Chapter seven (Actions Within the World) part three (Human Labor as a Means) subsection three (The Creative Genius) states as follows:
Far above the millions that come and pass away tower the pioneers, the men whose deeds and ideas cut out new paths for mankind. For the pioneering genius [12] to create is the essence of life. To live means for him to create. The activities of these prodigious men cannot be fully subsumed under the praxeological concept of labor. They are not labor because they are for the genius not means, but ends in themselves. He lives in creating and inventing. For him there is not leisure, only intermissions of temporary sterility and frustration. His incentive is not the desire to bring about a result, but the act of producing it. The accomplishment gratifies him neither mediately nor immediately. It does not gratify him mediately because his fellow men at best are unconcerned about it, more often even greet it with taunts, sneers, and persecution. Many a genius could have used his gifts to render his life agreeable and joyful; he did not even consider such a possibility and chose the thorny path without hesitation. The genius wants to accomplish what he considers his mission, even if he knows that he moves toward his own disaster. Neither does the genius derive immediate gratification from his creative activities. Creating is for him agony and torment, a ceaseless excruciating struggle against internal and external obstacles; it consumes and crushes him. The Austrian poet Grillparzer has depicted this in a touching poem "Farewell to Gastein." [13] We may assume that in writing it he thought not only of his own sorrows and tribulations but also of the greater sufferings of a much greater man, of Beethoven, whose fate resembled his own and whom he understood, through devoted affection and sympathetic appreciation, better than any other of his contemporaries. Nietzsche compared himself to the flame that insatiably consumes and destroys itself.[14] Such agonies are phenomena which have nothing in common with the connotations generally attached to the notions of work and labor, production and success, breadwinning and enjoyment of life. The achievements of the creative innovator, his thoughts and theories, his poems, paintings, and compositions, cannot be classified praxeologically as products of labor. They are not the outcome of [p. 140] the employment of labor which could have been devoted to the production of other amenities for the "production" of a masterpiece of philosophy, art, or literature. Thinkers, poets, and artists are sometimes unfit to accomplish any other work. At any rate, the time and toil which they devote to creative activities are not withheld from employment for other purposes. Conditions may sometimes doom to sterility a man who would have had the power to bring forth things unheard of; they may leave him no alternative other than to die from starvation or to use all his forces in the struggle for mere physical survival. But if the genius succeeds in achieving his goals, nobody but himself pays the "costs" incurred. Goethe was perhaps in some respects hampered by his functions at the court of Weimar. But certainly he would not have accomplished more in his official duties as minister of state, theater manager, and administrator of mines if he had not written his plays, poems, and novels. It is, furthermore, impossible to substitute other people's work for that of the creators. If Dante and Beethoven had not existed, one would not have been in a position to produce the Divina Commedia or the Ninth Symphony by assigning other men to these tasks. Neither society nor single individuals can substantially further the genius and his work. The highest intensity of the "demand" and the most peremptory order of the government are ineffectual. The genius does not deliver to order. Men cannot improve the natural and social conditions which bring about the creator and his creation. It is impossible to rear geniuses by eugenics, to train them by schooling, or to organize their activities. But, of course, one can organize society in such a way that no room is left for pioneers and their path-breaking. The creative accomplishment of the genius is an ultimate fact for praxeology. It comes to pass in history as a free gift of destiny. It is by no means the result of production in the sense in which economics uses this term.
Far above the millions that come and pass away tower the pioneers, the men whose deeds and ideas cut out new paths for mankind. For the pioneering genius [12] to create is the essence of life. To live means for him to create.
The activities of these prodigious men cannot be fully subsumed under the praxeological concept of labor. They are not labor because they are for the genius not means, but ends in themselves. He lives in creating and inventing. For him there is not leisure, only intermissions of temporary sterility and frustration. His incentive is not the desire to bring about a result, but the act of producing it. The accomplishment gratifies him neither mediately nor immediately. It does not gratify him mediately because his fellow men at best are unconcerned about it, more often even greet it with taunts, sneers, and persecution. Many a genius could have used his gifts to render his life agreeable and joyful; he did not even consider such a possibility and chose the thorny path without hesitation. The genius wants to accomplish what he considers his mission, even if he knows that he moves toward his own disaster.
Neither does the genius derive immediate gratification from his creative activities. Creating is for him agony and torment, a ceaseless excruciating struggle against internal and external obstacles; it consumes and crushes him. The Austrian poet Grillparzer has depicted this in a touching poem "Farewell to Gastein." [13] We may assume that in writing it he thought not only of his own sorrows and tribulations but also of the greater sufferings of a much greater man, of Beethoven, whose fate resembled his own and whom he understood, through devoted affection and sympathetic appreciation, better than any other of his contemporaries. Nietzsche compared himself to the flame that insatiably consumes and destroys itself.[14] Such agonies are phenomena which have nothing in common with the connotations generally attached to the notions of work and labor, production and success, breadwinning and enjoyment of life.
The achievements of the creative innovator, his thoughts and theories, his poems, paintings, and compositions, cannot be classified praxeologically as products of labor. They are not the outcome of [p. 140] the employment of labor which could have been devoted to the production of other amenities for the "production" of a masterpiece of philosophy, art, or literature. Thinkers, poets, and artists are sometimes unfit to accomplish any other work. At any rate, the time and toil which they devote to creative activities are not withheld from employment for other purposes. Conditions may sometimes doom to sterility a man who would have had the power to bring forth things unheard of; they may leave him no alternative other than to die from starvation or to use all his forces in the struggle for mere physical survival. But if the genius succeeds in achieving his goals, nobody but himself pays the "costs" incurred. Goethe was perhaps in some respects hampered by his functions at the court of Weimar. But certainly he would not have accomplished more in his official duties as minister of state, theater manager, and administrator of mines if he had not written his plays, poems, and novels.
