Physiocrat: Lilburne, If it's our evolution which has detemined us and consequently our psychology doesn't your defence of libertarianism to fall to one massive genetic fallacy?
Lilburne,
If it's our evolution which has detemined us and consequently our psychology doesn't your defence of libertarianism to fall to one massive genetic fallacy?
No,because I don't justify libertarianism according to evolution. I justify libertarianism according to my own moral feelings. Impelled by my own moral feelings, I try to spread the teachings of Austrian economics, because I believe that once people deeply understand it, it explodes for them the myth of the necessity of the state (at least the necessity of anything more than a night watchman state), and thereby clears the way for them to justify libertarianism according to THEIR own moral feelings. Think about: how many people are there who come to deeply understand Austrian economics who don't at least become minarchists?
I don't justify libertarianism according to the origin of the moral feelings that lead those who are disabused of the myth of state to it. I only explain the near-universality of those feelings according to their origin. Also, to be completely clear, I do NOT justify those moral feelings according to their near-universality either. For me as a moral agent, moral feelings are an irreducible given, even though for me as a student of the human psyche, they are not. They are not justified by other things, other things are justified by them.
zefreak:I am an eliminativist in the sense that I believe there are neural correlates for all experiential phenomena or 'qualia'. I do not think qualia poses a problem for materialism, considering that experience of qualia can be manipulated physically in a controlled setting. I side squarely with Metzinger and Dennett and consider qualia to be a largely unhelpful term that is way too much like Plato's perfect forms.
That sounds interesting. How can the experience of qualia be manipulated in a way that would say anything meaningful? If you don't want to explain you can provide a link or just tell me what to search for on google.
As I understand the zombie argument, it says that we can conceive a being which is physically identical to ourselves, yet it does not experience qualia. But that must mean that qualia are over and above our physical and functional properties. The zombie would still screech when it steps on a nail, but it would not actually feel pain as we do. I cannot give a good defense of materialism when people make this objection, especially when people can rely on very good arguments made by Kripke to defend it.
I also forgot about Mary's Room. Do you think Mary would learn anything new when she experiences the color red for the first time? I think I have pretty good reasons for believing that she would not, but it is still an objection that I am not too comfortable with.
Those are the two strongest objections against materialism in my opinion.
Thanks for that! I've been interested in mirror neurons ever since I came across them as an answer to a certain problem in philosophy of mind, specifically the "how do we know that other people are actors" question.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan:Thanks for that! I've been interested in mirror neurons ever since I came across them as an answer to a certain problem in philosophy of mind, specifically the "how do we know that other people are actors" question. WOW. The positivists have discovered that there is some sort of correlation between the brain, consciousness, emotions, thoughts, et cetera ?? That's an AMAZING discovery. I hope that the guy who discovered the brain got the nobel prize of positivism of something....
So do you equate any form of empiricism with positivism? You are doing a great disservice to those you admire with your naive strain of rationalism.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Juan:Sorry freakish entity, I can't understand your positivistic trash, to me it sounds like kcynywpcmetojme. ps : Did you pray to stirner today ?
Juan,
This is a place for CIVIL discussion. I will no longer brook your flaming. I will no longer let you elbow your way into conversations among people who disagree but who are nonetheless trying to teach and learn from each other, only to obstruct their efforts.
One day ban. Next time it will be three.
If you are unwilling to participate in civil discussion, then don't come back after your ban expires.
Eric: That sounds interesting. How can the experience of qualia be manipulated in a way that would say anything meaningful? If you don't want to explain you can provide a link or just tell me what to search for on google.
Much of the empirical studies I get from Metzinger's "The Ego Tunnel". For example,
A.D. Lawrence "Selective Disruption of the Recognition of Facial Expressions of Anger", NeuroReport 2002
In this study, patients which damage to particular areas of the ventral striatum of the basal ganglia (part of the neural system which is involved in the "mirror neurons" mentioned previously) show impairment in identifying aggression signals emitted by others. If these areas are blocked pharmacologically, subjects can recognize other emotions but can no longer recognize anger.
There are many more examples. I really recommend picking it up.
Eric: As I understand the zombie argument, it says that we can conceive a being which is physically identical to ourselves, yet it does not experience qualia. But that must mean that qualia are over and above our physical and functional properties. The zombie would still screech when it steps on a nail, but it would not actually feel pain as we do. I cannot give a good defense of materialism when people make this objection, especially when people can rely on very good arguments made by Kripke to defend it.
The zombie argument is simply begging the question. It asserts that a being which is physically identical to ourselves and does not experience qualia is conceivable. This says more about the misconceptions held regarding consciousness than it does about anything else. The zombie would screech and holler, behave in a way similar to goal driven behavior, etc. Yet, if consciousness is a process and self-identity an internal model, then a zombie with the exact physical make-up would experience just as we do.
Hence why the zombie problem adds absolutely nothing to the discussion. A materialist cannot conceive of a being that is physically identical to us but doesn't experience a phenomenal self and 'qualia', so the problem is based on a faulty premise. A dualist can, but you must already accept the existence of a spirit/soul/homunculus before the zombie concept even makes sense.
Eric: I also forgot about Mary's Room. Do you think Mary would learn anything new when she experiences the color red for the first time? I think I have pretty good reasons for believing that she would not, but it is still an objection that I am not too comfortable with.
