meambobbo: I think it's obvious what's Stranger's talking about. If I finance a car purchase, I do not have full property rights to the car if it is collateral for the loan. I cannot purposefully destroy it. He is saying the same thing with the medium anyone places a copyrighted work upon. The IP owner does not allow full property rights in the media they embed their information and sell to consumers - the media cannot be used to create copies and/or redistributions.
I think it's obvious what's Stranger's talking about. If I finance a car purchase, I do not have full property rights to the car if it is collateral for the loan. I cannot purposefully destroy it. He is saying the same thing with the medium anyone places a copyrighted work upon. The IP owner does not allow full property rights in the media they embed their information and sell to consumers - the media cannot be used to create copies and/or redistributions.
So, when you are reading your own writing, which you consider to be your "intellectual property", do you believe that you are thereby causing all other persons to "not" be able to acquire "full property rights to" each of the rays of light which reflect off it?
meambobbo: [...] the media cannot be used to create copies and/or redistributions.
[...] the media cannot be used to create copies and/or redistributions.
That argument is ridiculous. For, if you, for example, consider the "use" of a book, you quickly realize that (a) the "use" of the book which enables you to study the book, an apparently legitimate activity, and (b) the "use" of the book which enables you to copy the book, an allegedly illegitimate activity, do not necessarily differ. For (a) to study the content of the book via the harvesting the rays of light which reflect of it and then the writing of summaries of key sections or the copying of the patterns and symbols which constitute key sentences into a notebook and (b) to copy entirely the content of the book via the harvesting the rays of light which reflect of it and then the copying of the patterns and symbols which constitute the entire book into a notebook do not, in their "use" of the book, differ. How can some one seriously tell me that, because they partially own the book but not me, my pen, my house, my chair, my desk, or my notebook, I am allowed (a) to do action A to the book and then action X to my notebook but not (b) to do action A to the book and then action Y to my notebook?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
Why don't you just admit the problem outright instead of dancing around it. All this "original media"/knowledge/information stuff is nonsense. It should have no bearing on your argument whether or not the human brain (in any state) is another piece of property that can copy information, or whether such devices are external to one's person.
This admits that random contact with a copyrighted work, even without accepting any contract, permanently creates a property claim of the copyright owner onto that person or his property. You are comfortable allowing someone to gain a claim to someone else's property, but not their person.
In the case of unlicensed commercial competition with the copyright holder, one can understand the moral case for prohibiting such. But not all forms of redistribution are competition. And even if they are, in some cases they may have a moral case of their own. This is why I don't like prohibitions. I think the furthest extent you can take it is to seize revenues.
I don't think you can own information. Every additional copy means more draconian methods of ensuring that each copy is used "properly". I do believe, however, that mass-scale redistribution can be curbed without opening Pandora's box.
Check my blog, if you're a loser
meambobbo:Why don't you just admit the problem outright instead of dancing around it. All this "original media"/knowledge/information stuff is nonsense. It should have no bearing on your argument whether or not the human brain (in any state) is another piece of property that can copy information, or whether such devices are external to one's person.
It's actually a quite ebullient field of science. However, I did admit earlier that a theory of information is not necessary to have a valid theory of intellectual property. One needs only to look at human action to do that, and Rothbard saw that quite clearly.
The use of information science is only employed to dispel the fallacy that information is not scarce (despite the fact that human action indicates that it is, many people claim it is not).
The fallacies of intellectual communism, a compilation - On the nature of power
I. Ryan,
I generally agree with you. I was more or less trying to explain Stranger's logic, not necessarily saying it's correct.
I. Ryan:How can some one seriously tell me that, because they partially own the book but not me, my pen, my house, my chair, my desk, or my notebook, I am allowed (a) to do action A to the book and then action X to my notebook but not (b) to do action A to the book and then action Y to my notebook?
Because it's their property, and they are allowed to make the rules.
How can I make a rule that says you are allowed to drink in my restaurant, but not allowed to bring your own drinks? Because it's my restaurant.
Stranger: Because it's their property, and they are allowed to make the rules.
But neither my pen, my house, my chair, my desk, my notebook, nor my body is their property.
Stranger: How can I make a rule that says you are allowed to drink in my restaurant, but not allowed to bring your own drinks? Because it's my restaurant.
Uh, unless you own my house, that is quite clearly not analogous.
