Does anybody know of an article where Block gives his justification for self-ownership and homesteading and the NAP? In other words, why does Block accept these as axioms? I've always assumed that he accepts Rothbard's quasi- natural right framework, but I'm looking for an actual passage where he might say so.
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
The problem with the paper on Hoppe, is that you can defend someone else's position without actually adopting it. You are probably right that its via Rothbardian natural rights, I'd just like to see it in print so I can reference it in this thing I'm doing. I might just shoot Block an email.
I might just shoot Block an email.
That might be best. The Hoppe essay was the closest thing I could find to a justification, but you are right, he never says that he actually adopted argumentation ethics as a position. If he responds to you, I'd love it if you could repost his response here.
I'm working on this very area right now. I'd also be interested in a response from Block on whether he accepts completely Rothbard's model based on natural law and on how he integrates this with argumentation ethics, if at all.
Re: "I'm working on this very area right now. I'd also be interested in a response from Block on whether he accepts completely Rothbard's model based on natural law and on how he integrates this with argumentation ethics, if at all."
He does accept Rothbard's arguments which are axiomatic-deductive in that they show the praxeological absurdity of ethics / norms not based on self-ownership and original appropriation. Nor is there any need for "integration" with argumentation ethics..
As per Rothbard in 1988:
“Nevertheless, by coming out with a genuinely new theory (amazing in itself, considering the long history of political philosophy) Hoppe is in danger of offending all the intellectual vested interests of the libertarian camp. Utilitarians, who should be happy that value-freedom was preserved, will be appalled to find that Hoppean rights are even more absolutist and "dogmatic" than natural rights. Natural rightsers, while happy at the "dogmatism," will be unwilling to accept an ethics not grounded in the broad nature of things. Randians will be particularly upset because the Hoppean system is grounded (as was the Misesian) on the Satanic Immanuel Kant and his "synthetic a priori." Randians might be mollified, however, to learn that Hoppe is influenced by a group of German Kantians (headed by mathematician Paul Lorenzen) who interpret Kant as a deeply realistic Aristotelian, in contrast to the idealist interpretation common in the United States. As a natural rightser, I don't see any real contradiction here, or why one cannot hold to both the natural-rights and the Hoppean-rights ethic at the same time. Both rights ethics, after all, are grounded, like the realist version of Kantianism, in the nature of reality. Natural law, too, provides a personal and social ethic apart from libertarianism; this is an area that Hoppe is not concerned with.”
Conza,
Do you have a quote from Block confirming that he accepts natural rights, or is this just speculation, or based on deduction from the context of his works or what? Not that I think you're wrong, I'm just looking for something concrete.
Yo Mikachusetts, all three really.
"I only insist that if it is to be an overall libertarian society, then the relations between the members of this small group and everyone else must be founded upon the Rothbardian philosophy of no threats or carrying out of physical invasion." — Block, Walter. “Reply to Frank van Dun’s ‘Natural Law and the Jurisprudence of Freedom’” Journal of Libertarian Studies. Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 2004. pp. 65-72.
Favourably quoting Rothbard [as he does everywhere, as is only natural] in "Libertarianism Is Unique". He's lock n' step with Rothbard on pretty much everything. In a few places he's extended the analysis (evictionism). Some things differ with i.e 'voluntary slavery'.
"Thus, there is no need to drive a wedgebetween so-called formal and substantive rights, whether to human personsor to their property, and to promote the latter at the expense of the former. The two are in this case at least one and the same, if the relevant concepts are properly understood. But, if so, thenthis distinction cannot be used, either, to drive a wedge between libertarian theory, which supports the rights of free individuals to engage in prostitution, pornography, homosexuality, etc., and the presumed substantive rights of children to be free of possibly witnessing these acts. Feser’s mistake is to claim, in effect, that libertarian rights can conflict. They cannot. If there is a seeming conflict, one or the other (or possibly both) must be in error. According to Rothbard (1984, 6): “The whole point of natural rights is that they are eternal and absolute, and the every man’s rights are compossiblewith the rights of every other man. In every situation of a seeming conflict of rights, the libertarian political philosopher must search to eliminate the supposed conflict, and to identify whoserights are to prevail, to find out who is the victim and who is the aggressor"
"I came across an exchange between Mr. Halliday, Walter Block and an editors note by Murray Rothbard. The Libertarian Forum 1973/06. I agree with Blocks rebuttal, and Murray’s note:
“How about Professor Block’s second premise, that evil is only the initiation of violence? Here I think it is possible to partially reconcile the Block and Halliday positions. It is a question of what context we are dealing with. I would agree with Block that within the context of libertarian theory, evil must be confined to the initiation of violence. On the other hand, when we proceed from libertarianism to the question of wider social and personal ethics, then I would agree with Halliday that there are many other actions which should be considered as evil: lying, for example or deliberately failing to fulfill one’s best potential. But these are not matters about which liberty - the problem of the proper scope of violence - has anything to say. In short, qua libertarian there is nothing wrong or evil about breaking dates, being gratuitously nasty to one’s associates, or generally behaving like a cad: here not only do I join Professor Block, but I would expect Mr. Halliday and all other libertarians to do the same. On the other hand, qua general ethicist, I would join Mr. Halliday in denouncing such behavior, while Professor Block would not.”
Recently via personal correspondence; “Block: I’m shocked that I ever wrote it. I don’t think I meant it. I agree, fully, with Murray.”"
I just thought it was obvious.. never really sought out some kind of direction confirmation, but there is some above there. Hope that helps.
Thanks for doing the legwork on that, Conza.