Sage: The purpose of natural law is not to protect rights, but to guide us in protecting rights.
The purpose of natural law is not to protect rights, but to guide us in protecting rights.
I don't know of anybody that thinks a law can donk somebody on the head.
Adam Knott: Sage: "...market competition in legal systems..." Fair enough. But this the complete opposite of Rothbardian anarcho-capitalism.
Sage:
"...market competition in legal systems..."
Fair enough. But this the complete opposite of Rothbardian anarcho-capitalism.
No it is not. There are various quotes of Rothbard being explicit about how he is not advocating a "monopoly" and that the free market will determine the outcome of legal systems. I emailed these quotes to you before in a discussion we had. I find no need to have to pull those quotes up again and re-type them. I don't know why you contradict what Rothbard actually states. disingenious?
Adam Knott: Your vision of AnCap includes various legal systems, whereas in Rothbardian AnCap, all but one legal system is an "open outlaw and aggressor."
Your vision of AnCap includes various legal systems, whereas in Rothbardian AnCap, all but one legal system is an "open outlaw and aggressor."
I think what you don't readily grasp is that any one legal system, in the case of Rothbard his numerous writings and advocation of natural rights, will think it has the best and most just legal system - unless of course there would actually be one that advocates injustice. Rothbard even argues why natural rights are just and he also dialogues how other forms are criminal. He defines what a criminal is. He defines what justice in accord with natural rights are. He was very reasonably convicted about what he outlined as being good and just.
Adam Knott: When you write: "This may have been Rothbard's view..." This is subjectivism; the idea that Rothbard's legal conceptions were OK for him, but not necessarily for you or others. This then implies that legal codes are subjective to the individual or group concerned..... This is more of a Misesian conception than a Rothbardian conception. I'm not saying I disagree, but this is what your statements imply to me.
When you write: "This may have been Rothbard's view..." This is subjectivism; the idea that Rothbard's legal conceptions were OK for him, but not necessarily for you or others. This then implies that legal codes are subjective to the individual or group concerned..... This is more of a Misesian conception than a Rothbardian conception. I'm not saying I disagree, but this is what your statements imply to me.
This is written in absence of what property rights covers. What Rothbard consistently outlined. He based his theorizing on the individual. That is certain.
Adam Knott:When you write: "This may have been Rothbard's view..." This is subjectivism; the idea that Rothbard's legal conceptions were OK for him, but not necessarily for you or others. This then implies that legal codes are subjective to the individual or group concerned..... This is more of a Misesian conception than a Rothbardian conception.
What I meant was that I wasn't sure that your interpretation of Rothbard was correct. But looking over EoL now, it does seem that Rothbard never fully escaped the constitutionalist fantasy of a constitution as some self-enforcing magical document that exists outside of society. The natural law cannot be protected merely by enshrining it in a legal document. What is needed is real checks and balances and incentive structures. The case for anarchism is that market competition produces more extensive checks and balances and more reliable incentive structures than does government. At least Rothbard recognized this last point.
On subjectivism: what do you think of the distinction between explanatory value subjectivism (explanation in terms of the actor's values) and normative value subjectivism (the view that there are no objective values)? If the former is true and the latter is false, we can have subjectivist economics and objective ethics.
Adam Knott:My point is that there is a huge difference between a conception of libertarianism where there is a single monolithic legal code and where multiple private providers may compete to administer this monolithic legal code.....and, a conception of libertarianism that allows for or envisions the idea of multiple legal codes, and an assumed mediation between various legal codes, societies, associations, cultures, etc...
What do you make of this?
A market anarchist can certainly think that some right-claims are correct and others are mistaken, and that agencies acting on correct views have the moral right to defend their clients, by force if necessary, against agencies acting on mistaken views. In that sense, market anarchists have no objection to the idea that actions based on correct views of justice have a right to a “monopoly” against actions based on a mistaken view of justice. What market anarchists deny is the further inference that this “monopoly” is best achieved through a monopoly agency or institution. On the contrary. (Long p.17 n.37)
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism
I pulled out some quotes from "Democracy - The God That Failed".
"...for a government allowing unlimited secession is of course no longer a compulsory monopolist of law and order but a voluntary association. Thus notes Rothbard with regard to Mises' pronouncement, 'once admit any right of secession whatever, and there is no logical stopping-point short of the right of individual succession, which logically entails anarchism, since then individuals may secede and patronize their own defense agencies, and the State has crumbled' (The Ethics of Liberty, p. 182) see also idem, "Power and Market"..." [italics Rothbards]
"Power and Market" : Rothbard: "Defense in a free society... would therefore have to be supplied by people or firms who (a) gained their revenue voluntarily rather than by coercion and (b) did not - as the State does - arrogate to themselves a compulsory monopoly of police or judicial protection... defense firms would have to be as freely competitive and as noncoercive against noninvaders as are all other suppliers of goods and services on the free market. Defense services, like all other services, would be marketable and marketable only."
In these two quotes, and there lots more to understand and read, Rothbard had directly 'word for word even at times' stated other than what you have to tried to pass off here Adam Knott.
Sage: Adam Knott:When you write: "This may have been Rothbard's view..." This is subjectivism; the idea that Rothbard's legal conceptions were OK for him, but not necessarily for you or others. This then implies that legal codes are subjective to the individual or group concerned..... This is more of a Misesian conception than a Rothbardian conception. What I meant was that I wasn't sure that your interpretation of Rothbard was correct. But looking over EoL now, it does seem that Rothbard never fully escaped the constitutionalist fantasy of a constitution as some self-enforcing magical document that exists outside of society. The natural law cannot be protected merely by enshrining it in a legal document. What is needed is real checks and balances and incentive structures. The case for anarchism is that market competition produces more extensive checks and balances and more reliable incentive structures than does government. At least Rothbard recognized this last point. On subjectivism: what do you think of the distinction between explanatory value subjectivism (explanation in terms of the actor's values) and normative value subjectivism (the view that there are no objective values)? If the former is true and the latter is false, we can have subjectivist economics and objective ethics. Adam Knott:My point is that there is a huge difference between a conception of libertarianism where there is a single monolithic legal code and where multiple private providers may compete to administer this monolithic legal code.....and, a conception of libertarianism that allows for or envisions the idea of multiple legal codes, and an assumed mediation between various legal codes, societies, associations, cultures, etc... What do you make of this? A market anarchist can certainly think that some right-claims are correct and others are mistaken, and that agencies acting on correct views have the moral right to defend their clients, by force if necessary, against agencies acting on mistaken views. In that sense, market anarchists have no objection to the idea that actions based on correct views of justice have a right to a “monopoly” against actions based on a mistaken view of justice. What market anarchists deny is the further inference that this “monopoly” is best achieved through a monopoly agency or institution. On the contrary. (Long p.17 n.37)
"The case for anarchism is that market competition produces more extensive checks and balances and more reliable incentive structures than does government. At least Rothbard recognized this last point."
I agree with this. But I think this comes close to simply being a general definition of libertarianism. This is essentially a fundamental thesis of libertarianism. But the more narrow point is whether under AnCap, as a particular branch or school of libertarianism, competition is conceived to apply between various legal codes, or only between agencies enforcing a single legal code? I believe Rothbard intended the latter (again, pages 236, 237, TEoL) I think this is an important question and a valid question.
"On subjectivism: what do you think of the distinction between explanatory value subjectivism (explanation in terms of the actor's values) and normative value subjectivism (the view that there are no objective values)? If the former is true and the latter is false, we can have subjectivist economics and objective ethics."
Maybe start a thread on this one?
"What do you make of this?"
I think that the monopolistic conception of libertarianism is contrary to purpose, and that a conception of libertarianism that envisions the coexistence of various civil associations on a nonterritorial basis is what will pave the way for emergent libertarian societies.
"(1) A market anarchist can certainly think that some right-claims are correct and others are mistaken, and that agencies acting on correct views have the moral right to defend their clients, by force if necessary, against agencies acting on mistaken views. (2) In that sense, market anarchists have no objection to the idea that actions based on correct views of justice have a right to a “monopoly” against actions based on a mistaken view of justice. (3) What market anarchists deny is the further inference that this “monopoly” is best achieved through a monopoly agency or institution. On the contrary"
I interpret "think" above to mean something like "believe." For example, Ayn Rand can certainly think (believe) that anyone who violates a copyright or patent is an aggressor, and defend this view, by force if necessary, against those acting on mistaken views. Or, Murray Rothbard can certainly think (believe) that anyone who violates a copyright is an aggressor, and defend this view, by force if necessary, against those acting on mistaken views. Or, Kinsella and Hoppe can certainly think (believe) that anyone who enforces a patent or copyright is an aggressor, and defend this view, by force if necessary, against those acting on mistaken views.
I think #1 is the subjective preference of the individual or group concerned. Then #2 is a "justification" of a monopolistic theory of law based on considering #1 not the subjective preference of the individual concerned, but instead an objective universal truth. I think #3 needs to be spelled out in detail. This might be a separate thread.
Sage, if you would like to be an advocate of various positions or theories of R. Long in separate threads, I would be willing to participate. There are other former forum posters who would probably be interested, though they may not have time to participate. Plauche, Wombatron, Leonidia, Lilburne, etc..
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Adam Knott: But the more narrow point is whether under AnCap, as a particular branch or school of libertarianism, competition is conceived to apply between various legal codes, or only between agencies enforcing a single legal code? I believe Rothbard intended the latter (again, pages 236, 237, TEoL) I think this is an important question and a valid question.
