Heya, i'm a recent high school grad (private school of course ). I first got interested in libertarianism and economics when I was like 13, because my dad had a bunch of books by Friedrich Hayek.
I've been lurking on www.mises.org for a couple of years now and i decided to join, specifically to demand more David Gordon! He provided some of my favorite points of disputation for my civics and economics professors last year, he's so smart!
"The first Accounts we have of Mankind are but so many Accounts of their Butcheries.All Empires have been cemented in Blood..."
- Edmund Burke, A Vindication of Natural Society
Alice: Heya, i'm a recent high school grad (private school of course ). I first got interested in libertarianism and economics when I was like 13, because my dad had a bunch of books by Friedrich Hayek. I've been lurking on www.mises.org for a couple of years now and i decided to join, specifically to demand more David Gordon! He provided some of my favorite points of disputation for my civics and economics professors last year, he's so smart!
David Gordon tells some of the funniest jokes that almost no one ever gets.
To paraphrase Marc Faber: We're all doomed, but that doesn't mean that we can't make money in the process. Rabbi Lapin: "Let's make bricks!" Stephan Kinsella: "Say you and I both want to make a German chocolate cake."
Alice:He provided some of my favorite points of disputation for my civics and economics professors last year
Sounds like you are a handful for your teachers haha.
I just put this up last night.
http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/10036.aspx
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Daniel: David Gordon tells some of the funniest jokes that almost no one ever gets.
yeah, he's a source of good philosophy jokes
i try
I just put this up last night. http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/10036.aspx
i listened to that when it first came out. i liked the sections on hegel
You probably have this but just to be sure:
http://mises.org/media.aspx?action=author&ID=64
Laughing Man: You probably have this but just to be sure: http://mises.org/media.aspx?action=author&ID=64
i do
lately i've been reduced to using google video to find him at the Libertarian Alliance and such
Alice:lately i've been reduced to using google video to find him at the Libertarian Alliance and such
What do you like about Gordon? Perhaps I can recommend some other authors who have similar fields of study as he does.
Laughing Man: Alice:lately i've been reduced to using google video to find him at the Libertarian Alliance and such What do you like about Gordon? Perhaps I can recommend some other authors who have similar fields of study as he does.
the level of philosophy, the interdisciplinary stuff and the hegel jokes.
i also like economics jokes. i enjoy bob murphy and tom woods, though for different reasons
Alice: Laughing Man: Alice:lately i've been reduced to using google video to find him at the Libertarian Alliance and such What do you like about Gordon? Perhaps I can recommend some other authors who have similar fields of study as he does. the level of philosophy, the interdisciplinary stuff and the hegel jokes. i also like economics jokes. i enjoy bob murphy and tom woods, though for different reasons
If you like philosophy then I might Roderick Long. He mixes philosophy with praxeology, the epistemological methods of Austrians etc. He also does some history.
Laughing Man: If you like philosophy then I might Roderick Long. He mixes philosophy with praxeology, the epistemological methods of Austrians etc. He also does some history.
i have listened to long on economic methodology and his praxeology and ethics lectures. he's interesting, though i dont entirely agree with him
Alice:i have listened to long on economic methodology and his praxeology and ethics lectures. he's interesting, though i dont entirely agree with him
Por Que?
Laughing Man: Por Que?
i think his view of happiness as the ultimate goal is not indicated by praxeology, all praxeology indicates is that within the framework of a particular given actor one aims at satisfaction. but such satisfaction is ontologically or materially distinct. thus the satisfaction aimed at for some supercomputer is analogous, but not equivalent, to that of a particular person; they can only be established as the same in the way in which they motivate behaviour, physically and subjectively they are different phenomena. i don't think anyone is ever going to be able to rehabilitate Summum bonum or virtue ethics.
This is why i consider myself a contractarian liberal, and not a believer in natural rights or the Nicomachean alternatives.
Alice:i think his view of happiness as the ultimate goal is not indicated by praxeology, all praxeology indicates is that within the framework of a particular given actor one aims at satisfaction.
