why I added "say that it is de-facto enforceable due to property interests." By that I meant that there is such a large title change/transfer in event of breaking the contract that having such clauses so de-facto enforces it (for example, transfer of all the property someone owns).
Well, it boils down to "why the heck should I care about any of your morals?" Why is slavery morally wrong? Why is murder evil? All of these come down to some assumption that people make that is just an assumption. As I said, I'm hoping that it can be shown that the NAP is the only logically-consistent assumption that can be made and the one that doesn't have any reductios.
Yeah, I tend to think so too (semantics), but since in practice it makes such little difference (just changing one word), I concede the point.
With that in mind, I think an actually enforceable version of your second scenario would be as follows: The title to this $1000 is hereby changed such that, should I fail to act in your movie, you will then have title to it. In other words, you can think of the title becoming conditional once the contract has been agreed to. Furthermore, the change of title is a present action
With that in mind, I think an actually enforceable version of your second scenario would be as follows:
In other words, you can think of the title becoming conditional once the contract has been agreed to. Furthermore, the change of title is a present action
He didn't mean to say that the title transfer is unenforceable. He means that you cannot actually use force to have the actor act. You can simply use force to get your money as stipulated in the contract.
No serious person could argue that. Any attempt would ignore the nature and mechanics of government itself. I think this is why I am more of an anarchist for public choice reasons than anything else.
Take the example of the 'wise' government knowing that heroin is bad for you and then outlawing it for the protection of its citizens. It doesn't take much to realize that any steps the gov't takes to stop this problem, only create more problems.
Basically, just because we can imagine a better system (i.e. something like the neo-classical concept of 'perfect competition'), does not mean that its actually acheivable. While in the free market there would not be perfect competition, that doesn't mean that the free market is still not the 1st best option when it comes to optimal policy.
Crusoe, Morality, and Axiomatic Libertarianism
tunk:A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End The Natural Rights Debate: A Comment on a Reply In Defense of Natural End Ethics: A Rejoinder to O'Neil and Osterfeld
You skipped the reply by O'Neil, which as far as I can tell utterly destroys Rasmussen and Den Uyl. Not that this is hard: their complicated logical argument is just wordplay, as I showed in just a few words in this thread. Osterfeld adds nothing on the pro-natural rights side, as I showed here.
As for Rand and objective value in general, this is probably the best short deconstruction: http://mises.org/Community/forums/p/13643/295359.aspx#295359
But the main criticism always comes back to the fact that "objective value" is an incoherent term, because value requires a valuer so it is inherently subjective. No one has ever given a coherent definition, that I have seen.
Besides, this matter doesn't need to be reconciled, just clarified:
In the absence of civil government, most people engage in productive activity in peaceful cooperation with their fellows. Some do not. A minority engages in predation, attempting to use violence to expropriate the labor or output of others. The existence of this predatory element renders insecure the persons and possessions of those engaged in production. Further, even among the productive portion of the population, disputes arise concerning broken agreements, questions of rightful possession, and actions that inadvertently result in personal injuries for which there is no antecedently established mechanism for resolution. In the state of nature, interpersonal conflicts that can lead to violence often arise.
What happens when they do? The existence of the predatory minority causes those engaged in productive activities to band together to institute measures for their collective security. Various methods of providing for mutual protection and for apprehending or discouraging aggressors are tried. Methods that do not provide adequate levels of security or that prove too costly are abandoned. More successful methods continue to be used. Eventually, methods that effectively discourage aggression while simultaneously minimizing the amount of retaliatory violence necessary to do so become institutionalized. Simultaneously, nonviolent alternatives for resolving interpersonal disputes among the productive members of the community are sought. Various methods are tried. Those that leave the parties unsatisfied and likely to resort again to violence are abandoned. Those that effectively resolve the disputes with the least disturbance to the peace of the community continue to be used and are accompanied by ever-increasing social pressure for disputants to employ them.
