Laughing Man:Do you mean AE [ Austrian economics ]?
AC as in anarcho-capitalism
Conza88: Normative Rights -> Legal Rights -> Defacto Rights Natural Law -> Natural Rights -> Natural Justice It would be good if you could address the other questions.
Normative Rights -> Legal Rights -> Defacto Rights
Natural Law -> Natural Rights -> Natural Justice
It would be good if you could address the other questions.
This I can address, but I don't see how any of the rest addresses what I was saying.
Now, natural justice (de facto enforcement of natural law) may be necessary in order to have free markets. I accept this. I also agree that if everyone accepts natural law as Rothbard conceives of it, then there will most likely be natural justice, resulting in free markets. What I don't agree with, is that this implies that natural law must be accepted in order to have free markets. In other words, it's possible to have an enforcement situation that happens to coincide with natural justice without people actually accepting natural law. Rothbard seems to imply this is not the case. That's all I mean to point out.
Why anarchy fails
AJ: Now, natural justice (de facto enforcement of natural law) may be necessary in order to have free markets. I accept this. I also agree that if everyone accepts natural law as Rothbard conceives of it, then there will most likely be natural justice, resulting in free markets. What I don't agree with, is that this implies that natural law must be accepted in order to have free markets. In other words, it's possible to have an enforcement situation that happens to coincide with natural justice without people actually accepting natural law. Rothbard seems to imply this is not the case. That's all I mean to point out.
Do you mean an individual doesn't explicitly accept natural law, but they affirm it by their actions anyways? That's still an affirmation. It doesn't matter if a person knows it or not. If any person doesn't initiate physical aggression against another ie. property, then such a person knowingly or not has followed what natural law of human nature is. Such a person does not need to think it through, but those that know would be able to point out that such a person hasn't violated property rights, ie. said person has instead affirmed property rights. The person hasn't refused nor rejected property rights they have affirmed their existence. Again whether they know it or not.
For instance, I may not know that such and such a rock is sandstone, but a geologist is able to say it is certainly a sandstone. It's what a person knows and focuses upon in their endeavors in life. That's the whole point of liberty for any person that wants to live. To be able to live their life no matter what division of labor the individual partakes in or what leisure time they have and pick and choose to do with it.
I'm really trying to dialogue with you on this. Please don't think I'm being confrontational on this point. Understand what you are saying beats around the bush a lot from where I sit.
AJ:Now, natural justice (de facto enforcement of natural law) may be necessary in order to have free markets. I accept this. I also agree that if everyone accepts natural law as Rothbard conceives of it, then there will most likely be natural justice, resulting in free markets.
Good.
AJ:What I don't agree with, is that this implies that natural law must be accepted in order to have free markets. In other words, it's possible to have an enforcement situation that happens to coincide with natural justice without people actually accepting natural law. Rothbard seems to imply this is not the case. That's all I mean to point out.
And yet... Rothbard has acknowledge this - so really... you're not pointing out anything at all.
"A great defect in Leoni's thesis is the absence of any criterion for the content of the judge-made law. It is a happy accident of history that a great deal of private law and common law is libertarian – that they elaborate the means of preserving one's person and property against "invasion" – but a good deal of the old law was antilibertarian, and certainly custom can not always be relied on to be consistent with liberty. Ancient custom, after all, can be a frail bulwark indeed; if customs are oppressive of liberty, must they still serve as the legal framework permanently, or at least for centuries? Suppose ancient custom decrees that virgins be sacrificed to the gods by the light of the full moon, or that redheads be slaughtered as demons? What then? May not custom be subject to a higher test – reason?
The common law contains such antilibertarian elements as the law of "conspiracy," and the law of "seditious libel" (which outlawed criticism of the government), largely injected into the law by kings and their minions. And perhaps the weakest aspect of the volume is Leoni's veneration for the Roman law; if the Roman law provided a paradise of liberty, how account for the crushing taxation, the periodic inflation and currency debasement, the repressive network of controls and "welfare" measures, the unlimited imperial authority, of the Roman Empire?"
AJ: but I don't see how any of the rest addresses what I was saying.
What don't you understand? You profess to be utilitarian and value free, yet within that contains normative and value statements - which you won't acknowledge, nor even address.
"Oh no, the excerpt DOES address that. Every de facto/ legal right has a set of NORMATIVE "ought to" propositions within it. Here it is again, to refresh yours and others memories."
Law as a Normative Discipline - Murray Rothbard
If ethics is a normative discipline that identifies and classifies certain sets of actions as good or evil, right or wrong, then tort or criminal law is a subset of ethics identifying certain actions as appropriate for using violence against them. The law says that action X should be illegal, and therefore should be combated by the violence of the law. The law is a set of "ought" or normative propositions.
Many writers and jurists have claimed the law is a value-free, "positive" discipline. Of course it is possible simply to list, classify and analyze existing law without going further into saying what the law should or should not be.[2] But that sort of jurist is not fulfilling his essential task. Since the law is ultimately a set of normative commands, the true jurist or legal philosopher has not completed his task until he sets forth what the law should be, difficult though that might be. If he does not, then he necessarily abdicates his task in favor of individuals or groups untrained in legal principles, who may lay down their commands by sheer fiat and arbitrary caprice.
Thus, the Austinian jurists proclaim that the king, or sovereign, is supposed to lay down the law, and the law is purely a set of commands emanating from his will. But then the question arises: On what principles does or should the king operate?[3] Is it ever possible to say that the king is issuing a "bad" or "improper" decree? Once the jurist admits that, he is going beyond arbitrary will to begin to frame a set of normative principles that should be guiding the sovereign. And then he is back to normative law.
Modern variants of positive legal theory state that the law should be what the legislators say it is. But what principles are to guide the legislators? And if we say that the legislators should be the spokesmen for their constituents, then we simply push the problem one step back, and ask: What principles are supposed to guide the voters? Or is the law, and therefore everyone's freedom of action, to be ruled by arbitrary caprice of millions rather than of one man or a few?[4]
Even the older concept that the law should be determined by tribal or common-law judges, who are merely interpreting the custom of the tribe or society, cannot escape normative judgments basic to the theory. Why must the rules of custom be obeyed? If tribal custom requires the murder of all people over six feet tall, must this custom be obeyed regardless? Why cannot reason lay down a set of principles to challenge and overthrow mere custom and tradition? Similarly, why may it not be used to overthrow mere arbitrary caprice by king or public?
As we shall see, tort or criminal law is a set of prohibitions against the invasion of, or aggression against, private property rights; that is, spheres of freedom of action by each individual. But if that is the case, then the implication of the command, "Thou shall not interfere with A's property right," is that A's property right is just and therefore should not be invaded. Legal prohibitions, therefore, far from being in some sense value-free, actually imply a set of theories about justice, in particular the just allocation of property rights and property titles. "Justice" is nothing if not a normative concept.
Notes
[2] Ronald Dworkin, however, has pointed out that even positive legal analysis necessarily involves moral questions and moral standards. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), chaps. 2, 3, 12, 13. Also see Charles Fried, "The Law of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History," Journal of Legal Studies (March 1980): 340.
[3] The Austinians, of course, are also smuggling in a normative axiom into their positive theory: The law should be what the king says it is. This axiom is unanalyzed and ungrounded in any set of ethical principles.
[4] Again, these modern, democratic variants of positive legal theory smuggle in the unsupported normative axiom that statutes should be laid down by whatever the legislators or the voters wish to do. [Or market? Like redheads, eh? For what are consumers but more than one vote eh?]
"De facto law (rights) refers to law (rights) that are actually enforced."
Why must the law be obeyed or enforced? If the law requires the murder of all people over six feet tall, must this be obeyed regardless? Why cannot reason lay down a set of principles to challenge and overthrow mere custom and tradition? [or legal positivism] Similarly, why may it not be used to overthrow mere arbitrary caprice by king or public?
Within those statements are normative ones.
wilderness: z1235, i know you are basically angry. I obviously can't say that for sure, but from most of your recent posts my intuition is taking a more than wild stab at it. You haven't been able to argue accept most recently in favor of your explicit consent that 'initiating physical aggression is an axiom' in that pin stand thread, which is unfortunate that you (A) would pervert what an axiom is (B) make humans out to be pure violence (C) argue for initiating coercion. I ask why you attack my or anybody's free-will?
z1235, i know you are basically angry. I obviously can't say that for sure, but from most of your recent posts my intuition is taking a more than wild stab at it. You haven't been able to argue accept most recently in favor of your explicit consent that 'initiating physical aggression is an axiom' in that pin stand thread, which is unfortunate that you (A) would pervert what an axiom is (B) make humans out to be pure violence (C) argue for initiating coercion.
I ask why you attack my or anybody's free-will?
Wilderness, I honestly want to understand you, but sometimes it feels (to me) like you speak a language from another planet. Judging by your "understanding" of my arguments and positions (above), it seems that the situation is mutual. Sadly, we may have to consider that, perhaps, some dialogues were just not meant to be.
Z.
I. Ryan:In economics, each proposition consists of "if X, Y". To use that information to form a political ideology, you must add an explicit or (more often) implicit assumption of "I want Y" or "we want Y".1. If X, Y.2. We want Y to exist.3. Therefore, we should want to cause X.The "normative" aspect exists outside economics. The "normative" aspect involves the determination of what "we" want.
"For if myself and the retailer are indeed to be free to trade the dollar for the hula hoop without coercive interference by third parties, then this can only be done if these economists will proclaim the justice and the propriety of my original ownership of the dollar and the retailer’s ownership of the hula hoop.In short, for an economist to say that X and Y should be free to trade Good A for Good B unmolested by third parties, he must also say that X legitimately and properly owns Good A and that Y legitimately owns Good B. But this means that the freemarket economist must have some sort of theory of justice in property rights; he can scarcely say that X properly owns Good A without asserting some sort of theory of justice on behalf of such ownership.Suppose, for example, that as I am about to purchase the hula hoop, the information arrives that the retailer had really stolen the hoop from Z. Surely not even the supposedly wertfrei economist can continue to blithely endorse the proposed exchange of ownership titles between myself and the retailer. For now we find that the retailer’s, Y’s, title of ownership is improper and unjust, and that he must be forced to return the hoop to Z, the original owner. The economist can then only endorse the proposed exchange between myself and Z, rather than Y, for the hula hoop, since he has to acknowledge Z as the proper owner of title to the hoop.In short, we have two mutually exclusive claimants to the ownership of the hoop. If the economist agrees to endorse only Z’s sale of the hoop, then he is implicitly agreeing that Z has the just, and Y the unjust, claim to the hoop. And even if he continues to endorse the sale by Y, then he is implicitly maintaining another theory of property titles: namely, that theft is justified. Whichever way he decides, the economist cannot escape a judgment, a theory of justice in the ownership of property. Furthermore, the economist is not really finished when he proclaims the injustice or theft and endorses Z’s proper title. For what is the justification for Z’s title to the hoop? Is it only because he is a nonthief?"
- Justice and Property Rights, Egalitarianism a Revolt Against Nature
By the way this isn't just directed at you.
z1235: wilderness: z1235, i know you are basically angry. I obviously can't say that for sure, but from most of your recent posts my intuition is taking a more than wild stab at it. You haven't been able to argue accept most recently in favor of your explicit consent that 'initiating physical aggression is an axiom' in that pin stand thread, which is unfortunate that you (A) would pervert what an axiom is (B) make humans out to be pure violence (C) argue for initiating coercion. I ask why you attack my or anybody's free-will? Wilderness, I honestly want to understand you, but sometimes it feels (to me) like you speak a language from another planet.
Wilderness, I honestly want to understand you, but sometimes it feels (to me) like you speak a language from another planet.