I'm with Dennett on this, where "Mary would not, in fact, learn something new if she stepped out of her black and white room to see the colour red. Dennett asserts that if she already truly knew "everything about colour", that knowledge would necessarily include a deep understanding of why and how human neurology causes us to sense the "qualia" of color. Mary would therefore already know exactly what to expect of seeing red, before ever leaving the room. Dennett argues that, although we cannot conceive of such a deep knowledge, if the unrealistic premise of the thought experiment is that Mary knows all there is to know about colour, we cannot assume that we cannot fathom or even describe such knowledge — or that such knowledge doesn't exist. As a consequence, Dennett concludes that this is not a sound argument for the existence of qualia."
"Dennett finds that many people find it difficult to see this, so he uses the case of RoboMary to further illustrate what it would be like for Mary to possess such a vast knowledge of the physical workings of the human brain and colour vision. RoboMary is an intelligent robot who, instead of the ordinary colour camera-eyes, has a software lock such that she is only able to perceive black and white and shades in-between.
RoboMary can examine the computer brain of similar non-colour-locked robots when they look at a red tomato, and see exactly how they react and what kinds of impulses occur. RoboMary can also construct a simulation of her own brain, unlock the simulation's colour-lock and, with reference to the other robots, simulate exactly how this simulation of herself reacts to seeing a red tomato. RoboMary naturally has control over all of her internal states except for the colour-lock. With the knowledge of her simulation's internal states upon seeing a red tomato, RoboMary can put her own internal states directly into the states they would be in upon seeing a red tomato. In this way, without ever seeing a red tomato through her cameras, she will know exactly what it is like to see a red tomato.
Dennett uses this example to show us that Mary's all-encompassing physical knowledge makes her own internal states as transparent as those of a robot or computer, and it is almost straightforward for her to figure out exactly how it feels to see red."
Sorry for the blocks of quotes, but much of what I could say has been said better by other people. :)
zefreak: Much of the empirical studies I get from Metzinger's "The Ego Tunnel". For example, A.D. Lawrence "Selective Disruption of the Recognition of Facial Expressions of Anger", NeuroReport 2002 In this study, patients which damage to particular areas of the ventral striatum of the basal ganglia (part of the neural system which is involved in the "mirror neurons" mentioned previously) show impairment in identifying aggression signals emitted by others. If these areas are blocked pharmacologically, subjects can recognize other emotions but can no longer recognize anger. There are many more examples. I really recommend picking it up.
I actually ordered that book not too long ago. I have it at my house but I need to finish up a few other books before I can start reading it. But anyways, I am familiar with those types of experiments, but I still am not too sure about them. As I am sure you know, the brain is not completely disconnected. It is still one brain. Under normal conditions, people with split brains behave pretty normally. It is only with these "experiments" where people have such strange behavior. Many researchers say that what is really being examined is awkwardness, failure of co-ordination, or cognitive malfunctioning. Stuff very similar to what occurs when a person suffers from many different types of brain damages. Just like MPD, the evidence is not conclusive. Until the issue is solved once and for all, I don't think it can be an argument for materialism.
zefreak: The zombie argument is simply begging the question. It asserts that a being which is physically identical to ourselves and does not experience qualia is conceivable. This says more about the misconceptions held regarding consciousness than it does about anything else. The zombie would screech and holler, behave in a way similar to goal driven behavior, etc. Yet, if consciousness is a process and self-identity an internal model, then a zombie with the exact physical make-up would experience just as we do. Hence why the zombie problem adds absolutely nothing to the discussion. A materialist cannot conceive of a being that is physically identical to us but doesn't experience a phenomenal self and 'qualia', so the problem is based on a faulty premise. A dualist can, but you must already accept the existence of a spirit/soul/homunculus before the zombie concept even makes sense.
That makes sense I guess. I always assumed that a zombie was conceivable in the context of materialism, but maybe I was wrong.
zefreak: "Dennett finds that many people find it difficult to see this, so he uses the case of RoboMary to further illustrate what it would be like for Mary to possess such a vast knowledge of the physical workings of the human brain and colour vision. RoboMary is an intelligent robot who, instead of the ordinary colour camera-eyes, has a software lock such that she is only able to perceive black and white and shades in-between. RoboMary can examine the computer brain of similar non-colour-locked robots when they look at a red tomato, and see exactly how they react and what kinds of impulses occur. RoboMary can also construct a simulation of her own brain, unlock the simulation's colour-lock and, with reference to the other robots, simulate exactly how this simulation of herself reacts to seeing a red tomato. RoboMary naturally has control over all of her internal states except for the colour-lock. With the knowledge of her simulation's internal states upon seeing a red tomato, RoboMary can put her own internal states directly into the states they would be in upon seeing a red tomato. In this way, without ever seeing a red tomato through her cameras, she will know exactly what it is like to see a red tomato. Dennett uses this example to show us that Mary's all-encompassing physical knowledge makes her own internal states as transparent as those of a robot or computer, and it is almost straightforward for her to figure out exactly how it feels to see red."
How would you respond to this objection...
Science can only explain to us objective, third-person phenomena. However, only from the subjective first person point of view can experiences be understood. Take a bat for example. We can never know what it is like to be a bat, even if we know everything there is to know about bats. This is because in order to understand what it is like to be a bat, one would would need to become a bat. There is no other way for us to know what it is like to be a bat. This means that physical facts cannot give us all the knowledge of conscious experience. Neuroscience will never be able to reveal to us what it is like to experience something (such as seeing the color red), since such knowledge cannot be known by relying on third-person data. There is just a conceptual difference that cannot be breached between subjective experience and objective third-person data. So this means that Mary would learn something new. She would learn what it is like to see red because the only way to learn what it is like to see red is through subjective experience.
wilderness:I am certain that natural means intellect in the context of natural law of human nature. That's all I've said. You've been going on tangents.