But the more narrow point is whether under AnCap, as a particular branch or school of libertarianism, competition is conceived to apply between various legal codes, or only between agencies enforcing a single legal code? I believe Rothbard intended the latter (again, pages 236, 237, TEoL) I think this is an important question and a valid question.
I'll try another angle but of the basics I already put forth. What is another legal code outside of do not initiate physical aggression ie. property rights? You tell me.
AJ:This is educated conjecture, right?
"In turn, we can distinguish two subvarieties of descriptive rights: legal rights and de facto rights.
This gives us a three-way distinction:
• Legal rights: the claims that a given legal institution officially announces it will respect and protect.
• De facto rights: the claims that actually receive respect and protection in a given society."
AJ: Conza88:Why on earth would two people who have a property dispute, or their respective DRO's - choose to use a third party DRO that does not protect property rights? What each side considers valid property rights may differ.
Conza88:Why on earth would two people who have a property dispute, or their respective DRO's - choose to use a third party DRO that does not protect property rights?
What each side considers valid property rights may differ.
Yes, that could be part of their dispute. But it is absurd to then believe that they would turn to a DRO, 3rd party that does not respect property rights or the NAP.
Adam Knott:I believe you are stating the situation that AJ was trying to address originally. First you ask "What type of law are they deciding? And then you answer your own question, apparently not only for yourself, but for every single person on earth: "If they contradict..natural rights, i.e., violate the NAP, then they become aggressors and criminal."
The point that I was raising was that, they don't just get to arbitrarily decide what the law should be... i.e from demand on the market.
"Well, there are many things demanded on the market that are also crimes. There may be a demand for killing redheads. And there is certainly a demand for government loot. What's so great about market demand? if it is not within a framework of non-aggression, there will always be a demand for fraud and theft.
The free bankers accept a kind of David Friedmanite anarchism, where there is no law, only people engaging in exchange and buying people out. If you have a group that wants to kill redheads, the redheads will have to buy them off if they value their hair. I think this is monstrous, the kind of anarchism would indeed be chaos. Just because there is a demand for something doesn't mean it should be fulfilled."
Do you deny that someone initiating violence is not an aggressor?
Another part of the point I was addressing, but not stating clearly enough:
"One common, flip criticism by opponents of natural law is: who is to establish the alleged truths about man? The answer is not who but what: man's reason. Man's reason is objective, i.e., it can be employed by all men to yield truths about the world. To ask what is man's nature is to invite the answer."
Some agencies may error, which is - as Rothbard stipulated:
"Furthermore, difference of opinion is no excuse for discarding all sides to a dispute; the responsible person is the one who uses his reason to examine the various contentions and make up his own mind.[22] He does not simply say a priori, "a plague on all your houses!" The fact of man's reason does not mean that error is impossible. Even such "hard" sciences as physics and chemistry have had their errors and their fervent disputes.[23] No man is omniscient or infallible – a law, by the way, of man's nature."
So some will make mistakes, and I believe the market will correct them, as in it can be self regulating... i.e two people have a property dispute, or someone initiated violence against one of them. They want to know who is justified and want the problem properly solved. Their issue is what is the justified use of force, naturally it leans towards the NAP. Or Kinsella's estoppel approach. Some judges may naturally error, make bad descisions and their reputations as fair decision makers would be tarnished, no-one would want to use them again. It would be like a run on the banks.
On the other hand, you have DRO's in a religious fundamentalist society. Men rule over women and it has been so determined in the "courts" that women have no real legal or defacto rights, and must be obedient to the whims of their husbands. How can you pose any political ethical objections?
"On the contrary, the fact that natural-law theorists derive from the very nature of man a fixed structure of law independent of time and place, or of habit or authority or group norms, makes that law a mighty force for radical change."
Adam Knott:What you are saying is that any legal agency will, in your view, be enforcing a specific legal theory of natural rights.
Not will, but should... i.e using natural law as the guide. The NAP isn't too hard to understand, is it? Philosophy of self ownership?
Adam Knott:You are saying that enforcement agencies won't be enforcing any other legal theories than the specific natural rights legal theory you have in mind.
If their decrees violate the NAP, they are sanctioning aggression.
"For we can avoid aggressive violence completely by preventing it through purchasing the services of defense agencies, agencies which are empowered to use only defensive violence." - ETOL (225)
A PDA stops being a Private Defense Agency when it initiates violence, because it clearly isn't defending anymore.
Adam Knott:This is exactly what Rothbard is saying on page 236 of The Ethics of Liberty. The provision of legal services can grow by the market process. This is the "anarcho" part. Various companies can open and close, and customers can patronize various providers.
Furthermore, law and the State are both conceptually and historically separable, and law would develop in an anarchistic market society without any form of State. Specifically, the concrete form of anarchist legal institutions- judges, arbitrators, procedural methods for resolving disputes, etc.-would indeed grow by a market invisible-hand process, while the basic Law Code (requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property) would have to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies, just as all the competing judges once agreed to apply and extend the basic principles of the customary or common law.13 But the latter, again, would imply no unified legal system or dominant protective agency. Any agencies that transgressed the basic libertarian code would be open outlaws and aggressors, and Nozick himself concedes that, lacking legitimacy, such outlaw agencies would probably not do very well in an anarchist society.14
13. Cf., Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1972), and F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).
So I would reject the notion, characterization & use of the word 'monopolistic' is describing the basic law code.
Adam Knott: This assumes that what property rights are and what constitutes aggression is clear and unanimously agreed upon. This is far from the case. Consider intellectual property. In Randian property rights theory, one is an aggressor if one violates a copyright or patent. In Rothbardian property rights theory, one is an aggressor if one violates a copyright, but not if one violates a patent. And in contemporary property rights theory as supported (I believe) by Tucker, Kinsella, and Hoppe, one is not an aggressor if one violates a copyright or a patent. So here you have three distinct property rights theories, each defining aggression differently with respect to intellectual property.
This assumes that what property rights are and what constitutes aggression is clear and unanimously agreed upon. This is far from the case.
Consider intellectual property. In Randian property rights theory, one is an aggressor if one violates a copyright or patent. In Rothbardian property rights theory, one is an aggressor if one violates a copyright, but not if one violates a patent. And in contemporary property rights theory as supported (I believe) by Tucker, Kinsella, and Hoppe, one is not an aggressor if one violates a copyright or a patent.
So here you have three distinct property rights theories, each defining aggression differently with respect to intellectual property.
This goes beyond the BASIC law code "(requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property)" = that is NOT being questioned, what IS being discussed - and the issue you raise, is which is the right / correct one?
There are disagreements within Libertarianism about what constitutes a violation of the NAP sure (FRB, IP), but they are all still trying to apply the NAP!
The issue you raise goes beyond the basic law code, and into the intermediate / advanced. There is room for the market to operate thus, and determine much like Roman Law. As it pointed out in Bruno Leoni's Freedom and the Law.
Adam Knott:Rothbard simply assumes or presupposes that a uniform legal code is in effect.
Uniform how? Only in its basic principles, i.e the NAP. And he stipulated "just as all the competing judges once agreed to apply and extend the basic principles of the customary or common law." Historical precedence. And if they don't, fine - they are on the freemarket, and Rothbard acknowledges this: "Any agencies that transgressed the basic libertarian code would be open outlaws and aggressors, and Nozick himself concedes that, lacking legitimacy, such outlaw agencies would probably not do very well in an anarchist society."Again, 'Why on earth would two people who have a property dispute, or their respective DRO's - choose to use a third party DRO that does not protect /; respect property rights? Or a violation of the NAP?' It is absurd.
Adam Knott:He's thinking of his own vision of libertarian law.
Not who, but what.
Adam Knott: But the question is, what happens in the case when someone chooses a Randian or Kinsella/Tucker/Hoppe legal code as the basis for defining what constitutes aggression? That is the important question.
But the question is, what happens in the case when someone chooses a Randian or Kinsella/Tucker/Hoppe legal code as the basis for defining what constitutes aggression?
That is the important question.
A person can choose to define whatever they want as constituting aggression. They may believe rape is not aggression, since they own their wife. One of the counter measures, is that a DRO isn't going to keep such a person on as their client, or customer when a person with such an inclination is more than likely going to cause so many property disputes. The costs / premiums for that person naturally go up. The point is when there is a property dispute, someone is seeking justice or damages, the two parties decide on a judge, or third party who they will believe to be fair, and just in his decision and state they will accept it in the contract or payment for his services. The individuals respective DRO's could do this on behalf of their clients, and have a number of limited appeals set into the process before it begins.
The applicant and defendant could present both their conceptions or arguments and the judge would decide. It would be reasoned out with arguments etc. That's how I see it playing out. But as was mentioned before, the basic law code is the name - but what is being dealt with is advanced, i.e beyond the foundations.
Adam Knott:What non-Rothbardians are trying to point out
I don't think it's actually necessary.
Adam Knott:this is without even considering all the other cultures and possible legal codes outside the very small libertarian world)
What does that have to do with it?
If, then, the natural law is discovered by reason from "the basic inclinations of human nature ... absolute, immutable, and of universal validity for all times and places," it follows that the natural law provides an objective set of ethical norms by which to gauge human actions at any time or place.[37]
Just on this, as a kind of consolidation for all the obvious cultures out there;
Thus, and I elaborated on this recently in some thread I can no longer find - that individuals and "society" may use various means to condemn such actions as immoral, for eg. in India the cow is a sacred animal. In a Libertarian society, there is nothing unethical about homesteading the cow and doing what you want with it, as long as it doesn't violate the NAP - it doesn't violate natural law / political ethics, then the law should have nothing to say about it.