Over time, security arrangements and dispute settlement procedures that are well-enough adapted to social and material circumstances to reduce violence to generally acceptable levels become regularized. Members of the community learn what level of participation in or support for the security arrangements is required of them for the system to work and for them to receive its benefits. By rendering that level of participation or support, they come to feel entitled to the level of security the arrangements provide. After a time, they may come to speak in terms of their right to the protection of their persons and possessions against the type of depredation the security arrangements discourage, and eventually even of their rights to personal integrity and property. In addition, as the dispute settlement procedures resolve recurring forms of conflict in similar ways over time, knowledge of these resolutions becomes widely diffused and members of the community come to expect similar conflicts to be resolved in like manner. Accordingly, they alter their behavior toward other members of the community to conform to these expectations. In doing so, people begin to act in accordance with rules that identify when they must act in the interests of others (e.g., they may be required to use care to prevent their livestock from damaging their neighbors’ possessions) and when they may act exclusively in their own interests (e.g., they may be free to totally exclude their neighbors from using their possessions). To the extent that these incipient rules entitle individuals to act entirely in their own interests, individuals may come to speak in terms of their right to do so (e.g., of their right to the quiet enjoyment of their property).
In short, the inconveniences of the state of nature represent problems that human beings must overcome to lead happy and meaningful lives. In the absence of an established civil government to resolve these problems for them, human beings must do so for themselves. They do this not through coordinated collective action, but through a process of trial and error in which the members of the community address these problems in any number of ways, unsuccessful attempts to resolve them are discarded, and successful ones are repeated, copied by others, and eventually become widespread practices. As the members of the community conform their behavior to these practices, they begin to behave according to rules that specify the extent of their obligations to others, and, by implication, the extent to which they are free to act at their pleasure. Over time, these rules become invested with normative significance and the members of the community come to regard the ways in which the rules permit them to act at their pleasure as their rights. Thus, in the state of nature, rights evolve out of human beings’ efforts to address the inconveniences of that state. In the state of nature, rights are solved problems.
@AJ
I didn't "skip" O'Neil, I just forgot about him. The fact that you feel a compulsion to assume bad faith on the part of everybody who disagrees with you says far more about you than it does about me.
O'Neil doesn't "destroy" anything, because he attacks a complete caricature. Obviously, Randian ethics depends on whether or not an agent has life as an ultimate value. It was the whole point of Rasmussen to show that you adopt life as an ultimate value merely by acting, which O'Neil doesn't come within an inch of rebutting.
As for his t+1, etc., stuff, a) the argument is explicitly not that you have to be alive in order to act. That's trivial and unimportant. And b) as Rasmussen and Den Uyl point out in their rebuttal, dying at time t + x is beyond your choice and hence not a problem.
For some reason, you place tremendous confidence in your ability to "show" the supposed falsity of the natural rights position. I don't see any reason for you to do so, since your critiques utterly fail. You don't even demonstrate convincingly that you understand it, as evinced by your dismissal of it as "wordplay". You gave a link to threads where you asked people to define natural rights. Obviously, since you are the arbiter of whether any definition is coherent or not, all attempts at definitions will ex vi termini be incoherent! That's an immature non-argument.
AJ:value requires a valuer so it is inherently subjective.
What you are describing is exactly the Randian-Aristotelian position. There is no value without a valuer, and so values are indeed "subjective" or agent-relative. But again, if it can be shown that there is an end which all human beings accept, then it is possible to objectively perscribe universal means to that end.
Adam Knott's post simply consists of saying what we all know, that there is a distinction between scientific fact and moral value and you can't deduce an ought from an is. How this refutes anything is beyond me, since the natural law position only deduces "ought" from another "ought" that we all implictly accept. But go ahead, persist in your delusion that you've "deconstructed" natural rights when all you've done is knock down a strawman.
tunk: I didn't "skip" O'Neil, I just forgot about him. The fact that you feel a compulsion to assume bad faith on the part of everybody who disagrees with you says far more about you than it does about me.
No bad faith assumed. I simply noticed you left him out for whatever reason, and I wanted people to see his side as well.
As to the rest, you see that if you define something clearly it is no longer a problem. The word "objective" is never defined clearly by the above folks that I have found (can't speak for Rand, though), and if it is, it's something like "universal," which then becomes acceptable but no longer has the same force. You clearly state that you are deriving an ought from an ought, and that I completely agree with. There is nothing to be resolved here, except that too many people like to use wordplay in an apparent attempt to add extra force to their arguments. That is what I rail against in those threads, and I do stand behind the wordplay charge, though I do not claim that it is deliberate. Hoppe does this, too.
AJ:As to the rest, you see that if you define something clearly it is no longer a problem.
