I've not read them at any length. As such I am deferring judgement until I have.
-Jon
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Donny with an A: It's just that a lot of people have taken teleological views to refer to broader conceptions of the good which span across individuals, and I think it's okay to allow them to use the term that way. Aside from the inherent difficulties in interpersonal measurement of any plausible conception of "the good," do you think there's anything fundamentally wrong with the use of the term that way?
Well, the reason why I answered the way I did is that I've seen people refer to utilitarian ethics as perfectionist or teleological at times. Even without taking the issue of aggregation into account, they are using these terms in very different ways than pre-moderns. The metaphysics and epistemology and philosophical anthropology underlying their meaning are very different. The "common good" might be considered a broader, aggregated telos. The problem I have with that is that the term "common good" has been used to justify all manner of un-libertarian things throughout history. It is possible to put a libertarian spin on it, however, such that the common good at the political level is liberty.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct Instructor, Buena Vista UniversityWebmaster, LibertarianStandard.comFounder / Executive Editor, Prometheusreview.com
Geoffrey, I definitely hear what you're saying on this. As a counterpoint, I'd offer John Broome's characterization from a really cool utilitarian book called Counting the Cost of Global Warming:
Teleology is the theory that one should act so as to maximize good. The notion of good can include many ethical values. For instance, it can include the value of equality, either within a generation or between generations. If equality is a good thing, then that good can be put together with other goods, such as the total of people's wellbeing, to determine overall good. So a teleologist can aim to maximize overall good, taking equality into account.
If any ethical theory says that we should maximize something, it is fair to say that that something is what the theory considers good. So any maximizing theory is teleological; it says we should maximize good, as the theory conceives good. Teleology can be identified by its structure, therefore: it has a maximizing structure. So long as a theory sets up an objective that should be maximized, it is a teleological theory. That is how I identify teleology.
I'm interested to hear how you'd respond.
Liberty student, I certainly don't expect anyone to take my word for anything. My objection was only to the fact that my positions were being attacked because they had their roots in certain thinkers' work, when the people who were criticizing me weren't familiar with the parts of those thinkers' work that I had in mind. I would never ask you to accept my correctness on faith, but I would hope that you wouldn't question my philosophical abilities simply because I don't completely denounce certain thinkers with whom you are not entirely familiar, but who have been denounced by other intelligent philosophers. I have all the respect in the world for the Austrian critiques of the Marxian economic system, and even wrote one of my very first papers in philosophy on Mises' critique of Marx's class ideology in Theory and History (even expanding it to indict Marx's theory in a new way that Mises did not discuss: if the purpose of technically false class ideologies is, as Marx writes in The German Ideology, to promote the interests of the class while systematically ignoring the fact that substantial portions of the populous will be subjugated by its rise to power, and if Socialism is the class ideology of the proletariat, then it would seem to follow that Marx was implicitly indicting his own theory as false ideological propaganda designed to help the proletariat rise to power at the expense of all others in the society). But there's some really cool stuff in Marx and Hegel, and I'd hope that we wouldn't have to shut all that stuff out just because they were wrong about a lot of other stuff.
Donny with an A: Geoffrey, I definitely hear what you're saying on this. As a counterpoint, I'd offer John Broome's characterization from a really cool utilitarian book called Counting the Cost of Global Warming: Teleology is the theory that one should act so as to maximize good. The notion of good can include many ethical values. For instance, it can include the value of equality, either within a generation or between generations. If equality is a good thing, then that good can be put together with other goods, such as the total of people's wellbeing, to determine overall good. So a teleologist can aim to maximize overall good, taking equality into account. If any ethical theory says that we should maximize something, it is fair to say that that something is what the theory considers good. So any maximizing theory is teleological; it says we should maximize good, as the theory conceives good. Teleology can be identified by its structure, therefore: it has a maximizing structure. So long as a theory sets up an objective that should be maximized, it is a teleological theory. That is how I identify teleology. I'm interested to hear how you'd respond.
Right, this is obviously utilitarianism given the 'maximization' language. Perfectionism and teleology in Aristotelian ethics involves development to our natural end, to maturity, i.e., as rational, political and social animals. There's none of this maximization language. In the Aristotelian context, maximization brings to mind, to me, excess. And the only thing that might prevent excess within this brand of utilitarianism might be having to balance off one good against another. Rather, one should be endeavoring to achieve the right "amount" of something, and what that right "amount" is depends upon universal human nature, our inborn talents, social context, personal choices, the nature of the "something" itself, etc. And it is the function of practical wisdom/prudence to integrate the various goods and virtues into a harmonious whole over the course of our lives. Also, with utilitarianism, I often wonder what is the standard for determining what is good and how various goods should be balanced or integrated. With Aristotelian ethics, it is clear, man's natural end (his own flourishing) is his ultimate good and standard of value; it is an inclusive end, meaning that the various goods and virtues are constitutive of it.
