I recently watched a video where Dr. Block was explaining the theory of homesteading and defending his idea of private roads against various usual objections and desires to use eminent domain. (I tried to find this specific video again, but with no luck so please refer me to it if you know where it is). Here's a summary of the discussion and I'll get to the question after that.
The most obvious case FOR eminent domain is when some people (call them "Roadsters") want a road from A to C and there's a homesteaded private property located in between (owned by "Roadblock"). The shape of the property is an elongated thin strip. Keep in mind that this objection is inherently utilitarian and should be fought on that level. However, since most people ARE believers in at least some utilitarianism, we have to point out that the owner of the property does not own the slice in the third dimension. So the roadsters could build a tunnel or a bridge. Dr. Block then analyzes that and proves that building a bridge/tunnel is very likely possible in all situations.
My first observation is that there is a cost to building a tunnel/bridge or making the road go around roadblock's property, however this cost has no relevance to the argument about who should be allowed to do what, moreover Dr. Block should agree to this point given his rejection of Coaseian-like and utilitarian distributions of property rights. (I can provide reasons if interested). This is mostly standard stuff up to here.
Here is the part that interested me. Dr. Block then put forward the scenario where Roadblock homesteads a donut shaped patch of land surrounding the land owned by "Donuthole". Here is where Dr. Block claimed that it would not be libertarian for Roadblock to homestead property in this way. The reason being that Roadblock is effectively controlling land that is owned by Donuthole (I'm paraphrasing here). Apparently there is some article somewhere about this, please point me to it if you know.
HERE ARE MY OBJECTIONS
What are your thoughts? I'd be very interested to hear anything related to this since these are fundamental issues.
Now as an addition to the scenario (this is added by me and not in the video). Suppose Roadblock builds a sphere around Donuthole's land. 1 and 2 would not hold anymore since Donuthole needs to break the sphere to get out. However 3 still holds (possibly Roadblock has to give air and water to Donuthole so he isn't a murderer). So even in this extreme example we still shouldn't limit the shape of property. Note that you could be guilty of murder under some situations, but this still doesn't mean we should have a regulation on property shapes, only punish after the fact and allow self defense to the possible victim.
"Apparently there is some article somewhere about this, please point me to it if you know."
http://mises.org/daily/3794/Freedom-and-Property-Where-They-Conflict
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Hey thanks!
Adam Knott: http://mises.org/daily/3794/Freedom-and-Property-Where-They-Conflict
That's a great article.
I think the article by Dr. Block (I was looking for initially) is the one referred to here: https://mises.org/daily/3794/Freedom-and-Property-Where-They-Conflict#ref7
I'm not sure I am ready to accept that freedom is more important than property rights. "Restricted freedom" in this case seems to imply that you were denied some kind of positive right, like "the right to travelling outside the encircled". Where are you getting this right from.
I'm thinking now that if I accept the right of passage idea, I'd have to accept some form of socialism, because being able to travel is no different than having access to information or the ability to build your own car or having "access" to healthcare.
Am I wrong or is this a fundamental disagreement on method?
Hi Derpstatis,
Walter Block is a Rothbardian and approaches these problems differently than a subjectivist moralist (such as Mises, Hazlitt, etc) would.
See: Dealing with lifeboat scenarios. This Week in Liberty, Episode 2. Guest: Rob (Autolykos)
As a Rothbardian, I am not pleased with Block's donut theory (as I read it in another paper).
Malachi, I agree that if he has homesteaded the easement that would be the end of the discussion. Or perhaps homesteaded access rather than easement? This argument is one I am willing to pursue and it looks very favorable.
However there is no a priori reason to presume he has. In fact in the special case where Donuthole has never left his property or had any communications with others he has clearly not homesteaded any easement or access. Such would be the case if some aliens have already homesteaded the universe minus our solar system. In my view we would not have the right to demand passage through the universe and we have not homesteaded any such easement.
Here I think there are also the questions of what can be homesteaded and how, but even if you are correct about the homesteading of easement, since we have not shown (or IF it is not shown in case I am mistaken) that to be necessarily the case, I would contend that it is an issue for arbitration rather than an outright ban on the shape of property. I presume you would agree with this? If so would you agree there is nothing to be said about such limitations on property and that we can let the arbitrators figure out who homesteaded what to solve this dilemma?