I. Ryan: But neither my pen, my house, my chair, my desk, my notebook, nor my body is their property.
You are not allowed to hide drinks in your clothes to smuggle them into a restaurant because your clothes are your property.
Stranger: I. Ryan:How can some one seriously tell me that, because they partially own the book but not me, my pen, my house, my chair, my desk, or my notebook, I am allowed (a) to do action A to the book and then action X to my notebook but not (b) to do action A to the book and then action Y to my notebook? Because it's their property, and they are allowed to make the rules. How can I make a rule that says you are allowed to drink in my restaurant, but not allowed to bring your own drinks? Because it's my restaurant.
I can burn a CD with my own material (you know the stuff that Is actually scarce, versus your pattern).
The only way your example here is relevant is in direct agreement between the originator and a consumer. A third party can't be subject to the agreement.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
Stranger: You are not allowed to hide drinks in your clothes to smuggle them into a restaurant because your clothes are your property.
But am I allowed to "hide" my house "in [my] clothes to smuggle [it] into the restaurant"? Again, unless you own my house, your purported analogy is quite clearly not analogous.
E. R. Olovetto:The only way your example here is relevant is in direct agreement between the originator and a consumer. A third party can't be subject to the agreement.
Fallacy 7.
I. Ryan: Stranger: You are not allowed to hide drinks in your clothes to smuggle them into a restaurant because your clothes are your property. But am I allowed to "hide" my house "in [my] clothes to smuggle [it] into the restaurant"? Again, unless you own my house, your purported analogy is quite clearly not analogous.
Argument from miracle.
I must say, at this point the anti-IP argument is not based on rights, facts, ethics or morality, but just on the possibility of finding the slightest loophole in the law. That is not an argument at all.
Stranger: Argument from miracle.
Apparently you missed the point of that first sentence. But, in any case, again, unless you own my house, your purported analogy is quite clearly not analogous.
Stranger: I must say, at this point the anti-IP argument is not based on rights, facts, ethics or morality, but just on the possibility of finding the slightest loophole in the law. That is not an argument at all.
No, the argument precedes the law. For the argument itself concerns what the law "should" be.
I don't like that you can make me a criminal by generating a complex and 'unmemorizable' image of a mandelbrot fractal, declaring that it is your information that I have no right to perform the act of 'observation' with and then leaving it in the periphery of my vision such that there are directions I can't look at or else be criminal.
when I say I don't like it. I mean its incomprehensibly silly.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Stranger: E. R. Olovetto:The only way your example here is relevant is in direct agreement between the originator and a consumer. A third party can't be subject to the agreement. Fallacy 7.
A pattern or a concept, like "poem", isn't property. There are arbitrary time and scope limits on IP because the laws would otherwise totally stifle us. Whoever created each of these letters in my post or the patterns of the words would have a claim against me for typing this response.
Your #7 is a strawman, based on your fallacious #2 (where you amusingly seem to employ the Labor Theory of Value whilst calling others socialists).
The only type of valid contract you can form between artist (A) and buyer (B) is in regards the object purchased (that exact physical specimen alone) and B's allowable behavior. If B copies A's work this can be a violation of "failure to perform" (the act of refraining from copying). If C somehow gets a copy of A's work, A's only course of action is to prove B copied the work.
nirgrahamUK: I don't like that you can make me a criminal by generating a complex and 'unmemorizable' image of a mandelbrot fractal, declaring that it is your information that I have no right to perform the act of 'observation' with and then leaving it in the periphery of my vision such that there are directions I can't look at or else be criminal.
Fallacy 2, 13. That is not possible.
E. R. Olovetto: Your #7 is a strawman, based on your fallacious #2 (where you amusingly seem to employ the Labor Theory of Value whilst calling others socialists).
Fallacy 8.
Stranger: nirgrahamUK:I don't like that you can make me a criminal by generating a complex and 'unmemorizable' image of a mandelbrot fractal, declaring that it is your information that I have no right to perform the act of 'observation' with and then leaving it in the periphery of my vision such that there are directions I can't look at or else be criminal. Fallacy 2, 13. That is not possible.
nirgrahamUK:I don't like that you can make me a criminal by generating a complex and 'unmemorizable' image of a mandelbrot fractal, declaring that it is your information that I have no right to perform the act of 'observation' with and then leaving it in the periphery of my vision such that there are directions I can't look at or else be criminal.
lol, i refereed to neither scarcity, fallacy 2 (even though i believe you are confused about issues of scarcity)
neither did i mention uniquely creating duplicates without observation of your media. (supposedly 13)
so maybe you have a new number for me?
nirgrahamUK: Stranger: nirgrahamUK:I don't like that you can make me a criminal by generating a complex and 'unmemorizable' image of a mandelbrot fractal, declaring that it is your information that I have no right to perform the act of 'observation' with and then leaving it in the periphery of my vision such that there are directions I can't look at or else be criminal. Fallacy 2, 13. That is not possible. lol, i refereed to neither scarcity, fallacy 2 (even though i believe you are confused about issues of scarcity) neither did i mention uniquely creating duplicates without observation of your media. (supposedly 13) so maybe you have a new number for me?