But couldn't Broome reply that you're taking an overly narrow view of maximization? In economics jargon, as you know, if something is desirable in low quantities, but then in excess becomes bad, then it is no longer "a good" once your reach those large quantities. The same might be said for valued objects within an aggregative teleological theory. If "having the best amount of all things" is "the good," then an Aristotelian take on a teleological theory the way Broome sees them might arrive at the view that the outcome is best which comes closest to having the best amount of all things. Or, if the "things" in question are being used to promote human flourishing, then perhaps the best outcome would be the one in which personal flourishing was most fully or extensively fostered. The maximizing structure could be the same, but the thing that is to be "maximized" would be an abstract value, rather than a concrete object. How would you respond?
Geoffrey Allan Plauche: Right, this is obviously utilitarianism given the 'maximization' language. Perfectionism and teleology in Aristotelian ethics involves development to our natural end, to maturity, i.e., as rational, political and social animals. There's none of this maximization language. In the Aristotelian context, maximization brings to mind, to me, excess. And the only thing that might prevent excess within this brand of utilitarianism might be having to balance off one good against another. Rather, one should be endeavoring to achieve the right "amount" of something, and what that right "amount" is depends upon universal human nature, our inborn talents, social context, personal choices, the nature of the "something" itself, etc. And it is the function of practical wisdom/prudence to integrate the various goods and virtues into a harmonious whole over the course of our lives. Also, with utilitarianism, I often wonder what is the standard for determining what is good and how various goods should be balanced or integrated. With Aristotelian ethics, it is clear, man's natural end (his own flourishing) is his ultimate good and standard of value; it is an inclusive end, meaning that the various goods and virtues are constitutive of it.
I don't think you are understanding the "maximization" language correctly. Imagine a cartesian coordinate system where the x-axis is the thing you are engaging in and the y-axis is how much happiness/utility you get from it.
Now image a function such as
f(x) = -x^2
so that there is a parabola opening downwards. If you move left along the x-axis starting at zero the amount of utility declines. Also, if you move right along the x-axis utility will decline. The maximum amount of utility will be at the very highest point of the parabola at x=0. This isn't the point of "too much" like you would get if you moved right along the x-axis, or of "too little" like if you moved left along the x-axis. This is the point of moderation in the Aristotelian sense, thus maximizing your utility.
It seems to me that there is not a contradiction between maximizing utility and acting virtuously if you are maximizing utility over the long-run. Acting in between the extremes of cowardice and rashness tends toward the median of bravery, which would lie at the highest point of the graph where utility is maximized. Sorry if I haven't made myself clear, but I will restate my idea later when its not so late at night if it needs clarification.
"I cannot prove, but am prepared to affirm, that if you take care of clarity in reasoning, most good causes will take care of themselves, while some bad ones are taken care of as a matter of course." -Anthony de Jasay
Magnus:You're asking HIM to explain to YOU why marxism and austrianism can't be merged? Dude, you're the one who is gonna have to explain to the rest of us how it can be done.
Posit -> Prove. Negative claims cannot be proven.
Magnus:You know, moral, methodology, economics etc.
Insofar as it is a science, Austrian Economics is wertfrei and cannot present a moral code. Ethical/moral frameworks are independent of Austrianism, but can (and many times, as far as libertarian ethics, do) invoke Austrian methodology.
Magnus:The only thing marxism has in common with austrianism is some of the observations and categories the two schools both make upon society, like when they talk about "class-struggle", the "proletariat", "explotation", etc.
And it is precisely the "class" idea which is developed in agorism.
banned:Negative claims cannot be proven.
Like x^n+y^n=z^n has no integer solutions?
scineram:Like x^n+y^n=z^n has no integer solutions?
Were you thinking of a different formula? That is obviously false.
Anyways, negative claims need not be proven, that better?
Atheism is not true, better?
scineram:Atheism is not true, better?
No.
What do you mean by Atheism? Atheism is the lack of belief in a god. "The lack in a beliefe in a god is not true" doesn't even make sense.
Do you mean "God does not exist is not true"? This statement is no longer a negative claim as it relies on a positive being true. God's exists.
"God does not exist", however, is not provable.