I'm generally not a fan of the Rothbard/Block-style approach to legal theory. The deductive approach is of no use in determining the normative content of the law. This is a crucial point, too, since it leads directly to the realization that without a thriving market in law, we are doomed in terms of establishing what the law should be. Legal criticism is just so much hot air contra other hot air. Every point of view is equally mere opinion.
Clayton -
Hi Clayton,
I somewhat agree. But isn't your approach a bit like saying that we could not discuss how anarchy would work until we have it? I would prefer that these things are hashed out so that we know what to expect and what to agitate for and what to try to persuade people to take up as principles.
Sorry, but Block is simply masturbating.
Donut theory or not, the choice before every encircler (and every other human) is between beeing (1) a peaceful, cooperative agent aiming to enjoy the benefits of division of labor and trade with others, or (2) a dick. Without a state to attract/collect the dicks and provide them powers, the non-dicks will outcompete dicks hands down, and their patronage of arbitrators delivering non-dicky judgments would set non-dicky precedents for other arbitrators to follow. In your particular example, if arbitrators have not yet established the non-dicky precedents, the non-dicks prevalent in society would likely have enough resources to encircle the encircling dick with yet a larger donut and give him a taste of his own medicine -- in addition to refusing to exchange goods and services with him and banning him from their properties.
Can you lock me into your Port-A-Potty while I'm inside and demand $1m to let me out before you throw your property over a cliff?
I say, do whatever you want and enjoy/suffer the consequences.
isn't your approach a bit like saying that we could not discuss how anarchy would work until we have it?
But Rothbard/Block aren't just speculating about how the law might work under competition. They pretend to be laying down certain rules about how law must work; private law in any case. I have myself speculated at length about how the law might work under competition. But I make no pretense to be establishing rules about how the law must work.
I also think we can do slightly better than speculation by looking at cases in the modern world where true law manages to eke an existence and also by looking in history and comparing law across cultures. But this form of study is decidedly empirical and the conclusions drawn are, therefore, inherently uncertain as regards their applicability to the character of law in an unhampered market in law services.
Clayton: But Rothbard/Block aren't just speculating about how the law might work under competition. They pretend to be laying down certain rules about how law must work; private law in any case. I have myself speculated at length about how the law might work under competition. But I make no pretense to be establishing rules about how the law must work. I also think we can do slightly better than speculation by looking at cases in the modern world where true law manages to eke an existence and also by looking in history and comparing law across cultures.
I also think we can do slightly better than speculation by looking at cases in the modern world where true law manages to eke an existence and also by looking in history and comparing law across cultures.
Thanks Clayton, I believe I understand you position a little better.
I agree with your characterization of Rothbard/Block. But isn't it true that they are deriving these rules based on reason/logic and the principle of homesteading (at least in this case). Are you somehow looking for a non-normative view of law (in which case I presume you would not necessarily accept homesteading or any theory of property rights other than that which arises naturally)?
I would object to using the empirical approach because it suffers from the bias of positivism. In using the empirical approach you must also resort to logic to interpret your observations. So I say for the sake of discussion that we speculate that homesteading will arise as a principle in SOME free societies and see where logic will necessarily take us.
I'd be happy to continue the discussion on method in another post if you are willing.
But isn't it true that they are deriving these rules based on reason/logic and the principle of homesteading (at least in this case). Are you somehow looking for a non-normative view of law (in which case I presume you would not necessarily accept homesteading or any theory of property rights other than that which arises naturally)?
My views are explained at length here.
Whoever said we can't use logic? The use of empirical evidence does not positivism make. Do you believe that you must be a positivist in order to say, "the particulars of human anatomy are empirical facts"?
I hope we won't stray from the topic too much.
Clayton: But isn't it true that they are deriving these rules based on reason/logic and the principle of homesteading (at least in this case). Are you somehow looking for a non-normative view of law (in which case I presume you would not necessarily accept homesteading or any theory of property rights other than that which arises naturally)? My views are explained at length here.
I will take a look, thanks.
Clayton: Whoever said we can't use logic?
Whoever said we can't use logic?
I wasn't implying that you said that. I just thought that we would agree that logic must be used, and so I hoped that would lend support to my defense of Block's method, if it hasn't that's fine.
Clayton: The use of empirical evidence does not positivism make. Do you believe that you must be a positivist in order to say, "the particulars of human anatomy are empirical facts"?
The use of empirical evidence does not positivism make. Do you believe that you must be a positivist in order to say, "the particulars of human anatomy are empirical facts"?
