Here's a rather good article by G. A. Plauche on Austrian methodology and Aristotelean apriorism.
It's doubly worth reading because it makes it clearer what praxeology consists in.
Thanks. I'm enjoying it so far (about half-way through).
"Melody is a form of remembrance. It must have a quality of inevitability in our ears." - Gian Carlo Menotti
Inquisitor:Here's a rather good article by G. A. Plauche on Austrian methodology and Aristotelean apriorism.http://www.veritasnoctis.net/docs/aristotelianapriorism.pdf It's doubly worth reading because it makes it clearer what praxeology consists in.
The argument for praxeology seems to be: Empiricism isn't perfectly accurate or flawless, so we should resort philosophizing, which is in practice a great deal more flawed and inaccurate -- unless you only evaluate the methodology in terms of its own logical consistency.
In other words, praxeology is perfectly consistent if you accept its basic axioms. But if empirical evidence contradicts the theory, the theory doesn't need to be reformed.
Just as with any kind of philosophy, it's also difficult to make verifiable progress. If universal laws of human behavior can be determined without observation , then to whose conjecture do we appeal to? If two positivists disagree on an issue, they can resort to further study and eventually, there will be some evidence that can prove one side is in the wrong. But if two praxeologists disagree on an issue, then they interact the same way that any philosophers interact, both essentially accusing the other of irrationality, of dishonesty, and so on. In the absence of being able to appeal to tangible reality, they have no means of reconciling their different views.
Furthermore, I find the idea of a "science of human action" to be very grandiose and hubristic.
"Austrian economics and freedom are not synonymous." -JAlanKatz
Nathyn:If two positivists disagree on an issue, they can resort to further study and eventually, there will be some evidence that can prove one side is in the wrong. But if two praxeologists disagree on an issue, then they interact the same way that any philosophers interact, both essentially accusing the other of irrationality, of dishonesty, and so on. In the absence of being able to appeal to tangible reality, they have no means of reconciling their different views.
Irrelevant. Both positivists and praxeologists claim to have sound conclusions which follow from valid logic and true premises. The premises of an empiricist are of course empirical data. The premises of praxeology are self-evident axioms. Its very easy for two empiricists to argue over the premises (how data was collected), but its also easy for them to argue over the conclusion drawn from those premises (their logic). In most natural sciences, a positivist can "appeal to tangible reality" to test the truthfulness of their premises. This is why the scientific method demands all experiments must be repeatable. Repetition allows people to see the given premises always produce the given results. If any hidden premises are present, they should be able to be revealed through repeated experimentation.
For example, one scientists might say "A + B -> X".Another scientist says, "no you are wrong, A + B ony yields X when C is present, the correct formula is A + B + C -> X, your premise is incomplete". These scientists could form an experiment in which C was and was not present. The winner would be obvious. Unfortunately, such experiments are rarely possible in economics, so the scientists must argue over logic and generally have no means of reconciling their different views
It is very hard to refute the premises of praxeological arguments. Austrian arguments often have far more premises than just the axiom of human action, and those of course can be more easily refuted. But because so much can be shown just on by praxeology alone, there is less to argue over. This is in contrast to the method of empirical observation, which necessarily implies bias when collecting data. Since most all data about reality must be excluded from the collection, the empiricist must have pre-defined notions of causation in order to even decide what data to collect. The natural scientists get around this by being able to repeat experiments with the variables they believe define causation held constant. Economics can't do this.
Nathyn, if you don't know what you're talking about, I recommend reconsidering even opening your mouth. You've demonstrated more than once that you're ignorant of methodological issues, i.e. whether positivism can even sustain itself on its own arguments (and conflating rationalism with 'rhetoric' and 'philosophizing'.) Then you raise Friedman's (idiotic) objection to rationalism. Do you realize how science actually proceeds, and how often evidence is rejected in favour of the theory, in spite of what positivists allege? Maybe I should put up one of my essays here to run you through the basics, or maybe I should just recommend you read Rational Economic Man by Hollis and Nell or Reason and Analysis by Brand Blanshard. Apriorism is fallibilistic. Too bad 'empiricists' cannot comprehend this. I agree with Grant on everything he said.