It is, furthermore, impossible to substitute other people's work for that of the creators. If Dante and Beethoven had not existed, one would not have been in a position to produce the Divina Commedia or the Ninth Symphony by assigning other men to these tasks. Neither society nor single individuals can substantially further the genius and his work. The highest intensity of the "demand" and the most peremptory order of the government are ineffectual. The genius does not deliver to order. Men cannot improve the natural and social conditions which bring about the creator and his creation. It is impossible to rear geniuses by eugenics, to train them by schooling, or to organize their activities. But, of course, one can organize society in such a way that no room is left for pioneers and their path-breaking.
The creative accomplishment of the genius is an ultimate fact for praxeology. It comes to pass in history as a free gift of destiny. It is by no means the result of production in the sense in which economics uses this term.
To me, this just seems to be against the entire nature of human action as described earlier in the book. Has anybody expanded upon this or refuted it as mere misunderstanding by Mises? If it neither gives him satisfaction immediately nor mediately, then why does he choose such action over an action that might give satisfaction immediately or mediately? If actions are chosen by creating a subjective value of scales with that which gives more satisfaction over less, for what reason would a so-called genius decide to ignore this? I hypothesize that a genius must have this scale of values, but unlike a normal person, the economic data for him states that creativity of action is the least negative in providing satisfaction of all actions, even that of not acting. There is no positive choice for a genius. But, is it possible for a person to live in a non-blissful world that he cannot make more satisfactory and still value acting more than not acting?(Furthermore, is it ironic that I am more certain of the chapter of Uncertainty than the chapter on Actions Within the World? :P)
I really see nothing wrong, or special for that mater, with the passage. It just states that some guys have such value scales, as to prefer creation over non-creation, unlike others who attach disutility to toil. The fact that creation is painful doesn’t mean that it is non-utile on end, because besides the pain there’s also the great value that the genius attaches to creation. It would be like saying that giving birth to a baby is non-utile for a mother only because she suffers so much: we forget to include the utility of giving birth per se. If a genius was only faced with the choice between “lesser evils”, he would simply commit suicide, as no utility can be gained from staying alive.
Yea, I always thought that entire passage was pretty pointless and stupid.
Havvy: To me, this just seems to be against the entire nature of human action as described earlier in the book. Has anybody expanded upon this or refuted it as mere misunderstanding by Mises? If it neither gives him satisfaction immediately nor mediately, then why does he choose such action over an action that might give satisfaction immediately or mediately? If actions are chosen by creating a subjective value of scales with that which gives more satisfaction over less, for what reason would a so-called genius decide to ignore this? I hypothesize that a genius must have this scale of values, but unlike a normal person, the economic data for him states that creativity of action is the least negative in providing satisfaction of all actions, even that of not acting. There is no positive choice for a genius. But, is it possible for a person to live in a non-blissful world that he cannot make more satisfactory and still value acting more than not acting?
To me, this just seems to be against the entire nature of human action as described earlier in the book. Has anybody expanded upon this or refuted it as mere misunderstanding by Mises? If it neither gives him satisfaction immediately nor mediately, then why does he choose such action over an action that might give satisfaction immediately or mediately? If actions are chosen by creating a subjective value of scales with that which gives more satisfaction over less, for what reason would a so-called genius decide to ignore this? I hypothesize that a genius must have this scale of values, but unlike a normal person, the economic data for him states that creativity of action is the least negative in providing satisfaction of all actions, even that of not acting. There is no positive choice for a genius. But, is it possible for a person to live in a non-blissful world that he cannot make more satisfactory and still value acting more than not acting?
The two extra assumptions which the theory of the division of labor contains are (a) that the successful attainment of some ends necessitates that multiple individuals synthesize together their efforts and (b) that the distribution of abilities among individuals is non-uniform, uneven, that each individual possesses certain strengths and weaknesses, inequalities, vis-à-vis each other individual.
Remember that, among those two and other assumptions, the assumption that (c) "labor implies disutility", that "leisure is a good", exists. So I think that the point of that section was to attempt to hypostatize, to remove from the rest of the body of theory, the "creative genius". For the "creative genius" apparently contradicts that assumption!
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
It was memorable passage for me as well. I think this one sentence is a key one:
Havvy: His incentive is not the desire to bring about a result, but the act of producing it.
His incentive is not the desire to bring about a result, but the act of producing it.
I think when understood from this on it can be expanded to include more than just productive geniouses. In my understanding it can be any person who simply must do something. For example a monk who sets himself on fire totally regardless of whether he thinks this will help his cause or not.
The Monk is Gossen's example on page one of Gossen's treatise. (And Mises in Human action pursues this line of understanding rationality.) Gossen was first to deny the existence of so-called irrational action (because rationality depends on correspondence of means to ends, the end being subjective).
If the monk thinks he will attain infinite goods in heaven by setting himself on fire, then he is rational, because setting himself on fire, according to his own knowledge (or lack thereof), is a means to end up in heaven. Such is his preference scale; he is not irrational.
Mises argues, on the other hand, the Genius has a preference scale such that the end is creation of knowledge (which cannot be anything but labour), The means, in that case, would be food, materials, which allow him to pursue that end of labour. Such is his preference scale; he is not irrational.