Well then there is no argument. You are not a criminal for looking at things, but for duplicating them onto media.
Maybe that is a new fallacy.
Fallacy 15: Observing copyrighted media is criminal. Actually, only copying copyrighted media is.
Stranger:Well then there is no argument. You are not a criminal for looking at things, but for duplicating them onto media.
now you must explain that. why can it go into my eye but not through my digital camera lense. the light rays....
nirgrahamUK: Stranger:Well then there is no argument. You are not a criminal for looking at things, but for duplicating them onto media. now you must explain that. why can it go into my eye but not through my digital camera lense. the light rays....
Because that creates a media copy, hence the expression, copy-right.
Stranger: nirgrahamUK: Stranger: nirgrahamUK:I don't like that you can make me a criminal by generating a complex and 'unmemorizable' image of a mandelbrot fractal, declaring that it is your information that I have no right to perform the act of 'observation' with and then leaving it in the periphery of my vision such that there are directions I can't look at or else be criminal. Fallacy 2, 13. That is not possible. lol, i refereed to neither scarcity, fallacy 2 (even though i believe you are confused about issues of scarcity) neither did i mention uniquely creating duplicates without observation of your media. (supposedly 13) so maybe you have a new number for me? Well then there is no argument. You are not a criminal for looking at things, but for duplicating them onto media. Maybe that is a new fallacy. Fallacy 15: Observing copyrighted media is criminal. Actually, only copying copyrighted media is.
Is duplication possible? You mentioned earlier that exact replications are impossible. So, taking a pic of your copyrighted work with my iPhone is not duplication, correct? Thus, my selling of that pic of your work is not a violation of your copyright, correct?
To paraphrase Marc Faber: We're all doomed, but that doesn't mean that we can't make money in the process. Rabbi Lapin: "Let's make bricks!" Stephan Kinsella: "Say you and I both want to make a German chocolate cake."
Stranger:Because that creates a media copy, hence the expression, copy-right.
no. if you throw your tomatoes at me, and fall into my stew. i do not violate your tomato rights. you should not have sent your tomatoes into my stew. just as you should not have sent out 'your' 'information' via lightwaves to my eye or lense.
and explain again why you don't object to the media copy onto my brain media, only media that is outside of my brain cavity?
Daniel Muffinburg: Is duplication possible? You mentioned earlier that exact replications are impossible. So, taking a pic of your copyrighted work with my iPhone is not duplication, correct? Thus, my selling of that pic of your work is not a violation of your copyright, correct?
Yes it is, you started with one copy and then created a second one on the iPhone.
nirgrahamUK: Stranger:Because that creates a media copy, hence the expression, copy-right. no. if you throw your tomatoes at me, and fall into my stew. i do not violate your tomato rights. you should not have sent your tomatoes into my stew. just as you should not have sent out 'your' 'information' via lightwaves to my eye or lense. and explain again why you don't object to the media copy onto my brain media, only media that is outside of my brain cavity?
That is the silliest question. Because the property owner explicitly allows it.
I. Ryan: Stranger: Argument from miracle. Apparently you missed the point of that first sentence. But, in any case, again, unless you own my house, your purported analogy is quite clearly not analogous.
Stranger:That is the silliest question. Because the property owner explicitly allows it.
so if the property owner didnt allow it, then it couldnt go into my lense or my eye....
I. Ryan: I. Ryan: Stranger: Argument from miracle. Apparently you missed the point of that first sentence. But, in any case, again, unless you own my house, your purported analogy is quite clearly not analogous.
Please don't flood this thread with your nonsense. I would reply but I have been warned by moderators to leave you people be.
nirgrahamUK: Stranger:That is the silliest question. Because the property owner explicitly allows it. so if the property owner didnt allow it, then it couldnt go into my lense or my eye....
