Free-Rider Military question

Is it possible to counter the free rider argument in regards to military protection without bringing up private defense contractors?

How do private defense contractors solve the problem?

If they choose not to purchase protection then they won't have said protection.

Yes.

The military bureaucrats, generals, recruiters, pro-war politicians, etc. are the ones who are free riders - they have never fought back or repelled an invading army that was in our country. Even our soldiers don't do this.

Now if the marines were targetting DEA/FBI/CIA/DHS/IRS operations, then I might say they were actually risking themselves to protect our freedoms. Until then, nope. They're just part of the problem.

Let me provide a little more context of what I am asking. Somebody says we are all obligated to pay taxes because of the miltary. Anyone who does not pay taxes is a free rider. They get the protection of the military without paying for it. Is there any way to counter this without saying "well if we had a private military we could solve this problem." From what I've been able to dig up so far, all I can say is "who cares, free riders don't harm anyone and they didn't ask for the protection."

@Prime: I think that, in the limit, the answer to your question is, simply, no. I think your best bet is to read this fairly short book. Once finished, you should be well-equipped to tackle any counter-arguments as well as raise a positive argument for the case of private security. I know it's a bit daunting to be told "read the book!" however, on this topic, there isn't really any short-cut as the rat's nest of myths, lies, distortions, fabrications, fallacies and downright gobbledy-gook is insuperable. The need for a standing army is the single most propagandized point in the entirety of public discourse.

Clayton -

Prime,

I think that you underestimate both the nature and seriousness of the free rider problem in this instance. The whole problem with public defense is that it's a public good, at least from the point of view from military defense (law is a bit of a different issue). If force X is invading a city then the military can't say "Okay, we defend everything in the city except free rider house. The enemy can invade and bomb the s*** out of that house, but no one else's". You can't realistically stop the free rider from getting defense unless you don't provide it at all if he doesn't pay, which is an insane and untenable idea upon any sort of scale.

This might all be fine in the way that you describe except for a very major problem: Everyone has an incentive to be a free rider. If your marginal contribution to defense means nothing, or very little, then you don't have an incentive to provide for defense. Now you can argue the case of whether or not your marginal contribution does matter, and this depends in part upon context, but the whole problem is that with the free rider problem in effect, a situation could well develop where there is no defense, contractor or otherwise, at all.

You make a good point. Essentially, there is no way to prevent a free rider without forcible taxation. The only other way to argue this is to say who cares.

Positive externalities have their own set of benefits. And lets just say that the kind of people we want involved in private security are the kind of people who dont think its a bad thing that, when 40% of businesses in a given area hire their services, crime decreases to such an extent that the other 60% dont need to hire them.

I don't think the concern here is for the security firm that isn't getting paid by the 60%. The concern is for the 40% who are paying more than they otherwise would have for protection if the other 60% would have chipped in.

That is a fallacy I like to call "inappropriate basis for comparison." they're also paying a lot more than they would pay if the justice league lived in that town. They are paying a lot less than they would pay in the midst of a klingon invasion. In the event of widespread turmoil, their firms and property will be protected while the other 60% are not. That is what they are paying for.

Malachi:

In the event of widespread turmoil, their firms and property will be protected while the other 60% are not. That is what they are paying for.

I will refer you to what Neodoxy just said in case you didn't read it:

"If force X is invading a city then the military can't say "Okay, we defend everything in the city except free rider house. The enemy can invade and bomb the s*** out of that house, but no one else's". You can't realistically stop the free rider from getting defense unless you don't provide it at all if he doesn't pay, which is an insane and untenable idea upon any sort of scale."

With that in mind, which looks like a solid response as far as I can tell, I will refer back to my previous question; Are the only two responses to this free rider dilemma either (1) forced taxation, or (2) who cares?

 

If force X is invading a city then the military can't say "Okay, we defend everything in the city except free rider house. The enemy can invade and bomb the s*** out of that house, but no one else's".

well I'm not sure what is being said. This military certainly cant give anyone permission to bomb someone's house. But its simply not realistic to expect them to defend a house that they are not being paid to defend when they are busy protecting their customers. In any event, theres nothing preventing them from saying the above, it just doesnt seem prudent or even realistic IMO.

You can't realistically stop the free rider from getting defense unless you don't provide it at all if he doesn't pay, which is an insane and untenable idea upon any sort of scale."

First, lets dismiss this idea of "stopping the free rider from getting defense" because of my above assertion that people that we want in defense industry are people who dont care about, or favor, benign free riders. No one, in my scenario, is trying to stop them from getting defense. If the defenders are driving around with nothing to do, and they see a non-customer being aggressed upon, certainly this is an opportunity to ply their trade and get a new customer. If, however, there is a state of war, and the customers are using the protection services, the defenders cannot be expected to provide protection services to non-customers. I dont understand why this would be insane and untenable, if in fact customers have hired those firms for their own protection, I cant imagine a good entrepreneur expending his resources on noncustomers when his customers have purchased and desire to use those services.

so I must confess I dont see the dilemma.