In India, that doesn't mean the individual who slaughtered the cow - won't be ostracized, condemned, boycotted, ignored, barred from certain private property, his reputation attacked etc. (All acceptable, as they do not violate the NAP) Some people will refuse to sell him items, while others will take pity and do so. He can use reason and persuasion to convince them that their beliefs are absurd and illogical etc. But he cannot initiate violence against them, and they cannot to the same to him.
Adam Knott:Usually, when anarcho-capitalism is discussed on this forum, those advocating it are assuming or presupposing a single, monolithic legal code that is in effect for all of society
You mean natural law and natural rights?
Adam Knott: If libertarianism is to be conceived as a monopolistic legal code enforced on all people by various market providers, the question of which legal code is to be enforced is an important one that can't be ignored.
Again, I reject the monopolistic characterization. There is no barrier of entry is there? A PDA / DRO can set itself up, outside of the basic law code (NAP), and essentially be an outlaw organisation, but as is conceded by Nozick, it won't get very far nor last long.
AJ:Here is Rothbard: "...the basic Law Code...would have to be agreed upon by all judicial agencies..." "Any agencies that transgressed the basic...code would be open outlaws and aggressors..."
Yes because of natural law and the study of human interaction through the thymological process. Rothbard postulates that when laws will be established immoral actions will apriori be illegal. What these 'immoral actions' are is established through the NAP. I'm sure there will be some place that loves Block's idea of 'murder park' but the aim of Ethics of Liberty is not to engage in the deduction of every action that an individual may take in a libertarian society but what a possible ethical system concerning what general laws and codes would arise from human interaction that can be label 'libertarian'
AJ:Exactly. You've pointed out the flaw in Rothbard's position better that I could have.
Where do you see this 'flaw'? Rothbard believed in natural law but that does not infer then that he wanted monopolistic legal systems.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
One thing is for sure, we can never expect a just legal system to emerge from the state. The incentives just aren't there. Our only shot at upholding the NAP is market law. There is a good amount of historic precedent for us to be optimistic about the outcomes.
Conza88: AJ:This is educated conjecture, right? [R. Long] • Normative rights: the claims that ought to be respected and protected.
[R. Long] • Normative rights: the claims that ought to be respected and protected.
This brings us back to "what do you mean by ought to?" Later you make clear that you mean objective ought, as in Rothbardian natural law. This I reject, so I suppose this ends the discussion. I've posted my refutation of various objective ethical theories several times, which I can dig up if interested.
Conza88: AJ: Conza88:Why on earth would two people who have a property dispute, or their respective DRO's - choose to use a third party DRO that does not protect property rights? What each side considers valid property rights may differ. Yes, that could be part of their dispute. But it is absurd to then believe that they would turn to a DRO, 3rd party that does not respect property rights or the NAP.
Again, which conception of property rights? Which conception of the NAP (which definition of aggression)?
Why anarchy fails
Laughing Man: AJ:Here is Rothbard: "...the basic Law Code...would have to be agreed upon by all judicial agencies..." "Any agencies that transgressed the basic...code would be open outlaws and aggressors..." Yes because of natural law and the study of human interaction through the thymological process. Rothbard postulates that when laws will be established immoral actions will apriori be illegal. What these 'immoral actions' are is established through the NAP. I'm sure there will be some place that loves Block's idea of 'murder park' but the aim of Ethics of Liberty is not to engage in the deduction of every action that an individual may take in a libertarian society but what a possible ethical system concerning what general laws and codes would arise from human interaction that can be label 'libertarian' AJ:Exactly. You've pointed out the flaw in Rothbard's position better that I could have. Where do you see this 'flaw'? Rothbard believed in natural law but that does not infer then that he wanted monopolistic legal systems.
I believe your position is that Rothbard's conception of natural law is a priori correct.
(1) In that case, it would make sense to call anyone not observing natural law an "outlaw" and an "aggressor," and not intended as mere subjective opinion. In response to this, see what I wrote to Conza. Either we can discuss the logical validity of Rothbard's proofs or we're at an impasse in this particular thread.
(2) However, even if natural law were a priori correct, I gather you agree that the only thing causing people and PDAs, etc. to adhere to it would be its inherent logical correctness. If so, can I assume that if Rothbard's proof was shown to be in error you would change your position? (I don't mean change it away from the NAP, but change it away from "the NAP is objective")
Conza88: "Well, there are many things demanded on the market that are also crimes. There may be a demand for killing redheads. And there is certainly a demand for government loot. What's so great about market demand? if it is not within a framework of non-aggression, there will always be a demand for fraud and theft. The free bankers accept a kind of David Friedmanite anarchism, where there is no law, only people engaging in exchange and buying people out. If you have a group that wants to kill redheads, the redheads will have to buy them off if they value their hair. I think this is monstrous, the kind of anarchism would indeed be chaos. Just because there is a demand for something doesn't mean it should be fulfilled."
By the way, this is very interesting.
Also interestingly, the same interview continues:
Austrian Economics Newsletter: One of the criticisms of this position [rejection of free banking] is that it is normative and not economic.
Rothbard: Yes, but the response to 100% reserves is that bank entrepreneurs have the right to offer whatever fraction of deposits they want, which is also a normative position. Any discussion of policy is inherently normative. You can't have free markets unless you have property rights.
Conza, your quote from Long about normative, legal, and de facto rights seems to make the part I italicized a non sequitur, because property rights in Rothbard's statement, "You can't have free markets unless you have property rights," only applies to de facto rights, not normative ones.
Is Rothbard confused?
The way to tell a set of 'defacto' property rights apart from a set of 'defacto' nonsense, or 'not-property rights' is through normative understanding.
iotw. you have to understand 'political' freedom if you are to conceive of a 'free' market.
"you are free to do what your master tells you", and "you are free and have no masters".... both use the term 'free' but one is proper and the other shallow. you cannot have more than a shallow view if you deprecate objective/normative moral truth viz ownership and aggression.
Was the Nazi economy a free economy? well there were a set of 'defacto property rights.....', as the jedi would say; these are not the rights you are looking for
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
AJ: Conza88: "Well, there are many things demanded on the market that are also crimes. There may be a demand for killing redheads. And there is certainly a demand for government loot. What's so great about market demand? if it is not within a framework of non-aggression, there will always be a demand for fraud and theft. The free bankers accept a kind of David Friedmanite anarchism, where there is no law, only people engaging in exchange and buying people out. If you have a group that wants to kill redheads, the redheads will have to buy them off if they value their hair. I think this is monstrous, the kind of anarchism would indeed be chaos. Just because there is a demand for something doesn't mean it should be fulfilled." By the way, this is very interesting.
There is also a "market" demand for tariffs, minimum wage laws, and for printing ever more money. But economic science doesn't approach the demand for such things by means of a normative theory. Economics demonstrates the necessary (incontestable) consequences of these actions, and thus nonlibertarians (for example) abstain from doing these things to the degree they otherwise would, because economic science shows them how it harms their own interests. Economics shows how those actions harm the people and groups they themselves care about. They abstain out of self-interest, as demonstrated by value-free economic science. They do not abstain due to libertarian normative theory.
Then, when we switch over to "ethical actions" (i.e., non-catallactic actions---actions not conceivable in terms of money, prices, and exchange ratios), the assumption is automatically made that we must switch over to a normative approach to deal with them. The assumption is that there are no necessary (incontestable) consequences to such "ethical actions" as there are to economic actions, and thus no way to appeal to the self-interest of the nonlibertarian (for example) by means of value-free science.
This assumption is totally mistaken, and as far as I am aware, there is actually no sustained or coherent argument that value-free science cannot demonstrate with respect to ethical actions what it demonstrates with respect to economic actions; that there are incontestable consequences to such actions, that were the actor to know about them, he may possibly abstain from such actions out of self-interest.
Normative ethics is based on and conducted on the assumption that there is no regularity in ethical phenomena as there is in catallactic phenomena (market phenomena), and that therefore, there are no "exact laws" of ethical action. This is a mistaken assumption, but it is the assumption which enables normative ethicists to believe they are practicing the only possible approach to the subject realm of ethics.
This is an understandable mistake for mainstream social theorists, since they make no (or few) explicit claims about exact knowledge. But for Austrian social thinkers, this mistake is tragic, since Austrian economics, founded by Menger, and carried by Mises through the twentieth century, is founded on the idea of exact laws of human action.
Ethical acts are acts. They aim at ends and utilize means. And there is a logic of those acts just the same as there is a logic of economic (catallactic) acts.
A normative approach is not necessary with respect human actions---such as ethical actions---that are not conceivable in terms of money prices. What is needed is to extend Austrian School social science (praxeology, Menger's science of exact laws) into other realms of human action beyond mere catallactic human action.
This debate shows the flaw in the name 'anarcho-capitalism'. It makes it sound like one system, when it's actually two. Anarchism is a description of how legal codes are created... specifically by competing providers. Capitalism (a better term would be libertarianism) is the normative part. The two must be seperated. I call myself a libertarian anarchist, stressing that anarchism is my view about how law should be provided, and libertarianism is my view of what would make good laws.