Ah yes but to use an example of Long. Let us theorize that you have ends for both Ice cream and fame and you are confronted with a choice between the two. You can either choose fame or choose ice cream. There must be a third 'aim' that allows you to rationalize which end to choose. That is the eudiamonia that Long speaks of, the overarching third party that rationalizes constituent means to overall ends.
Alice:thus the satisfaction aimed at for some supercomputer is analogous
Do computers act on means to achieve ends?
Alice:they can only be established as the same in the way in which they motivate behaviour, physically and subjectively they are different phenomena.
Well eudiamonia is a subjective goal for each individual. My eudiamonia could be intelligence or a family while yours could be something you desire. However, eudiamonia is objective in the sense that it can be applied to all without expection for no one walks through life without being confronted with two beneficial choices and the need to choose one of them.
Alice:This is why i consider myself a contractarian liberal, and not a believer in natural rights or the Nicomachean alternatives.
So you believe that unless we are in contractual agreements with all then we have no rights?
Laughing Man:Ah yes but to use an example of Long. Let us theorize that you have ends for both Ice cream and fame and you are confronted with a choice between the two. You can either choose fame or choose ice cream. There must be a third 'aim' that allows you to rationalize which end to choose. That is the eudiamonia that Long speaks of, the overarching third party that rationalizes constituent means to overall ends.
i disagree, because i don't think this is indicated by the methodological singularism of praxeology; it is at most a psychological possibility. that being said i still don't find it plausible because the ultimate constituents of reality that ultimately make up the pattern of our cognitions are not themselves conscious, and the utlimate pattern and dominance of values is reducible to the simple fact of their arrangement in one way or another. as Mises said, ends are beyond rational examination. i don't buy explanations to human behaviour that are not theoretically constituted of entirely material processes, though (contra the positivists or empiricists) i do not think this is incompatible with the existence of goal-oriented consciousness.
Laughing Man:Do computers act on means to achieve ends?
There is certainly no reason they could not, human beings may be unusual but we are not exceptional. Like us, they would do so in accordance to a self-referencing framework of ends and ideas about how to achieve them.
Laughing Man:Well eudiamonia is a subjective goal for each individual. My eudiamonia could be intelligence or a family while yours could be something you desire. However, eudiamonia is objective in the sense that it can be applied to all without expection for no one walks through life without being confronted with two beneficial choices and the need to choose one of them.
action is only decided by one being of a higher intensive or assertiveness than the other, which is ultimately beyond rational or conscious examination.
Laughing Man:So you believe that unless we are in contractual agreements with all then we have no rights?
i don't think 'rights' could be anything but a metaphor, since they have a meaning which has nothing to do with metaphysical endowments. i believe people have liberties, and there is an epistemic requirement for those who claim the authority to interfere with them to prove it. liberties, unlike rights, are unlimited and, what is more, unlike rights are not just a term badly borrowed from contract law.
I think rights are metaphysical. rights are being (they are). life is life and is good of life to be such (life in and of itself) in other words, it is alright for life to be life. life affirms itself. it doesn't negate itself. that wouldn't be A=A (logical)
Alice:i disagree, because i don't think this is indicated by the methodological singularism of praxeology; it is at most a psychological possibility.
Why not? Praxeology is merely the study of action. Thus means/ends, preference, choice
Alice:that being said i still don't find it plausible because the ultimate constituents of reality that ultimately make up the pattern of our cognitions are not themselves conscious
You have no overarching goal in your life? Do you just move from one end to the next without any forthought?
Alice:as Mises said, ends are beyond rational examination. i don't buy explanations to human behaviour that are not theoretically constituted of entirely material processes, though (contra the positivists or empiricists) i do not think this is incompatible with the existence of goal-oriented consciousness
Mises held that value was normative subjective. However, praxeology need not be such. Praxeology only been to be explanatory subjective.
Alice:There is certainly no reason they could not, human beings may be unusual but we are not exceptional. Like us, they would do so in accordance to a self-referencing framework of ends and ideas about how to achieve them.
Well we have yet to create a computer with such free will capacity as to choose which means best achieve its ends.
Alice:action is only decided by one being of a higher intensive or assertiveness than the other, which is ultimately beyond rational or conscious examination.