I suggest asking questions, even if you private message people. If you don't understand what other people are talking about sadly that will not help you.
z1235: Judging by your "understanding" of my arguments and positions (above),
Judging by your "understanding" of my arguments and positions (above),
I didn't judge what you said. I repeated near word for word what you have not only said recently but have been working up to. Here's one of your last posts:
"With or without a state, there is not ONE human being that has ever lived on this planet toward whom force hasn't been initiated. Force/aggression WILL be initiated, period. Take it as an axiom, if you prefer."
---
maybe you use concepts you don't understand. that doesn't help out at all. if you don't understand others and then don't understand what words you are using, again, sadly that doesn't help.
z1235: ...it seems that the situation is mutual.
...it seems that the situation is mutual.
How does liberty initiate physical aggression against you when the very term liberty is the contrariety or opposite of initiated coercion? How does liberty threat you?
z1235: Sadly, we may have to consider that, perhaps, some dialogues were just not meant to be.
Sadly, we may have to consider that, perhaps, some dialogues were just not meant to be.
You are giving up in life way too easily, especially when the other person - me - is all about dialogue and wants to be on the side of justice in which initiated coercion against humans is looked down upon as something to live without and thereby to a more properous, enjoyable civil society.
peace
wilderness:Do you mean an individual doesn't explicitly accept natural law, but they affirm it by their actions anyways? That's still an affirmation. It doesn't matter if a person knows it or not. If any person doesn't initiate physical aggression against another ie. property, then such a person knowingly or not has followed what natural law of human nature is. Such a person does not need to think it through, but those that know would be able to point out that such a person hasn't violated property rights, ie. said person has instead affirmed property rights. The person hasn't refused nor rejected property rights they have affirmed their existence. Again whether they know it or not.
If I punish someone for stealing, do I affirm natural law? Or do I also affirm Sharia law, Moses's commandments, Masai tribal law (which all may prescribe the same enforcement and punishment for the same act)? I say I affirm none of these. My actions simply happen to coincide with their prescriptions.
Conza88: 1) Austrian Economics is explanatory - if x happens, y will happen. 2) Libertarianism deals with political philosophy and answers the question; what should be law.3) But even the utilitarian economist who attempts wertfrei (value free) "or at the least to confine their advocacy to the processes of trade and exchange, cannot be maintained." !
1) Austrian Economics is explanatory - if x happens, y will happen.
2) Libertarianism deals with political philosophy and answers the question; what should be law.3) But even the utilitarian economist who attempts wertfrei (value free) "or at the least to confine their advocacy to the processes of trade and exchange, cannot be maintained." !
Do you mean #1 cannot be maintained ?
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Conza88: AJ:What I don't agree with, is that this implies that natural law must be accepted in order to have free markets. In other words, it's possible to have an enforcement situation that happens to coincide with natural justice without people actually accepting natural law. Rothbard seems to imply this is not the case. That's all I mean to point out. And yet... Rothbard has acknowledge this - so really... you're not pointing out anything at all. "A great defect in Leoni's thesis is the absence of any criterion for the content of the judge-made law. It is a happy accident of history that a great deal of private law and common law is libertarian – that they elaborate the means of preserving one's person and property against "invasion" – but a good deal of the old law was antilibertarian, and certainly custom can not always be relied on to be consistent with liberty.
"A great defect in Leoni's thesis is the absence of any criterion for the content of the judge-made law. It is a happy accident of history that a great deal of private law and common law is libertarian – that they elaborate the means of preserving one's person and property against "invasion" – but a good deal of the old law was antilibertarian, and certainly custom can not always be relied on to be consistent with liberty.
He implies that he understands the concept here, but that makes it all the more puzzling that he would say, "Any discussion of policy is inherently normative. You can't have free markets unless you have property rights." In particular, why would a policy discussion have to be normative in order to allow for free markets, when all that is necessary for free markets is for the policy to actually enforce property rights? This is my only point, and I don't see it being addressed. It may be a fluke, and it may be that he was speaking in an interview and simply misspoke. I just found it a curious thing to say.
Conza88:You profess to be utilitarian and value free...
I do?
...
The rest you quoted talks about why legal rights imply normative rights, but I haven't mentioned legal rights. I'm talking about de facto rights. I'm not saying "Legal rights don't imply normative rights"; I'm saying "de facto rights don't imply normative rights."
AJ: wilderness:Do you mean an individual doesn't explicitly accept natural law, but they affirm it by their actions anyways? That's still an affirmation. It doesn't matter if a person knows it or not. If any person doesn't initiate physical aggression against another ie. property, then such a person knowingly or not has followed what natural law of human nature is. Such a person does not need to think it through, but those that know would be able to point out that such a person hasn't violated property rights, ie. said person has instead affirmed property rights. The person hasn't refused nor rejected property rights they have affirmed their existence. Again whether they know it or not. If I punish someone for stealing, do I affirm natural law?
If I punish someone for stealing, do I affirm natural law?
Punish, and if you think it is wrong that is affirming natural law.
AJ: Or do I also affirm Sharia law, Moses's commandments, Masai tribal law (which all may prescribe the same enforcement and punishment for the same act)?
Or do I also affirm Sharia law, Moses's commandments, Masai tribal law (which all may prescribe the same enforcement and punishment for the same act)?
maybe. It doesn't matter if it's called Sharia Law, etc... If these laws ie. Moses's, etc... denounce initiating physical aggression then any one person practicing these again ie Masai, etc... are affirming natural law.
AJ: I say I affirm none of these. My actions simply happen to coincide with their prescriptions.
I say I affirm none of these. My actions simply happen to coincide with their prescriptions.
Coinciding is affirmation so you do affirm natural law.
"prescriptions" is a red herring
Also don't be disingenuous, unfortunately like Adam Knott. I respond to your statements directed towards me, and have always answered your questions to keep a good dialogue going. Please answer this question from this earlier post.
AJ:He implies that he understands the concept here
That's because he does.
AJ:but that makes it all the more puzzling that he would say, "Any discussion of policy is inherently normative. You can't have free markets unless you have property rights."
It's not puzzling at all when you realise what is meant. It is clarified and crystallized it all of his writings... (i.e Law as a Normative Discipline), yet you attempt to use one sentence from an interview, as a basis for refuting it? It's most amusing. Much like the attempt by others to call it "monopolistic" / "unified legal code" / "monolithic".. but that didn't last too long, did it? lol
"You can't have free markets unless you have [PRIVATE] property rights"
"The key to the theory of liberty is the establishment of the rights of private property for each individual's justified sphere of free action can only be set forth if his rights of property are analyzed and established." - Preface Ethics of Liberty
How is that not addressing it? What is to address? Is your curiosity satisfied? "You cannot have free markets without [private] property rights" - Rothbard... you can have markets with property rights, but they are not free! "Any discussion of policy is inherently normative." - Rothbard. True and still stands.
AJ:I do?
You don't? AJ:The rest you quoted talks about why legal rights imply normative rights, but I haven't mentioned legal rights. I'm talking about de facto rights. I'm not saying "Legal rights don't imply normative rights"; I'm saying "de facto rights don't imply normative rights."Ahh.... lol
AJ:The rest you quoted talks about why legal rights imply normative rights, but I haven't mentioned legal rights. I'm talking about de facto rights. I'm not saying "Legal rights don't imply normative rights"; I'm saying "de facto rights don't imply normative rights."
AJ:De facto law (rights) refers to law (rights) that are actually enforced.
Yes and my point is de facto rights necessarily DO imply normative propositions - and everything above addresses that. That which you are still yet to address. I mean, should I post it again? Do you have anything to say about the 'Justice and Property Rights' excerpt above?
Adam Knott:Do you mean #1 cannot be maintained ?
No.. and why that is, is covered here; Praxeology, Value Judgments and Public Policy
And I quote:
To our contention that the sciences, including praxeology, are in themselves value-free, it might be objected that it is values or ethics that direct the interest of the scientist in discovering the specific laws of his discipline. There is no question about the fact that medical science is currently far more interested in discovering a cure for cancer than in searching for a cure for some disease that might only have existed in parts of the Ukraine in the eighteenth century. But the unquestioned fact that values and ethics are important in guiding the attention of scientists to specific problems is irrelevant to the fact that the laws and disciplines of the science itself are value- free. Similarly, Crusoe on his desert island may not be particularly interested in investigating the science of bridge building, but the laws of that science itself are value- free.
Ethical questions, of course, play a far smaller role in applied medicine than they do in politics or political economy. A basic reason for this is that generally the physician and his patient agree—or are supposed to agree—on the end in view: the advancement of the patient's health. The physician can advise the patient without engaging in an intense discussion of their mutual values and goals. Of course, even here, the situation is not always that clear-cut. Two examples will reveal how ethical conflicts mayarise: first, the patient needs a new kidney to continue to live; is it ethical for the physician and/or the patient to murder a third party and extract his kidney? Second, is it ethical for the physician to pursue medical research for the possible good of humanity while treating his patient as an unwitting guinea pig? These are both cases where valuational and ethical conflicts enter the picture.
In economic and political questions, in contrast, ethical and value conflicts abound and permeate society. It is therefore impermissible for the economist or other social scientist to act as if he were a physician, who can generally assume complete agreement on values and goals with his patient and who can therefore prescribe accordingly and with no compunction. Since, then, praxeology provides no ethics whatsoever but only the data for people to pursue their various values and goals, it follows that it is impermissible for the economist qua economist to make any ethical or value pronouncements or to advocate any social or political policy whatsoever.The trouble is that most economists burn to make ethical pronouncements and to advocate political policies—to say, in effect, that policy X is "good" and policy Y "bad." Properly, an economist may only make such pronouncements in one of two ways: either (1) to insert his own arbitrary, ad hoc personal value judgments and advocate policy clearly on that basis; or (2) to develop and defend a coherent ethical system and make his pronouncement, not as an economist, but as an ethicist, who also uses the data of economic science. But to do the latter, he must have thought deeply about ethical problems and also believe in ethics as an objective or rational discipline—and precious few economists have done either. That leaves him with the first choice: to make crystal clear that he is speaking not as an economist but as a private citizen who is making his own confessedly arbitrary and ad hoc value pronouncements.
Most economists pay lip service to the impermissibility of making ethical pronouncements qua economist, but in practice they either ignore their own criteria or engage in elaborate procedures to evade them. Why? We can think of two possible reasons. One is the disreputable reason that, if Professor Doakes advocates policy X and basically does so as an economics professor, he will be listened to and followed with awe and respect; whereas if he advocates policy X as plain Joe Doakes, the mass of the citizenry maycome to the perfectly valid conclusion that their own arbitrary and ad hoc value judgments are just as good as his, and that therefore there is no particular reason to listen to him at all. A second and more responsible reason might be that the economist, despite his professed disbelief in a science of ethics, realizes deep down that there is something unfortunate—we might even say bad—about unscientific and arbitrary value judgments in public policy, and so he tries desperately to square the circle, in order to be able to advocate policy in some sort of scientific manner.While squaring this circle is impossible, as we shall consider further, I believe that this putative uneasiness at making arbitrary value judgments is correct. While it is surely admirable (ethical?) for an economist to distinguish clearly and carefully between the value-free science and his own value judgments, I contend further that it is the responsibility of any scientist, indeed any intellectual, to refrain from any value judgment whatever unless he can support it on the basis of a coherent and defensible ethical system. This means, of course, that those economists who, on whatever grounds, are not prepared to think about and advance an ethical system should strictly refrain from any value pronouncements or policy conclusions at all. This position is of course itself an ethical one. But it relates to the ethical system that is the precondition of all science; for, even though particular scientific laws are themselves value-free, the very procedures of science rest on the ethical norm of honesty and the search for truth; that norm, I believe, includes the responsibility to lend coherence and system to all one's pronouncements including valuational ones. I might add in passing that anyone conceding the necessity of honesty in science ipso facto becomes willy- nilly a believer in objective ethics, but I will leave that point to the ethical subjectivists to grapple with. 2...More usual is an attempt by the economist to place himself in the status of the physician of our foregoing example, that is, as someone who is merely agreeing to or ratifying the values either of a majority in society or of every person in it. But even in these cases, it must be remembered that the physician is in no sense value- free, though he is simply sharing the value of his patient, and that the value of health is so deeply shared that there is no occasion for making it explicit. Nevertheless, the physician does make a value judgment, and, even if every person in society shares the same value and goal, the economist who goes along with such a value is still making a value judgment, even if indeed universally shared. He is still illegitimately going beyond the bounds of the economist per se, and his value judgments must still be supported by rational argument.