New fallacy 16, argument from loophole.
We are not arguing about the physics of light, but about actions. Economics is about human action, not physics. I will not make any further replies concerning the physics of light as they are irrelevant.
You could argue that you are not a murderer because you couldn't stop a bullet from entering someone's head, but your action was still firing at the man.
Stranger: Please don't flood this thread with your nonsense. I would reply but I have been warned by moderators to leave you people be.
Did a moderator seriously tell you that you are not allowed to respond to my arguments?
Stranger: I. Ryan: Stranger: You are not allowed to hide drinks in your clothes to smuggle them into a restaurant because your clothes are your property. But am I allowed to "hide" my house "in [my] clothes to smuggle [it] into the restaurant"? Again, unless you own my house, your purported analogy is quite clearly not analogous. Argument from miracle.
Why were you allowed to respond to that?
Stranger:You could argue that you are not a murderer because you couldn't stop a bullet from entering someone's head, but your action was still firing at the man.
fine, abstract away from light as the transmission mechanism by which your information imposes itself on my property and me. ( i am of course my own property anyway....)
Stranger: Daniel Muffinburg: Is duplication possible? You mentioned earlier that exact replications are impossible. So, taking a pic of your copyrighted work with my iPhone is not duplication, correct? Thus, my selling of that pic of your work is not a violation of your copyright, correct? Yes it is, you started with one copy and then created a second one on the iPhone.
So the copy does not have to be exact?
About scarcity...
Stranger is technically correct when saying that information is scarce. If it were not, as he says, there would be no demand for the transmission of said information. However, copyright intentionally promotes scarcity and higher prices. The issue of scarcity is not the basis of property in my mind - it is who has the most just claim to determine how something is used when its use is necessarily excludes others.
The use of the information, however, is not mutually exclusive. As many people can use it as there are copies. One person's selling transmission of the information does not prevent anyone else from doing the same, it only weakens the earlier transmitters' market positions.
meambobbo: About scarcity... Stranger is technically correct when saying that information is scarce. If it were not, as he says, there would be no demand for the transmission of said information. However, copyright intentionally promotes scarcity and higher prices. The issue of scarcity is not the basis of property in my mind - it is who has the most just claim to determine how something is used when its use is necessarily excludes others. The use of the information, however, is not mutually exclusive. As many people can use it as there are copies. One person's selling transmission of the information does not prevent anyone else from doing the same, it only weakens the earlier transmitters' market positions.
That is inflation, fallacy 4.
Stranger: nirgrahamUK:care to explain your objection? I wanted to analyse copyright by appeal to Rothbardian title transfer theory. I recognise with you that the perishability of physical goods has bearing on how failures to conclude title-transfers must be resolved. I should think the only reason for you not to grant the assumption and to continue to discuss is that you think that it is either impossible for books and cd's to be imperishable over the relevant time-spansWhatever the material structure of the media, the information has still been consumed. It cannot be refunded.
nirgrahamUK:care to explain your objection? I wanted to analyse copyright by appeal to Rothbardian title transfer theory. I recognise with you that the perishability of physical goods has bearing on how failures to conclude title-transfers must be resolved. I should think the only reason for you not to grant the assumption and to continue to discuss is that you think that it is either impossible for books and cd's to be imperishable over the relevant time-spans
you sell me a CD of your exquisite and unique song writing and musical instrument playing, you transfer title of it to me in exchange for the title to what was my 10$ on the condition that I do not make a copy CD. I similarly transfer title to you of 10$ in exchange for the title over the cd on the condition that i do not make a copy.
some time later, i make a copy of the cd.
obviously our original contract is not consummated according to all necessary conditionals. good news is that the CD has been treated with great care as has the 10$, neither have suffered wear and tear, and therefore justice may be done by my returning the CD to you and you returning my 10$ to me if you wish it, or by us simply contenting ourselves with the new arrangement and forgiving the other in lieu of the properties we have gained.
if you object, "but you listened to the cd and 'enjoyed it'". then i say that "'you held my cash' and satiated your 'demand for money' ". just as the 10$ has not degraded neither has the CD. so neither needs pay compensation. no such performance bond had been agreed.
if we had bartered chair for table, on condition that no prayer ever be said in the room with the table, and then a prayer should be said. we would find ourselves in analogous situation to above. forgiveness of the break of the condition (status quo) , or return of 'unexchanged' items (state of affairs pre exchange)
Stranger:That is inflation, fallacy 4.