Rothbard was a great libertarian who did superb work showing the justification for a legal code based on the NAP. However, just like Mises never took the step of supporting competition in the field of security, Rothbard never took the step of supporting competition in the field of legal codes.
He conceived 'a single legal code', with courts competing over the application of this single legal code. He viewed a court not respecting his particular version of justice (adherence to the NAP) as an 'outlaw court'. Abortion and capital punishment are two issues where it is not clear what the 'correct' libertarian answer is. In Rothbard's system, if abortion is allowed by the 'single legal code', then any courts not allowing abortion are outlaw courts. Although he did not recognise it, and in several places denied it, I believe he was 'stuck in the monopoly paradigm', as AJ says.
David Friedman has a much better conception of anarchy and how competition in the field of legal codes would work. And he gives convincing reasons why the legal codes that are produced are likely to be largely libertarian. Libertarian legal codes will probably be the most demanded legal codes in the market. They may even be so popular that no other legal codes are demanded, in which case they would be a beneficial market "monopoly" - and the world would appear to be no different to how Rothbard imagined. But this is an organic process. Friedman shows how courts following totally different legal codes (pro/anti-abortion, and pro/anti-capital punishment) will interract via a theoretical 'bargaining process'.
Friedman is first an anarchist, and second a libertarian. Rothbard is first a libertarian, and unfortunately not quite an anarchist.
Murray Rothbard: "Well, there are many things demanded on the market that are also crimes. There may be a demand for killing redheads. And there is certainly a demand for government loot. What's so great about market demand? if it is not within a framework of non-aggression, there will always be a demand for fraud and theft. The free bankers accept a kind of David Friedmanite anarchism, where there is no law, only people engaging in exchange and buying people out. If you have a group that wants to kill redheads, the redheads will have to buy them off if they value their hair. I think this is monstrous, the kind of anarchism would indeed be chaos. Just because there is a demand for something doesn't mean it should be fulfilled."
In Friedman's system the kinds of legal codes produced are those that are demanded. Isn't that how it should be? Isn't that what we'd expect - that the laws of a soceity reflect the values of the individuals in that society. What is the alternative? That laws are produced that people dont really want... in other words they are having a legal code 'forced' upon them... a legal code created by libertarian philosophers. The libertarian philosophers become the overlords!
Rothbard's concern about 'buying people out' reminds me of people who reject private security because the rich will be better protected than the poor. It's an anti-market view. Just like with security, we should be advocating for legal codes to be market-produced. The libertarian philosophers will compete with each other on the market, because each court will want to say it uses the 'best' libertarian code and will therefore pay for the services of libertarian philosophers.
Because of the 'bargaining process' Friedman describes, a court which uses a code which endorses killing redheads will not last long. If this is a minority view, it will be prohibitively expensive to set up an anti-redhead court. The major courts have the power to outbid the redhead court. Even if the majority support killing redheads, it may still be prohibitively expensive, because the redheads will probably care much more about not being killed than the majority do about killing them. If virtually everyone supports killing redheads, then maybe such legal codes will be cheap enough to buy. We'll just have to hope enough people oppose the killing of redheads that it nevers becomes part of a legal code. I am optimistic about how libertarian laws will likely be under anarchy. Theory and history support this view.
Government Explained 2: The Special Piece of Paper
Law without Government
trulib:David Friedman has a much better conception of anarchy and how competition in the field of legal codes would work. And he gives convincing reasons why the legal codes that are produced are likely to be largely libertarian.
Snowflake: trulib:David Friedman has a much better conception of anarchy and how competition in the field of legal codes would work. And he gives convincing reasons why the legal codes that are produced are likely to be largely libertarian. Link svp?
Chapter 31 of The Machinery of Freedom: Is anarcho-capitalism libertarian? Also excerpted in the wonderful Anarchy and the Law. I can't find a link to the chapter itself.
"The "social engineer" is the reformer who is prepared to "liquidate" all those who do not fit into his plan for the arrangement of human affairs."
sounds familiar, lol.
trulib:We'll just have to hope enough people oppose the killing of redheads that it nevers becomes part of a legal code.
lol, why should we hope that unless we care about justice?
but i guess you are confused and don';t know what justice is.
i guess you arent sure why its wrong to kill innocent readheads, nor why redheads buying their lives from their would-be-killers is simply slavery/extortion.
trulib:I am optimistic about how libertarian laws will likely be under anarchy.
I am pessimistic since the flavour of modern 'libertarianism' junks morality, justice, and 'liberty'...
trulib:Chapter 31 of The Machinery of Freedom: Is anarcho-capitalism libertarian? Also excerpted in the wonderful Anarchy and the Law. I can't find a link to the chapter itself.
AJ: (2) However, even if natural law were a priori correct, I gather you agree that the only thing causing people and PDAs, etc. to adhere to it would be its inherent logical correctness. If so, can I assume that if Rothbard's proof was shown to be in error you would change your position? (I don't mean change it away from the NAP, but change it away from "the NAP is objective")
AJ, I asked Adam, but he hasn't been able to answer. What other legal code other than 'do not initiate physical aggression' ie. property rights are there?
Secondly, what do you think 'code' means? I can only assume what Rothbard meant, but it is a very educated guess. Code has various meanings but one is a set of rules or principles. Property rights are of the intellect and is a principle/axiom. Thinking in terms of Rothbard, he therefore meant legal code to mean legal principle, and principles do not vary. Principles are certain and absolute deductively. A theory about a principle can vary though. Therefore the principle - property rights - is certain. It is a legal principle that much is certain. Any theories about property rights may AND have varied in history. The episteme of any theory expands, and may even be subtracted from, added to, or completely aborted. The principles being certain do not disappear because of poor knowledge/theory. The principles (and facts) of any theory simply get absorbed into a better theory if need be. Property rights being a principle/axiom does not disappear but how it is interpreted and applied (both of theory) can change. Scientific theories, even of social theoretics, are open to evalution and improvement if something comes along that has more or better explanatory power (which again is of the theory not the doubting of property rights).
Being objective and subjective has nothing to do with this.
nirgrahamUK: trulib:I am optimistic about how libertarian laws will likely be under anarchy. I am pessimistic since the flavour of modern 'libertarianism' junks morality, justice, and 'liberty'...
You're conflating libertarianism with anarchism. As I a modern libertarian I'm driven by passion for morality, justice and liberty. As an anarchist, I recognise that other people have different ideas of what those words mean, and I'm not going to force anyone to live by my conceptions of them.
trulib: They may even be so popular that no other legal codes are demanded, in which case they would be a beneficial market "monopoly" - and the world would appear to be no different to how Rothbard imagined. But this is an organic process. Friedman shows how courts following totally different legal codes (pro/anti-abortion, and pro/anti-capital punishment) will interract via a theoretical 'bargaining process'.
They may even be so popular that no other legal codes are demanded, in which case they would be a beneficial market "monopoly" - and the world would appear to be no different to how Rothbard imagined. But this is an organic process. Friedman shows how courts following totally different legal codes (pro/anti-abortion, and pro/anti-capital punishment) will interract via a theoretical 'bargaining process'.
The problem is property rights exist. They are a metaphysical fact. It would be the theory of property rights because of the ever-growing episteme of the world. That theory of property rights may vary. You gave theories about property rights. Both of the above "legal codes" you put in parenthesis are theories that both can apply to property rights. As you even point out "will interract via a theoretical"... yes theoretical. Legal codes used once by Rothbard is not a hinging factor to explain what he meant other than providing other quotes and facts about what Rothbard explained.
1 - And Rothbard for a fact stated property rights are a principle (which one definition of code is defined as principle).
2 - Rothbard word for word states he is not talking about a monopoly and word for word speaks out against a monopoly.
3 - Rothbard talks about natural rights are based on the individual
4 - Rothbard discusses how law is of the market "only" (quote of his)
---
To state what Rothbard was explicitly against hinged on a half sentence in an epilogue (i believe so it wasn't even the main part of his book) and yet to find out that code means principle and Rothbard was talking about principle(s) ie. NAP, property rights, etc...
Another understanding instead of those offered trying to illogically conjecture what Rothbard said in his discussion on Nozick so far would be necessary.
The question is. Are there other principles - other legal codes - that would completely change the theory of natural law of human nature (NAP included), but this theory would still need to include property rights as they are necessary, in other words, a principle. A different application, a different interpretation of property rights may happen but that would be a change in theory not in the principle.
trulib: As an anarchist, I recognise that other people have different ideas of what those words mean, and I'm not going to force anyone to live by my conceptions of them.
As an anarchist, I recognise that other people have different ideas of what those words mean, and I'm not going to force anyone to live by my conceptions of them.
What is your definition of justice? And are you going to enforce it?
no one is advocating 'forcing' people to be moral and just.
'classic libertarians' (Rothbardians if you will) advocate understanding right from wrong, and using that knowledge to guide action. and also to determine self-defense against unjust non-libertarians.
you are conflating understanding that murdering redheads is wrong, with 'forcing' people not to murder redheads.
of course, 'self-defending' against red-head killers was not even mentioned by you, (or you twisted defence into forcing others not to abuse you........ )there is no 'forcing' in defense against evil aggressors. its defence. the killers are the forcers. this is libertarian theory believe it or not.....
DF's full machine: http://is.gd/58ptZ
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
AJ:Again, which conception of property rights? Which conception of the NAP (which definition of aggression)?