Why? Do you think the economist can "escape a judgment, a theory of justice in the ownership of property" in the example from the post you quoted? If so, how?
In short, we have two mutually exclusive claimants to the ownership of the hoop. If the economist agrees to endorse only Z’s sale of the hoop, then he is implicitly agreeing that Z has the just, and Y the unjust, claim to the hoop. And even if he continues to endorse the sale by Y, then he is implicitly maintaining another theory of property titles: namely, that theft is justified. Whichever way he decides, the economist cannot escape a judgment, a theory of justice in the ownership of property. Furthermore, the economist is not really finished when he proclaims the injustice or theft and endorses Z’s proper title. For what is the justification for Z’s title to the hoop? Is it only because he is a nonthief?"
Also, "Value Implications of Economic Theory" - Rothbard, makes it clear.
By the way Adam, did you mean to skip my last post addressed to you? Would be good if you could also address it thanks.
AJ: wilderness: If I punish someone for stealing, do I affirm natural law? Punish, and if you think it is wrong that is affirming natural law.
wilderness: If I punish someone for stealing, do I affirm natural law?
What if I just punish because I think it will be in my interests to do so?
About being disingenuous...I don't think not responding to something that doesn't make sense to me is disingenuous. It's just me choosing not to defend my position. The question you asked earlier was leading, and it also was among set of similar questions that I did address even though I didn't see the point of them. I try (not always succeeding) to only write when I can say something productive, and sometimes I have nothing productive to say - either because there is no content worth responding to or because I have no insight worth taking up thread space for.
AJ: AJ: wilderness: If I punish someone for stealing, do I affirm natural law? Punish, and if you think it is wrong that is affirming natural law. What if I just punish because I think it will be in my interests to do so?
yes; Who's else interest would it be?
AJ: About being disingenuous...I don't think not responding to something that doesn't make sense to me is disingenuous.
About being disingenuous...I don't think not responding to something that doesn't make sense to me is disingenuous.
It is disingenuous when I'm right here talking to you.
AJ: It's just me choosing not to defend my position.
It's just me choosing not to defend my position.
Who said answering a question has to do with defending your position? That's seems to be a leap.
AJ: The question you asked earlier was leading, and it also was among set of similar questions that I did address even though I didn't see the point of them.
The question you asked earlier was leading, and it also was among set of similar questions that I did address even though I didn't see the point of them.
It's not leading. You are actually 'leading' when you say there are other laws, when in fact, you have not given other laws, other than property rights. So are property rights the only law I ask or are you not being upfront about something?
AJ: I try (not always succeeding) to only write when I can say something productive, and sometimes I have nothing productive to say - either because there is no content worth responding to or because I have no insight worth taking up thread space for.
I try (not always succeeding) to only write when I can say something productive, and sometimes I have nothing productive to say - either because there is no content worth responding to or because I have no insight worth taking up thread space for.
it was a yes or no question. You could say I don't know or respond with something else. I mean I'm right here and you ignore what is being discussed in this on-going dialogue. I would understand it more if you dropped the topic altogether and moved on, but you bring up the same issues over and over again. Repeating yourself and when a dialogue with other people is on-going, cause remember you are not the only one in the dialogue fiddling through this, to not handle issues directly but yet to bring them back up when answers or questions are introduced to get through the impasse it isn't appropiate. Something isn't right about what you are doing. It seems dishonest. Maybe it's not simply disingenuous, maybe it's rude. I hope you understand.
Conza88:It's not puzzling at all when you realise what is meant. It is clarified and crystallized it all of his writings... (i.e Law as a Normative Discipline), yet you attempt to use one sentence from an interview, as a basis for refuting it? It's most amusing. Much like the attempt by others to call it "monopolistic" / "unified legal code" / "monolithic".. but that didn't last too long, did it? lol
As I said, maybe he misspoke, I just found it a curious thing to say. As for the monopolistic debate, what do you mean it didn't last too long? The points were made by both sides, and it turned out that the legal code is monopolistic unless you accept objective natural law, but if you accept objective natural law then in some sense it is not monopolistic. I wouldn't say either side was wrong on that one; it just collapses back into the natural law debate.
Conza88: "You can't have free markets unless you have [PRIVATE] property rights" "The key to the theory of liberty is the establishment of the rights of private property for each individual's justified sphere of free action can only be set forth if his rights of property are analyzed and established." - Preface Ethics of Liberty How is that not addressing it? What is to address?
How is that not addressing it? What is to address?
De facto rights. He's not referring to de facto rights here. Or if he is, he contradicts his observation that much of common law throughout history has been libertarian. You keep saying and emphasizing private, but what does that have to do with whether the rights are actually enforced or not?
Conza88:You don't?
I do value my own pursuits.
Conza88:Yes and my point is de facto rights necessarily DO imply normative propositions - and everything above addresses that. That which you are still yet to address. I mean, should I post it again?
1. That quote doesn't address this notion that de facto rights imply normative propositions. 2. I've addressed this notion several times already in this thread. I think what I wrote above is the clearest example of why this isn't the case: If I punish someone for stealing, does it imply Rothbardian property rights, Xeer law, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster Handbook of Moral Precepts (all of which may say that stealing should or can legitimately be punished)? Bottom line: Actions don't necessarily have or imply propositional content.
To further illustrate: If I pet a cat, it's not a statement that I like the cat, that cats are good, etc. I might just be teasing it, or trying to build up static electricity, or practicing for a play, or maybe my hand just accidentally brushed against it in a petting motion. Likewise, if I punish someone for stealing, I might be trying to encourage them to steal more using reverse psychology, I might not actually think stealing is wrong but I just had a bad day and took it out on the thief, I might have just accidentally punished him, or I might have punished him solely out of the desire to discourage him from stealing again (because I don't like being stolen from). None of this is normative, at least not in the sense I presume you intend.
AJ: If I punish someone for stealing, does it imply Rothbardian property rights, Xeer law, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster Handbook of Moral Precepts (all of which may say that stealing should or can legitimately be punished)? Bottom line: Actions don't necessarily have or imply propositional content.
If I punish someone for stealing, does it imply Rothbardian property rights, Xeer law, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster Handbook of Moral Precepts (all of which may say that stealing should or can legitimately be punished)? Bottom line: Actions don't necessarily have or imply propositional content.
It doesn't matter. "All... may say that stealing..." and that's natural law. Natural law doesn't necessarily entail a person to know he or she is holding a sandstone when they in fact are holding a sandstone.
wilderness: AJ: AJ: wilderness: If I punish someone for stealing, do I affirm natural law? Punish, and if you think it is wrong that is affirming natural law. What if I just punish because I think it will be in my interests to do so? yes; Who's else interest would it be?
You haven't said how that affirms natural law.
wilderness:It is disingenuous when I'm right here talking to you.
If you look at my thread history you'll see I often have the last comment at the end of the thread. That means a lot of what I write receives no answer. It doesn't bother me. Conversation will intersect when both parties are interested in that specific content, and both parties have something they consider valuable to say.
wilderness:So are property rights the only law I ask or are you not being upfront about something?
It seems like we've been through this. I recall already answering this question by saying that the question misses the point, because any set of laws could be defined in terms of "property rights." If I give a law that is not explicitly related to property rights, you or me or anyone could respond with a reason why that law is really about "property rights" of some sort, and I would not disagree with that. I would simply say that the type of "property rights" are not always libertarian ones, so it's not relevant to this discussion. I'm pretty sure I already gave the example of how in Sharia law adulterers are to be stoned, and yes that can be defined in terms of the property right that "a woman is her husband's property." But how is that relevant? Even if all laws can be expressed in terms of "property rights" by some oddball definition of them, that doesn't seem to add anything to the present discussion. If, on the other hand, all laws could be expressed in terms of Rothbardian property rights, then that would be relevant point, but that's clearly not the case - Sharia law is one counterexample (among many).
wilderness: AJ: It's just me choosing not to defend my position. Who said answering a question has to do with defending your position? That's seems to be a leap.
I assumed your question was rhetorical, as an attempt to refute my position. Or did you just ask me that out of curiosity?
wilderness:it was a yes or no question. Something isn't right about what you are doing. It seems dishonest. I hope I'm wrong, but you are definitely dancing around and not being straight about something.
All that's happening is I'm allocating my time toward the posts and threads I feel I have the most to contribute to, and/or seem most likely to lead to productive discussion. If someone pointed out a weakness in my position, I would respond to it, and if I don't respond to it then it really just helps my opponents look good, does it not?
Wilderness,
To your edit of the above, I'm sorry if I missed more than a couple of your previous posts while responding to later ones. I felt the content was similar enough that my answer to the latter posts would sufficiently answer your questions. And in some cases I just found the content to be beside the point (and/or already covered) and you posted again, so I only responded to that latter post. If there are any other points I failed to address or answer, feel free to post them.
AJ: wilderness: AJ: AJ: wilderness: If I punish someone for stealing, do I affirm natural law? Punish, and if you think it is wrong that is affirming natural law. What if I just punish because I think it will be in my interests to do so? yes; Who's else interest would it be? You haven't said how that affirms natural law.
yes I have and you have to
AJ: wilderness:It is disingenuous when I'm right here talking to you. If you look at my thread history you'll see I often have the last comment at the end of the thread. That means a lot of what I write receives no answer. It doesn't bother me. Conversation will intersect when both parties are interested in that specific content, and both parties have something they consider valuable to say.
You and I are in a dialogue. Various other posters are in this dialogue, Conza for one. We are responding to each other. This isn't a summary at the end of a thread.
AJ: wilderness:So are property rights the only law I ask or are you not being upfront about something? It seems like we've been through this. I recall already answering this question by saying that the question misses the point,
It seems like we've been through this. I recall already answering this question by saying that the question misses the point,
No it doesn't miss the point.
AJ: ...because any set of laws could be defined in terms of "property rights."
...because any set of laws could be defined in terms of "property rights."
And why is that?
AJ: If I give a law that is not explicitly related to property rights, you or me or anyone could respond with a reason why that law is really about "property rights" of some sort,
If I give a law that is not explicitly related to property rights, you or me or anyone could respond with a reason why that law is really about "property rights" of some sort,
and why is that?
AJ: and I would not disagree with that. I would simply say that the type of "property rights" are not always libertarian ones, so it's not relevant to this discussion.
and I would not disagree with that. I would simply say that the type of "property rights" are not always libertarian ones, so it's not relevant to this discussion.
it is relevant
AJ: I'm pretty sure I already gave the example of how in Sharia law adulterers are to be stoned, and yes that can be defined in terms of the property right that "a woman is her husband's property." But how is that relevant?
I'm pretty sure I already gave the example of how in Sharia law adulterers are to be stoned, and yes that can be defined in terms of the property right that "a woman is her husband's property." But how is that relevant?
Because it is derived as a theory from property rights. Contradictions in a person(s) theory doesn't refute the principle. It refutes the theory.
AJ: Even if all laws can be expressed in terms of "property rights" by some oddball definition of them, that doesn't seem to add anything to the present discussion.