I think you might have misinterpreted what I meant by "bias of positivism". I meant that whenever you look to how things are to speculate on the best way they could be (or how they should be if you accept normative legal arguments) you are going to be biased because you assume some sort of rationality of the system. I used the term bias of positivism because this is a regular problem with legal positivists saying "well there is a law so there must be a reason for that". I will read your views a little later, but I don't see how you can escape that problem without some normative views, since if we find the law operating in a certain way at a given time you will not (as far as I can tell) have a basis to object to that because it must have been the result of interpreting the evidence (+ logic) or the result of a process which you favor. The proverbial example of slavery is probably worth mentioning in this regard. Please correct me if I'm wrong here.
@Derp: Well, I think the operative word in your last paragraph is "we" - there is no "we" in any particular dispute, there is only the individuals who are party to the dispute and their several views of right & wrong as well as their own beliefs about their power to bring about their desired outcome.
Imagine we live 500 years ago. I begin plowing on part of your field and harvesting it. You bring up a dispute and then take me to law. However, before we enter the court, I whisper in your ear that I know about the affair you're having with Daisy in the town on the other side of the mountain when you go to market. When we get into the courtroom, you drop your claim and we settle that the new property line is, in fact, moved.
Is this just? I think we all agree that the means by which I've brought about my desired outcome had nothing to do with justice or morality or "common sense" or any of that. It had to do with the fact that I had some kind of power over you (in this case, being privy to a ruinous secret) and exploited that power to my advantage.
Yet, the fact is that our case would be exceptional. Most of the time, a dispute would simply turn on the moral argument - who is right and who is wrong (morally)? Of course, morality is its own can of worms. So when I say "morality", I don't mean it in the "Thou shalt not" sense but, rather, in the sense of obvious, polite decency... the same sense in which you know better than to urinate in a public park in broad daylight. So both power and morality are both always in operation in any dispute.
"We" don't need to reach any sort of consensus about how every dispute of a certain kind must be resolved. When law is rightly understood, you realize that the judge is no such thing. He is not really a judge; he merely makes a pretense of decreeing and ordering. To whatever extent he does decree, he does so in the capacity of an agent of the ruling power, not in the capacity of moral conviction, all pretenses aside.
Rather, the role that is played by judges today would be performed solely by mediators and arbitrators in an unhampered market in law. There is zero market demand for judges. Helping people resolve their disputes is a job that can be performed by an expert in law, that is, someone who has studied moral philosophy and the philosophy and history of law and who has a deep understanding of the particular nature of the disputes he hears (in other words, a specialist). When he speaks, he speaks in the role of a counselor, an advisor. He is merely someone who is helping both sides to a dispute find a durable solution to their dispute so that they can avoid becoming entangled in a feud and his advice carries weight by virtue of his extensive knowledge of prior disputes and dispute-resolutions (settlements) and how those have worked out over time.
The modern, government judge is a hollowed-out, cartoonish shell by comparison. The job of the government judge is to obfuscate the farcical nature of what is actually happening in the courtroom.
Clayton,
What I mean by "we" was actually "you". I was refering to you as the observer/speculator that will have to apply the evidence based method you described previously.
In your example it is clear that the blackmailer traded his silence for some property. I don't see any problem with that or why that should reflect on morality as you describe it.
I completely agree with the rest of what you said, in the end it isn't about justice or morality. However I don't see how it answers the question of method. Why is it preferable to base legal speculation on your version of empirical study rather than the Block/Rothbard method as you describe it? What if people by using the market end up prefering the Block/Rothbard method?
Regarding your urinating example, this is interesting because there are places in the world where that is normal as long as you are not showboating. So for my personal clarity how would you speculate that the case urinator (A) vs. passer by (B) get settled? Suppose that you had to supply your opinion on the dispute. What method would you use to form an opinion on who is in the right (A or B or none)? Again I don't need to know the decision, just the method.
Thanks.
I distinguish between law proper and philosophy of law - I would say you are talking about the latter, in this case. The difference is that the opinions of "commentators/speculators" is immaterial to actual law, whereas the philosophy of law is nothing but (and of no actual consequence to real disputes).
That's my point - it doesn't. And we have no idea what, exactly, is "in trade" in any particular dispute. Only the disputants know that.