And I'm certain that you are way off base. Natural law (lex naturalis) is a specific theory, a doctrine. Your contention that it means intellect doesn't prove the validity of the theory nor is it relevant to proving the validity of the theory. What you are talking about is either wrong or irrelevant to myself (and the OP). nd my use of the aether was neither a strawman nor tangent (that should have been obvious enough by its presentation) it was merely a device to point out how out of touch you are.
Eric: How would you respond to this objection... Science can only explain to us objective, third-person phenomena. However, only from the subjective first person point of view can experiences be understood. Take a bat for example. We can never know what it is like to be a bat, even if we know everything there is to know about bats. This is because in order to understand what it is like to be a bat, one would would need to become a bat. There is no other way for us to know what it is like to be a bat. This means that physical facts cannot give us all the knowledge of conscious experience. Neuroscience will never be able to reveal to us what it is like to experience something (such as seeing the color red), since such knowledge cannot be known by relying on third-person data. There is just a conceptual difference that cannot be breached between subjective experience and objective third-person data.
Science can only explain to us objective, third-person phenomena. However, only from the subjective first person point of view can experiences be understood. Take a bat for example. We can never know what it is like to be a bat, even if we know everything there is to know about bats. This is because in order to understand what it is like to be a bat, one would would need to become a bat. There is no other way for us to know what it is like to be a bat. This means that physical facts cannot give us all the knowledge of conscious experience. Neuroscience will never be able to reveal to us what it is like to experience something (such as seeing the color red), since such knowledge cannot be known by relying on third-person data. There is just a conceptual difference that cannot be breached between subjective experience and objective third-person data.
Eric:
Excellent passage here.
I would accept the objection and then proceed to try to explain the phenomena of consciousness by means other than natural science.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Eric: I actually ordered that book not too long ago. I have it at my house but I need to finish up a few other books before I can start reading it. But anyways, I am familiar with those types of experiments, but I still am not too sure about them. As I am sure you know, the brain is not completely disconnected. It is still one brain. Under normal conditions, people with split brains behave pretty normally. It is only with these "experiments" where people have such strange behavior. Many researchers say that what is really being examined is awkwardness, failure of co-ordination, or cognitive malfunctioning. Stuff very similar to what occurs when a person suffers from many different types of brain damages. Just like MPD, the evidence is not conclusive. Until the issue is solved once and for all, I don't think it can be an argument for materialism.
Perhaps there was a misunderstanding, but the example I posted wasn't related to split brain phenomena. Any healthy patient can be the subject of such experiments. There are numerous examples in the book, with massive implications towards our understanding of consciousness. If empathy is a result of the process of various neural networks working together at a sub-conscious level, then it should be possible to turn on/off or otherwise affect the agent's experience of that phenomena. This is what studies such as the one above achieve. Now theoretically there are neural correlates for such various sensations as pleasure, confidence (there are numerous interesting studies regarding pharmacologically induced confidence in subjects, with extremely positive results) and pain.
When it comes to split brain phenomena, I am not expert, but it is lucky to be the subject of much study. Under normal conditions, people with split brain syndrome may seem to behave normally because only in scientific studies are anomalies specifically searched for. Cognitive deficiencies are not necessarily noticeable, unless you are testing for them. The evidence that I am aware of comes down overwhelmingly on the side of materialism.
Do you have any links that may cast doubt on my understanding of split brain disorder? I am certainly willing to be proven too hasty.
This is what Dennett's first paragraph I quoted is getting at.
"We can never know what it is like to be a bat, even if we know everything there is to know about bats"
This statement is, within the materialist paradigm, false. It may be that we will never know all there is to know about bats, but if such an impossibility happened to occur, and a non-bat was able to know everything there is to know about them, including the neural correlates of subjective bat experience and their related 'qualias', then that individual with god-like knowledge would 'know' the bats experience without necessarily experiencing it himself.
I think the whole thought-experiment is faulty for this reason. For the experiment to be conceptually solid, Mary must have all knowledge about color. This includes the neural correlates that causes the qualia of color. It also includes the qualia that those correlates reference.
For example, if I tell you that a particular sequence of neural firings produces the qualia or sensation of 'cadmium red', does that mean you know all there is to know about cadmium red? You know the neural correlate, you know the cause and reason for cadmium red, but if you don't know the sensation itself that it references then you only know one side of the equation.
The problem is with the basic assumptions of the thought experiment. Mary cannot know all there is to know about color, a fundamental premise of the experiment, without knowing the sensations that the correlates reference.
"Dennett asserts that if she already truly knew "everything about colour", that knowledge would necessarily include a deep understanding of why and how human neurology causes us to sense the "qualia" of color. Mary would therefore already know exactly what to expect of seeing red, before ever leaving the room. Dennett argues that, although we cannot conceive of such a deep knowledge, if the unrealistic premise of the thought experiment is that Mary knows all there is to know about colour, we cannot assume that we cannot fathom or even describe such knowledge — or that such knowledge doesn't exist. As a consequence, Dennett concludes that this is not a sound argument for the existence of qualia."
Thanks for the answers Zefreak.
I do not have any links about split brain syndrome. I only heard about the controversy via one of my professors. He had posted examples showing how the topic is inconclusive. I will ask him where he got he information.
As for the bat argument, it just seems very difficult to imagine how one could understand what it is like to be a bat without actually becoming a bat. But what you said makes sense. So I will get back so you on that. I am guessing all of this is addressed in that book you recommended me.