"The laissez-faireists offer several objections to the idea of free-market defense. One objection holds that, since a free market of exchanges presupposes a system of property rights, therefore the State is needed to define and allocate the structure of such rights. But we have seen that the principles of a free society do imply a very definite theory of property rights, namely, self-ownership and the ownership of natural resources found and transformed by one's labor. Therefore, no State or similar agency contrary to the market is needed to define or allocate property rights. This can and will be done by the use of reason and through market processes themselves; any other allocation or definition would be completely arbitrary and contrary to the principles of the free society."
AJ:Conza, your quote from Long about normative, legal, and de facto rights seems to make the part I italicized a non sequitur, because property rights in Rothbard's statement, "You can't have free markets unless you have property rights," only applies to de facto rights, not normative ones.Is Rothbard confused?
nirgrahamUK:The way to tell a set of 'defacto' property rights apart from a set of 'defacto' nonsense, or 'not-property rights' is through normative understanding.iotw. you have to understand 'political' freedom if you are to conceive of a 'free' market. "you are free to do what your master tells you", and "you are free and have no masters".... both use the term 'free' but one is proper and the other shallow. you cannot have more than a shallow view if you deprecate objective/normative moral truth viz ownership and aggression.Was the Nazi economy a free economy? well there were a set of 'defacto property rights.....', as the jedi would say; these are not the rights you are looking for
Adam Knott:There is also a "market" demand for tariffs, minimum wage laws, and for printing ever more money. But economic science doesn't approach the demand for such things by means of a normative theory. Economics demonstrates the necessary (incontestable) consequences of these actions, and thus nonlibertarians (for example) abstain from doing these things to the degree they otherwise would, because economic science shows them how it harms their own interests. Economics shows how those actions harm the people and groups they themselves care about. They abstain out of self-interest, as demonstrated by value-free economic science. They do not abstain due to libertarian normative theory.
You assume they abstain. And what about when they know the praxeological considerations, yet choose to reject them?
"In the first place, while praxeology can indeed demonstrate that laissez-faire will lead to harmony, prosperity, and abundance, while government intervention leads to conflict and impoverishment,19 and while it is probably true that most people value the former highly, it is not true that these are their only goals or values. The great analyst of ranked value scales and diminishing marginal utility should have been more aware of such competing values and goals. For example, many people, whether through envy or a misplaced theory of justice, may prefer far more equality of income than will be attained on the free market. Many people, pace the aforementioned intellectuals, may want less abundance in order to whittle down our allegedly excessive affluence. Others, as I have mentioned, may prefer to loot the capital of the rich or the businessman in the short run, while acknowledging but dismissing the long-run ill effects, because they have a high time preference. Probably very few of these people will want to push statist measures to the point of total impoverishment and destruction—although this may happen, as in the case of Communist China. But a majority coalition of the foregoing might well opt for some reduction in wealth and prosperity on behalf of these other values. They may well decide that it is worth sacrificing a modicum of wealth and efficient production because of the high opportunity cost of not being able to enjoy an alleviation of envy, or a lust for power, or a submission to power, or, for example, the thrill of “national unity,” which they might enjoy from a (short-lived) economic crisis.What could Mises reply to a majority of the public who have indeed considered all the praxeological consequences and still prefer a modicum—or, for that matter, even a drastic amount—of statism in order to achieve some of their competing goals? As a utilitarian, he could not quarrel with the ethical nature of their chosen goals: for he had to confine himself to the one value judgment that he favored the majority’s achieving their chosen goals. The only reply that Mises could make within his own framework was to point out that government intervention has a cumulative effect, that eventually the economy must move either toward the free market or toward full socialism, which praxeology shows will bring chaos and drastic impoverishment, at least to an industrial society. But this, too, is not a fully satisfactory answer. While many programs of statist intervention—especially price controls—are indeed cumulative, others are not. Furthermore, the cumulative impact takes such a long time that the time preferences of the majority would probably lead them, in full acknowledgment of the consequences, to ignore the effect. And then what?Mises attempted to use the cumulative argument to answer the contention that the majority of the public prefer egalitarian measures even knowingly at the expense of a portion of their own wealth. Mises’s comment was that the “reserve fund” was on the point of being exhausted in Europe, and therefore that any further egalitarian measures would have to come directly out of the pockets of the masses through increased taxation. Mises assumed that once this became clear, the masses would no longer support interventionist measures.20 In the first place, this is no argument against the previous egalitarian measures or in favor of their repeal. But secondly, while the masses might be convinced, there is certainly no apodictic certainty involved; the masses have in the past and presumably will in the future continue knowingly to support egalitarian and other statist measures on behalf of others of their goals, despite the knowledge that their income and wealth would be reduced. Thus, as William E. Rappard pointed out in his thoughtful critique of Mises’s position:Does the British voter, for instance, favor confiscatory taxation of large incomes primarily in the hope that it will redound to his material advantage, or in the certainty that it tends to reduce unwelcome and irritating social inequalities? In general, is the urge towards equality in our modern democracies not often stronger than the desire to improve one’s material lot?21Rappard also noted that in his own country, Switzerland, the urban industrial and commercial majority of the country have repeatedly, and often at popular referendums, endorsed measures to subsidize the minority of farmers in a deliberate effort to retard industrialization and the growth of their own incomes. The urban majority did not do so in the “absurd belief that they were thereby increasing their real income.” Instead, “quite deliberately and expressly, political parties have sacrificed the immediate material welfare of their members in order to prevent, or at least somewhat to retard, the complete industrialization of the country. A more agricultural Switzerland, though poorer, such is the dominant wish of the Swiss people today.”22 The point here is that Mises, not only as a praxeologist but also as a utilitarian liberal, could have no word of criticism against these statist measures once the majority of the public take their praxeological consequences into account and choose them anyway on behalf of goals other than wealth and prosperity.Furthermore, there are other types of statist intervention that clearly have little or no cumulative effect and that may even have very little effect in diminishing production or prosperity. Let us, for example, assume—and this assumption is not very farfetched in view of the record of human history—that the great majority of a society hate and revile redheads, perhaps, to cite Simons again, because they find redheads “evil or unlovely.” Let us further assume that there are very few redheads in the society. This large majority then decide that they would like very much to murder all redheads. Here they are; the murder of redheads is high on the value scales of the great majority of the public; there are few redheads so that there will be little loss in production on the market. How could Mises rebut this proposed policy either as a praxeologist or as a utilitarian liberal? I submit that he could not do so.Mises made one further attempt to establish his position, but it was even less successful. Criticizing the arguments for state intervention on behalf of equality or other moral concerns, he dismissed them as “emotional talk.” After reaffirming that “praxeology and economics . . . are neutral with regard to any moral precepts,” and asserting that “the fact that the immense majority of men prefer a richer supply of material goods to a less ample supply is a datum of history; it does not have any place in economic theory,” he concluded by insisting that “he who disagrees with the teachings of economics ought to refute them by discursive reasoning, not by . . . the appeal to arbitrary, allegedly ethical standards.”23But I submit that this will not do; for Mises would have to concede that no one can decide upon any policy whatever unless he makes an ultimate ethical or value judgment. But since this is so, and since according to Mises all ultimate value judgments or ethical standards are arbitrary, how then could he denounce these particular ethical judgments as “arbitrary”? Furthermore, it was hardly correct for Mises to dismiss these judgments as “emotional,” since for him as a utilitarian, reason cannot establish ultimate ethical principles, which can therefore only be established by subjective emotions. It was pointless for Mises to call for his critics to use “discursive reasoning” since he himself denied that discursive reasoning can be used to establish ultimate ethical values. Furthermore, the man whose ultimate ethical principles would lead him to support the free market could also be dismissed by Mises as equally “arbitrary” and “emotional,” even if he takes the laws of praxeology into account before making his ultimately ethical decision. And we have seen above that the majority of the public very often have other goals which they hold, at least to a certain extent, higher than their own material well-being."
trulib:Abortion and capital punishment are two issues where it is not clear what the 'correct' libertarian answer is. In Rothbard's system, if abortion is allowed by the 'single legal code', then any courts not allowing abortion are outlaw courts.
And that's complete bs. It's "BASIC Law code" which is as simple as "(requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property)" - the strawmanners have added the word single to try make their fallacious point.
They further lie when they call it a uniform legal code... yet: "just as all the competing judges once agreed to apply and extend the basic principles of the customary or common law.13 But the latter, again, would imply no unified legal system or dominant protective agency." And it wouldn't.
The charges are bunk.
trulib:Although he did not recognise it, and in several places denied it, I believe he was 'stuck in the monopoly paradigm', as AJ says.
Except he's not. The use of the word monopoly to describe Rothbard's position is not Austrian, nor correct in any sense of the word and doesn't stand the light of day.
But what if Jones challenges the finding? In that case, he can either take the case to his X court system, or take it directly to a privately competitive Appeals Court of a type that will undoubtedly spring up in abundance on the market to fill the great need for such tribunals. Probably there will be just a few Appeals Court systems, far fewer than the number of primary courts, and each of the lower courts will boast to its customers about being members of those Appeals Court systems noted for their efficiency and probity. The Appeals Court decision can then be taken by the society as binding. Indeed, in the basic legal code of the free society, there probably would be enshrined some such clause as that the decision of any two courts will be considered binding, i.e., will be the point at which the court will be able to take action against the party adjudged guilty.[4]
Every legal system needs some sort of socially-agreed-upon cutoff point, a point at which judicial procedure stops and punishment against the convicted criminal begins. But a single monopoly court of ultimate decision-making need not be imposed and of course cannot be in a free society; and a libertarian legal code might well have a two-court cutoff point, since there are always two contesting parties, the plaintiff and the defendant.
trulib:David Friedman has a much better conception of anarchy and how competition in the field of legal codes would work. And he gives convincing reasons why the legal codes that are produced are likely to be largely libertarian. Libertarian legal codes will probably be the most demanded legal codes in the market.