For the same reason you can't use the Block/Rothbard method in "deducing" human anatomy from axiomatic principles. Sure, you can say "logic and the geometry of local space dictate that two organs cannot occupy the same place within the chest cavity", but a) that isn't telling us anything non-trivial and b) you still can't deduce the particular facts of human anatomy from the axiomatic principles. In other words, you can deduce that a liver and a heart cannot occupy the same space in the chest cavity but you cannot deduce that human beings have a heart and have a liver. In order to discover that, you have to actually get out a scalpel and start carving up cadavers (or read a book by someone who has).
In the same way, you can deduce that Jones and Smith cannot both own the same object at the same time (since ownership is, by definition, the exclusive right to use of something). However, you cannot deduce the particular facts of law - even property law! - from these elementary logical/Euclidean concepts. In order to discover these particulars, you must actually study how people settle their disputes as a matter of common practice.
That was just a side-point... the illustration is immaterial. I'm just trying to point out the difference between deontological morality ("Thou shalt not") and the more pragmatic or "obvious common sense" idea of morality that actually governs people's day-to-day behavior.
I understand what you are saying. I understand that your or my opinion is immaterial. I understand that you cannot deduce law without first studying how things are.
But I think it is important to settle one question. The question is how you personally would go about forming an opinion on a dispute with the knowledge you have now. I assume you would see what the common sense morality is (as you personally perceive it) and try to see what its logical implications are for the particular circumstances.
Secondly and most importantly what is your basis for opposing the current legal order? Why not have a coercive state with judges? I don't see how you personally can ever pass a value judgment on any existing system unless you presume to know what common sense morality is. Or perhaps you know enough of it to oppose a state, but not enough to figure out the particulars of an anarchistic society?
DerpStatis:The most obvious case FOR eminent domain is when some people (call them "Roadsters") want a road from A to C and there's a homesteaded private property located in between (owned by "Roadblock"). The shape of the property is an elongated thin strip. Keep in mind that this objection is inherently utilitarian and should be fought on that level.
How is it inherently utilitarian? Even if it were, why does that mean it must be fought on that level and no other?
As I see it, "eminent domain" is really the state's way of saying that it owns the land, not the person who the state fraudulently says owns it.
DerpStatis:Here is the part that interested me. Dr. Block then put forward the scenario where Roadblock homesteads a donut shaped patch of land surrounding the land owned by "Donuthole". Here is where Dr. Block claimed that it would not be libertarian for Roadblock to homestead property in this way. The reason being that Roadblock is effectively controlling land that is owned by Donuthole (I'm paraphrasing here). Apparently there is some article somewhere about this, please point me to it if you know. HERE ARE MY OBJECTIONS Donuthole can still get out given enough resources. (Think something like west Berlin). This shows that Roadblock won't NECESSARILY control Donuthole's land. Since such homesteading hasn't been shown to ALWAYS lead to a problem it should not be forbidden/unlibertarian. Donuthole can still get out given enough resources. Just like in the case with the tunnel/bridge we should not use the cost of something to argue for a limitation on homesteading. If Roadblock were to homestead only one of the semi-circles and his brother homesteaded the other wouldn't it be perfectly legitimate for them to voluntarily join their land into one whole piece under a corporation? This ends up in the same scenario and we see that the argument isn't for limiting homesteading to permissible geometric forms. Rather, the argument given by Dr. Block is in fact an argument for limiting the shape of any land property and this means all potentially affected third parties having to approve the merger. (remember that the third parties do not suffer an externality/physical trespass, but merely a financial cost from the merger). I'd argue again that there is no victim here. Something seems wrong with having to approve mergers and aquisitions, but I haven't hashed out the logical argument against that yet. What are your thoughts? I'd be very interested to hear anything related to this since these are fundamental issues.
I don't consider ownership to be the same thing as control. Ownership is normative, while control is descriptive. Furthermore, I think ownership entails three kinds of right: the right to use (jus utendi), the right to the fruit(s) of use (jus fruendi), and the right to abandon (jus abutendi).
With that said, I think Donuthole has in fact already homesteaded one or more footpaths (at least) from the land he resides on and one or more other people's land. Indeed, because he homesteaded them (and thus took complete ownership of them), Donuthole isn't limited to using those strips of land solely as footpaths. If Roadblock prevents Donuthole from making any use of those footpaths, he's effectively stealing from him. Indeed, I'd say that Roadblock can't take ownership of those strips of land without agreement from Donuthole. An easement allowing Donuthole to travel through Roadblock's surrounding land would actually entail a diminution of Donuthole's existing rights IMO.