Angurse: wilderness:I am certain that natural means intellect in the context of natural law of human nature. That's all I've said. You've been going on tangents. And I'm certain that you are way off base. Natural law (lex naturalis) is a specific theory, a doctrine. Your contention that it means intellect doesn't prove the validity of the theory
And I'm certain that you are way off base. Natural law (lex naturalis) is a specific theory, a doctrine. Your contention that it means intellect doesn't prove the validity of the theory
You keep bringing up theory. I haven't. That's a tangent. Natural in natural law tradition does mean intellect(ual). Robin Smith in Aristotle's book Prior Analytics comments on how Aristotle's deductions are called natural deductions as it is of the intellect. It is the whole basis of what science contends, which is it is an intellectual venture. The nature of anything is a process that involves metaphysically not only the thing but the intellect grasping the thing. That metaphysic event of the thing AND intellect is called natural in the natural law of human nature tradition. The knowledge of what this thing is, is where theory enters the picture. Natural in this tradition, not by my own accord but by the tradition itself mentioned by various teachers of this field, includes intellect and the nature of what is - together in the same definition. So when natural is mentioned in the natural law tradition the definition of natural, having various definitions, but one is most certainity: intellect(ual).
Angurse: nor is it relevant to proving the validity of the theory.
nor is it relevant to proving the validity of the theory.
I am not talking about a theory. I am talking about intellect.
Angurse: What you are talking about is either wrong or irrelevant to myself (and the OP).
What you are talking about is either wrong or irrelevant to myself (and the OP).
It's not wrong and therefore it is irrelevant - I agree - for your whole argument has been tangentially meaningless with some strawmen thrown in. You needed to not even have responded initially.
Angurse: and my use of the aether was neither a strawman nor tangent
and my use of the aether was neither a strawman nor tangent
No, it was/is a tangent.
Angurse: (that should have been obvious enough by its presentation) it was merely a device to point out how out of touch you are.
(that should have been obvious enough by its presentation) it was merely a device to point out how out of touch you are.
another strawman.
Now that it has been pointed out by you the irrelevance of you initially responding.
good night
zefreak: Juan:Thanks for that! I've been interested in mirror neurons ever since I came across them as an answer to a certain problem in philosophy of mind, specifically the "how do we know that other people are actors" question. WOW. The positivists have discovered that there is some sort of correlation between the brain, consciousness, emotions, thoughts, et cetera ?? That's an AMAZING discovery. I hope that the guy who discovered the brain got the nobel prize of positivism of something.... So do you equate any form of empiricism with positivism? You are doing a great disservice to those you admire with your naive strain of rationalism.
This is what irritates me the most about people in the Mises-Rothbard Austrian School. Logical Positivism has been dead for decades. Why not address other epistemological theories like Critical Rationalism or Constructive Empiricism?
"I cannot prove, but am prepared to affirm, that if you take care of clarity in reasoning, most good causes will take care of themselves, while some bad ones are taken care of as a matter of course." -Anthony de Jasay
Solid_Choke: zefreak: Juan:Thanks for that! I've been interested in mirror neurons ever since I came across them as an answer to a certain problem in philosophy of mind, specifically the "how do we know that other people are actors" question. WOW. The positivists have discovered that there is some sort of correlation between the brain, consciousness, emotions, thoughts, et cetera ?? That's an AMAZING discovery. I hope that the guy who discovered the brain got the nobel prize of positivism of something.... So do you equate any form of empiricism with positivism? You are doing a great disservice to those you admire with your naive strain of rationalism. This is what irritates me the most about people in the Mises-Rothbard Austrian School. Logical Positivism has been dead for decades. Why not address other epistemological theories like Critical Rationalism or Constructive Empiricism?
Worse than that, many lay Austrian's don't even understand logical positivism, let alone the critiques. And what's wrong with critical rationalism?
wilderness: You keep bringing up theory. I haven't. That's a tangent. Natural in natural law tradition does mean intellect(ual). Robin Smith in Aristotle's book Prior Analytics comments on how Aristotle's deductions are called natural deductions as it is of the intellect. It is the whole basis of what science contends, which is it is an intellectual venture. The nature of anything is a process that involves metaphysically not only the thing but the intellect grasping the thing. That metaphysic event of the thing AND intellect is called natural in the natural law of human nature tradition. The knowledge of what this thing is, is where theory enters the picture. Natural in this tradition, not by my own accord but by the tradition itself mentioned by various teachers of this field, includes intellect and the nature of what is - together in the same definition. So when natural is mentioned in the natural law tradition the definition of natural, having various definitions, but one is most certainity: intellect(ual).
It is nothing but theory(s)! Thats the point. Thats the discussion. Have any been proven? Talk about intellect all you like, it doesn't verify anything as being true or correct or real. Goodness! Not understanding natural law (lex naturalis) is fine, but continuing inane irrelevant nonsense and throwing out more ideas you clearly don't understand (strawman, tangent) is just plain pitiful.
zefreak: Solid_Choke: zefreak: Juan:Thanks for that! I've been interested in mirror neurons ever since I came across them as an answer to a certain problem in philosophy of mind, specifically the "how do we know that other people are actors" question. WOW. The positivists have discovered that there is some sort of correlation between the brain, consciousness, emotions, thoughts, et cetera ?? That's an AMAZING discovery. I hope that the guy who discovered the brain got the nobel prize of positivism of something.... So do you equate any form of empiricism with positivism? You are doing a great disservice to those you admire with your naive strain of rationalism. This is what irritates me the most about people in the Mises-Rothbard Austrian School. Logical Positivism has been dead for decades. Why not address other epistemological theories like Critical Rationalism or Constructive Empiricism? Worse than that, many lay Austrian's don't even understand logical positivism, let alone the critiques. And what's wrong with critical rationalism?