Have you read No More Military Socialism? I don't think you have.
trulib:Friedman is first an anarchist, and second a libertarian. Rothbard is first a libertarian, and unfortunately not quite an anarchist.
Rubbish, just not the type of anarchist you want.
Do You Hate the State?
"Let us take, for example, two of the leading anarcho-capitalist works of the last few years: my own For a New Liberty and David Friedman’s Machinery of Freedom. Superficially, the major differences between them are my own stand for natural rights and for a rational libertarian law code, in contrast to Friedman’s amoralist utilitarianism and call for logrolling and trade-offs between non-libertarian private police agencies. But the difference really cuts far deeper. There runs through For a New Liberty (and most of the rest of my work as well) a deep and pervasive hatred of the State and all of its works, based on the conviction that the State is the enemy of mankind. In contrast, it is evident that David does not hate the State at all; that he has merely arrived at the conviction that anarchism and competing private police forces are a better social and economic system than any other alternative. Or, more fully, that anarchism would be better than laissez-faire which in turn is better than the current system. Amidst the entire spectrum of political alternatives, David Friedman has decided that anarcho-capitalism is superior. But superior to an existing political structure which is pretty good too. In short, there is no sign that David Friedman in any sense hates the existing American State or the State per se, hates it deep in his belly as a predatory gang of robbers, enslavers, and murderers. No, there is simply the cool conviction that anarchism would be the best of all possible worlds, but that our current set-up is pretty far up with it in desirability. For there is no sense in Friedman that the State – any State – is a predatory gang of criminals."
trulib:Isn't that how it should be?
No.
trulib:Isn't that what we'd expect - that the laws of a soceity reflect the values of the individuals in that society.
Not natural laws, or natural rights (normative).Sharia Law? Hell no.
trulib:What is the alternative?
trulib:That laws are produced that people dont really want... in other words they are having a legal code 'forced' upon them... a legal code created by libertarian philosophers. The libertarian philosophers become the overlords!
"Leoni's great contribution is to point out to even our staunchest laissez-faire theorists an alternative to the tyranny of legislation. Rather than accept either administrative law or legislation, Leoni calls for a return to the ancient traditions and principles of "judge-made law" as a method of limiting the State and insuring liberty. In the Roman private law, in the Continental Civil Codes, in the Anglo-Saxon common law, "law" did not mean what we think today: endless enactments by a legislature or executive. "Law" was not enacted but found or discovered; it was a body of customary rules that had, like languages or fashions, grown up spontaneously and purely voluntarily among the people. These spontaneous rules constituted "the law"; and it was the works of experts in the law—old men of the tribe, judges, or lawyers—to determine what the law was and how the law would apply to the numerous cases in dispute that perpetually arise.If legislation is replaced by such judge-made law, says Leoni, fixity and certainty (one of the basic requirements of the "rule of law") will replace the capriciously changing edicts of statutory legislation. The body of judge-made law changes very slowly; furthermore, since judicial decisions can only be made when parties bring cases before the courts, and since decisions properly apply only to the particular case, judge-made law—in contrast to legislation—permits a vast body of voluntary, freely-adopted rules, bargains, and arbitrations to proliferate as needed in society. Leoni brilliantly shows the analogy between these free rules and bargains, which truly express the "common will" of all participants, and the voluntary bargains and exchanges of the free market.[2] The twin of the free-market economy, then, is not a democratic legislature ever grinding out new diktats for society, but a proliferation of voluntary rules interpreted and applied by experts in the law."
Force? Hilarious.
trulib:Rothbard's concern about 'buying people out' reminds me of people who reject private security because the rich will be better protected than the poor. It's an anti-market view.
Rothbard: "In a free society, as we have stated, every man is a selfowner. No man is allowed to own the body or mind of another, that being the essence of slavery."
Trulib: "Why can't you buy and sell people? It's an anti-market view!"
trulib:Just like with security, we should be advocating for legal codes to be market-produced. The libertarian philosophers will compete with each other on the market, because each court will want to say it uses the 'best' libertarian code and will therefore pay for the services of libertarian philosophers.
This is close to what I stipulated above in response to Adam. What needs to be noted is your assumption that this would not take place in the Rothbardian "system" is false, as it's clearly not a unified legal system.
trulib:I am optimistic about how libertarian laws will likely be under anarchy. Theory and history support this view.
They do some what with "Roman private law, in the Continental Civil Codes, in the Anglo-Saxon common law", but what about Sharia Law and other instances of natural rights / human rights being violated by the legal system as being supported by the culture / society, do you have any political ethical objections?
Anyway, what needs to be remembered is:
Another common objection to the workability of free-market defense wonders: May not one or more of the defense agencies turn its coercive power to criminal uses? In short, may not a private police agency use its force to aggress against others, or may not a private court collude to make fraudulent decisions and thus aggress against its subscribers and victims? It is very generally assumed that those who postulate a stateless society are also naïve enough to believe that, in such a society, all men would be "good," and no one would wish to aggress against his neighbor. There is no need to assume any such magical or miraculous change in human nature.
Of course, some of the private defense agencies will become criminal, just as some people become criminal now. But the point is that in a stateless society there would be no regular, legalized channel for crime and aggression, no government apparatus the control of which provides a secure monopoly for invasion of person and property. When a State exists, there does exist such a built-in channel, namely, the coercive taxation power, and the compulsory monopoly of forcible protection. In the purely free-market society, a would-be criminal police or judiciary would find it very difficult to take power, since there would be no organized State apparatus to seize and use as the instrumentality of command. To create such an instrumentality de novo is very difficult, and, indeed, almost impossible; historically, it took State rulers centuries to establish a functioning State apparatus.
Furthermore, the purely free-market, stateless society would contain within itself a system of built-in "checks and balances" that would make it almost impossible for such organized crime to succeed. There has been much talk about "checks and balances" in the American system, but these can scarcely be considered checks at all, since every one of these institutions is an agency of the central government and eventually of the ruling party of that government. The checks and balances in the stateless society consist precisely in the free market, i.e., the existence of freely competitive police and judicial agencies that could quickly be mobilized to put down any outlaw agency.
It is true that there can be no absolute guarantee that a purely market society would not fall prey to organized criminality. But this concept is far more workable than the truly Utopian idea of a strictly limited government, an idea that has never worked historically. And understandably so, for the State's built-in monopoly of aggression and inherent absence of free-market checks have enabled it to burst easily any bonds that well-meaning people have tried to place upon it. Finally, the worst that could possibly happen would be for the State to be reestablished. And since the State is what we have now, any experimentation with a stateless society would have nothing to lose and everything to gain.
trulib:Rothbard was a great libertarian who did superb work showing the justification for a legal code based on the NAP. However, just like Mises never took the step of supporting competition in the field of security, Rothbard never took the step of supporting competition in the field of legal codes.
Why would he, he was a natural law libertarian after all?
trulib:He conceived 'a single legal code', with courts competing over the application of this single legal code. He viewed a court not respecting his particular version of justice (adherence to the NAP) as an 'outlaw court'. Abortion and capital punishment are two issues where it is not clear what the 'correct' libertarian answer is. In Rothbard's system, if abortion is allowed by the 'single legal code', then any courts not allowing abortion are outlaw courts. Although he did not recognise it, and in several places denied it, I believe he was 'stuck in the monopoly paradigm', as AJ says.
I don't think the man was stuck, I think he was putting forth the (his, at least) ideal libertarian legal code. Not necessarily saying that anarcho-capitalism can only be founded upon the code. Just as a Catholic anarchist would prefer all courts to follow Canon law, Rothbard would prefer Natural Law. Without society can still be anarcho-capitalist (as Friedman has shown) just less libertarian or Catholic.
Conza88: And what about when they know the praxeological considerations, yet choose to reject them?
And what about when they know the praxeological considerations, yet choose to reject them?
And what about when they know the natural-rights considerations, yet choose to reject them?
Both the praxeologist and the natural-rights proponent are protected to some extent by a legal system that deters some types of harmful acts. Thus, both the praxeologist and the natural-rights proponent, as citizens, are able to deter harmful acts to some extent, due to the existing legal system, or due to the legal system either would choose were he free to do so.
In addition to the consequences of legal punishment which both the praxeologist and the natural-rights proponent can avail themselves of in order to deter harmful acts, the praxeologist, as social scientist, can also demonstrate in what way the acts the harmer was intending are also harmful to the harmer's own interests (above and beyond the mere punishment the legal system may administer).
The significance of Mises's praxeology and of Menger's theoretical exact science, the pillars of Austrian School social thought, is that this approach provides a scientific demonstration to the actor of the ways some of his intended acts are harmful to himself. This provides the actor with an additional reason, above and beyond threatened punishment, to abstain from some of the acts he was considering.