Solid_Choke: I don't think you are understanding the "maximization" language correctly. Imagine a cartesian coordinate system where the x-axis is the thing you are engaging in and the y-axis is how much happiness/utility you get from it. Now image a function such as f(x) = -x^2 so that there is a parabola opening downwards. If you move left along the x-axis starting at zero the amount of utility declines. Also, if you move right along the x-axis utility will decline. The maximum amount of utility will be at the very highest point of the parabola at x=0. This isn't the point of "too much" like you would get if you moved right along the x-axis, or of "too little" like if you moved left along the x-axis. This is the point of moderation in the Aristotelian sense, thus maximizing your utility. It seems to me that there is not a contradiction between maximizing utility and acting virtuously if you are maximizing utility over the long-run. Acting in between the extremes of cowardice and rashness tends toward the median of bravery, which would lie at the highest point of the graph where utility is maximized. Sorry if I haven't made myself clear, but I will restate my idea later when its not so late at night if it needs clarification.
The maximization language is ambiguous. You shouldn't need an equation and a graph to convert it into moderation in your head. Why not just call it the right amount? Also, when economists talk about wealth maximization, are they conceiving of wealth as something you can have too much of? Can you have too much happiness? Even too much utility? So the maximization language really only makes sense with some of the lesser goods and with the over-arching, inclusive good, whatever that is: happiness, utility. If you apply it to many other lesser constitutive goods it leads you astray unless you're very careful to fit them into that formula. What does it mean to maximize equality? On the face of it, it sounds like thorough-going egalitarianism. You have to fit it into that formula, carefully differentiating different meanings, weighing them and balancing them against other goods to keep from going to extremes on equality. This starts to require specialized knowledge. For the layman, the maximization language strikes me as too complicated and so will probably be applied simplistically. Economist-Ethicist: "Equality is a good - maximize it. But wait! Not so much!" Layman: "But you said to maximize it!" E-E: "No no no no no. See here." Plugs numbers into an equation, does the math, plots it on a graph. Layman's eyes glaze over.
Donny with an A: But couldn't Broome reply that you're taking an overly narrow view of maximization? In economics jargon, as you know, if something is desirable in low quantities, but then in excess becomes bad, then it is no longer "a good" once your reach those large quantities. The same might be said for valued objects within an aggregative teleological theory. If "having the best amount of all things" is "the good," then an Aristotelian take on a teleological theory the way Broome sees them might arrive at the view that the outcome is best which comes closest to having the best amount of all things. Or, if the "things" in question are being used to promote human flourishing, then perhaps the best outcome would be the one in which personal flourishing was most fully or extensively fostered. The maximizing structure could be the same, but the thing that is to be "maximized" would be an abstract value, rather than a concrete object. How would you respond?
Off the cuff, I would answer in part the way I answered Solid Choke. It's also not clear to me what is gained by using the maximization language, particularly if you only apply it to the over-arching good and not the lesser instrumental or constitutive goods so as to avoid confusion. What is gained over standard Aristotelian terminology by saying we should maximize our own flourishing? Another problem I have is that utilitarianism is generally not an ethic for individual perfection. Like most modern theories of ethics, it tends to be about maintaining some conception of social order. It's a socialized ethic. But the biggest problem with utilitarianism is that act-utilitarianism is generally rejected and Roderick has shown that rule-utilitarianism is praxeologically unstable, collapsing either into act-utilitarianism or deontology, neither of which are sound, in my opinion.
"There are no square circles" = sound negative proof.
AnalyticalAnarchism.net - The Positive Political Economy of Anarchism
Even more straightforwardly, --P = P is proof of a negative from classical logic.
Geoffrey, what is gained, I think, is the ability to classify a number of different views according to a common structure. The intention, I think, is to set teleological views apart from those concerned with things like constraints and duties which don't directly correspond to conceptions of the good.
With regard to the idea of not being able to prove negatives, I think the basic idea is that if it is possible for something to exist, then it is not possible to prove that it does not exist. A square circle cannot possibly exist, and therefore it is possible to prove that it does not exist. But a unicorn, for example, could possibly exist, and it cannot be proven not to exist. The implication for atheism is that if the concept of God is not inherently contradictory (which many accounts of God's characteristics unfortunately are), then it's not possible to prove that the God in question does not exist. The Quine-Duhem thesis seems immediately relevant.
Thanks for clearing up, Donny. Although I think square circles exist.
scineram:Thanks for clearing up, Donny. Although I think square circles exist.