If anyone is interested, I'll make a new thread about what is wrong with Critical Rationalism; but this thread seems to be off-topic enough as it is.
Angurse: It is nothing but theory(s)! Thats the point. Thats the discussion. Have any been proven?
It is nothing but theory(s)! Thats the point. Thats the discussion. Have any been proven?
Intellect is theory? Biological questioning or the science (episteme) questioning of intellect is irrelevant to what I said initially.
Angurse: Talk about intellect all you like,
Talk about intellect all you like,
From the source I linked earlier: ""Thus Hobbes altered the meaning of the words "nature" and "natural,"...becom(ing) the opposite of civitas, "reason" and "order"."
From the source I linked earlier:
""Thus Hobbes altered the meaning of the words "nature" and "natural,"...becom(ing)
the opposite of civitas, "reason" and "order"."
--- I was talking about what natural means according to the natural law tradition. So of course I was talking about intellect all I want. I am staying on point to my initial comment. Angurse: it doesn't verify anything as being true or correct or real.
I was talking about what natural means according to the natural law tradition. So of course I was talking about intellect all I want. I am staying on point to my initial comment.
Angurse: it doesn't verify anything as being true or correct or real.
it doesn't verify anything as being true or correct or real.
me: your questioning intellect's presence being true or real is irrelevant to my initial comment you responded to.
Angurse: ...but continuing inane irrelevant nonsense and throwing out more ideas you clearly don't understand (strawman, tangent) is just plain pitiful.
...but continuing inane irrelevant nonsense and throwing out more ideas you clearly don't understand (strawman, tangent) is just plain pitiful.
another tangent of yours.
wilderness:Intellect is theory? Biological questioning or the science (episteme) questioning of intellect is irrelevant to what I said initially.
Natural law (lex naturalis) is theory, the very theory in question. Saying its discovered through intellect doesn't answer the question of whether it actually has been discovered.
wilderness:me: your questioning intellect's presence being true or real is irrelevant to my initial comment you responded to.
Again, I'm not questioning the presence of intellect at all. As I've been saying, your initial comment was irrelevant, as it didn't prove/discover/verify anything, it was just an irrelevant comment.
wilderness:another tangent of yours.
More proof that you don't understand what "tangent" means.
Solid_Choke:If anyone is interested, I'll make a new thread about what is wrong with Critical Rationalism; but this thread seems to be off-topic enough as it is.
I would be interested.
Angurse: wilderness:Intellect is theory? Biological questioning or the science (episteme) questioning of intellect is irrelevant to what I said initially. Natural law (lex naturalis) is theory, the very theory in question.
Natural law (lex naturalis) is theory, the very theory in question.
I don't care that you want to talk about the theory of natural law. This is about semantics on what the word natural means.
Angurse: Saying its discovered through intellect doesn't answer the question of whether it actually has been discovered.
Saying its discovered through intellect doesn't answer the question of whether it actually has been discovered.
I never brought up anything being discovered. Again irrelevant.
Angurse: wilderness:me: your questioning intellect's presence being true or real is irrelevant to my initial comment you responded to. Again, I'm not questioning the presence of intellect at all. As I've been saying, your initial comment was irrelevant, as it didn't prove/discover/verify anything, it was just a comment.
Again, I'm not questioning the presence of intellect at all. As I've been saying, your initial comment was irrelevant, as it didn't prove/discover/verify anything, it was just a comment.
My initial comment was on what natural means in the tradition of natural law. Natural means intellect. What is irrelevant are your tangents away from this point. You initially commented on what I said with strawmen, tangents, and have tried to discuss theories. These are irrelevant to what I initially said.
Angurse: wilderness:another tangent of yours. More proof that you don't understand what "tangent" means.
oh yeah, your going on, and on about your personal ghost stories which are totally revelant to what I initially said. if you don't like the meaning of natural ie intellect - Not my problem.
wilderness:I don't care that you want to talk about the theory of natural law. This is about semantics on what the word natural means.
Exactly!!!
Semantics about the word natural are completely irrelevant to the discussion. The OP explicitly concerned objective morality (a natural rights theory). It was you who first introduced the off-topic death-spiral of the semantics behind the term natural. I've repeatedly stressed that I am NOT talking about the semantics behind the term natural.
Angurse:You seem to have missed "natural law" as a specific concept and now confined yourself to defending "natural" as being equal to intellect. Who cares? That isn't the topic.
Discussing the semantics behind the term may be interesting but it was never my intention nor was it related to the OP.
I can't figure out the meaning of about 50% of the words in this thread... eff you guys
Now if you'll excuse me, I have to go school my ass.
"A man’s time is always scarce." - Murray N. Rothbard
Never mind Mises money clips! Where are the Mises wheelbarrows?
Eric: Solid_Choke:If anyone is interested, I'll make a new thread about what is wrong with Critical Rationalism; but this thread seems to be off-topic enough as it is. I would be interested.
I'm also interested. I consider myself 90% critical rationalist, in my understanding of the term. That doesn't mean fallibilism and the critical rationalist approach to empirical science can be adequately applied to economics.
wilderness:Natural in natural law tradition does mean intellect(ual). Robin Smith in Aristotle's book Prior Analytics comments on how Aristotle's deductions are called natural deductions as it is of the intellect.