DerpStatis:Now as an addition to the scenario (this is added by me and not in the video). Suppose Roadblock builds a sphere around Donuthole's land. 1 and 2 would not hold anymore since Donuthole needs to break the sphere to get out. However 3 still holds (possibly Roadblock has to give air and water to Donuthole so he isn't a murderer). So even in this extreme example we still shouldn't limit the shape of property. Note that you could be guilty of murder under some situations, but this still doesn't mean we should have a regulation on property shapes, only punish after the fact and allow self defense to the possible victim.
Given what I wrote above, I think Roadblock building such a sphere would in fact violate Donuthole's existing property rights.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
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But I think it is important to settle one question. The question is how you personally would go about forming an opinion on a dispute with the knowledge you have now.
Well, there are two components to the answer. The first is philosophical (what we're doing now: philosophy of law) and the other is entrepreneurial (actually putting out a shingle as a dispute arbitrator). I think you're asking me to give an answer to the latter with only the tools of the former, an impossibility. In other words, until there is a thriving market in dispute-resolution, there really is nothing but my speculation versus your speculation on how such a market would operate.
That being said, there have been nearly-free markets in dispute-resolution and I would direct your attention to David Friedman's many online articles and lectures as he's the only person I'm aware of that has done real leg-work in studying historical legal systems under conditions of greater freedom in the market of dispute-resolution. This imposes a discipline on the speculation that cannot be had any other way.
I assume you would see what the common sense morality is (as you personally perceive it) and try to see what its logical implications are for the particular circumstances.
At a high level, yes, I think that the arbitrator would be functioning as a kind of "referee" of the dispute... if someone makes an argument that is blatantly circular, he might point out that logical fallacies are not a solid basis for long-lasting legal settlements as people tend to realize later on that the terms they've agreed to were all based on mumbo-jumbo reasoning. Or, if someone applies a double-standard, he might point out that it is absurd to expect someone to settle a dispute on significantly different terms than you would be willing to settle the very same dispute if things were the other way around. Or, if someone goes into listing what a great person they are and what a terrible person the other party is, the arbitrator might point out that everyone praises themselves and abuses their enemies so such lists are really a waste of everyone's time and why not let's get down to actually settling the dispute?
I don't see how you personally can ever pass a value judgment on any existing system unless you presume to know what common sense morality is. Or perhaps you know enough of it to oppose a state, but not enough to figure out the particulars of an anarchistic society?
Common sense morality is not a formal basis of the legal order, in my view. To reiterate, I was merely making the much weaker claim that deontological morality is not the basis of the legal order in an unhampered market (contrary to the present system that is based on deontological morality, where the commands of the State (statutes) are the highest moral commands of all).
Instead of passing a value judgment on the current system, I prefer to characterize it in terms of the health of the social order. A doctor who says "You need to go on a diet and lose weight" is not saying "Thou shalt not overindulge" or "Gluttony is an abomination to God"... he is saying that your body is unhealthy (as evidenced by its dysfunction) and that if such-and-such steps are taken, its health can be improved. The doctor can say this because he has studied the objective functions of the body, so he has criteria by which to assess dysfunction. We can do the same at the social level - though sociology is a more challenging science than medicine, that is, it is much more challenging to get scientific results of the same significance.
I think a lot of people perceive that the modern social order is dysfunctional. Unlike ordinary disease - where an individual generally knows when he is sick or the doctor can apply an objective test to determine that the individual is sick - it is very challenging to put into words precisely what is meant by asserting that the modern social order is dysfunctional. But that doesn't mean that it's impossible and that there is no objective function of the social order by which its dysfunction can be measured.
Autolykos: How is it inherently utilitarian? Even if it were, why does that mean it must be fought on that level and no other?
I didn't mean to exclude other levels of refutation, I merely pointed out that I thought it would be sufficient to destroy it on grounds that it is utilitarian. I take this part about it being utilitarian back, given that, like you said Donuthole might have has some kind of ownership or right predating the encircling.
Autolykos: With that said, I think Donuthole has in fact already homesteaded one or more footpaths (at least) from the land he resides on and one or more other people's land. Indeed, because he homesteaded them (and thus took complete ownership of them), Donuthole isn't limited to using those strips of land solely as footpaths. If Roadblock prevents Donuthole from making any use of those footpaths, he's effectively stealing from him. Indeed, I'd say that Roadblock can't take ownership of those strips of land without agreement from Donuthole. An easement allowing Donuthole to travel through Roadblock's surrounding land would actually entail a diminution of Donuthole's existing rights IMO. ... Given what I wrote above, I think Roadblock building such a sphere would in fact violate Donuthole's existing property rights.