And thus, for example, though both legislative houses in the US are controlled by those who by ideology would favor protectionism and higher wages mandated by law, they abstain from any significant tariff program or minimum wage increase, since they (rightly) believe it will harm the classes of citizens they are trying to help. And, though the present monetary authorities have both the means and legal authority to continue printing ever more money, which they could use for pressing social concerns, they are fearful of doing so. Instead, they are searching for ways to curtail further significant monetary expansion.
In these areas in which value-free economics instructs, people who would otherwise be acting much more harmfully than they are, abstain from doing so not because of threatened punishment from the legal system, and not because of any socialist, religious, or libertarian theory of norms.
They abstain because they believe the consequences of these actions would be harmful to their own interests. And they believe this because of value-free economic science, which is essentially the logical science of human "catallactic" action.
Thus, the value-free social scientist can assert consequences to human actions above and beyond the penalty the legal system might administer. Value-free social science can demonstrate other consequences that the actor may consider harmful to his own interests. These consquences are "extra-legal" consequences. If science demonstrates them, and once this type of cause and effect knowledge becomes generally accepted (as much of it has in the economic sphere), then people abstain from harmful acts peacefully, and of their own accord, since they believe the acts would harm themselves (would be detrimental to their own interests).
To the extent that social science can demonstrate how actions the individual intended are harmful to his own interests, and to the extent the individual abstains from specific actions due to this knowledge, then to this extent government intervention isn't necessary to constrain individual behavior.
Thus, the advance of value-free social science is related to a decrease in government intervention. Because value-free science provides that information (scientific knowledge) which causes the individual to abstain from harmful acts without the need to resort to government intervention.
What is needed in the ethical realm of human action is not more normative theories. What is needed in the ethical realm of action is value-free science that can demonstrate how various ethical actions (for example, coercion and dishonesty) harm the interests of those who utilize these social means.
As in the economic realm of human action, if science can demonstrate the necessary consequences of ethical acts, then actors can be expected to abstain from specific types of harmful ethical acts of their own accord, and without the need to resort to government intervention.
This does not eliminate harmful social acts absolutely. But it diminishes harmful social acts without the need for government intervention.
To the extent we cannot tell the actor: Your intended act X will harm your own interests...
Then, if we wish him to abstain from act X, we must say to him: If you undertake act X, we will harm your interests...
This latter is essentially government, i.e., threatened punishment.
Thus, what is needed is to extend the science envisioned by Menger and Mises beyond the catallactic realm of human action (those actions conceiveable in terms of exchange ratios and money prices), and into other realms of human action such as the ethical realm. The advance of Austrian School theoretical science beyond economics goes hand in hand with freedom (non-intervention) in the ethical (political) realm of human action as opposed to merely freedom in the economic (catallactic) realm of human action.
In other words, instead of only having freedom in the economic realm (freedom to buy and sell), we desire freedom in the ethical/political realm (freedom to politically associate). And this can happen when people abstain more and more from harmful ethical actions such as dishonesty and coercion, of their own accord, because they believe these actions harm themselves. This is why Menger's exact science and Mises's praxeology are important.
Conza88, some really good quotes and analysis.
Adam Knott: ...then people abstain from harmful acts peacefully, and of their own accord, since they believe the acts would harm themselves (would be detrimental to their own interests).
...then people abstain from harmful acts peacefully, and of their own accord, since they believe the acts would harm themselves (would be detrimental to their own interests).
yes - in liberty people incline to do such things. When there is liberty there is peace.
Adam Knott: What is needed in the ethical realm of human action is not more normative theories. What is needed in the ethical realm of action is value-free science that can demonstrate how various ethical actions (for example, coercion and dishonesty) harm the interests of those who utilize these social means.
And what would such a theory based on the consequences of coercion, dishonesty pronounce as its contraieties?
Adam Knott: If you undertake act X, we will harm your interests... This latter is essentially government, i.e., threatened punishment.
If you undertake act X, we will harm your interests...
The use of the word "government" in this instance is a drawback that excludes any type of justice in a free society. It muddies what you are trying to say. I suggest more clarity on your part here. You point out that criminals will be around in a free society and I ask what else does one do to criminals other than stop them by enacting self-defense (which has various forms that include simply verbally stating, "Stop" all the way on the other end of the spectrum of needing to apply violence to them before they murder an innocent) and then the following appropiate repercussions ie. ostracized, paying a fine, etc...
Even saying "stop" to an innocent child may prevent them from mingling with the wrong crowd. That need not be construed as a monopoly or a governmental action on a child's life. That need not be construed that the child is even a criminal. That's merely called good parenting.
Adam Knott: And this can happen when people abstain more and more from harmful ethical actions such as dishonesty and coercion, of their own accord, because they believe these actions harm themselves. This is why Menger's exact science and Mises's praxeology are important.
And this can happen when people abstain more and more from harmful ethical actions such as dishonesty and coercion, of their own accord, because they believe these actions harm themselves. This is why Menger's exact science and Mises's praxeology are important.
A good education is one way of preventing a person from going off-course from their own individual moral compass. In liberty with good guidance, a developing individual has the opportunity to discover their own good path in life.
Conza88: trulib:Abortion and capital punishment are two issues where it is not clear what the 'correct' libertarian answer is. In Rothbard's system, if abortion is allowed by the 'single legal code', then any courts not allowing abortion are outlaw courts. And that's complete bs. It's "BASIC Law code" which is as simple as "(requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property)" - the strawmanners have added the word single to try make their fallacious point.
Here, again, is the quote by Rothbard: "...the basic Law Code...would have to be agreed upon by all judicial agencies..." "Any agencies that transgressed the basic...code would be open outlaws and aggressors..." (The Ethics of Liberty, p. 236-237)
You're right - he doesn't say single. But he says "the", meaning only one. And by saying all judicial agencies have to agree, he is implying that there are no variations between different courts' legal codes (only their interpretation of it).
How much detail is there in the basic legal code in your view? You say it could be simply requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property but this depends on what is considered a person's rightful property. I think Rothbard meant property meaning rightful property as he defines it (acquired by homesteading, production or voluntary exchange).
So what if a court wanted to have a different rule for defining rightful property - for example, suppose they believe in Rothbard's rules in all cases except water. This court believes, for some reason, that water is always the "property of the Earth" - so if A takes some water from B, this is simply not a crime, because B has no better claim to the water than A, in the view of this court. Now - would Rothbard call this an outlaw court? I think he would, even though this court is abiding by the basic legal code (it simply has a different definition of invasion/aggression/property).
If the basic legal code does not define what rightful property is, then a court can define it any way it wants. In this case, I don't see how it is possible to have an outlaw court (they're all just 'different' courts), and I don't see what the courts would be 'agreeing' to. Surely Rothbard meant for the legal code to be more narrow, namely requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property according to the libertarian definitions of property and invade.
Without this stipulation, the basic legal code is a non-concept. As wilderness pointed out here...
wilderness: The problem is property rights exist. They are a metaphysical fact. It would be the theory of property rights because of the ever-growing episteme of the world. That theory of property rights may vary. You gave theories about property rights. Both of the above "legal codes" you put in parenthesis are theories that both can apply to property rights.
The problem is property rights exist. They are a metaphysical fact. It would be the theory of property rights because of the ever-growing episteme of the world. That theory of property rights may vary. You gave theories about property rights. Both of the above "legal codes" you put in parenthesis are theories that both can apply to property rights.
... any legal code can be framed in terms of property rights. Every legal code will be based on a version of the NAP. It all depends on how property rights are defined.
So - my question to you is. Is the basic legal code:
Conza88:Have you read No More Military Socialism? I don't think you have.
I hadn't. Thank you for the link.
Conza88:Do You Hate the State?
This one I've read. I agree with most of it. I hate the State, and I think Rothbard's arguments for libertarianism are stronger than Friedman's. I don't see how it's relevant to this discussion though.
Conza88: trulib:Isn't that what we'd expect - that the laws of a soceity reflect the values of the individuals in that society. Not natural laws, or natural rights (normative).Sharia Law? Hell no.
So if a bunch of people in Rothbardia want to live under Sharia law, can they? Will the libertarian courts just call the Sharia courts "outlaws"? Or will there be a Friedmanite bargaining process where two courts try to outbid each other over whether cases between their respective clients are tried under libertarian law or Sharia law?
Conza88:but what about Sharia Law and other instances of natural rights / human rights being violated by the legal system as being supported by the culture / society, do you have any political ethical objections?
Of course. But what do you propose to do about it? Use force to make them live under libertarian law, or leave them be and stick to persuasion?
trulib:So if a bunch of people in Rothbardia want to live under Sharia law, can they?
sure, viz. each other.
trulib:Will the libertarian courts just call the Sharia courts "outlaws"?
trulib:Or will there be a Friedmanite bargaining process where two courts try to outbid each other over whether cases between their respective clients are tried under libertarian law or Sharia law?
the bargaining between those who would wish to be unjust and those who would be treated justly should only flow one way. that is, the prima-facie unjust actors, could hope to make their actions just by offering to pay the other parties as compensation to allow them to do the act, and if they strike a deal they will succeed to perform the acts within the mode of justice, else they must refrain or be unjust.
trulib:Use force to make them live under libertarian law, or leave them be and stick to persuasion?
if sharia customers want to stone adulterers signed up to libertarian courts then i do propose that there will be occasions when force would be legitimately used against them. this is no more suprising than to say that robinson crusue and man friday, if one were to try to kill the other, the would be victim would apply defensive force *in justice*
trulib: wilderness: The problem is property rights exist. They are a metaphysical fact. It would be the theory of property rights because of the ever-growing episteme of the world. That theory of property rights may vary. You gave theories about property rights. Both of the above "legal codes" you put in parenthesis are theories that both can apply to property rights. ... any legal code can be framed in terms of property rights. Every legal code will be based on a version of the NAP. It all depends on how property rights are defined. So - my question to you is. Is the basic legal code: Narrow - requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property according to the libertarian definitions of property and invade - in which case, any court deviating from libertarian principles is an "outlaw court". or Broad - requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property - in which case, what is it the courts are agreeing to exactly (since every legal code fits this basic legal code)? And how could a court ever be an "outlaw court"?