Wilderness,
Natural deduction has nothing to do with the natural law tradition. Natural deduction was coined, not by a natural law theorist, but by a mathematician/logician (Gerhard Getzen). It refers to a particular approach to logic that developed in the 1920s and 30s which was is in contrast to the "axiomatic systems" which dominated logic in the earlier 20th century. By "natural", Gentzen did not refer to natural law, but to a formulation of logic that he considered more "natural" to the way we actually think. What Robin Smith is saying in the introduction to Prior Analytics is that he believes that the philosopher John Corcoran has demonstrated that the logical system of Aristotle himself used what we would today call non-axiomatic (that is, "natural") deduction. Again, this has nothing to do with the natural law tradition that evolved out of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. For Aristotle, logic was a tool which one used to examine nature. This is why his corpus of logical works is called "the organon" (the implement). It was not nature itself.
Angurse: wilderness:I don't care that you want to talk about the theory of natural law. This is about semantics on what the word natural means. Exactly!!! Semantics about the word natural are completely irrelevant to the discussion.
Semantics about the word natural are completely irrelevant to the discussion.
Good. then you didn't need to respond to me initially.
Angurse: The OP explicitly concerned objective morality (a natural rights theory).
The OP explicitly concerned objective morality (a natural rights theory).
obviously.
Angurse: It was you who first introduced the off-topic death-spiral of the semantics behind the term natural.
It was you who first introduced the off-topic death-spiral of the semantics behind the term natural.
This is about natural rights, thus, natural law, as you say, yet I introduced the semantics about the word natural in a thread about natural ----. Perfectly relevant I am being.
Angurse: I've repeatedly stressed that I am NOT talking about the semantics behind the term natural.
I've repeatedly stressed that I am NOT talking about the semantics behind the term natural.
I am. So you need not respond to me anymore.
No. I pointed out to you what I was talking about and you keep responding to me about irrelvant tangents about theory. Understand. I don't want to talk to you about the theory. I am simply responding to your original response to me on the semantics. That's what this discussion between you and me has been about. It is your ghost fetish to argue about the theory. Find somebody else.
Original response:
Angurse: wilderness: throughout the history of natural law, natural law has always meant intellectual law. Its a doctrine.
wilderness: throughout the history of natural law, natural law has always meant intellectual law.
Its a doctrine.
wilderness:Intellect isn't a doctrine.
----
Angurse: Discussing the semantics behind the term may be interesting but it was never my intention nor was it related to the OP.
Then you could have moved on cause I incidently brought up the semantics of the term 'natural' and you argued it. Not my problem as I've stated. It is irrelevant and a tangent that you keep responding to me as I've said.
Lilburne: wilderness:Natural in natural law tradition does mean intellect(ual). Robin Smith in Aristotle's book Prior Analytics comments on how Aristotle's deductions are called natural deductions as it is of the intellect. Wilderness, Natural deduction has nothing to do with the natural law tradition.
Natural deduction has nothing to do with the natural law tradition.
It has something to do with it. I wouldn't say "nothing" in the absolute of the term. Aristotle's deductions are most definitely used in the natural law tradition. Whether they are thought of as only natural deductions and exclude axioms may be a debateable point, but I'm not going to argue that and I haven't been arguing that. It is clear though that Aristotle's deductive method is used in the natural law tradition. What is included or excluded from Aristotle's method today - was never part of the original discussion I brought up and I don't find it interesting at the moment to pursue it currently in a discussion.
Lilburne: Natural deduction was coined, not by a natural law theorist, but by a mathematician/logician (Gerhard Getzen). It refers to a particular approach to logic that developed in the 1920s and 30s which was is in contrast to the "axiomatic systems" which dominated logic in the earlier 20th century. By "natural", Gentzen did not refer to natural law, but to a formulation of logic that he considered more "natural" to the way we actually think. What Robin Smith is saying in the introduction to Prior Analytics is that he believes that the philosopher John Corcoran has demonstrated that the logical system of Aristotle himself used what we would today call non-axiomatic (that is, "natural") deduction. Again, this has nothing to do with the natural law tradition that evolved out of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. For Aristotle, logic was a tool which one used to examine nature. This is why his corpus of logical works is called "the organon" (the implement). It was not nature itself.
Natural deduction was coined, not by a natural law theorist, but by a mathematician/logician (Gerhard Getzen). It refers to a particular approach to logic that developed in the 1920s and 30s which was is in contrast to the "axiomatic systems" which dominated logic in the earlier 20th century. By "natural", Gentzen did not refer to natural law, but to a formulation of logic that he considered more "natural" to the way we actually think. What Robin Smith is saying in the introduction to Prior Analytics is that he believes that the philosopher John Corcoran has demonstrated that the logical system of Aristotle himself used what we would today call non-axiomatic (that is, "natural") deduction. Again, this has nothing to do with the natural law tradition that evolved out of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. For Aristotle, logic was a tool which one used to examine nature. This is why his corpus of logical works is called "the organon" (the implement). It was not nature itself.
I never said it was nature itself for as long as I've been in this forum.* Glad to see you agree on that point. My initial point was that natural has had a particular meaning (amongst many) that means: "to the way we actually think" to quote you - in other words - 'natural refers to the intellect' to quote me from various posts in this recent trend of a discussion.
I said Robin Smith calls Aristitle's deductions "natural deductions" so your simply repeating what I said.
What the term natural means goes back before the 1920's. The term natural deduction may have been coined then, but not the term natural with its connotation of intellect.
*by nature itself I'm assuming you mean nature devoid of human
zefreak: it is almost straightforward for her to figure out exactly how it feels to see red.
it is almost straightforward for her to figure out exactly how it feels to see red.