Malachi:

I dont understand why this would be insane and untenable

Lets go over a scenario then. Suppose house A (pays for protection) and house B (free-rider) are situated 20 feet apart and the agressor, a foreign military, is flying a B2 bomber overhead and carpet bombing everything in a 500 yard radius. How is a defense firm going to single out and protect house A and not house B? Indeed it cannot, which is why it is untenable. The notion of not protecting house B can be done on a small arms scale, single criminals, etc...but it cannot be done on a larger scale, such as a foreign military.

 

I dont understand why a firm would want to do that, nor do I understand why this is a problem that must be solved. Air defense would cost the same thing even if house B wasnt there, except the kids in house A wouldnt have anybody to play with. So my answer to this part of the question is "who cares?"

The notion of not protecting house B can be done on a small arms scale, single criminals, etc...but it cannot be done on a larger scale, such as a foreign military

Its trivially true that if centurion defense contractor has pledged to protect monticello against all threats, and halstead manor is within 500 feetof monticello, then an attack on halstead manor with a weapon where the damage radius combined with circular error of probability is greater than 500 feet would fall under the defense mandate of centurion defense contractor. I guess I am dense because I dont see a problem here. Halstead manor still has to deal with threats smaller than 500 feet (foreign troops, machines guns, tomahawk missiles) and concomitantly higher insurance rates. Likely as not they couldnt afford to live in the neighborhood without the "free rider effect" so everyone who transacts with them is likewise benefitting from the "free rider effect."

Malachi:

...nor do I understand why this is a problem that must be solved.

It is a problem because it is used as justification for taxes. "We must make the free-rider pay for these services."

Malachi:

Air defense would cost the same thing even if house B wasnt there

It is true, the cost of an air defense unit would be the same no matter how many customers the defense contractor has. However, from the point of view of the paying customer, Monticello, it costs more in monthly premiums to cover that fixed cost if Halstead is not paying for the service. Think of it like medical insurance; as a custmer, you want as many other healthy individuals in your coverage pool as possible so you pay lower premiums. What pisses people off is when Halstead gets the benefit of the defense protection without paying for it, meanwhile Monticello gets stuck with higher premiums. Monticello then has an incentive to forcibly tax Halstead.

This is very difficult to debate with someone who is an advocate for taxation in order to remedy this problem. I've found my only option is to say "who cares" and move on.

 

I really dont think its a problem, if my firm expends some active protection munitions to save halstead, and they dont feel like writing me a contract, then fine. The fact that my defenses are geared to protect monticello should become obvious with repeated volleys of mnitions, at which point the hostile party may decide to attack halstead and ignore monticello, because of those defenses.

Whats interesting is that given the collateral effect of active protection systems, its more likely than not that defense firms wouldnt protect noncustomers from certain precision attacks. A side-attack anti-missile munition puts out a donut of death that cuts through the missile and everything else in that plane for 25-100 m or more. Theres an awful lot of liability associated with detonating one of those in someone's backyard without authorization.

Malachi, you seem to be framing your response only from the point of view of the defense firm. The crux of the issue, the problem so to speak, comes from the point of view of the actively paying client, in that they are forced to pay higher prices. Please see my post just before this one for a scenario if yoiu haven't read it yet, and try to address the issue from a different perspective.

There are plenty of people living in the U.S. who do not pay federal taxes and by extension do not support the military. The structure of U.S. defense is more based on geography but also on population and infrastructure, etc.. Of course, ultimately its job is to protect the citizens of the states, but it's not setup on a per capita basis.

This isnt a problem because the person in need of services, who has the money, will buy the services. I am illustrating how it would be feasible to provide those services to a client and not his next-door neighbor, thus negating the free-rider "problem." if someone a) needs defense services and b) can afford to pay for defense services, they will. If they are upset because other people benefit from positive externalities, thats their problem. They have no reason to be upset because their neighbors are getting the same benefits, because their neighbors in fact are not. I will also point out that many examples of how a private law society may work include the bundling of insurance services with protection contracts, which the free-rider neighbors would not have the benefit of, paying higher rates for a standalone insurance policy.

the customers of a defense firm, especially commercial customers, are far more likely to be glad of "free riders" because those people will be customers and employees.

Malachi:

This isnt a problem because the person in need of services, who has the money, will buy the services.

Not if they can get them for free, hence the problem.

Malachi:

I will also point out that many examples of how a private law society may work include the bundling of insurance services with protection contracts, which the free-rider neighbors would not have the benefit of, paying higher rates for a standalone insurance policy.

Now you may be on to something here. I can see how an insurance policy may offer lower rates for members who contract with a private defense firm, thus encouraging the free rider to purchase private defense.

Malachi:

the bundling of insurance services with protection contracts, which the free-rider neighbors would not have the benefit of, paying higher rates for a standalone insurance policy.

Buying a bundle containing both a military protection policy and a criminal protection policy may result in a lower total cost than if the policies were bought separately, but it cannot have a lower cost than just a criminal protection policy. And it can't be that consumer's have no option but to buy the unwanted military protection policy along with the criminal protection policy, since given a free market, a new firm can always arise to offer standalone criminal protection policies to those who desire them.