Even if all laws can be expressed in terms of "property rights" by some oddball definition of them, that doesn't seem to add anything to the present discussion.
yes it does
AJ: If, on the other hand, all laws could be expressed in terms of Rothbardian property rights, then that would be relevant point, but that's clearly not the case - Sharia law is one counterexample (among many).
If, on the other hand, all laws could be expressed in terms of Rothbardian property rights, then that would be relevant point, but that's clearly not the case - Sharia law is one counterexample (among many).
And that is why way back when, maybe before you came to this forum, there was an original poster and then others that began an attack on Rothbard and then began to call some posters Rothbardian and/or would call certain interpretations of natural law Rothbardian when in fact Rothbard is only a voice, one person amongst many that have studied and voiced what they have learned and discovered about natural law. Natural law isn't Rothbardian. That's a strawman on natural law. Rothbard may have one of the best theories on property rights with little or no contradictions in his theorizing. He may have worked out one of the largest ever systematic anaylsis of natural law, but again that doesn't make natural law his. He simply put a lot of time and effort into this field. Like a DNA biologist may in DNA. Doesn't make the DNA the biologists.
I will state this from over a long anaylsis of posts with you and others that polycentric law is ill-properly named. It should be named polycentric theory on law.
AJ: wilderness: AJ: It's just me choosing not to defend my position. Who said answering a question has to do with defending your position? That's seems to be a leap. I assumed your question was rhetorical, as an attempt to refute my position. Or did you just ask me that out of curiosity?
Please stop assuming. Dialogue throughout human history gets stopped, confusion reins, and to the extreme conflicts arise when dialogue stops and assumptions grow. Questions involve answers. Questions are asked to fill the void in which an answer is being called upon. Yes - curious.
AJ: wilderness:it was a yes or no question. Something isn't right about what you are doing. It seems dishonest. I hope I'm wrong, but you are definitely dancing around and not being straight about something. All that's happening is I'm allocating my time toward the posts and threads I feel I have the most to contribute to, and/or seem most likely to lead to productive discussion. If someone pointed out a weakness in my position, I would respond to it, and if I don't respond to it then it really just helps my opponents look good, does it not?
one word - dialogue
AJ: To your edit of the above, I'm sorry if I missed more than a couple of your previous posts while responding to later ones. I felt the content was similar enough that my answer to the latter posts would sufficiently answer your questions. And in some cases I just found the content to be beside the point (and/or already covered) and you posted again, so I only responded to that latter post. If there are any other points I failed to address or answer, feel free to post them.
you're a good sport. thanks
Conza88: Austrian Economics is explanatory - if x happens, y will happen.
Austrian Economics is explanatory - if x happens, y will happen.
Yes.
Conza88: Libertarianism deals with political philosophy and answers the question; what should be law.
Libertarianism deals with political philosophy and answers the question; what should be law.
1. If the set of laws X exists, A.
2. If the set of laws Y exists, B.
3. If the set of laws Z exists, C.
4. I or we desire that result B exists more than that result A or result C exists.
5. Therefore, I or we should desire to establish the set of laws B, not A or C.
The first three propositions, #1, #2 and #3, are propositions of economics. The second-to-last proposition, #4, is a proposition of "normative" ethics. The last proposition, #5, is a proposition of politics.
Conza88: But even the utilitarian economist who attempts wertfrei (value free) "or at the least to confine their advocacy to the processes of trade and exchange, cannot be maintained." ! "For if myself and the retailer are indeed to be free to trade the dollar for the hula hoop without coercive interference by third parties, then this can only be done if these economists will proclaim the justice and the propriety of my original ownership of the dollar and the retailer’s ownership of the hula hoop.In short, for an economist to say that X and Y should be free to trade Good A for Good B unmolested by third parties, he must also say that X legitimately and properly owns Good A and that Y legitimately owns Good B. But this means that the freemarket economist must have some sort of theory of justice in property rights; he can scarcely say that X properly owns Good A without asserting some sort of theory of justice on behalf of such ownership.Suppose, for example, that as I am about to purchase the hula hoop, the information arrives that the retailer had really stolen the hoop from Z. Surely not even the supposedly wertfrei economist can continue to blithely endorse the proposed exchange of ownership titles between myself and the retailer. For now we find that the retailer’s, Y’s, title of ownership is improper and unjust, and that he must be forced to return the hoop to Z, the original owner. The economist can then only endorse the proposed exchange between myself and Z, rather than Y, for the hula hoop, since he has to acknowledge Z as the proper owner of title to the hoop.In short, we have two mutually exclusive claimants to the ownership of the hoop. If the economist agrees to endorse only Z’s sale of the hoop, then he is implicitly agreeing that Z has the just, and Y the unjust, claim to the hoop. And even if he continues to endorse the sale by Y, then he is implicitly maintaining another theory of property titles: namely, that theft is justified. Whichever way he decides, the economist cannot escape a judgment, a theory of justice in the ownership of property. Furthermore, the economist is not really finished when he proclaims the injustice or theft and endorses Z’s proper title. For what is the justification for Z’s title to the hoop? Is it only because he is a nonthief?" - Justice and Property Rights, Egalitarianism a Revolt Against Nature By the way this isn't just directed at you.
But even the utilitarian economist who attempts wertfrei (value free) "or at the least to confine their advocacy to the processes of trade and exchange, cannot be maintained." !
If an economist qua economist were to engage the example above, he would not care whether one or both of the items were "stolen", just as he would not care whether one or both of the items actually function like each of the participants involved in the exchange believe that they do[1], he would merely note what happened, that person A forcibly took control of item X from person B and, then, that person A gave item X to person B while person C gave item Y to person A, and explain the consequences.
The argument that Rothbard advanced seems to be somewhat an appeal to emotion. He basically claims that, "if you are an economist, you cannot seriously just describe that situation, you would have to pass some judgement!". But, whether or not the economist does feel that irresistible urge to pass judgement, he, if he does and subsequently passes the judgement, would not act as an economist qua economist.
[1] Carl Menger differentiated "real" and "illusory" goods. Mises believed such a judgement does not belong in economics. From "Human Action", section 4.1, "Ends and Means":
"Praxeology and economics do not deal with human meaning and action as they should be or would be if all men were inspired by an absolutely valid philosophy and equipped with a perfect knowledge of technology. For such notions as absolute validity and omniscience there is no room in the frame of a science whose subject matter is erring man. An end is everything which men aim at. A means is everything which acting men consider as such.
It is the task of scientific technology and therapeutics to explode errors in their respective fields. It is the task of economics to expose erroneous doctrines in the field of social action. But if men do not follow the advice of science, but cling to their fallacious prejudices, these errors are reality and must be dealt with as such. Economists consider foreign exchange control as inappropriate to attain the ends aimed at by those who take recourse to it. However, if public opinion does not abandon its delusions and governments consequently resort to foreign exchange control, the course of events is determined by this attitude. Present-day medicine considers the doctrine of the therapeutic effects of mandrake as a fable. But as long as people took this fable as truth, mandrake was an economic good and prices were paid for its acquisition. In dealing with prices economics does not ask what things are in the eyes of other people, but only what they are in the meaning of those intent upon getting them. For it deals with real prices, paid and received in real transactions, not with prices as they would be if men were different from what they really are."
From "Human Action", section 4.3, "The Scale of Needs":
"Notwithstanding all declarations to the contrary, the immense majority of men aim first of all at an improvement of the material conditions of well-being. They want more and better food, better homes and clothes, and a thousand other amenities. They strive after abundance and health. Taking these goals as given, applied physiology tries to determine what means are best suited to provide as much satisfaction as possible. It distinguishes, from this point of view, between man's "real" needs and imaginary and spurious appetites. It teaches people how they should act and what they should aim at as a means.
The importance of such doctrines is obvious. From his point of view the physiologist is right in distinguishing between sensible action and action contrary to purpose. He is right in contrasting judicious methods of nourishment from unwise methods. He may condemn certain modes of behavior as absurd and opposed to "real" needs. However, such judgments are beside the point for a science dealing with the reality of human action. Not what a man should do, but what he does, counts for praxeology and economics. Hygiene may be right or wrong in calling alcohol and nicotine poisons. But economics must explain the prices of tobacco and liquor as they are, not as they would be under different conditions.
There is no room left in the field of economics for a scale of needs different from the scale of values as reflected in man's actual behavior. Economics deals with real man, weak and subject to error as he is, not with ideal beings, omniscient and perfect as only gods could be."
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan,
Economics is a field that developed in the ethical philosophy department. I don't know for how long, but I do know that Adam Smith was head of the philosophy department in Scotland(?) because that's where economics was. It's rooted still in ethics. Malinvestments due to central economic planning is understood to be not prosperous, ie. good, for the free market. Various economic theories make light of this amongst other things.
wilderness: AJ: wilderness: AJ: AJ: wilderness: If I punish someone for stealing, do I affirm natural law? Punish, and if you think it is wrong that is affirming natural law. What if I just punish because I think it will be in my interests to do so? yes; Who's else interest would it be? You haven't said how that affirms natural law. yes I have and you have to
Where? I punish someone because I think it would be in my interests, how does that affirm or assert or acknowledge natural law? It seems to only affirm - if anything - that I believe punishing that person would benefit me. "Punishing that person will benefit me" doesn't seem to be a statement of natural law.
wilderness: AJ: ...because any set of laws could be defined in terms of "property rights." And why is that?
Probably the same reason that any set of laws could be defined in terms of "action rights" or "obligations" or "integers" or probably any number of other things. The reason is that once you allow a word to mean anything, it's not difficult to use it as a building block for a whole system of ideas. Just change the definition suitably enough, and there you are. For example, a law prohibiting theft from your home (what we would call "theft from your home" because we are used to thinking in terms of property rights) could also be defined in terms of action rights: "You are allowed to kill any person who removes clothes from the home that you live in." This boils down to a de facto property right, but now which is being defined in terms of which? Now it is the action rights that are the underpinning for everything else, including property rights. It's just a redefinition of terms, or a semantic reframing of the situation. Functionally nothing has changed. All laws can be based on some kind of property rights. All laws can be based on some kind of action rights. Neither seem relevant.
wilderness:And that is why way back when, maybe before you came to this forum, there was an original poster and then others that began an attack on Rothbard and then began to call some posters Rothbardian and/or would call certain interpretations of natural law Rothbardian when in fact Rothbard is only a voice, one person amongst many that have studied and voiced what they have learned and discovered about natural law. Natural law isn't Rothbardian. That's a strawman on natural law. Rothbard may have one of the best theories on property rights with little or no contradictions in his theorizing. He may have worked out one of the largest ever anaylsis of natural law, but again that doesn't make natural law his. He simply put a lot of time and effort into this field. Like a DNA biologist may in DNA. Doesn't make the DNA the biologists.
Acknowledged.
wilderness: Economics is a field that developed in the ethical philosophy department. I don't know for how long, but I do know that Adam Smith was head of the philosophy department in Scotland(?) because that's where economics was.
Economics is a field that developed in the ethical philosophy department. I don't know for how long, but I do know that Adam Smith was head of the philosophy department in Scotland(?) because that's where economics was.
That does not surprise me. For economics is the prerequisite of any responsible judgement about "ethics".
wilderness: It's rooted still in ethics. Malinvestments due to central economic planning is understood to be not prosperous, ie. good, for the free market. Various economic theories make light of this amongst other things.
It's rooted still in ethics. Malinvestments due to central economic planning is understood to be not prosperous, ie. good, for the free market. Various economic theories make light of this amongst other things.
That proposition, that "[m]alinvestments [...] is understood to be not prosperous", is tautological. For the word "malinvestment" already contains an implicit value judgement, that the investments are bad. Therefore, it states, basically, that "[bad things] [are] understood to be not prosperous".