Eric: There is just a conceptual difference that cannot be breached between subjective experience and objective third-person data.
There is just a conceptual difference that cannot be breached between subjective experience and objective third-person data.
This is a very interesting discussion. Eric, I think you are introducing a very valid point. The excerpt above could be reworded as so: "There is just a conceptual difference that cannot be breached between how it feels and how it appears.
This reminds me of one of my favorite excerpts from Adam Knott's book "Striving and Attainment":
When I walk into a park and see a person posing as a bronze statue, I may believe this person’s intention to be making money, or getting attention or notoriety, or practicing for an acting class, or something else. But upon nearing this person and realizing that it is actually a statue that looks like a person posing as a statue, then what was the true nature of the intentions I previously held to have real existence? Apparently they were physical facts or physical appearances to which I imputed an intention... There is no certain point at which another person’s intentions might not change for me upon the next observation I make of him. What another person’s intentions or actions are or were may always change upon my receiving further information. Thus, what another person’s intentions or actions are or were is always a function of something that happens for me. This implies that, for me (for my consciousness), another person’s consciousness (his actions, intentions, values, etc.) is not something that can be a “real” aspect of that person (cannot have a spatiotemporal existence). In keeping with our previously stated approach, this is not to be interpreted as an assertion or implication that other consciousnesses do or do not exist. Rather it is to be interpreted as saying something about the relationship between a conscious observer A and another consciousness B, from the point of view of consciousness A.
When I walk into a park and see a person posing as a bronze statue, I may believe this person’s intention to be making money, or getting attention or notoriety, or practicing for an acting class, or something else. But upon nearing this person and realizing that it is actually a statue that looks like a person posing as a statue, then what was the true nature of the intentions I previously held to have real existence? Apparently they were physical facts or physical appearances to which I imputed an intention...
There is no certain point at which another person’s intentions might not change for me upon the next observation I make of him. What another person’s intentions or actions are or were may always change upon my receiving further information. Thus, what another person’s intentions or actions are or were is always a function of something that happens for me. This implies that, for me (for my consciousness), another person’s consciousness (his actions, intentions, values, etc.) is not something that can be a “real” aspect of that person (cannot have a spatiotemporal existence).
In keeping with our previously stated approach, this is not to be interpreted as an assertion or implication that other consciousnesses do or do not exist. Rather it is to be interpreted as saying something about the relationship between a conscious observer A and another consciousness B, from the point of view of consciousness A.
I encourage everyone to read this book, if they are interested in the philosophy of consciousness and ethics. It is really groundbreaking work.
Here is the problem as I see it coming from my interpretation of Adam Knott's "Striving and Attainment":
What is a relationship? In terms of praxeology, what I typically consider a "relationship" is actually a collection of objects in space and time, and this sometimes includes an assignment of a motive to that collection of objects. Most of my conscious experience in regard to the relationships I am involved in have to do with physical, verbal, and/or contextual interactions and not necessarily assigning a motive to those physical, verbal, and/or contextual interactions.
This problem is we tend believe that simply by listening to a word, it's placement in a sentence, the tone, and what another body looks like when the word comes out of it, that we can essentially deduce a consciousness or motive out of that arrangement of objects. We are essentially trying to deduce a conscious experience from an arrangement of objects.
(see also Knott's pg. 14 in the "The Logic of Happiness" in regard to body and speech)
Only ideas can overcome ideas...
Wade:This problem is we tend believe that simply by listening to a word, it's placement in a sentence, the tone, and what another body looks like when the word comes out of it, that we can essentially deduce a consciousness or motive out of that arrangement of objects. We are essentially trying to deduce a conscious experience from an arrangement of objects.
This is crucial to understand. I suggest that communication of a conscious experience goes through four stages:
1. Experience: A experiences something
2. Transmission: A attempts to communicate that experience (by words, tone of voice, facial expression, gestures, etc. - some of these being involuntary)
3. Receipt of transmission: B senses (hears, sees, feels, etc.) the communication attempt
4. Interpretation: B attempts to interpret the communication
(This whole discussion will eventually hinge on whether each participant believes that humans fundamentally think in words or not. I believe we do not, although there are reasons why it feels as if we do.)
Why anarchy fails
AJ: Wade:This problem is we tend believe that simply by listening to a word, it's placement in a sentence, the tone, and what another body looks like when the word comes out of it, that we can essentially deduce a consciousness or motive out of that arrangement of objects. We are essentially trying to deduce a conscious experience from an arrangement of objects. This is crucial to understand. I suggest that communication of a conscious experience goes through four stages: 1. Experience: A experiences something 2. Transmission: A attempts to communicate that experience (by words, tone of voice, facial expression, gestures, etc. - some of these being involuntary) 3. Receipt of transmission: B senses (hears, sees, feels, etc.) the communication attempt 4. Interpretation: B attempts to interpret the communication (This whole discussion will eventually hinge on whether each participant believes that humans fundamentally think in words or not. I believe we do not, although there are reasons why it feels as if we do.)
Thank you for you insights AJ. I think that is an excellent interpretation of the complexity of human social interaction. I have had similar intuitions myself. It seems that we are all trying to "jump start" the feelings we have into someone else by manipulating the material objective world. This is because we are working within the limitations of human action. We cannot "read other people's minds" so to speak. So we use something that we ourselves believe is attainable by others, because we ourselves can attain those things, those things being "words, tone of voice, facial expression, gestures, etc..."
Thank you for the link to your other discussions about this phenomenon.