...
I agree that Donuthole might have homesteaded something, but see my reply to Malachi above. Basically, I tend to agree with you about how this should be resolved and I point out that there is no justification to limit property rights in the way Dr. Block proposes. (Assuming we use Dr. Block's own proposed method, rather than, say, some kind of utilitarianism). My only reservations are whether and/or how one can homestead access or easement.
Thanks for elaborating in such length on your view. I think I have a very good idea about what you are defending. Perhaps I might come closer to that view in the future once I have a chance of understanding it better.
However I think you are dodging my question because it might open a can of worms. In fact I was hoping it would. I really wanted you to provide your personal beliefs, rather than speculative about anything else (such as what the market might do). I'm sure you have them. For example, say "I would point out..." instead of "the arbitrator might point out... ". And I really wanted to know if homesteading might be something you would suggest the two parties consider in order to resolve a dispute.
I was also hoping not to discuss these high level issues in this post, since we are talking about method and I'd like to remain in the framework proposed by Dr. Block in order to assess his own theory. If you reject the value of such a discussion, accept this if you will as an intellectual excercise, you can consider it my selfish preference for abstract discussion.
As for your other argument it is hard for me to understand what your "formal" basis is. It seems to be a moving goal post or undefined or intentionally non-existent, but I will read up more and try to understand that.
"health of the social order" is too vague and ill-defined for my liking because you are implicitly relying on a fallacy that assumes the human body is analogous to some abstract thing like "social order". Anyone that would claim "the social order is not healthy" has to be making some kind of normative judgment, for there is no objective measure or definition of "healthy". And I still don't see why you must oppose the current order rather than, say, try to improve it by small tweaks (why be a radical at all?). Even if we assume your analogy and social order is unhealthy, then I'd say so are all people. Your body is constantly fixing itself, but is never free of disorders, viruses and bacteria. That says nothing about desiring a different biological system or removing central planning from the body or not interfering with the natural biological processes.
You have not convinced me. If you will allow, I will stop here with this strain of thought and perhaps I will challenge you later when I have a better grasp of your view.
DerpStatis:I didn't mean to exclude other levels of refutation, I merely pointed out that I thought it would be sufficient to destroy it on grounds that it is utilitarian. I take this part about it being utilitarian back, given that, like you said Donuthole might have has some kind of ownership or right predating the encircling.
Okay, fair enough.
DerpStatis:I agree that Donuthole might have homesteaded something, but see my reply to Malachi above. Basically, I tend to agree with you about how this should be resolved and I point out that there is no justification to limit property rights in the way Dr. Block proposes. (Assuming we use Dr. Block's own proposed method, rather than, say, some kind of utilitarianism). My only reservations are whether and/or how one can homestead access or easement.
I've looked over your reply to Malachi and will reply to it after this.
As far as whether and/or how one can homestead access or easement, I don't think those things are homesteaded specifically. That is, I think homesteading is much more general. In traversing over unowned land, Donuthole didn't simply homestead access or easement, he homesteaded the land itself (that he traversed).
DerpStatis:Malachi, I agree that if he has homesteaded the easement that would be the end of the discussion. Or perhaps homesteaded access rather than easement? This argument is one I am willing to pursue and it looks very favorable. However there is no a priori reason to presume he has. In fact in the special case where Donuthole has never left his property or had any communications with others he has clearly not homesteaded any easement or access. Such would be the case if some aliens have already homesteaded the universe minus our solar system. In my view we would not have the right to demand passage through the universe and we have not homesteaded any such easement.
Maybe Donuthole was born on the property and inherited it after his parents died. If so, he still inherited the thin strips of land his parents homesteaded in making their way there. I don't know of any other way that he could have never left the (main) property or had any communications with others.
As for aliens homesteading the universe minus our solar system, I think that's essentially impossible. But in theory, I would agree there that no human would have a prima facie right to pass out of the solar system. A human would only have that right if the aliens granted it to him.
DerpStatis:Here I think there are also the questions of what can be homesteaded and how, but even if you are correct about the homesteading of easement, since we have not shown (or IF it is not shown in case I am mistaken) that to be necessarily the case, I would contend that it is an issue for arbitration rather than an outright ban on the shape of property. I presume you would agree with this? If so would you agree there is nothing to be said about such limitations on property and that we can let the arbitrators figure out who homesteaded what to solve this dilemma?