What I was pointing out is that 'property right' is a legal code. Understanding property begins byt theorizing upon what 'mine and thine' is. I say theorizing because no matter the origin of how ethics arises ie. moral feelings, god-given, or thoughts etc... what we know is what we are talking about here. The distinction between mine and thine is a distinction between two differing properties ie. his property, her property, etc... What we know about 'mine and thine' - the theory that tries to determine and thus deliberate upon the metaphysical fact that there is a 'mine and thine' is where variance may happen. Let me focus on your two questions here and see what I think.
Narrow - I would say the evalution of any particular court to be identified as a "outlaw court" would be a court that deviates from property rights. Hypothetically speaking, but also based on a prior, a court may be identified as "outlaw" by free marketers who may find the service provided by the court to be at odds with their individual desire to retain a free society. They simply may not shop there. Of course if the "outlaw court" further proves it's actions are at odds with the free society by overt coercion, then self-defense is appropiate to stop the growing threat. This would all hopefully, thus the hypothetical based on principles of what a free society is, be stopped by the free market process before any conflict - way before - any conflict happens. The free market doesn't like it's service and over time it loses profit and simply dissolves. If some grand conspiracy is ever able to get off the ground before market forces stop any outlaw for that matter, then self-defense is an appropiate last resort.
Broad - An outlaw court would deviate from what a free society has deliberated upon, that is as long as enough people are present to evade with a free market process or if necessary self-defense to make a difference in detering a criminal, in this case a court that has deviated from what enough liberty-minded/hearted, people deliberate upon.
In both the narrow and broad approach the deliberation upon what is appropiately considered liberty, justice, and retains the aspiring effort of what a free market/society is, such a deliberation is considered by any number of individuals. What is understood as an "outlaw court" in the narrow and broad is deliberated upon a knowledgable society that has come to terms as to what the retainment of liberty requires. It is the passing of ideas, hugs not thugs, and profitable exchanges between individuals that shape the growing theory as to what 'mine and thine' is. The innovation of the computer is one example that obviously historical clarification and theorizing will not shed light on. Property rights are a beginning of the process in determining what is 'mine and thine' on the internet, but theorizing and applying this is as new as the computer and internet itself.
Did that answer your questions? If not I apologize and maybe another go might be necessary, let me know.
trulib: Here, again, is the quote by Rothbard: "...the basic Law Code...would have to be agreed upon by all judicial agencies..." "Any agencies that transgressed the basic...code would be open outlaws and aggressors..." (The Ethics of Liberty, p. 236-237) You're right - he doesn't say single. But he says "the", meaning only one. And by saying all judicial agencies have to agree, he is implying that there are no variations between different courts' legal codes (only their interpretation of it). ...it could be simply requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property but this depends on what is considered a person's rightful property. I think Rothbard meant property meaning rightful property as he defines it (acquired by homesteading, production or voluntary exchange). So what if a court wanted to have a different rule for defining rightful property - for example, .... Now - would Rothbard call this an outlaw court? I think he would, even though this court is abiding by the basic legal code (it simply has a different definition of invasion/aggression/property). If the basic legal code does not define what rightful property is, then a court can define it any way it wants. In this case, I don't see how it is possible to have an outlaw court (they're all just 'different' courts), and I don't see what the courts would be 'agreeing' to. Surely Rothbard meant for the legal code to be more narrow, namely requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property according to the libertarian definitions of property and invade. Without this stipulation, the basic legal code is a non-concept.... ... any legal code can be framed in terms of property rights. Every legal code will be based on a version of the NAP. It all depends on how property rights are defined. So - my question to you is. Is the basic legal code: Narrow - requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property according to the libertarian definitions of property and invade - in which case, any court deviating from libertarian principles is an "outlaw court". or Broad - requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property - in which case, what is it the courts are agreeing to exactly (since every legal code fits this basic legal code)? And how could a court ever be an "outlaw court"?
...it could be simply requiring that no one invade any one else's person and property but this depends on what is considered a person's rightful property. I think Rothbard meant property meaning rightful property as he defines it (acquired by homesteading, production or voluntary exchange).
So what if a court wanted to have a different rule for defining rightful property - for example, .... Now - would Rothbard call this an outlaw court? I think he would, even though this court is abiding by the basic legal code (it simply has a different definition of invasion/aggression/property).
Without this stipulation, the basic legal code is a non-concept....
Trulib:
These are all valid points. And the point I've been trying to make is that we don't even have to go outside of libertarianism to make your point. Because there is no unanimity about what constitutes property and aggression even within libertarianism.
Rothbard's early associate, Ayn Rand, believed that both patents and copyrights were legitimate property, and anyone violating them would be an aggressor. Rothbard himself believed that only copyrights were legitimate property, and one is only an aggressor if one violates a copyright, but not if one violates a patent. Now, followers of Rothbard believe that the very institutions of patent and copyright are themselves a form of aggression, and that one is not an aggressor for violating either a patent or a copyright.
So here are three different definitions of what constitutes property and aggression. These constitute, in essence, three different legal codes. And this is not only within libertarianism. The definition of property and aggression differs significantly amongst associates and followers of Rothbard himself. There is no agreed upon libertarian definition of property and aggression. It depends on which libertarian we are referring to.
(here, we need not consider all the other possible libertarian-related schools or philosophies, such as anti-property anarchists, anti-hierarchy anarchists, etc... They will all have their own ideas and normative theories on what constitutes "just property" and what constitutes "aggression")
There simply is no agreed upon libertarian legal code. There are many factions and schools within libertarianism and anarchism, and each have their own notions of just property, of aggression, of justice, fairness, morality, immorality, etc....
nirgrahamUK: trulib:Or will there be a Friedmanite bargaining process where two courts try to outbid each other over whether cases between their respective clients are tried under libertarian law or Sharia law? the bargaining between those who would wish to be unjust and those who would be treated justly should only flow one way. that is, the prima-facie unjust actors, could hope to make their actions just by offering to pay the other parties as compensation to allow them to do the act, and if they strike a deal they will succeed to perform the acts within the mode of justice, else they must refrain or be unjust. trulib:Use force to make them live under libertarian law, or leave them be and stick to persuasion? if sharia customers want to stone adulterers signed up to libertarian courts then i do propose that there will be occasions when force would be legitimately used against them. this is no more suprising than to say that robinson crusue and man friday, if one were to try to kill the other, the would be victim would apply defensive force *in justice*
But the determination of prima-facie unjust depends on what "just" means. The libertarian court will say its prima-facie unjust to stone adulterers. The Sharia court will say its prima-facie unjust for adulterers to object to being stoned, because stoning is fair punishment for adultery. I agree this will be resolved by one party paying the other party off in some sense - i.e. the Friedman bargaining process. But it could easily be the case that the adulterer pays compensation to the stoners to refrain, if adultery is generally considered unjust (i.e. if the Sharia courts are able to outbid the libertarian courts, which may be the case if Sharia law is more popular than libertarian law).
Adam Knott: Rothbard's early associate, Ayn Rand, believed that both patents and copyrights were legitimate property, and anyone violating them would be an aggressor. Rothbard himself believed that only copyrights were legitimate property, and one is only an aggressor if one violates a copyright, but not if one violates a patent. Now, followers of Rothbard believe that the very institutions of patent and copyright are themselves a form of aggression, and that one is not an aggressor for violating either a patent or a copyright. So here are three different definitions of what constitutes property and aggression.
So here are three different definitions of what constitutes property and aggression.
I underlined what the legal code is. You even point out in your own statement that all three are referring to property. It is the theorizing of property rights that is happening.
Adam Knott: These constitute, in essence, three different legal codes.
These constitute, in essence, three different legal codes.
No. These are three different theories based on one legal code ie. property rights. You even said yourself all three are based on property.
wilderness: Adam Knott: Rothbard's early associate, Ayn Rand, believed that both patents and copyrights were legitimate property, and anyone violating them would be an aggressor. Rothbard himself believed that only copyrights were legitimate property, and one is only an aggressor if one violates a copyright, but not if one violates a patent. Now, followers of Rothbard believe that the very institutions of patent and copyright are themselves a form of aggression, and that one is not an aggressor for violating either a patent or a copyright. So here are three different definitions of what constitutes property and aggression. I underlined what the legal code is. You even point out in your own statement that all three are referring to property. It is the theorizing of property rights that is happening. Adam Knott: These constitute, in essence, three different legal codes. No. These are three different theories based on one legal code ie. property rights. You even said yourself all three are based on property.
wilderness-
What legal code isn't based on property rights? In Rand's theory an inventor owns his idea. In Sharia theory men own their wives. In a hypothetical redhead-killing theory redheads do not own their own bodies. All these are property rights theories. You asked this yourself earlier the thread. Do you think the answer is that no legal code not based on property rights can conceivably exist?