But the proposition that those "malinvestments" occur "due to central economic planning" is a compound proposition: (a) The existence of the connective, "due to", implies that an principle of economics is involved, that "central economic planning" causes the occurrence of a certain set of "investments", and (b) the existence of the prefix "mal-" implies that that certain set of "investments" is undesirable, is "bad".
1. If X, "central economic planning", occurs, Y, a certain type of investment where the investor determines, after his investment, that his investment was unsustainable, occurs.
2. I or we do not desire that Y occurs.
The first proposition, #1, is a proposition of economics. The second proposition, #2, is a proposition of "normative" ethics.
AJ: Where? I punish someone because I think it would be in my interests, how does that affirm or assert or acknowledge natural law?
Where? I punish someone because I think it would be in my interests, how does that affirm or assert or acknowledge natural law?
That's what natural justice is. That's why. And so you here again affirm it.
AJ: It seems to only affirm - if anything - that I believe punishing that person would benefit me. "Punishing that person will benefit me" doesn't seem to be a statement of natural law.
It seems to only affirm - if anything - that I believe punishing that person would benefit me. "Punishing that person will benefit me" doesn't seem to be a statement of natural law.
if you are doing it out of self-defense or out of justice due to such a person initiated coercion, yes you have affirmed natural law.
wilderness: AJ: And why is that? Probably the same reason that any set of laws could be defined in terms of "action rights" or "obligations" or "integers" or probably any number of other things. The reason is that once you allow a word to mean anything, it's not difficult to use it as a building block for a whole system of ideas. Just change the definition suitably enough, and there you are. For example, a law prohibiting theft from your home (what we would call "theft from your home" because we are used to thinking in terms of property rights) could also be defined in terms of action rights: "You are allowed to kill any person who removes clothes from the home that you live in." This boils down to a de facto property right, but now which is being defined in terms of which? Now it is the action rights that are the underpinning for everything else, including property rights. It's just a redefinition of terms, or a semantic reframing of the situation. Functionally nothing has changed. All laws can be based on some kind of property rights. All laws can be based on some kind of action rights. Neither seem relevant.
AJ: And why is that?
Property is human action. Neither can be separated from the other. Human action is a specie of human nature; hence natural law of human nature.
Property rights are defined in a certain way. It is axiomatic. Any theories developed using this principle may vary. That's the difference between logic/axiom/property and episteme/knowledge/theory of property. That's why naming what has been said polycentric theory of law would be more definitive or self-explanatory.
have a good day
I. Ryan: That proposition, that "[m]alinvestments [...] is understood to be not prosperous", is tautological. For the word "malinvestment" already contains an implicit value judgement, that the investments are bad. Therefore, it states, basically, that "[bad things] [are] understood to be not prosperous".
yes it is self-evident
I. Ryan: But the proposition that those "malinvestments" occur "due to central economic planning" is a compound proposition: (a) The existence of the connective, "due to", implies that an principle of economics is involved, that "central economic planning" causes the occurrence of a certain set of "investments", and (b) the existence of the prefix "mal-" implies that that certain set of "investments" is undesirable, is "bad".
ok
I. Ryan: 1. If X, "central economic planning", occurs, Y, a certain type of investment where the investor determines, after his investment, that his investment was unsustainable, occurs. 2. I or we do not desire that Y occurs. The first proposition, #1, is a proposition of economics. The second proposition, #2, is a proposition of "normative" ethics.
AJ:As I said, maybe he misspoke
You misunderstood.
AJ: Conza88: "You can't have free markets unless you have [PRIVATE] property rights" "The key to the theory of liberty is the establishment of the rights of private property for each individual's justified sphere of free action can only be set forth if his rights of property are analyzed and established." - Preface Ethics of Liberty How is that not addressing it? What is to address? De facto rights. He's not referring to de facto rights here. Or if he is, he contradicts his observation that much of common law throughout history has been libertarian.
De facto rights. He's not referring to de facto rights here. Or if he is, he contradicts his observation that much of common law throughout history has been libertarian.
Yes, he is not and that is the point. You cannot have a free market unless have the proper normative (ought to) rights being protected, which are based / guided by natural law and end up being (de facto) ones.
Furthermore, not only is it illegitimate for the economist to advocate a free market without also adumbrating a theory of justice in property titles; he cannot even define a free market without doing so. For even to define and expound upon the free-market model, the economist is describing a system in which property titles are being exchanged, and therefore he must also define and expound upon how these titles are arrived at in the first place; he must have a theory of original property and of how property comes into being."
Conza88:You keep saying and emphasizing private, but what does that have to do with whether the rights are actually enforced or not?
What rights should be enforced? It is to distinguish the Libertarian property assignment rule from all other systems that deal with property rights.
AJ: Conza88:You don't? I do value my own pursuits.
And who doesn't? What a nothing statement. So are you a utilitarian or not? Do you propose to not make any other value judgments? What is your theory of property rights and justice? How do you contend they don't contain value judgments? What is your argument against the status quo?
Value Implications of Economic Theory"I maintain that it is impermissible to advocate the free market without bolstering one's economic analysis with an ethical framework. Indeed, in some cases it is even impossible to set forth a coherent free-market approach without taking a frankly ethical position, and a position which goes beyond the almost universally-held utilitarian viewpoint of economists. Let us ponder our above-mentioned voluntary exchange between A and B. The free market economist advocates a world where such exchanges are legitimate and not interfered with. But any exchange implies an exchange of titles to private property. If I buy a newspaper for fifteen cents, what has happened is that I have ceded my ownership of the fifteen cents to the newsdealer, who in turn has granted his ownership of the newspaper to me. But this means that to advocate our right to make this exchange, means also to advocate the propriety, and hence the justice, of the existing property titles in the first place. To pronounce it "good" for myself and the newsdealer to have the right to make the exchange, means also to pronounce it "good" and just for each of us to own the fifteen cents and the newspaper to begin with. Yet economists are not willing to make this extension, for to do so would mean adopting a systematic concept of justice in property titles, which would involve the adoption of a system of political ethics. Economists have generally regarded such ethical systems as beyond their province; but if so, it is illegitimate for them to advocate a free market at all.
Let us illustrate: suppose that in our presumed exchange between A and B, A has sold to B a watch which he has stolen from a third party, C. Here It becomes clear that it is illegitimate to cheer this voluntary exchange from the sidelines. For since A had stolen the watch, it was not his legitimate property, and therefore he had no right to keep it or sell it; the watch was not in his legitimate title to do with as he wished. But if this is true in the case of the watch, then it would also be true in other less directly flagrant cases of unjust property titles.
AJ: Conza88:Yes and my point is de facto rights necessarily DO imply normative propositions - and everything above addresses that. That which you are still yet to address. I mean, should I post it again? 1. That quote doesn't address this notion that de facto rights imply normative propositions.
1. That quote doesn't address this notion that de facto rights imply normative propositions.
AJ:I've addressed this notion several times already in this thread.
Nope.
AJ:If I punish someone for stealing
We were talking about law & policy. Again, it's about a political ethic - not personal morality. Which you seem to be sneaking in. You changed the terms. And thus: "We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such "political ethical" questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression." I.e What should the law be?
Which brings us right back to this:
Why are they being punished? Is the use of force justified? You have assumed a property right owner, you have assumed property title transfer and theft have you not? Otherwise how do you define stealing?
So:
"and therefore he must also define and expound upon how these titles are arrived at in the first place; he must have a theory of original property and of how property comes into being."
And I thus say, "Begin, good sir... for I am interested to know."
AJ:None of this is normative, at least not in the sense I presume you intend.
None of it deals with normative (ought to) propositions, because nothing you mentioned has anything to do with law, or policy, or political ethics, or punishment theory, or justice. I'm not sure how your point has anything to do with a refutation. Rothbard makes a seemingly similar one in Praxeology, Value Judgments and Public Policy, as an argument against Mises "ingenious attempt to allow pronouncements of "good" or "bad" by the economist without making a value judgment; for the economist is supposed to be only a praxeologist, a technician, pointing out to his readers or listeners that they will all consider a policy "bad" once he reveals its full consequences". lol
"In the case of my purchase of the newspaper, historians or psychologists may make more or less informed estimates of the newsdealers's or my value scales through the process of interpretive understanding, but all that the economist can know scientifically and with certainty is the preference relative to 15 cents or the newspaper as demonstrated through concrete action. Mises himself emphasized that one must not forget that the scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the reality of action. These scales have no independent existence apart from the actual behavior of individuals. The only source from which our knowledge concerning these scales is derived is the observation of a man's actions. Every action is always in perfect agreement with the scale of values or wants because these scales are nothing but an instrument for the interpretation of a man's acting. 15 Given Mises's own analysis, then, how can the economist know what the motives for advocating various policies really are or how people will regard the consequences of these policies?"
I. Ryan: Conza88: Libertarianism deals with political philosophy and answers the question; what should be law. Yes. 1. If the set of laws X exists, A. 2. If the set of laws Y exists, B. 3. If the set of laws Z exists, C. 4. I or we desire that result B exists more than that result A or result C exists. 5. Therefore, I or we should desire to establish the set of laws B, not A or C. The first three propositions, #1, #2 and #3, are propositions of economics. The second-to-last proposition, #4, is a proposition of "normative" ethics. The last proposition, #5, is a proposition of politics.
By what right do you get to establish the set of laws? Why ought these laws be followed and obeyed?
I. Ryan:If an economist qua economist were to engage the example above, he would not care whether one or both of the items were "stolen", just as he would not care whether one or both of the items actually function like each of the participants involved in the exchange believe that they do[1], he would merely note what happened, that person A forcibly took control of item X from person B and, then, that person A gave item X to person B while person C gave item Y to person A, and explain the consequences.
Yes... have they followed this:
"Since, then, praxeology provides no ethics whatsoever but only the data for people to pursue their various values and goals, it follows that it is impermissible for the economist qua economist to make any ethical or value pronouncements or to advocate any social or political policy whatsoever."
And how often does that ever happen with economists?
I. Ryan:The argument that Rothbard advanced seems to be somewhat an appeal to emotion.
Except it's not.
I. Ryan:He basically claims that, "if you are an economist, you cannot seriously just describe that situation, you would have to pass some judgement!".
I. Ryan:But, whether or not the economist does feel that irresistible urge to pass judgement, he, if he does and subsequently passes the judgement, would not act as an economist qua economist.
That's right. However;
"If an economist does not have an ethical system, but only subjective and arbitrary values, then it is incumbent upon him as a scientist ruthlessly to keep them out of his work. In short, the economist who lacks an ethical system must refrain from any and all value-loaded or political conclusions. (This statement, of course, is itself a value judgment stemming from an ethical system which holds that science must confine itself strictly to the search for, and the exposition of, truth.)"
I. Ryan:Mises believed such a judgement does not belong in economics
As did Rothbard.
Economics, as a science, attempts and claims to be purely value-free; that is, separate from the personal, valuational, or political proclivities of the economist. And yet economics and economists are continually making political pronouncements; economics per se is shot through with value-loaded assumptions, usually implicit, which then emerge as political conclusions and recommendations. It is my contention that this procedure is illegitimate and unscientific, and that it is incumbent on economic theory to purge itself of all vestiges of the unsupported value judgment. As a science, economics can and should stand apart from such value judgments. But since all political policy recommendations necessarily involve value judgments, does this mean that the economist must never make any policy recommendations or indeed, never use any terminology that is value-loaded? Not necessarily.
There are only two possible kinds of philosophical status for value judgments. Either they are all necessarily purely subjective and personal whims on the part of the valuer, in which case for the economist to remain a scientist he must indeed refrain from all policy recommendations whatever. Or these judgments may well be part of a general ethical system which is rationally and objectively demonstrable; in that case, it is perfectly legitimate for the economist when he applies his scientific theory to public policy to use this ethical system to arrive at economic policy recommendations.