All your arguments are analogies to clearly legal contracts and property rights. The problem is we are not comparing apples to apples. Bank notes being counterfeited is clearly not the same thing as reproducing a copyrighted work.
In any case...
Inflation is not wrong simply because the note issuer makes non-reproduction part of the terms of use. It is fraud. Notes are claims to property. Counterfeit notes are assertions of ownership of goods over which the counterfeiter does not have. It should be legal to copy a bank note; however, to present such a copy as an authentic title to property in the market is fraud.
Strictly following your argument, mining gold should be made illegal because it can cause inflation of the money supply. Your thoughts?
Stranger:A counterfeit copy of intellectual property achieves exactly the same result. It gives the counterfeiter a productive advantage by multiplying his instances of the scarce information, while reducing the productive advantage of the producer of the information and of those who have entered into contractual relations with him to obtain part of the scarce information. Inflation is promoted, production is punished. Some in reply claim that money can only enjoy property protection to the extent that it is a claim on scarce metal specie. However, it is not the specie that money consumers demand, but the more efficient productivity of the money-substitute itself. Undermining this productivity is an attack on their property rights regardless of the state of the stock of specie.
Some in reply claim that money can only enjoy property protection to the extent that it is a claim on scarce metal specie. However, it is not the specie that money consumers demand, but the more efficient productivity of the money-substitute itself. Undermining this productivity is an attack on their property rights regardless of the state of the stock of specie.
You are blatantly advocating that people can have property claims to market positions. Let's say I decide to use every cent of my money to buy up raw meat, and I let it spoil. Meat prices are driven up, and the productivity of surrounding restaurants and groceries are undermined. Have I violated property rights?! Of course not. Your argumentation is not based upon property rights but utility. That's not necessarily bad, but it's your burden to frame rules that clearly produce a net social benefit.
Stranger:A similar fallacy states that the counterfeiter is only guilty of fraud towards the purchaser of his product because he misrepresented himself, and the original owner of the counterfeit good is unaffected. This is a grave error, as much capital is invested in the production of goodwill by capitalist enterprise. The existence and propagation of counterfeit products of lower quality directly destroy the confidence of consumers in the products of this enterprise, and make all accumulated goodwill worthless.
You are advocating both LTV and ownership of the market value of an intangible concept - beliefs that exist inside the minds of others. You really can't argue otherwise.
Or can you...?
And as long as we are quoting Rothbard:
meambobbo:One evident reason for the confusion of exchange with a mere trade of material objects is the fact that much intangible property cannot, by its very nature, be exchanged. A violinist may own his musicianly ability and exchange units of it, in the form of service, for the services of a physician. But other personal attributes, which cannot be exchanged, may be desired as goods. Thus, Brown might have a desired end: to gain the genuine approval of Smith. This is a particular consumers’ good which he cannot purchase with any other good, for what he wants is the genuine approval rather than a show of approval that might be purchased. In this case, the consumers’ good is a property of Smith’s that cannot be exchanged; it might be acquired in some way, but not by exchange. In relation to exchange, this intangible good is an inalienable property of Smith’s, i.e., it cannot be given up. Another example is that a man cannot permanently transfer his will, even though he may transfer much of his services and his property. As mentioned above, a man may not agree to permanent bondage by contracting to work for another man for the rest of his life. He might change his mind at a later date, and then he cannot, in a free market, be compelled to continue working thereafter. Because a man’s self-ownership over his will is inalienable, he cannot, on the unhampered market, be compelled to continue an arrangement whereby he submits his will to the orders of another, even though he might have agreed to this arrangement previously.34, 35 On the other hand, when property that can be alienated is transferred, it, of course, becomes the property—under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction—of the person who has received it in exchange, and no later regret by the original owner can establish any claim to the property.