Did you even read the paper I put up?
Nathyn, perhaps Inquisitor was a bit harsh in in message to you, but I have also noticed that you are good at repeating other peoples' comments on things, but it seems that you do not really understand the depth of the things which you comment on. I love your ambitiousness and passion to be involved, but it is important in my opinion to have a true depth of knowledge on a subject rather than a superficial understanding from having read a few arguments of different people. I found the Austrian system of economic thought 3 years ago (when I was 24) and after reading as much of the work as I can I am just now able to "put all of the pieces together" so to speak, in to a semblance of a whole. I am now venturing more into philosophy, and the epistemological side of Austrian thought. My point though is that to really understand some of the arguments posted here it is going to take years of study and reflection and not just looking up terms on wikipedia and para-phasing and combining the arguments like a college research paper. And by the way, if you want to find out your teachers beliefs on economics (for your macro 101 class). Ask him if he thinks it would be possible to have a currency based on good with a 100% reserve requirement, or if it would be better to have it (the currency value) based on a basket of commodities. And ask if he thinks that the country could function without a central bank. Post the answers to these questions on your other thread and well help you determine his ideology. He may be (like paul mcculley at pimco) "A keynesian, with Austrian Shoes, wearing a Minsky hat", or something to that effect.
Inquisitor, are you at all familiar with Karl Poppers works, I would like to hear your thoughts on him.
rob, I am only vaguely familiar with Popper. I know the general theory surrounding positivism and I have studied some critiques of Popper's view of science, namely by Kuhn (with whom I am in greater, but not complete, agreement) and Feyerabend. I couldn't give you a specific account of Popper's views though.
Incidentally, I came across a paper recently arguing that Austrianism could be cast in a Popperian light. I am dubious of the assertion though as little science is in effect Popperian, if any.
Nathyn:If universal laws of human behavior can be determined without observation , then to whose conjecture do we appeal to? If two positivists disagree on an issue, they can resort to further study and eventually, there will be some evidence that can prove one side is in the wrong. But if two praxeologists disagree on an issue, then they interact the same way that any philosophers interact, both essentially accusing the other of irrationality, of dishonesty, and so on. In the absence of being able to appeal to tangible reality, they have no means of reconciling their different views.
Interestingly, your description of how you expect praxeologists to behave is similar to Hawking's remarks on the ways scientists actually behave. I'm paraphrasing, but he presented a Popperian argument regarding falsification, then said "in actuality, when evidence is presented that contradicts the previously accepted laws, the moral integrity of the scientist making the observations is questioned."
Friedman actually said something along the same lines about Austrians. "If two Austrians disagree on what is self-evident, they have no choice but to turn to gunfighting." The easy objection to this is that it does not respect empirical evidence. Alabama is a gun-friendly state, and Mises frequently hosts speakers who disagree on various points with one another. Why is there no gunfighting?
More seriously, though, this misconstrues the idea of "self-evident." It is not an arbitrarily chosen axiom, but neither does self-evident, as Austrians use it, refer to intuition or something you "just see." Instead, Austrians seem to use self-evident to indicate "praxeologically valid" (as opposed to logically valid) and the argument to show self-evidence is the impossibility of the negation. Thus, self-evidence is established through a logical argument, and those who disagree with a particular claim may look over the derivation and challenge any part of it that they wish. The problem you and Friedman worry about only occurs if we take self-evident to mean something like intuition, which is internal and unchallengable.
Now, about those two positivists who can turn to the data and thus have an objective means of resolving their disagreement. In practice, as Hawking points out, this never happens. If two scientists disagree on the evidence for global warming, the dispute is resolved by one demanding that the other receive no funding. More importantly, data do not interpret themselves. Two people can see the same data and, because of a disagreement on a priori points, reach different interpretations of the data. This difference cannot be resolved by "looking at the data."