I. Ryan:From "Human Action", section 4.1, "Ends and Means":
I. Ryan:From "Human Action", section 4.3, "The Scale of Needs":
Essentially, Mises offered two very different solutions to this problem. The first is a variant of the unanimity principle. Essentially this variant affirms that an economist per se cannot say that a given governmental policy is "good" or "bad." However, if a given policy will lead to consequences, as explained by praxeology, that every one of the supporters of the policy will agree is bad, then the value-free economist is justified in calling the policy a "bad" one. Thus, Mises wrote:
An economist investigates whether a measure a can bring about the result p for the attainment of which it is recommended, and finds that a does not result in p but in g, an effect which even the supporters of the measure a consider undesirable. If the economist states the outcome of his investigationby saying that a is a bad measure, he does not pronounce a judgment of value. He merely says that from the point of view of those aiming at the goal p, the measure a is inappropriate.13
And again:
Economics does not say that . . . government interference with the prices of only one commodity . . . is unfair, bad, or unfeasible. It says, that it makes conditions worse, not better, from the point of view of the government and those backing its interference.14
Now this is surely an ingenious attempt to allow pronouncements of "good" or "bad" by the economist without making a value judgment; for the economist is supposed to be only a praxeologist, a technician, pointing out to his readers or listeners that they will all consider a policy "bad" once he reveals its full consequences. But ingenious as it is, the attempt completely fails. For how could Mises know what the advocates of the particular policy consider desirable? How could he know what their value scales are now or what they will be when the consequences of the measure appear? One of the great contributions of praxeology, as I have pointed out above, is that the praxeologist, the economist, doesn't know what anyone's value scales are except as those value preferences are demonstrated by a person's concrete action. In the case of my purchase of the newspaper, historians or psychologists may make more or less informed estimates of the newsdealers's or my value scales through the process of interpretive understanding, but all that the economist can know scientifically and with certainty is the preference relative to 15 cents or the newspaper as demonstrated through concrete action. Mises himself emphasized that one must not forget that the scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the reality of action. These scales have no independent existence apart from the actual behavior of individuals. The only source from which our knowledge concerning these scales is derived is the observation of a man's actions. Every action is always in perfect agreement with the scale of values or wants because these scales are nothing but an instrument for the interpretation of a man's acting. 15 Given Mises's own analysis, then, how can the economist know what the motives for advocating various policies really are or how people will regard the consequences of these policies?
Thus, Mises, qua praxeologist, might show that price controls (to use his example) will lead to unforeseen shortages of a good to the consumers. But how could Mises know that some advocates of price controls do not want shortages? They may, for example, be socialists, anxious to use the controls as a step toward full collectivism. Some may be egalitarians who prefer shortages because the rich will not be able to use their money to buy more of the product than poorer people. Others may be one of the legion of contemporary intellectuals who are eternally complaining about the excessive affluence of our society or about the great waste of energy; they may all delight in the shortages of goods. Still others may favor price controls, even after learning of the shortages,because they or their political allies will enjoy well-paying jobs or power in a price-control bureaucracy. All sorts of such possibilities exist, and none of them is compatible with the assertion of Mises, as a value- free economist, that all supporters of price controls—or of any other government intervention—must concede, after learning economics, that the measure is "bad." In fact, once Mises conceded that even a single advocate of price controls or any other interventionist measure may acknowledge the economic consequences and still favor it, he could no longer call any of these measures "bad" or "good" or even "appropriate" or "inappropriate" without inserting into his economic policy pronouncements the very value judgments that he himself held to be inadmissible as a scientist of human action. 16 He would no longer be a technical reporter to all advocates of a certain policy but an advocate participating on one side of a value conflict.Moreover, there is another fundamental reason for advocates of "inappropriate" policies to refuse to change their minds even after hearing and acknowledging the praxeological chain of consequences. For praxeology may indeed show that all types of government policies will have consequences that most people, at least, will tend to abhor. But, and this is a vital qualification, most of these consequences take time, some a great deal of time. No economist has done more than Ludwig von Mises to elucidate the universality of time preference in human affairs—the praxeologic law that everyone prefers to attain a given satisfaction sooner than later. And certainly Mises, as a value-free scientist, could never presume to criticize anyone's rate of time preference, to say that A's was "too high" and B's "too low." But, in that case, what about the high-time-preference people in society who retort to the praxeologist: "Perhaps this high tax and subsidy policy will lead to a decline of capital; perhaps even the price control will lead to shortages, but I don't care. Having a high time preference, I value more highly the short-run subsidies, or the short-run enjoyment of buying the current good at cheaper prices, than the prospect of suffering the future consequences."
And Mises, as a value- free scientist and opponent of any concept of objective ethics, could not call them wrong. There is no way that he could assert the superiority of the long run over the short run without overriding the values of the high-time-preference people; and that could not be cogently done without abandoning his own subjectivist ethics.
"In the first place, while praxeology can indeed demonstrate that laissez-faire will lead to harmony, prosperity, and abundance, while government intervention leads to conflict and impoverishment,19 and while it is probably true that most people value the former highly, it is not true that these are their only goals or values. The great analyst of ranked value scales and diminishing marginal utility should have been more aware of such competing values and goals. For example, many people, whether through envy or a misplaced theory of justice, may prefer far more equality of income than will be attained on the free market. Many people, pace the aforementioned intellectuals, may want less abundance in order to whittle down our allegedly excessive affluence. Others, as I have mentioned, may prefer to loot the capital of the rich or the businessman in the short run, while acknowledging but dismissing the long-run ill effects, because they have a high time preference. Probably very few of these people will want to push statist measures to the point of total impoverishment and destruction—although this may happen, as in the case of Communist China. But a majority coalition of the foregoing might well opt for some reduction in wealth and prosperity on behalf of these other values. They may well decide that it is worth sacrificing a modicum of wealth and efficient production because of the high opportunity cost of not being able to enjoy an alleviation of envy, or a lust for power, or a submission to power, or, for example, the thrill of “national unity,” which they might enjoy from a (short-lived) economic crisis.What could Mises reply to a majority of the public who have indeed considered all the praxeological consequences and still prefer a modicum—or, for that matter, even a drastic amount—of statism in order to achieve some of their competing goals? As a utilitarian, he could not quarrel with the ethical nature of their chosen goals: for he had to confine himself to the one value judgment that he favored the majority’s achieving their chosen goals. The only reply that Mises could make within his own framework was to point out that government intervention has a cumulative effect, that eventually the economy must move either toward the free market or toward full socialism, which praxeology shows will bring chaos and drastic impoverishment, at least to an industrial society. But this, too, is not a fully satisfactory answer. While many programs of statist intervention—especially price controls—are indeed cumulative, others are not. Furthermore, the cumulative impact takes such a long time that the time preferences of the majority would probably lead them, in full acknowledgment of the consequences, to ignore the effect. And then what?Mises attempted to use the cumulative argument to answer the contention that the majority of the public prefer egalitarian measures even knowingly at the expense of a portion of their own wealth. Mises’s comment was that the “reserve fund” was on the point of being exhausted in Europe, and therefore that any further egalitarian measures would have to come directly out of the pockets of the masses through increased taxation. Mises assumed that once this became clear, the masses would no longer support interventionist measures.20 In the first place, this is no argument against the previous egalitarian measures or in favor of their repeal. But secondly, while the masses might be convinced, there is certainly no apodictic certainty involved; the masses have in the past and presumably will in the future continue knowingly to support egalitarian and other statist measures on behalf of others of their goals, despite the knowledge that their income and wealth would be reduced. Thus, as William E. Rappard pointed out in his thoughtful critique of Mises’s position:
Does the British voter, for instance, favor confiscatory taxation of large incomes primarily in the hope that it will redound to his material advantage, or in the certainty that it tends to reduce unwelcome and irritating social inequalities? In general, is the urge towards equality in our modern democracies not often stronger than the desire to improve one’s material lot?21
Rappard also noted that in his own country, Switzerland, the urban industrial and commercial majority of the country have repeatedly, and often at popular referendums, endorsed measures to subsidize the minority of farmers in a deliberate effort to retard industrialization and the growth of their own incomes. The urban majority did not do so in the “absurd belief that they were thereby increasing their real income.” Instead, “quite deliberately and expressly, political parties have sacrificed the immediate material welfare of their members in order to prevent, or at least somewhat to retard, the complete industrialization of the country. A more agricultural Switzerland, though poorer, such is the dominant wish of the Swiss people today.”22 The point here is that Mises, not only as a praxeologist but also as a utilitarian liberal, could have no word of criticism against these statist measures once the majority of the public take their praxeological consequences into account and choose them anyway on behalf of goals other than wealth and prosperity.Furthermore, there are other types of statist intervention that clearly have little or no cumulative effect and that may even have very little effect in diminishing production or prosperity. Let us, for example, assume—and this assumption is not very farfetched in view of the record of human history—that the great majority of a society hate and revile redheads, perhaps, to cite Simons again, because they find redheads “evil or unlovely.” Let us further assume that there are very few redheads in the society. This large majority then decide that they would like very much to murder all redheads. Here they are; the murder of redheads is high on the value scales of the great majority of the public; there are few redheads so that there will be little loss in production on the market. How could Mises rebut this proposed policy either as a praxeologist or as a utilitarian liberal? I submit that he could not do so.Mises made one further attempt to establish his position, but it was even less successful. Criticizing the arguments for state intervention on behalf of equality or other moral concerns, he dismissed them as “emotional talk.” After reaffirming that “praxeology and economics . . . are neutral with regard to any moral precepts,” and asserting that “the fact that the immense majority of men prefer a richer supply of material goods to a less ample supply is a datum of history; it does not have any place in economic theory,” he concluded by insisting that “he who disagrees with the teachings of economics ought to refute them by discursive reasoning, not by . . . the appeal to arbitrary, allegedly ethical standards.”23But I submit that this will not do; for Mises would have to concede that no one can decide upon any policy whatever unless he makes an ultimate ethical or value judgment. But since this is so, and since according to Mises all ultimate value judgments or ethical standards are arbitrary, how then could he denounce these particular ethical judgments as “arbitrary”? Furthermore, it was hardly correct for Mises to dismiss these judgments as “emotional,” since for him as a utilitarian, reason cannot establish ultimate ethical principles, which can therefore only be established by subjective emotions. It was pointless for Mises to call for his critics to use “discursive reasoning” since he himself denied that discursive reasoning can be used to establish ultimate ethical values. Furthermore, the man whose ultimate ethical principles would lead him to support the free market could also be dismissed by Mises as equally “arbitrary” and “emotional,” even if he takes the laws of praxeology into account before making his ultimately ethical decision. And we have seen above that the majority of the public very often have other goals which they hold, at least to a certain extent, higher than their own material well-being.
I. Ryan: wilderness: Economics is a field that developed in the ethical philosophy department. I don't know for how long, but I do know that Adam Smith was head of the philosophy department in Scotland(?) because that's where economics was. That does not surprise me. For economics is the prerequisite of any responsible judgement about "ethics". wilderness: It's rooted still in ethics. Malinvestments due to central economic planning is understood to be not prosperous, ie. good, for the free market. Various economic theories make light of this amongst other things. That proposition, that "[m]alinvestments [...] is understood to be not prosperous", is tautological. For the word "malinvestment" already contains an implicit value judgement, that the investments are bad. Therefore, it states, basically, that "[bad things] [are] understood to be not prosperous". But the proposition that those "malinvestments" occur "due to central economic planning" is a compound proposition: (a) The existence of the connective, "due to", implies that an principle of economics is involved, that "central economic planning" causes the occurrence of a certain set of "investments", and (b) the existence of the prefix "mal-" implies that that certain set of "investments" is undesirable, is "bad". 1. If X, "central economic planning", occurs, Y, a certain type of investment where the investor determines, after his investment, that his investment was unsustainable, occurs. 2. I or we do not desire that Y occurs. The first proposition, #1, is a proposition of economics. The second proposition, #2, is a proposition of "normative" ethics.