Well now you are contradicting Mises in saying that rational action is unexplainable. Action is explainable through explanatory subjective value.
Alice:i believe people have liberties, and there is an epistemic requirement for those who claim the authority to interfere with them to prove it. liberties, unlike rights, are unlimited and, what is more, unlike rights are not just a term badly borrowed from contract law.
Well let us try a hypothetical to see how this term is used. However, I have the feeling that liberties / rights are just a semantical difference. Let us theorize that I like your pen. Am I at liberty to take it from you?
I think rights are metaphysical.
ithink life is descriptive of tendency, and not descriptive of construction or constitution. especially not when it comes to something like specific consciousness. evolution doesn't work like that, and complex objects are not coherently interpretable as being ontologically singular, they are complex objects
Laughing Man:Why not? Praxeology is merely the study of action. Thus means/ends, preference, choice
methdological singularism of praxeology focuses strictly on what is necessarily true of action, not that which may be true of particular psychologies and constructions. anything which is no strictly implied within the category of action is not part of praxeology.
Laughing Man:You have no overarching goal in your life? Do you just move from one end to the next without any forthought?
you're confusing recursiveness and integration with the particularity of action in a given instant. the psychological courses of mind are recursive and variably integrated in their cognitive and emotive aspects, but it is only the highest value which actually impels action which is relevant for the purposes of action and, therefor, praxeology.
Laughing Man:Mises held that value was normative subjective. However, praxeology need not be such. Praxeology only been to be explanatory subjective.
that's true, but i think Mises was basically correct. for one, because no one can be in a position to critique the values of another; that is an epistemic block on intersubjective normatives. even if they existed, it would be impossible to demonstrate them
Laughing Man:Well we have yet to create a computer with such free will capacity as to choose which means best achieve its ends.
but the same contrast is possible between two given human beings. all humans are physically, metaphysically and cognitively unique and singular in their relationship to their perceptions.
Laughing Man:Well now you are contradicting Mises in saying that rational action is unexplainable. Action is explainable through explanatory subjective value.
not at all - i am saying ultimate ends are beyond rational examination, exactly what mises said
Laughing Man:Well let us try a hypothetical to see how this term is used. However, I have the feeling that liberties / rights are just a semantical difference. Let us theorize that I like your pen. Am I at liberty to take it from you?
your statement presupposes that it is my pen. i would say that we would, if we had a claim which we took to arbitration, have to prove which of us had a prior (finders, keepers/first come, first serve) connection which allowed one of us to prevent access to the other. the presumption of liberty entails the liberty to use property, and to prevent access to property requires (either before or afterword) a proof of a claim prior to those we were prohibiting.
Alice:methdological singularism of praxeology focuses strictly on what is necessarily true of action, not that which may be true of particular psychologies and constructions. anything which is no strictly implied within the category of action is not part of praxeology.
Are you trying to state that preference and ends are psychologies?
Alice: you're confusing recursiveness and integration with the particularity of action in a given instant. the psychological courses of mind are recursive and variably integrated in their cognitive and emotive aspects, but it is only the highest value which actually impels action which is relevant for the purposes of action and, therefor, praxeology.
And eudiamonia is the highest value hence why I call it an 'over-arching' end. It is the end we wish to achieve most of all through our life of action.
Alice:that's true, but i think Mises was basically correct. for one, because no one can be in a position to critique the values of another; that is an epistemic block on intersubjective normatives. even if they existed, it would be impossible to demonstrate them
I would point to Rothbard's Power and Market and Ethics of Liberty as a critique of normative subjective value.
Alice:not at all - i am saying ultimate ends are beyond rational examination, exactly what mises said
Well are you now saying that we do have eudiamonia but that is unexaminable to another individual?
Alice:your statement presupposes that it is my pen.
Ooo why must you be so coy? Ok you buy the pen [ or make it ]
Alice:the presumption of liberty entails the liberty to use property, and to prevent access to property requires (either before or afterword) a proof of a claim prior to those we were prohibiting.
Is not saying 'I like the pen' more then enough to prevent access to you using the pen?
Grabs a bucket of popcorn and chicken wings, then sits down to watch.