You can't be serious. There is no possibility of having something which is both an equilateral quadrilateral with each interior angle of 90 degrees AND is also the locus of all points equidistant from a central point at the same time.
Draw the unit circle of 1-norm and sup-norm.
Radius of the circle is 1. Center of square to center of side is 1. Center of square to center of angle is sqrt(2). Not possible to have a square circle.
QED.
I suggest a refresher course in basic geometry.
I told you to use a different metric. The supremum metric.
And I told you how the measurement works. Take a refresher course in basic geometry. Or not. Either way: you're incorrect. It's just that simple. I provided the definitions for you. End of discussion.
Okay.
There is an entire universe behind "basic geometry".
Knight_of_BAAWA:There is no possibility of having something which is both an equilateral quadrilateral with each interior angle of 90 degrees AND is also the locus of all points equidistant from a central point at the same time.
Yes.
circle of radius 0 = square of sides 0.
That's a point, not a polygon or circle.
Knight_of_BAAWA:That's a point, not a polygon or circle.
A point fits the definition of any polygon sides = 0.
poly = more than 1.
0 = none.
How can it fit the definition of polygon?
Donny with an A:With regard to the idea of not being able to prove negatives, I think the basic idea is that if it is possible for something to exist, then it is not possible to prove that it does not exist. A square circle cannot possibly exist, and therefore it is possible to prove that it does not exist. But a unicorn, for example, could possibly exist, and it cannot be proven not to exist. The implication for atheism is that if the concept of God is not inherently contradictory (which many accounts of God's characteristics unfortunately are), then it's not possible to prove that the God in question does not exist.
Yeah. On the empirical/inductive level, we cannot prove anything (positively or negatively) with certainty. For example, we cannot prove there isn't a teacup orbiting the earth. However, on the logical/deductive level, we can prove things with certainty, e.g. no square circles. Or with the case of God, we can prove that God qua omnipotent and omniscient diety is impossible and doesn't exist. Of course, if you define God differently, that's a whole different story.
Knight_of_BAAWA: poly = more than 1. 0 = none.
I meant "sides length".
Zero-length is a point, essentially.
Knight_of_BAAWA:Zero-length is a point, essentially.
yes, and as I was saying, a point can be considered an n-gon with sides of lenght 0.
You can't have zero-length for a side, though. A side has to have some measurement greater than 0. That's just part of what a "side" is.
Knight_of_BAAWA:A side has to have some measurement greater than 0. That's just part of what a "side" is.
so sin(0) ought not return an answer then? since at 0 radians, the opposite side would be equal to 0, and thus could no longer be considered a side.
banned:so sin(0) ought not return an answer then? since at 0 radians, the opposite side would be equal to 0, and thus could no longer be considered a side.
Radians is an angle measurement, not a side measurement. sin(0) merely means you're trying to find the sine function answer when you plug in a horizontal line as the argument.
Knight_of_BAAWA:Radians is an angle measurement, not a side measurement.
Right, but at 0 radians, the opposite side is length 0. Which it cannot be if it is to be considered a side.
Knight_of_BAAWA:sin(0) merely means you're trying to find the sine function answer when you plug in a horizontal line as the argument.
And the sin function is (opposite side) / (hypotenuse). But if a side is not a side if if it has a length of 0, then the paramaters do not meet the function requirements (since the opposite side would be 0 and thus not a side and the sin function defines a relationship between sides) and no answer would be returned.
banned:Right, but at 0 radians, the opposite side is length 0. Which it cannot be if it is to be considered a side.
And it's not at that point. Are you being daft for a reason? Are you seriously trying to commit the egregious blunder of saying that because you can plug in "0" for the fuction, that means a side can be 0 length?
Knight_of_BAAWA:Are you seriously trying to commit the egregious blunder of saying that because you can plug in "0" for the fuction, that means a side can be 0 length?
No, I'm saying that 0 can be considered a length of a side, and because of that, it is a parameter which has a defined output in a sine function, if you say otherwise, a sine function cannot be defined if there is a side length 0.
banned:No, I'm saying that 0 can be considered a length of a side, and because of that, it is a parameter which has a defined output in a sine function, if you say otherwise, a sine function cannot be defined if there is a side length 0.
You have a muddled grasp of the function and what a "side" is. The sine function is simply defined as a ratio, and you're confusing that with a specific instance.
Is this conversation really happening? I think this might be the most incredible instance of thread hijacking I've ever seen in my life. Of course, the conversation that was going on here before this one was completely off topic as well, but this one is just impressive!
It takes a lot of talent to threadjack this well.