meambobbo:13. Enforcement Against Invasion of Property This work is largely the analysis of a market society unhampered by the use of violence or theft against any man’s person or property. The question of the means by which this condition is best established is not at present under consideration. For the present purpose, it makes no difference whether this condition is established by every man’s deciding to refrain from invasive action against others or whether some agency is established to enforce the abandonment of such action by every individual. (Invasive action may be defined as any action—violence, theft, or fraud—taking away another’s personal freedom or property without his consent.) Whether the enforcement is undertaken by each person or by some sort of agency, we assume here that such a condition—the existence of an unhampered market—is maintained in some way. One of the problems in maintaining the conditions of a free market is the role of the enforcing agency—whether individual or organizational—in exchange contracts. What type of contracts are to be enforced to maintain the conditions of an unhampered market? We have already seen that contracts assigning away the will of an individual cannot be enforced in such a market, because the will of each person is by its nature inalienable. On the other hand, if the individual made such a contract and received another’s property in exchange, he must forfeit part or all of the property when he decides to terminate the agreement. We shall see that fraud may be considered as theft, because one individual receives the other’s property but does not fulfill his part of the exchange bargain, thereby taking the other’s property without his consent. This case provides the clue to the role of contract and its enforcement in the free society. Contract must be considered as an agreed-upon exchange between two persons of two goods, present or future. Persons would be free to make any and all property contracts that they wished; and, for a free society to exist, all contracts, where the good is naturally alienable, must be enforced. Failure to fulfill contracts must be considered as theft of the other’s property. Thus, when a debtor purchases a good in exchange for a promise of future payment, the good cannot be considered his property until the agreed contract has been fulfilled and payment made. Until then, it remains the creditor’s property, and nonpayment would be equivalent to theft of the creditor’s property. An important consideration here is that contract not be enforced because a promise has been made that is not kept. It is not the business of the enforcing agency or agencies in the free market to enforce promises merely because they are promises; its business is to enforce against theft of property, and contracts are enforced because of the implicit theft involved. Evidence of a promise to pay property is an enforceable claim, because the possessor of this claim is, in effect, the owner of the property involved, and failure to redeem the claim is equivalent to theft of the property. On the other hand, take the case of a promise to contribute personal services without an advance exchange of property. Thus, suppose that a movie actor agrees to act in three pictures for a certain studio for a year. Before receiving any goods in exchange (salary), he breaks the contract and decides not to perform the work. Since his personal will is inalienable, he cannot, on the free market, be forced to perform the work there. Further, since he has received none of the movie company property in exchange, he has committed no theft, and thus the contract cannot be enforced on the free market. Any suit for “damages” could not be entertained on an unhampered market. The fact that the movie company may have made considerable plans and investments on the expectation that the actor would keep the agreement may be unfortunate for the company, but it could not expect the actor to pay for its lack of foresight and poor entrepreneurship. It pays the penalty for placing too much confidence in the man. The movie actor has not received and kept any of the company’s property and therefore cannot be held accountable in the form of payment of goods as “damages.”44 Any such enforced payment would be an invasion of his property rights on the free market rather than an attack upon invasion. It may be considered more moral to keep promises than to break them, but the condition of a free market is that each individual’s rights of person and property be maintained, and not that some further standard of morals be coercively imposed on all. Any coercive enforcement of such a moral code, going beyond the abolition of invasive acts, would in itself constitute an invasion of individual rights of person and property and be an interference in the free market.
This work is largely the analysis of a market society unhampered by the use of violence or theft against any man’s person or property. The question of the means by which this condition is best established is not at present under consideration. For the present purpose, it makes no difference whether this condition is established by every man’s deciding to refrain from invasive action against others or whether some agency is established to enforce the abandonment of such action by every individual. (Invasive action may be defined as any action—violence, theft, or fraud—taking away another’s personal freedom or property without his consent.) Whether the enforcement is undertaken by each person or by some sort of agency, we assume here that such a condition—the existence of an unhampered market—is maintained in some way.
One of the problems in maintaining the conditions of a free market is the role of the enforcing agency—whether individual or organizational—in exchange contracts. What type of contracts are to be enforced to maintain the conditions of an unhampered market? We have already seen that contracts assigning away the will of an individual cannot be enforced in such a market, because the will of each person is by its nature inalienable. On the other hand, if the individual made such a contract and received another’s property in exchange, he must forfeit part or all of the property when he decides to terminate the agreement. We shall see that fraud may be considered as theft, because one individual receives the other’s property but does not fulfill his part of the exchange bargain, thereby taking the other’s property without his consent. This case provides the clue to the role of contract and its enforcement in the free society. Contract must be considered as an agreed-upon exchange between two persons of two goods, present or future. Persons would be free to make any and all property contracts that they wished; and, for a free society to exist, all contracts, where the good is naturally alienable, must be enforced. Failure to fulfill contracts must be considered as theft of the other’s property. Thus, when a debtor purchases a good in exchange for a promise of future payment, the good cannot be considered his property until the agreed contract has been fulfilled and payment made. Until then, it remains the creditor’s property, and nonpayment would be equivalent to theft of the creditor’s property. An important consideration here is that contract not be enforced because a promise has been made that is not kept. It is not the business of the enforcing agency or agencies in the free market to enforce promises merely because they are promises; its business is to enforce against theft of property, and contracts are enforced because of the implicit theft involved.