Alice: i don't think anyone is ever going to be able to rehabilitate Summum bonum or virtue ethics.
Well maybe you could save me hours of toil by telling me why virtue ethics is dead from the neck up :)
Alice: I think rights are metaphysical. ithink life is descriptive of tendency, and not descriptive of construction or constitution. especially not when it comes to something like specific consciousness. evolution doesn't work like that, and complex objects are not coherently interpretable as being ontologically singular, they are complex objects
So you deny this.
Laughing Man:Are you trying to state that preference and ends are psychologies?
The nature of ultimate ends are always psychological and physiological.
Laughing Man:And eudiamonia is the highest value hence why I call it an 'over-arching' end. It is the end we wish to achieve most of all through our life of action.
no, satisfaction subjectively perceived is the 'highest value'. what it will consist of is dependent on the constitution of a given actor.
Laughing Man:I would point to Rothbard's Power and Market and Ethics of Liberty as a critique of normative subjective value.
power and market is only a critique of certain kinds of normative formulations, and ethics of liberty isn't a critique of anything - it's frankly an assertion of an unjustified axiom with a rational extension of it. not that i disagree overmuch on his qualitative judgements (they are compatible with my view of liberties and claims), but Rothbard's reasoning in this book strikes me as hermeneutical at best.
Laughing Man:Is not saying 'I like the pen' more then enough to prevent access to you using the pen?
no, because in order to establish exclusionary priviliges you must establish that you have a claim which precedes and supercedes the liberties of the other person. thus you must prove that you have a prior connection to it (which is to say, finders, keepers).
yes, i deny that life is a unique category of existence. it is a functional and empirical narrowing of scope for a particular science (which does not mean it is arbitrary, or without relevance, simply that it is not a philosophical or metaphysic primary). all complex objects are composed and determined entirely by their constituents. this is not to deny that consciousness exists, simply to say that consciousness is what it is to be a particular recursive process. likewise there are certain technological features of life that manifest qualitatively different behaviours than 'rocks', but ultimately it is nothing but a composition of various processes exactly like those which make up 'rocks' and 'stars'.
Laughing Man: Alice: you're confusing recursiveness and integration with the particularity of action in a given instant. the psychological courses of mind are recursive and variably integrated in their cognitive and emotive aspects, but it is only the highest value which actually impels action which is relevant for the purposes of action and, therefor, praxeology. And eudiamonia is the highest value hence why I call it an 'over-arching' end. It is the end we wish to achieve most of all through our life of action.
And why does every single person pursue eudaimonia as the highest end? Why can't a hell-bent man value revenge over his own happiness? There is no objective "'over-arching' end", and we cannot assume that the reason someone is doing x action is that he is pursuing his own happiness, there may very well be another motive.
Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found.
- Edmund Burke
Alice:no, satisfaction subjectively perceived is the 'highest value'. what it will consist of is dependent on the constitution of a given actor.
Human beings undeniably have a large degree of overlap in their values/goals. This is why objective morality exists and cooperation can occur.
laminustacitus:And why does every single person pursue eudaimonia as the highest end? Why can't a hell-bent man value revenge over his own happiness? There is no objective "'over-arching' end", and we cannot assume that the reason someone is doing x action is that he is pursuing his own happiness, there may very well be another motive.
On the contrary, survival is the overaching end.
twistedbydsign99: Alice:no, satisfaction subjectively perceived is the 'highest value'. what it will consist of is dependent on the constitution of a given actor. Human beings undeniably have a large degree of overlap in their values/goals. This is why objective morality exists and cooperation can occur.
i disagree. they have compatible plans, their values are singular to their own existence and are only meaningful in the context of their being actually felt.
Alice: So you deny this. yes, i deny that life is a unique category of existence. it is a functional and empirical narrowing of scope for a particular science (which does not mean it is arbitrary, or without relevance, simply that it is not a philosophical or metaphysic primary). all complex objects are composed and determined entirely by their constituents. this is not to deny that consciousness exists, simply to say that consciousness is what it is to be a particular recursive process. likewise there are certain technological features of life that manifest qualitatively different behaviours than 'rocks', but ultimately it is nothing but a composition of various processes exactly like those which make up 'rocks' and 'stars'.