Not if they can get them for free, hence the problem.

no one has yet established the free-rider getting the same services as the paying customer, hence the lack of a problem.

Buying a bundle containing both a military protection policy and a criminal protection policy may result in a lower total cost than if the policies were bought separately, but it cannot have a lower cost than just a criminal protection policy.

I was referring to insuring against damage versus purchasing a protection policy that includes insurance. If you have protection, your insurance will cost less. If you do not have protection, simple insurance might very well cost more than a protection policy bundled with insurance.

Malachi:

no one has yet established the free-rider getting the same services as the paying customer, hence the lack of a problem.

Of course we have. There is no feasable way for a security firm to single out the free rider in the event of all out war. I think you seriously underestimate the impossibility of singling out the free rider in such an event.

You may as well be asking how do you get rid of free rider in charity. You don't, without a free rider, you don't have charity. It is the same when we are talking about war. Ultimately no one may pay you to take part in a bloody war. Such money does not exist. People may only take part in a bloody war if they are coerced into it, think it may be exciting and think it may get them status and recognition, or as a form of charity (sacrafice) on their part (service to homeland, defense of their people, helping out their primary group). The idea many libertarians have that group of people A paying group of people B to defend them is feasible and realistic way of defending against a serious military threat is silly. It won't work because if the B people are only doing it for money they will flee when it gets serious. Libertarian society will have people who will be willing to sacrifice to defend it (and who therefore literally need free riders who make their sacrifice worth it), or there simply won't be any such society because it will fold in the face of first military threat.

Libertarian society will have people who will be willing to sacrifice to defend it (and who therefore literally need free riders who make their sacrifice worth it)

An interesting argument. But does it apply even when expected mortality among active defenders is less than 100%? They would do it for a chance to survive and to continue enjoying their liberty, at least such motivation is not excluded.

Prime:

Malachi:

no one has yet established the free-rider getting the same services as the paying customer, hence the lack of a problem.

Of course we have. There is no feasable way for a security firm to single out the free rider in the event of all out war. I think you seriously underestimate the impossibility of singling out the free rider in such an event.

There is no need to "single out" any noncustomer. There is only a need to protect the customer. If you think that I can pay an EP detail or special operations squad to protect me, and you can get the exact same protection by standing next to me, you are wrong. Likewise if you think I can pay a firm to set up a missile defense system for my house, and you can receive identical protection by building a house next to me, you are wrong. I will repeat, there is no need to single out a free rider, there is only a need to provide services to the customer.

An interesting argument. But does it apply even when expected mortality among active defenders is less than 100%?

Yes. I believe taking on a say 15% chance of being killed or maimed is a significant sacrifice. Eg, if you played the Russian roulette so that you could be certain your sweetheart does not have to then that's your sacrifice on her behalf even if you don't end up with a bullet lodged in your brain, but walk away unscathed. 

They would do it for a chance to survive and to continue enjoying their liberty, at least such motivation is not excluded.

True. But realistically speaking if you're only in it for yourself it makes much more sense to emigrate to New Zealand and be partly free than taking on a chance to get your head blown off. The only way I can see it in significant numbers is if it is a matter of principle. Eg a person going all defiant and making a personal stand against the agressor just on the principle that he won't be pushed around period.

Look, try to think of a person who cleans garbage from the streets because it gives them joy to make the streets cleaner and does it not expecting anything from us. In relation to such a person all who move about on the streets in question and value clean streets are free riders.

Now think of a person who cleans garbage because he gets paid to do it, via voluntary donations. In this case everyone who does not contribute to the garbage cleaner is a free rider to those who do.

But now think of a person who cleans garbage in part because he is paid by residents, and in part because they like doing it. Let us say that neither motivation would be sufficient for this person to do the job on its own. In which case everyone who likes the streets in question clean is again in part a free rider even if they are residents and help pay this guy. They benefit, they get a discount, because this guy likes cleaning garbage from the streets somehwat.

Now imagine there is a person who cleans garbage because he likes to be thanked for doing it. He cleans garbage and in return he recieves pats on the back from grateful streetgoers, which he counts as sufficient counter-service. In this case the people who like the streets in question clean, but do not pat the street-cleaner on the back are free riders to people who do.

Do you now begin to understand the problem with making free riders a problem?

If a person goes to war (to defend a libertarian society) there could be half a dozen categories of various free riders just in connection to him. Eg if someone does it in part because it shall increase his success with the female sex, then all the geezers who benefit from his service are automaticaly free riders to all the chicks who digg him better now. So now how do you even begin to eliminate the 'problem' of the free rider? Does anyone think this is a problem that needs saving? So what changes when you talk about money rather than all the possible other motivations? Why is it that all the other categories of free riders are not a problem that needs solving, but this one alone is?

(This without touching on my previous point, that serving free riders (eg ones family, settlement, love interest...) may (and will be) a motivation in itself, particularly when talking about something as crazy as going to war.)

How about this?  http://fringeelements.tumblr.com/search/defense