For one thing, I think an outright ban on the shape of property is unnecessary. For another thing, I think arbitration would only be necessary in the event of a property dispute. I don't see any reason to distinguish between homesteading access/easement and homesteading in general. In my opinion, whoever homesteads something owns it, plain and simple.
Autolykos,
I am in full agreement with you. The only possible exception is that I am not convinced if a single passage is sufficient for homestead. But that's up to the people to decide in individual cases, so I'm not worried about that.
Well, yeah, in property law I think one of the first questions that would be asked is "who had it first?" But the reason it matters is that "people generally take it to matter", not some logical/Euclidean proof that conflict is ineradicable without taking the rule of first-use as an axiom in one's property theory. As for my personal views about "the way it oughtta be", I'd simply direct you to click on my profile then click on the number of posts (this will lead to a listing of all my posts) and browse at will... I write a lot and you should be able to pick up the general gist pretty quickly. You can also check out my blog - which I haven't updated in about a year.
"health of the social order" is too vague and ill-defined for my liking because you are implicitly relying on a fallacy that assumes the human body is analogous to some abstract thing like "social order".
No, I'm not making an analogy between the human body and the social order. I'm stating that the social order has functions, which can be objectively ascertained. For example, the function of a parent with respect to a child (a mother, at least) is to feed and care for the child at least to the point where it has some respectable odds of surviving. This is not a consequence of valuation of the parent. It is not subjective. It is not relative. It is not maybe the case, it is definitely the case that this is the function of the parent. This is why females have mammaries, a body part which in no way contributes to their own survival or other selfish interests beyond seeing the survival of their children. Whenever a parent does not support his or her child in the way nature intended, we can say - as a value-free assessment - that this is a dysfunctional situation.
Anyone that would claim "the social order is not healthy" has to be making some kind of normative judgment, for there is no objective measure or definition of "healthy".
Our very anatomy reflects a number of facts about our social functions. For example, sexual diploidy (anatomical differences between men and women) tell us that men and women have different functions in human social order. Now, granted, this is the ancestral social order (out on the African savanna) we're speaking of... but the point still stands that the function is objective, not subjective. Alterations in our environment have made some behaviors that were dysfunctional in the ancestral environment functional in the modern environment, and vice-versa. But that does not alter the fundamental fact that there is such a thing as objective social function by which dysfunction can be measured.
And I still don't see why you must oppose the current order rather than, say, try to improve it by small tweaks (why be a radical at all?).
How do you get a "99% monopoly" on law, down from a 100% monopoly? And, by the way, I have made concrete, non-radical suggestions in this regard at the end of my article, A Praxeological Account of Law. These are suggested, preliminary steps to ending the law monopoly... something that is inherently radical and which I cannot conceive of any non-radical way of accomplishing. There either is or is not a law monopoly. It's a binary switch that, once thrown, will fundamentally alter the character of the entire social order. There are unnecessarily radical ways of going about this (such as re-writing the law from scratch) and I've provided suggestions on how to choose the least radical way to go about it.
Even if we assume your analogy and social order is unhealthy, then I'd say so are all people. Your body is constantly fixing itself, but is never free of disorders, viruses and bacteria.
But that's just a part of homeostasis. Health is not a germicidal sanitization of the body - which, by the way, would kill you. Did you know that the majority of your body weight are cells that are not you, that is, not your DNA? No doubt, the social order will always be characterized by conflict and disagreement and the unresolved clashes of big ideas.
It's not the fact that people argue that's the problem. It's the fact that many of the most basic and fundamental functions of the social order are dysfunctional. Some of this is my speculation, some of it is just simple fact and we can delve into the bowels of evolutionary psychology to start to pick apart specific dysfunctions within the social order that can be identified on that basis. But I have no patience for restricting social criticism to "the provable", so to speak. The Status Quo is not "innocent until proven guilty". No, there is a great deal of problems in the Status Quo that can be perceived even without scientific proof. And this is where we need real wise men - shamans, as it were - who can provide guidance in understanding where things are going wrong and steps we might take to address the issues. The science of social order will always be lagging far behind the curve because of the conservative nature of the scientific method. Science must restrict itself only to what we can "know for sure", where those with wisdom can provide valuable, relevant feedback on a wide range of issues at the cutting edge of the evolution of social behavior.