I.Ryan:
This is excellent. Question:
Can we refer to proposition #2 as a judgment of value? If not, why not?
Conza88: 1) Austrian Economics is explanatory - if x happens, y will happen. 3) But even the utilitarian economist who attempts wertfrei (value free) "or at the least to confine their advocacy to the processes of trade and exchange, cannot be maintained." ! AK: Do you mean #1 cannot be maintained ? Conza88: No
3) But even the utilitarian economist who attempts wertfrei (value free) "or at the least to confine their advocacy to the processes of trade and exchange, cannot be maintained." !
AK: Do you mean #1 cannot be maintained ?
Conza88: No
Conza88 asked: Do you think the economist can "escape a judgment, a theory of justice in the ownership of property"
Conza88:
I understand you as agreeing that the economist can say #1: if x happens, y will happen
Your question is then, what can the economist say about a theory of justice or property ownership, these as distinct from economic policies.
I will answer your question in two parts:
1. If by economist, you mean the person who studies the laws of specifically market phenomena, then we are saying that such a person can only say #1 with respect to specifically economic (market related) actions. (i.e., those actions conceivable in terms of money prices).
Then, by definition, such a person cannot say #1 with respect to other kinds of actions such as ethical actions (i.e., those actions that aim at establishing a particular social or legal order)
If an economist in the "catallactic" sense, as one who only studies market phenomena, says something about ethical actions, and his statement is not of the form: if x happens, y will happen, then his statement must be of another form. It may express that person's personal opinion, conviction, belief, etc... Essentially then, he expresses his personal preferences: I want X, I do not want Y. I like X, I do not like Y, etc...
I believe you are then calling such a statement of personal preference a judgment. (as distinct from #1 above, an explanatory "if-then" statement)
And you are implying, as I understand you, that such judgments are all that can be made with respect to ethical actions. That is, you are implying that #1 cannot be said with respect to social/political acts. #1 can only be said with respect to economic acts. That is how I interpret your position.
I do not agree with this.
2. If by economist, you mean the person who studies the laws of human action generally (i.e., a praxeologist, one who studies human action in all its forms), then by definition, since ethical acts are acts, and since the praxeologist studies the laws of human action, including ethical actions and other kinds of actions, then the economist in this sense (as praxeologist) can say #1 not only with respect to economic acts (market related acts and policies), but also with respect to ethical/political acts (social/political acts and policies).
Thus, he can say with respect to such proposed political acts or policies: if x happens, y will happen
And thus, judgments in the sense in which I interpret you as intending this term (as a value judgment), is not the only thing that can be said about social/ethical acts. Such acts can be approached just as economic acts are: with respect to their necessary entailments.
The praxeologist can say: if x happens, y will happen, with respect to proposed social or legal policies or actions, as distinct from specifically economic policies or actions.
Conza88: "... what happens when [if] they reject self ownership?[x] - I'm guessing [then] they are in a performative contradiction?[y.]" "...[if] they reject property rights[x]? - Well [then] they would have no political ethical objections [y.] to when they get killed, assaulted, or have their property stolen." "And should [if] they reject them so they can rob and steal from others[x], [then] they again could have no objections [y.] when the same is done to them..."
"... what happens when [if] they reject self ownership?[x] - I'm guessing [then] they are in a performative contradiction?[y.]"
"...[if] they reject property rights[x]? - Well [then] they would have no political ethical objections [y.] to when they get killed, assaulted, or have their property stolen."
"And should [if] they reject them so they can rob and steal from others[x], [then] they again could have no objections [y.] when the same is done to them..."
Here, you are doing essentially the same thing that praxeological economics tries to do with respect to "economic" acts and policies. You are showing how two things, "x" and "y" are related, such that if a person doesn't want y to happen, he may possibly avoid y by abstaining from x.
If you don't want to be caught in a performative contradiction, then don't reject self-ownership.
If you want to avoid having no political ethical objections when you are killed or have your property stolen, then don't reject property rights.
If you want to avoid having no objections when people rob and steal from you, again, then don't reject property rights.
My two comments on this approach are:
1. In social science, the idea would be to try to demonstrate that if x happens, y certainly will happen (necessity).
Because it will be less effective and less persuasive if you merely argue that if x happens, y might happen.
For example: If you reject self-ownership [x], then you might be caught in a performative contradiction [y.].....
This is why the idea of necessity or necessary relations, or necessary entailment, is so important in social science. The goal is generally to relate x and y logically and necessarily, not contingently and possibly...
2. The approach you are using above is associated with "utilitarianism," which in the Rothbardian lexicon is a pejorative term.
I'm not suggesting you abandon this approach. I'm an advocate of praxeology and the attempt to demonstrate how the actions a person intends to undertake----for example, rejecting self-ownership, or rejecting property rights, to use your examples----may be harmful to his own self-interests.
I'm just pointing out that this method or approach is generally referred to as "utilitarianism" and is generally rejected by Rothbard, by his followers, and by other objective ethicists.
Note: I inserted periods inside some parenthesis to avoid graphics. E.g. [y.]
Adam Knott:Conza88 asked: Do you think the economist can "escape a judgment, a theory of justice in the ownership of property"
See that's the thing, I'm not dead - so you can't willy nilly go and imply I meant this or that, or assume I meant this or that - and yet in the process change the very question that was asked and then go and answer your own, which so often happens here.
You've deliberately cut up the question, and you're not answering the one I asked at all. Please go back and do that.
Adam Knott: I do not agree with this.
That's unfortunate you don't have much of an argument against those whose value scales involve violating others natural rights.
Adam Knott:2. If by economist, you mean the person who studies the laws of human action generally (i.e., a praxeologist, one who studies human action in all its forms), then by definition, since ethical acts are acts, and since the praxeologist studies the laws of human action, including ethical actions and other kinds of actions, then the economist in this sense (as praxeologist) can say #1 not only with respect to economic acts (market related acts and policies), but also with respect to ethical/political acts (social/political acts and policies).
As a science, economics can and should stand apart from such value judgments. But since all political policy recommendations necessarily involve value judgments, does this mean that the economist must never make any policy recommendations or indeed, never use any terminology that is value-loaded? Not necessarily.
There are only two possible kinds of philosophical status for value judgments. Either they are all necessarily purely subjective and personal whims on the part of the valuer, in which case for the economist to remain a scientist he must indeed refrain from all policy recommendations whatever. Or these judgments may well be part of a general ethical system which is rationally and objectively demonstrable; in that case, it is perfectly legitimate for the economist when he applies his scientific theory to public policy to use this ethical system to arrive at economic policy recommendations. Let us take an example from medicine. A "purely" scientific, value-free medical procedure enables a physician to say that Treatment X will cure disease Y. As an applied scientist, the physician can then take this knowledge and combine it with the ethical judgment that "cure of the disease is good" and indeed is the goal of his treatment, and then conclude with the "policy" conclusion that he should apply Treatment X. In this case both the patient and the physician are proceeding, implicitly or explicitly, on the basis of a deeply shared ethical system; their value judgments are neither personal nor arbitrary, but stem from a shared ethical system which pronounces health and life as great goods for man and death and disease as corresponding evils.[1]
The point is that in medicine all parties proceed from the basis of a deeply shared ethical system. In the case of economics, this is scarcely true; here there are many competing and clashing values and value-systems held in society. Hence, the applied economist is in a more difficult situation. If an economist does not have an ethical system, but only subjective and arbitrary values, then it is incumbent upon him as a scientist ruthlessly to keep them out of his work. In short, the economist who lacks an ethical system must refrain from any and all value-loaded or political conclusions. (This statement, of course, is itself a value judgment stemming from an ethical system which holds that science must confine itself strictly to the search for, and the exposition of, truth.) But suppose on the other hand that an economist also holds an ethical system. What then?
It must be emphasized that if ethics is a rational and demonstrable discipline, it is self-subsistent, that is, its principles are arrived at apart from economics or any other particular science except itself. As in the case of medicine, the applied economist would then have to take this ethical system and add it to his economic knowledge to arrive at policy conclusions and recommendations. But in that case it is incumbent upon the applied economist to state his ethical system fully and with supporting argument; whatever he does, he must not slip value judgments, ad hoc, unanalyzed, and unsupported, into the body of his economic theory or into his policy conclusions. And yet this is precisely what the bulk of economists have been doing. They, and economic theory along with them, habitually make a host of value judgments which are smuggled into their analyses, and which then permit them to make policy recommendations, implicit or explicit, without presenting or defending a coherent ethical system. Because they cannot, like physicians, work from a universally shared ethical system, it is incumbent upon economists to present a coherent and supported ethical system or forever hold their valuational and political peace.
And so you state utilitarianism, is that very ethical system for you. Unfortunately, it doesn't have much at all to do with liberty or even anything to say about individual actions, once considered and rejected - but hey we've been over this.
Law as a Normative Discipline
Still think you can be value free?
Adam Knott:For example: If you reject self-ownership [x], then you might be caught in a performative contradiction [y.].....
Except there is no might, as a "proposition rises to the status of an axiom when he who denies it may be shown to be using it in the very course of the supposed refutation."
Adam Knott:I'm just pointing out that this method or approach is generally referred to as "utilitarianism" and is generally rejected by Rothbard, by his followers, and by other objective ethicists.
Except this is not my approach and I reject utilitarianism.
Your approach is anything but value free.
We must emphasize, however, that the praxeological conclusion that the free market maximizes social utility is not sufficient to enable the praxeological economist to advocate the free market while abstaining from value judgments or from an ethical system. In the first place, why should an economist favor increasing social utility? This in itself requires an ethical or value judgment. And, second, the social- utility concept has many other failings, including the fact that while the envious and the egalitarian or the admirer of coercion per se may not be included in the social- utility concept, the contemporary historian knows that he is there, lurking in the wings; it therefore requires an ethical judgment, which cannot be supplied by praxeology, to overrule him. Furthermore, many of the strictures against the unanimity principle apply here too; for example, should we really be eager to preserve the utility of the slaveholder against loss? And if so, why?
Is Utilitarianism Viable? Robert P. Murphy
Hi, my name’s Bob, and I’m a recovering utilitarian. It’s been a few months now since I admitted the truth to myself. You see, I used to believe that all moral issues could be reduced to a simple maximization of utility. Many of my closest friends told me I had a problem, but I refused to listen. They meant well, but they just didn’t get it. Or so I thought.
The fundamental problem with utilitarianism is this: Despite a succession of ingenious proponents, its advocates have yet to explain why the individual should behave morally. The fact that we are all better off if we all behave morally is utterly true and utterly irrelevant. (Such an argument violates the cherished Austrian precepts of marginalism and individualism.)
In other words, if you pause to wonder why you should ever die for a cause, then the honest utilitarian must admit: You should not.
This candid admission, in my opinion, is fatal to utilitarianism. There are all sorts of situations—i.e., not simply the soldier being asked to take a hill—where conventional morality requires an individual to forego genuine (i.e. long-run) gain. References to the benefits of a virtuous character will not convince someone who is lacking such a character in the first place.
Moreover, if everyone agreed with Yeager and other utilitarians that it were foolish to sacrifice oneself in these rare instances, an element of doubt would arise in all social interactions. Although pangs of conscience might be a wonderful evolutionary byproduct, it would be in the interest of everyone to steel himself against such "irrational" feelings (while still behaving in accordance with them under normal circumstances). One’s very life might one day depend on it.
It doesn’t really matter whether my conjecture is empirically true. The decisive issue is that, if it were true—that is, if the level of conventionally moral behavior did in fact deteriorate over time, until everyone viewed each other as a potentially deadly enemy—the utilitarian would have nothing much to say. He might lament the trend, but only in the way an astronomer would lament a comet hurtling toward Earth. Throughout the process, the utilitarian could not condemn anyone’s actions as immoral.