Really? Define "game" in such a way that there would be no problems figuring out if something is a game or not. If you can, was it necessary, or are we able to talk about games without your definition and get along ok?
The problem isn't definitions, its that the whole explanation put forth by neo-aristotelians is foreign to the logical empiricist approach. You're essentially talking to someone speaking a different language and asking them to define each word in terms of your language, instead of learning what the word means in their language.
(EDIT): "if you define something clearly it is no longer a problem" - You would never say something like this to a poet, because thats not what poetry is about. Are there problems in poetry that can't be solved with definitions? Maybe ethics has similar problems?
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
Maybe ethics has similar problems?
If that is given to you for argument sake: anytime ethics crosses over to ontology, political science, social science, economics or whatever it has a lot of explaining to do. If ethics speaks of economics it must be an economic entity, fact, and reality within the scope of economic language.
"As in a kaleidoscope, the constellation of forces operating in the system as a whole is ever changing." - Ludwig Lachmann
"When A Man Dies A World Goes Out of Existence" - GLS Shackle
I don't know how much I subscribe to what I'm saying here, but it seems like there are ways of talking about these things (ontology, economics, etc.) that would suffer from the same problems as ethics does, but we don't seem to care or notice because we understand the context (we know when something is art and treat it as such). We don't demand that art speaks of economics economically, but that it only does it as art. Yet we demand ethics speaks of economics economically, ontology ontologically, and so on. We demand science, and when we don't get it, we truncate ethics down to what can be said scientifically which ends up being only what we started with - economics, ontology, political science, etc.
If I read you correctly (and not to sure if I do):
I am saying I have a good enough picture as to what art is and am able to communicate it with most people, and realize where it becomes gibberish.
Ex: I can't say 3 + [insert the entirety of Beethoven's 3rd symphony here] = 6
I can say here is the 3rd symphony:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tHvztnHOWEQ
or even this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symphony_No._3_(Beethoven)
or perhaps I could show the music score, play a simple melody on the piano, etc - there are many ways to communicate the relevant info.
Anytime I can insert science and you understand it as an accurate picture of things, it is doing its job. I probably couldn't talk about electron shells when speaking of the practiced art of legal theory in a murder trial.
If one has a problem with ethics, it is it that it has not been shown or communicated in any relevant way, and if it has been communicated it thus far has always been able to be called something else (science, art, grammer, logic, legal theory etc).
I think you understood me just fine -
This is spot on what I was trying to say.
Where I think I'm at with this is that on one hand, I'm pretty skeptical that ethics is even capable of standing on its own feet and still have something to say. I can grasp ethical theory on a formal level, but the minute it gets fleshed out with content, it becomes way too metaphysically heavy or ends up describing anthropology or economics.
On the other hand, it seems like thinkers have been too quick to let other topics speak on ethics' behalf. I don't see why ethics devolves into either nonsense or some discipline besides ethics, so I remain open that there is some way that it can avoid those paths. Is there something inherent in ethics that makes it unable to be relevant in its own way, or have we just not grasped it yet?
The word "game" is a good example of why not to use everyday terms when discussing things carefully. Define "game" clearly as I presume they do in game theory, and there is no problem. In any case, I was talking specifically about the terms of ethics. If they speak another language and want other people to care, the onus is on them to teach us what they mean by these terms.
In the state of nature, rights are solved problems.
I think this can be stated even more strongly: rights are solved problems, period. There is, in fact, no other sense of "rights" and the common practice of applying the word "rights" to dispensations of the Prince and to solved problems leads to unnecessary confusion and equivocation about the social order. The Prince does not grant rights, not because we have rights "from God" but because our rights are not in respect to any one individual, not even the Prince. Our rights are in respect to the social order itself.
Rights emerge from social order. The Prince can merely grant permits, certificates, conveyances, dispensations and indulgences. These are basically just formal promises (of varying reliability) of safe-conduct but they are not rights precisely because they can always be revoked at the Prince's whim, no matter how vehemently or formally or solemnly he has promised not to do so.
Rights, on the other hand, are unalterable precisely because they are facts about the social order irrespective of how closely the social order approximates a natural order. People have rights in a black market under communist tyranny. If they did not, they would not engage in black market trade. Hence, natural order is a superfluous condition for rights (though one can easily argue that the quality and benefits of rights in a natural order are greater than in any alternative).
Clayton -