I have a question about ownership
Autolykos said the following in a recent thread, and I thought it was correct:
"I treat ownership as a normative concept, not a descriptive one. Otherwise, whoever controls something at a given moment therefore owns it at that moment, and ownership therefore has no distinction from control."
It seems to me that one major fear people have against anarchy is the belief that without a state to protect property rights, they won't be protected. We claim that the state cannot guarantee these rights, and in fact cannot respect them if it is to even exist (it must take from you to do so, thus violating property rights in the form of taxes).
It seems to me that Democracy is typically justified through the rule of the majority (a flimsy and ill-conceived justification), and more specifically how the majority defines ownership. In other words, if the majority feels that something is moral (i.e. the definition of ownership), then that something is inherently moral. I think this is problematic.
However, if the concept of ownership is normative rather than definitional, then that simply means that ownership is "defined" (for lack of a better term) by those with the power to define it. This could be a title agency that Claims the owner of property X is person Y, and this agency is the most respected with regards to "defining who owns X, or at is least more respected than the titling agencies that believe the title to X does not belong to Y.
If so, it seems to me that the more respected titling agency (the one with the most popular idea of who owns X) must be backed by the majority of the market, or at least holds the highest market share, thus resulting again in a sort of majority rule, albeit more justifiably than the dreaded democracy.
Extrapolating these facts as well as Autolykos' comment and in regard to anarchy and libertarian criticisms of democracy (or more specifically majority rule), I have a question:
Is my analysis right?
"If men are not angels, then who shall run the state?"
I like to think of rights (which ownership falls under) in 2 different categories (and one of those has 2 subsections):
Descriptive Rights vs Normative Rights
Under descriptive rights, you have de jure rights and de facto rights. Normative rights are also what I call "just rights". De jure rights are whatever the law says, but this doesn't mean it's necessarily practiced. De facto rights are rights that are actually practiced, even if the law says otherwise. Just rights are whatever one thinks rights in practice ought to be. For example, it is illegal by law to possess heroin, but if the cops don't arrest you for possessing it, then you really have a de facto right to possess heroin. Lastly, you might think that no one ought to possess heroin and that the cops are wrong to not arrest. Or you might think the opposite.
The concept of "owner" refers to the person who has the right to exclude others from the use of what is owned. Let's look at home ownership and eminent domain. Basically, when you own your house, we can describe the different ways that you own it. You might have a legal title to it in the form of a deed. You might also possess the power to exclude others from your house. You might also have acquired it according to libertarian just property theory (either through homesteading or legitimate trade).
Now, what happens when the state claims your home through eminent domain? First, the state claims that your deed is worthless. The state now has the legal title to your house. Next it actually evicts you, demonstrating that it has a de facto ownership of your house. But, according to libertarian theory, you still are the just owner of your house.
Basically, as libertarians, we want descriptive ownership to be in line with normative ownership. In other words, if you justly own your house, we want the law to recognize that, and we want you to have the power (either by yourself or by hiring others) to exercise your right to exclude others from your house.
This is how I view ownership, though I don't think Autolykos agrees with it.
The Texas Trigger:It seems to me that one major fear people have against anarchy is the belief that without a state to protect property rights, they won't be protected. We claim that the state cannot guarantee these rights, and in fact cannot respect them if it is to even exist (it must take from you to do so, thus violating property rights in the form of taxes).
Yes, most people believe in what I call "the illusion of certainty" - namely that the state can guarantee certain outcomes. Every question of the form "how will X be handled/done without the state?" betrays that belief, because that question format is deterministic. The state lulls people into a sort of "thought-sleep" by promising certain outcomes. However, the state's guarantee of property rights is a sham - not only because it's impossible to guarantee a future outcome per se, but also because the state like won't protect property rights that conflict with its own interests.
The Texas Trigger:It seems to me that Democracy is typically justified through the rule of the majority (a flimsy and ill-conceived justification), and more specifically how the majority defines ownership. In other words, if the majority feels that something is moral (i.e. the definition of ownership), then that something is inherently moral. I think this is problematic.
I'd say that one isn't prima facie obligated to agree with anyone else's definition of "moral" (or any other word, for that matter).
The Texas Trigger:However, if the concept of ownership is normative rather than definitional, then that simply means that ownership is "defined" (for lack of a better term) by those with the power to define it. This could be a title agency that Claims the owner of property X is person Y, and this agency is the most respected with regards to "defining who owns X, or at is least more respected than the titling agencies that believe the title to X does not belong to Y. If so, it seems to me that the more respected titling agency (the one with the most popular idea of who owns X) must be backed by the majority of the market, or at least holds the highest market share, thus resulting again in a sort of majority rule, albeit more justifiably than the dreaded democracy.