AJ: (This whole discussion will eventually hinge on whether each participant believes that humans fundamentally think in words or not. I believe we do not, although there are reasons why it feels as if we do.)
I almost had others discuss this a long time ago, but they shelled up like a turtle. Your brave enough. I have a question:
Do you think it is possible to put your explanation into words? (whatever that explanation is, is not pertinant to what I'm asking specifically)
first this, and then we'll move on.
<Edit> This is addressed to Wade:
Since I was 10 years old, I have been thinking on this topic more or less non-stop. It always bothered me that we have to rely on the terribly blunt instrument of words to communicate, when our thoughts can be so much richer and more precise. I also think this accounts for nearly all arguments, including the debates on these forums.
Reading other people's minds is a technology I am seriously looking forward to.
AJ: Since I was 10 years old, I have been thinking on this topic more or less non-stop. It always bothered me that we have to rely on the terribly blunt instrument of words to communicate, when our thoughts can be so much richer and more precise. I also think this accounts for nearly all arguments, including the debates on these forums. Reading other people's minds is a technology I am seriously looking forward to.
it's pleasant you say this, but yes or no? I'm not being confrontational.
edit: lol... sorry. I didn't check to see who's that reply was to. I thought that was your answer to me. My fault.
My position is that words are not the fundamental unit of thought. Before I explain why I think that, I'd like to know if anyone actually disagrees, or if I'm misunderstanding the "thoughts=words" position.
Hey AJ, you made me just realize what may be a fault in my reasoning.
Even if we were able to "read other's minds" is this not something different from being able to experience their consciousness. In other words, if their thoughts become something objective, is there still not something there that is subjective experience?
But lets toy with this idea and say we could experience their consciousness through some kind of bizarre technology where we "become" them, would it be possible to have 2 conscious experiences at the same time? If we "become" them, can we still "be" ourselves too. Or would we then still be from the perspective of 1 consciousness?
AJ: My position is that words are not the fundamental unit of thought.
My position is that words are not the fundamental unit of thought.
I wasn't asking what is fundamental.
AJ: Before I explain why I think that, I'd like to know if anyone actually disagrees, or if I'm misunderstanding the "thoughts=words" position.
Before I explain why I think that, I'd like to know if anyone actually disagrees, or if I'm misunderstanding the "thoughts=words" position.
I'm asking if you think that whatever you experience can be put into words. I don't think me saying I agree or disagree would be valid because I don't know what you are saying thus the question. I don't know if disagree or agree needs to even come up that seems to be an altogether different topic of discussion.
wilderness:Aristotle's deductions are most definitely used in the natural law tradition.
Aristotelean logic is used in a great many traditions. That doesn't make for some kind of special association between "intellect" and each tradition.
wilderness:My initial point was that natural has had a particular meaning (amongst many) that means: "to the way we actually think" to quote you - in other words - 'natural refers to the intellect' to quote me from various posts in this recent trend of a discussion.
There is also a way of conceiving aesthetics that is natural to the way we actually react to art. So then you could just as well say that "natural" refers to aesthetics. In the same way "natural" could refer to love, fear, humor, digestion...
Philosophy isn't a game of free association.
Wade,
I said "reading other people's minds" but I should have said "direct mind-to-mind communication," by which I simply mean much more detailed communication than is now available. I take for granted that it will probably never be perfect, so I'm not really meaning to get into the subjective/objective debate.
For instance, I have heard there are now technologies that allow people to imagine a shape and it will appear (fuzzy and distorted, but often recognizable) on a computer screen. If this technology advances smoothly, it may soon be possible to make a video display of whatever you're visually imagining in real time. I imagine flying around in a mountainous landscape, and you can see it as I'm imagining it. Maybe I can also imagine music, and it will flow out of speakers wired to my brain almost exactly as I'm imagining it. With some practice, perhaps I could create on-the-fly video presentations of concepts I wish to explain. I could of course combine these modes of communication with words to further clarify the meaning.
Of course then, for example, the feeling you get when you see the video of the landscape and hear the music will be different than the feeling they give me. You wouldn't yet be able to experience my consciousness exactly as I experience it, but we would probably understand each other a lot better.
So what I mean here is not yet "reading another's mind" (although I realize that is more relevant to the preceding discussion), but simply having better tools for communication - better tools than words. We already have this to a degree. A filmmaker can make his vision into a film; a musician can compose and play, or even play his feelings at this very moment if he is good at improvization. But this is usually a prohibitively cumbersome process for, say, debate.
Wade: AJ: Since I was 10 years old, I have been thinking on this topic more or less non-stop. It always bothered me that we have to rely on the terribly blunt instrument of words to communicate, when our thoughts can be so much richer and more precise. I also think this accounts for nearly all arguments, including the debates on these forums. Reading other people's minds is a technology I am seriously looking forward to. Hey AJ, you made me just realize what may be a fault in my reasoning. Even if we were able to "read other's minds" is this not something different from being able to experience their consciousness. In other words, if their thoughts become something objective, is there still not something there that is subjective experience? But lets toy with this idea and say we could experience their consciousness through some kind of bizarre technology where we "become" them, would it be possible to have 2 conscious experiences at the same time? If we "become" them, can we still "be" ourselves too. Or would we then still be from the perspective of 1 consciousness?
The reason I am bringing this up is because even if we were able to "become" someone else temporarily through some kind of breakthrough technology, this would not necessarily invalidate Methodological Individualism, the method or Praxeology. In other words, the theory does not care which consciousness is being addressed, it is just a formal method from the perspective of 1 consciousness.