Evidence of a promise to pay property is an enforceable claim, because the possessor of this claim is, in effect, the owner of the property involved, and failure to redeem the claim is equivalent to theft of the property. On the other hand, take the case of a promise to contribute personal services without an advance exchange of property. Thus, suppose that a movie actor agrees to act in three pictures for a certain studio for a year. Before receiving any goods in exchange (salary), he breaks the contract and decides not to perform the work. Since his personal will is inalienable, he cannot, on the free market, be forced to perform the work there. Further, since he has received none of the movie company property in exchange, he has committed no theft, and thus the contract cannot be enforced on the free market. Any suit for “damages” could not be entertained on an unhampered market. The fact that the movie company may have made considerable plans and investments on the expectation that the actor would keep the agreement may be unfortunate for the company, but it could not expect the actor to pay for its lack of foresight and poor entrepreneurship. It pays the penalty for placing too much confidence in the man. The movie actor has not received and kept any of the company’s property and therefore cannot be held accountable in the form of payment of goods as “damages.”44 Any such enforced payment would be an invasion of his property rights on the free market rather than an attack upon invasion. It may be considered more moral to keep promises than to break them, but the condition of a free market is that each individual’s rights of person and property be maintained, and not that some further standard of morals be coercively imposed on all. Any coercive enforcement of such a moral code, going beyond the abolition of invasive acts, would in itself constitute an invasion of individual rights of person and property and be an interference in the free market.
We have already admitted that consumption of information is non-refundable. The buyer cannot exchange his will, and his memory is inalienable from his will. His promise to not redistribute can be terminated by him at any moment. Thus, the copyright contract is not a contract in Rothbard's eyes. It is an exchange of money and a promise not to redistribute on the part of the buyer, and an exchange of a medium or transmission of information by the seller. One could even conclude that the transmission of information was a service, not an exchange.
Intellectual property cannot survive on the basis of contract. It must be a property right equivalent to property rights in tangible goods.
I think Rothbard was naive in his support of copyright. He never specifies how a pattern can be appropriated, only the medium it is inscribed upon. Sure, someone has property rights in that medium - if someone deleted the information without authorization, they should be held liable for property damages. But to suggest that the information itself can be owned, and that any tangible property that assumes the pattern immediately becomes partially owned by the originator of that information is a giant leap.
Stranger:How can I make a rule that says you are allowed to drink in my restaurant, but not allowed to bring your own drinks? Because it's my restaurant.
A terrible analogy. A more correct analogy to IP would be this.
I manufacture mugs. I sell you a mug. The purchase agreement stipulates that you are only permitted to drink beer out of this mug. Now when you go home with your new mug you drink water from it instead. (Ignoring the fact of how impossible it would be to enforce such a contract)
Lets say instead of drinking water from your new mug with the purchasing agreement you decide to build your own. Lets say this MUG has a big M on it, as a brand name. Lets continue to say you have the manufacturing capabilities to clone it in it's entirety, including the M, inside the comfort of your . I clone the mug and continue to drink beer from the original satisfying my purchase agreement, but drink water from the clone.
The IP Advocates state that I should never had made the clone, and that the clone follows from the original purchase agreement of the original mug, even though I built the second one from my own resources, time, and labor.
meambobbo:You are advocating both LTV and ownership of the market value of an intangible concept - beliefs that exist inside the minds of others. You really can't argue otherwise.
Others have pointed this out. It's ironic because he claims that Anti-IP advocates are communist.
At any rate this discussion will never progress so long as Stranger continues the circular pattern of repeating fallacy numbers. I'm not sure it's worth your time investment folks. The first few pages should be demonstration enough.
Stranger:This makes them, by any honest definition of the term, intellectual communists.
This shock term is to no avail with people who have read Menger, who argued that, regarding non-economic goods like air, we are all "natural communists". And the nature of already-created bits of information is such that for the user of the bits of information, "even if all other members of society completely meet their requirements for these goods, more than sufficient quantities will still remain for him to satisfy his needs." (Menger, Principles of Economics) Therefore they qualify as Mengerian non-economic goods.