So rocks will animations from within?
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
wilderness: So rocks will animations from within?
'animate' will is constituted of the same processes that make rocks hard, heavy, etc.
Alice: wilderness: So rocks will animations from within? 'animate' will is constituted of the same processes that make rocks hard, heavy, etc.
No. Rocks are made hard and heavy through the processes called cementation and lithification - external forces are necessary for such processes to even happen. Animate will is an internal force. A rock is sitting in this flat field. I push on the rock, but the rock is not pushing on me.
Alice:The nature of ultimate ends are always psychological and physiological.
An ultimate end is just a series of constitutive means applied to the series of ends. It is simply looking at the various ends we have met as a constitutive part of where our actions have taken us.
And like I have stated, eudiamonia is a subjective matter applied objectively. Therefore if my eudiamonia is intelligence then my highest value is applying means towards that overall goal. For you it could be something else. Each eudiamonia has the chance of being different from person to person, however I believe that each of us has one.
Alice:power and market is only a critique of certain kinds of normative formulations, and ethics of liberty isn't a critique of anything - it's frankly an assertion of an unjustified axiom with a rational extension of it. not that i disagree overmuch on his qualitative judgements (they are compatible with my view of liberties and claims), but Rothbard's reasoning in this book strikes me as hermeneutical at best.
I believe the last chapter of Power and the Market, Rothbard states thus:
'The economist, of course, is a technician who explains the consequences of various actions. But he cannot advise a man on the best route to achieve certain ends without committing himself to those ends. An economist hired by a businessman implicitly commits himself to the ethical valuation that increasing that businessman’s profits is good (although, as we have seen, the economist’s role in business would be negligible on the free market). An economist advising the government on the most efficient way of rapidly influencing the money market is thereby committing himself to the desirability of government manipulation of that market. The economist cannot function as an adviser without committing himself to the desirability of the ends of his clients. The utilitarian economist tries to escape this policy dilemma by assuming that everyone’s ends are really the same—at least ultimately. If everyone’s ends are the same, then an economist, by showing that Policy A cannot lead to Goal G, is justified in saying that A is a “bad” policy, since everyone values A in order to achieve G. Thus, if two groups argue over price controls, the utilitarian tends to assume that the proven consequences of maximum price controls—shortages, disruptions, etc.—will make the policy bad from the point of view of the advocates of the legislation. Yet the advocates may favor price controls anyway, for other reasons—love of power, the building of a political machine and its consequent patronage, desire to injure the masses, etc. It is certainly overly sanguine to assume that everyone’s ends are the same, and therefore the utilitarian shortcut to policy conclusions is also inadequate.'
In the Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard provides a system of positive ethical values that should be sought after by individuals. Power and the Market is more of a critique of normative subjective value while Ethics of Liberty is a positive denouncement that not all values are equally valid or beneficial
Alice:no, because in order to establish exclusionary priviliges you must establish that you have a claim which precedes and supercedes the liberties of the other person. thus you must prove that you have a prior connection to it (which is to say, finders, keepers).
Well I define a right as being a legitimately enforceable claim and truly from what I see in your writing, the only difference that there is between rights and 'liberties' [according to you] is the name.
laminustacitus:And why does every single person pursue eudaimonia as the highest end?
Because eudiamonia is the highest end...
laminustacitus:Why can't a hell-bent man value revenge over his own happiness?
Because his revenge would bring him happiness.
laminustacitus:There is no objective "'over-arching' end", and we cannot assume that the reason someone is doing x action is that he is pursuing his own happiness, there may very well be another motive.
Preference through choice. Even if we are to take Mises 'reduction of uneasiness' phrase then all choices we make are towards an ultimate goal of a plane of reduced uneasiness. You may call it uneasiness, I call it the propounding of happiness.
Alice:i disagree. they have compatible plans, their values are singular to their own existence and are only meaningful in the context of their being actually felt.