Although providing a thoughtful tour of previous work and offering a few novel arguments, Leland Yeager’s Ethics as Social Science ultimately fails in its attempt to rescue utilitarianism from its many flaws. Precisely because thinkers of the caliber of Yeager, Mises, and Hazlitt were unable to expound the doctrine in a satisfactory way, I have come to conclude that such an exercise is impossible.
Conza88: By what right do you get to establish the set of laws B? Why ought these laws be followed and obeyed?
By what right do you get to establish the set of laws B? Why ought these laws be followed and obeyed?
I already answered that. In the portion of mine that you quoted, I essentially wrote that "if A causes only B and I or we want B, I or we should want A".
Conza88: [1.] Except it's not. [...] [2.] No, he doesn't say that.
[1.] Except it's not. [...]
[2.] No, he doesn't say that.
1. "Except it[ is]."
2. "[Yes], he does[] say that."
Conza88: Yes... have they followed this: "Since, then, praxeology provides no ethics whatsoever but only the data for people to pursue their various values and goals, it follows that it is impermissible for the economist qua economist to make any ethical or value pronouncements or to advocate any social or political policy whatsoever." And how often does that ever happen with economists?
Not often. But that does not surprise me. For one of the main utilities of economics is that it provides the necessary foundation of the responsible advocation of what social policy a group should adopt.
Conza88: That's right. However; "[...] In short, the economist who lacks an ethical system must refrain from any and all value-loaded or political conclusions. (This statement, of course, is itself a value judgment stemming from an ethical system which holds that science must confine itself strictly to the search for, and the exposition of, truth.)"
"[...] In short, the economist who lacks an ethical system must refrain from any and all value-loaded or political conclusions. (This statement, of course, is itself a value judgment stemming from an ethical system which holds that science must confine itself strictly to the search for, and the exposition of, truth.)"
Why "[h]owever"?
If, due to the definition of the word "economist", you were (a) to claim that your writings are the work of an economist qua economist and (b) to not "refrain from [...] all value-loaded [...] conclusions", you would simply be incorrect. The choice to attempt to make your writings be the work of an economist qua economist may include a set of value judgements. But, once you make that choice, the fact alone does not imply that your writings will or must include any value judgements.
Adam Knott: Can we refer to proposition #2 as a judgment of value? If not, why not?
I am not sure. Is a "judgement of value" the correspondent to an ultimate desire or just any desire? I guess that I cannot answer your question simply because I do not really know, precisely, what a "judgement of value" is.
wilderness: AJ: It seems to only affirm - if anything - that I believe punishing that person would benefit me. "Punishing that person will benefit me" doesn't seem to be a statement of natural law. if you are doing it out of self-defense or out of justice due to such a person initiated coercion, yes you have affirmed natural law.
If I'm doing it for "justice" then yeah...but my point is, what if I am not?
wilderness:hat's why naming what has been said polycentric theory of law would be more definitive or self-explanatory.
Not sure what to say here. Maybe start another thread on it.
AJ: wilderness: AJ: It seems to only affirm - if anything - that I believe punishing that person would benefit me. "Punishing that person will benefit me" doesn't seem to be a statement of natural law. if you are doing it out of self-defense or out of justice due to such a person initiated coercion, yes you have affirmed natural law. If I'm doing it for "justice" then yeah...but my point is, what if I am not?
The individual still is, but it is a perversion. It is still the act of property, but an act that destroys property via. not being prosperous, increased conflict, suicide, and/or death, but it is still an act of property til the end, ie. death. It's a tracing of projectory.
AJ: wilderness:hat's why naming what has been said polycentric theory of law would be more definitive or self-explanatory. Not sure what to say here. Maybe start another thread on it.
i don't know, but at least for me, this understanding resolves a heck of a lot of issues that have been on-going. It resolves what I think might be a 'talking past one another'. It resolves a hang-up in the dialogue (not only for you and me I add) that can spring into a productive array of insight that is constructive rather than deconstructive or stuckness that inhibits a creative, logical momentum for potentially all involved.
And I don't think I'm saying anything new.
Conza88: Yes, he is not and that is the point. You cannot have a free market unless have the proper normative (ought to) rights being protected, which are based / guided by natural law and end up being (de facto) ones. Furthermore, not only is it illegitimate for the economist to advocate a free market without also adumbrating a theory of justice in property titles; he cannot even define a free market without doing so. For even to define and expound upon the free-market model, the economist is describing a system in which property titles are being exchanged, and therefore he must also define and expound upon how these titles are arrived at in the first place; he must have a theory of original property and of how property comes into being."
Do you see Mises's utilitarianism as normative? It can be phrased in terms of "ought to" but those are only "ought to...in order to achieve X goal," which I presume is different from what you mean when you say normative. In the case that you accept that Mises's utilitarianism is not normative (at least not in the objective sense - yes I do realize that in choosing Mises's utilitarianism people would be making an ethical choice of sorts, but it would be a subjective choice not an objective one), then any necessary theory of justice (now of course not normative concept, but one implemented purely for utilitarian (in the Misesian sense) reasons) would not require anything normative (remember you mean, I presume, objectively normative [yeah I know, what other kind is there, but just for clarity]). More than that, the above quote changes the whole notion of what a free market is, effectively saying that every ethicist will define "free market" differently. Technically, this moots everything both you and I have been saying....
Conza88:What rights should be enforced? It is to distinguish the Libertarian property assignment rule from all other systems that deal with property rights.
"Should"...for what purpose?
Conza88: AJ: Conza88:You don't? I do value my own pursuits. And who doesn't? What a nothing statement. So are you a utilitarian or not?
And who doesn't? What a nothing statement. So are you a utilitarian or not?
As I said, I value my own pursuits. That may make me a utilitarian by one of the many definitions out there, but I'm not sure which one.
'Do you propose to not make any other value judgments?"
There are things I disapprove of, and even things I would like others to agree with me on, but I don't see the whole "objective value" thing. It reminds me of a man who says, "That's a damn CRIME that you'd throw away those old Barry Manilow records." Sure sometimes we like to feel that our disapproval of something is in some sense "bigger than us," but that doesn't mean it is. Or it may just be "bigger than us" in the sense that my friends or my god agrees.
"What is your theory of property rights and justice?"
People will decide. I don't advocate a monopoly, so why would my theory matter?
"What is your argument against the status quo?"
My argument to myself is: A monopoly on force appears to result in things I don't like. My argument to others is: A monopoly on force appears to result in things that you may not like, or that you appear not to like; here's how it results in those things: [explanation of economics, etc.].
Conza88:De facto rights (the rights that are being protected), implies they ought to be protected and other normative (ought to) propositions as explained in the text you continually ignore.
The right of the president to declare war is being protected, so it ought to be protected? Well, obviously you don't mean that, but that's how you're phrasing it. As to the passage...
Conza88:We were talking about law & policy.
That's what you were talking about. I was talking about one thing only: that de facto rights do not imply normative rights. I never mentioned legal rights. That said, what I wrote above may explain the talking past each other here: differing definitions of normative.
Rothbard:cannot escape normative judgments basic to the theory. Why must the rules of custom be obeyed?
I see now why you quoted this, but it doesn't work to address what I said...unless you mean to imply that Mises's utilitarianism is normative. Because the answer to why the rules "must" be obeyed could simply be, "I want to obey them (and pay for their enforcement) because they are in my interests, and it appears that you want to do the same because they appear to be in your interests (but of course only you can answer that)." That is normative?
Conza88:Is the use of force justified?
Subjectively in my eyes, it may be "justified," but to me that means in the sense that such punishment will further my ends (in the broadest, most comprehensive sense: empathy, group harmony, etc. are also things I value - same meaning as "my pursuits" above).
Conza88:You have assumed a property right owner, you have assumed property title transfer and theft have you not? Otherwise how do you define stealing?
In my own mind? In terms of what acts I would identify as theft, they're probably much the same - if not almost exactly the same as Rothbard's. But again, unless I'm working in law enforcement or am on a jury, what I think about what "should" be the law doesn't matter since I don't think any monopolistic vision of society is in my interests (and I don't accept objective ethics or natural rights, which (if they were were valid concepts) may have been able to get around the monopoly issue).
Rothbard: "and therefore he must also define and expound upon how these titles are arrived at in the first place; he must have a theory of original property and of how property comes into being."
To the first part: People will figure that out in the absence of a monopoly. To the second part: Only if he [the economist/ethicist/etc.] is assuming a monopolistic vision of society or accepts objective natural rights or other objective ethics, which I don't.
Conza88: Rothbard makes a seemingly similar one in Praxeology, Value Judgments and Public Policy, as an argument against Mises "ingenious attempt to allow pronouncements of "good" or "bad" by the economist without making a value judgment; for the economist is supposed to be only a praxeologist, a technician, pointing out to his readers or listeners that they will all consider a policy "bad" once he reveals its full consequences". lol "In the case of my purchase of the newspaper, historians or psychologists may make more or less informed estimates of the newsdealers's or my value scales through the process of interpretive understanding, but all that the economist can know scientifically and with certainty is the preference relative to 15 cents or the newspaper as demonstrated through concrete action. Mises himself emphasized that one must not forget that the scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the reality of action. These scales have no independent existence apart from the actual behavior of individuals. The only source from which our knowledge concerning these scales is derived is the observation of a man's actions. Every action is always in perfect agreement with the scale of values or wants because these scales are nothing but an instrument for the interpretation of a man's acting. 15 Given Mises's own analysis, then, how can the economist know what the motives for advocating various policies really are or how people will regard the consequences of these policies?"
Rothbard makes a seemingly similar one in Praxeology, Value Judgments and Public Policy, as an argument against Mises "ingenious attempt to allow pronouncements of "good" or "bad" by the economist without making a value judgment; for the economist is supposed to be only a praxeologist, a technician, pointing out to his readers or listeners that they will all consider a policy "bad" once he reveals its full consequences". lol
Seems to strawman Mises's position, but I can't be sure. I'll leave this to someone who knows.
Conza88:None of it deals with normative (ought to) propositions, because nothing you mentioned has anything to do with law, or policy, or political ethics, or punishment theory, or justice. I'm not sure how your point has anything to do with a refutation.
What is has to do with it is this: You're saying de facto rights imply normative rights, but I'm saying that actions - even those that impinge upon other people - don't have to imply anything normative, as my several examples showed. Naturally, this may be a moot point given the above discussion about what we each intend by the word "normative."
wilderness: AJ: wilderness: AJ: It seems to only affirm - if anything - that I believe punishing that person would benefit me. "Punishing that person will benefit me" doesn't seem to be a statement of natural law. if you are doing it out of self-defense or out of justice due to such a person initiated coercion, yes you have affirmed natural law. If I'm doing it for "justice" then yeah...but my point is, what if I am not? The individual still is, but it is a perversion.
The individual still is, but it is a perversion.
What sentence is that connecting to?
wilderness: i don't know, but at least for me, this understanding resolves a heck of a lot of issues that have been on-going. It resolves what I think might be a 'talking past one another'. It resolves a hang-up in the dialogue (not only for you and me I add) that can spring into a productive array of insight that is constructive rather than deconstructive or stuckness that inhibits a creative, logical momentum for potentially all involved.
Well that sounds like a very good thing.
AJ: wilderness: AJ: ...but my point is, what if I am not? The individual still is, but it is a perversion. What sentence is that connecting to?
wilderness: AJ: ...but my point is, what if I am not? The individual still is, but it is a perversion.
AJ: ...but my point is, what if I am not?
...but my point is, what if I am not?
The one above of yours I left on the post and underlined. The other half of the sentence stated for justice. Justice does not pervert itself that would be a contradiction.