A definition doesn't exist outside of human minds. However, I think the vast majority of people have much the same conceptual understanding, even if they call the same concept by different names. Otherwise, social cooperation and division of labor would be impossible. But that doesn't mean everyone must cooperate with one another (in certain ways) or that labor must be divided in a specific way. Basically, then, social cooperation and division of labor among a group of people requires mutual agreement among them on fundamental norms. Is that a kind of "democracy"? Again, it depends on the definition being used.
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@ Autolykos
gotlucky: Basically, as libertarians, we want descriptive ownership to be in line with normative ownership. In other words, if you justly own your house, we want the law to recognize that, and we want you to have the power (either by yourself or by hiring others) to exercise your right to exclude others from your house. This is how I view ownership, though I don't think Autolykos agrees with it.
gotlucky:I like to think of rights (which ownership falls under) in 2 different categories (and one of those has 2 subsections): Descriptive Rights vs Normative Rights Under descriptive rights, you have de jure rights and de facto rights. Normative rights are also what I call "just rights". De jure rights are whatever the law says, but this doesn't mean it's necessarily practiced. De facto rights are rights that are actually practiced, even if the law says otherwise. Just rights are whatever one thinks rights in practice ought to be. For example, it is illegal by law to possess heroin, but if the cops don't arrest you for possessing it, then you really have a de facto right to possess heroin. Lastly, you might think that no one ought to possess heroin and that the cops are wrong to not arrest. Or you might think the opposite.
In the absence of the state, what would you say "law" would be?
As I see it, the notion of "right" is the same as the notion of "legitimate". That is, to say "I believe I have a right to do X" means the same thing to me as "I believe it's legitimate for me to do X". Furthermore, I think they both concern coercion (the use or threat of force). That is, if I believe I have the right to do X, then that to me means I'm willing to use or threaten force against those who would (try to) stop me from doing X.
Rights and legitimacy don't exist outside of the mind, so there can be no such thing as de facto rights, only de facto actions - and actually, all actions are de facto by definition. The state may say I have no right to possess heroin, but all that really means is it (i.e. its agents) will coerce me in one or more ways if it catches me possessing heroin. But I'm in no way obligated to agree with what the state thinks is right for me to do. If the state says I have no right to possess heroin, yet I'm not arrested for possessing heroin, that means either the state hasn't caught me possessing heroin or the state agents in question decide not to coerce me in any way for possessing heroin.
So basically, I don't consider the state to occupy any special position when it comes to rights. The only way I see to treat rights descriptively is in the sense of "Does X believe he/Y has the right to do Z or not?" That's not actually a descriptive treatment of rights per se - it's rather a descriptive treatment of one's view of rights. All rights per se are inherently normative.
gotlucky:The concept of "owner" refers to the person who has the right to exclude others from the use of what is owned. Let's look at home ownership and eminent domain. Basically, when you own your house, we can describe the different ways that you own it. You might have a legal title to it in the form of a deed. You might also possess the power to exclude others from your house. You might also have acquired it according to libertarian just property theory (either through homesteading or legitimate trade).
I'd just like to say here that believing one has the right to do something doesn't mean he necessarily will do it or even that he's necessarily able to do it.
gotlucky:Now, what happens when the state claims your home through eminent domain? First, the state claims that your deed is worthless. The state now has the legal title to your house. Next it actually evicts you, demonstrating that it has a de facto ownership of your house. But, according to libertarian theory, you still are the just owner of your house.
As I see it, the state always considered itself to be the true owner of your home. It just allowed you to make use of that property until it decided there was a better use for it. The state evicting you from your home in no way gives it any "de facto rights" over your home. It just means it's been able to take possession of your home. It exercised what it saw as its right, yes, but that in no way means that its actions necessarily carry that value judgement.
gotlucky:Basically, as libertarians, we want descriptive ownership to be in line with normative ownership. In other words, if you justly own your house, we want the law to recognize that, and we want you to have the power (either by yourself or by hiring others) to exercise your right to exclude others from your house. This is how I view ownership, though I don't think Autolykos agrees with it.
Right, I don't. The only way I see for one to be able to talk about descriptive ownership and normative ownership is if one defines "ownership" the same way as "possession". But I think it's more economical to use different single words to distinguish between descriptive and normative propositions.
Another issue I see here is with what seems like GotLucky's implicit definition of "de facto right" as "exercise of a right". For one thing, how can something be the same as the exercise of that something? That seems like an equivocation. For another thing, and once again, an action carries with it no particular judgement of rightness by necessity. So if A does something which he thinks he has the right to do, then he'd consider his action to be an exercise of that purported right; but if B thinks A doesn't have the right to do what he did, then B wouldn't consider A's action to be an exercise of any right on his part.