My opinion is compatible plans have compatible goals, compatible goals have some overlap and therefore something held in common between men with compatible plans. Their values are singular if they are subjective, but they can also be objective. If a man values a perfect square, thats objective because it is measurable, and it becomes an objective value for mankind if they all hold that value and cannot deny that value.
twistedbydsign99: laminustacitus:And why does every single person pursue eudaimonia as the highest end? Why can't a hell-bent man value revenge over his own happiness? There is no objective "'over-arching' end", and we cannot assume that the reason someone is doing x action is that he is pursuing his own happiness, there may very well be another motive. On the contrary, survival is the overaching end.
Individuals reguarly sacrafice their lives for causes they believe to be more valuable for survival; ergo, it seems dubious that everyone is striving for survival as their over-arching end.
Laughing Man: laminustacitus:And why does every single person pursue eudaimonia as the highest end? Because eudiamonia is the highest end...
Man is denied knowledge of what others strive for; ergo, there is no method by which we can discover the highest end that every individual strives for.
Laughing Man: laminustacitus:Why can't a hell-bent man value revenge over his own happiness? Because his revenge would bring him happiness. Not necessarily, not every single action is done for happiness. Knowledge is denied to the third party of why someone is doing what they are doing, and therefore we cannot know the general ends to which individuals strive. Laughing Man: laminustacitus:There is no objective "'over-arching' end", and we cannot assume that the reason someone is doing x action is that he is pursuing his own happiness, there may very well be another motive. Preference through choice. Even if we are to take Mises 'reduction of uneasiness' phrase then all choices we make are towards an ultimate goal of a plane of reduced uneasiness. You may call it uneasiness, I call it the propounding of happiness. Uneasiness, and the propounding of happiness are two entirely different things, and you are wrong in assuming that every individual strives for happiness.
Laughing Man: laminustacitus:There is no objective "'over-arching' end", and we cannot assume that the reason someone is doing x action is that he is pursuing his own happiness, there may very well be another motive. Preference through choice. Even if we are to take Mises 'reduction of uneasiness' phrase then all choices we make are towards an ultimate goal of a plane of reduced uneasiness. You may call it uneasiness, I call it the propounding of happiness.
Uneasiness, and the propounding of happiness are two entirely different things, and you are wrong in assuming that every individual strives for happiness.
twistedbydsign99: My opinion is compatible plans have compatible goals, compatible goals having some overlap and therefore something held in common between men with compatible plans. Their values are singular if they are subjective, but they can also be subjective. If a man values a perfect square, thats objective because it is measurable, and it becomes an objective value for mankind if they all hold that value and cannot deny that value.
My opinion is compatible plans have compatible goals, compatible goals having some overlap and therefore something held in common between men with compatible plans. Their values are singular if they are subjective, but they can also be subjective. If a man values a perfect square, thats objective because it is measurable, and it becomes an objective value for mankind if they all hold that value and cannot deny that value.
no, because what is a cost and what is a benefit is entirely subjective. all costs are opportunity costs, which we can make no comparison of among people. people may consider one thing (freedom of speech for homosexuals) a cost which they are nonetheless willing to accept in order to achieve a benefit (freedom of speech of christian gnostic sects), while others may have the reverse valuation and a third person may consider different aspects entirely.
laminustacitus: Man is denied knowledge of what others strive for; ergo, there is no method by which we can discover the highest end that every individual strives for.
And yesterday you denied man can know anything... so you don't even know what you wrote is correct or not.
wilderness: laminustacitus: Man is denied knowledge of what others strive for; ergo, there is no method by which we can discover the highest end that every individual strives for. And yesterday you denied man can know anything... so you don't even know what you wrote is correct or not.
the problem is categorical in nature, value is only value when felt. motive is only motive when it motivates
laminustacitus:Man is denied knowledge of what others strive for; ergo, there is no method by which we can discover the highest end that every individual strives for.
So you think that the means/ends scheme is...unknowable?
laminustacitus: Uneasiness, and the propounding of happiness are two entirely different things, and you are wrong in assuming that every individual strives for happiness.
Only concerning semantics. Easiness could very well imply happiness. Why do we choose to reduce uneasiness if there is nothing benificial to the state of mind that it provides?