I've been reading a bit about feudalism and medieval Europe, and it's crystalized what bothers me about the philosophy of voluntarism and the concept of self-ownership.
The problem with both is that they don't actually protect human freedom, because they allow for freedom to be 'voluntarily' given away. After all, if you "own yourself," you can also "sell yourself," into slavery for example. So, although it sounds like a concept which would protect freedom at first, voluntarism actually creates an intellectual justification for slavery.
For example, if I were dying of thirst in a desert, and someone came by and offered to give me water only if I signed a contract becoming their slave for life, it would apparently be justifiable under a theory of voluntary contracts for that person to enforce that contract, because it was 'voluntarily' entered in to. That's an unlikely scenario, but this kind of situation happened all the time in Medieval Europe - someone would be hungry and landless and enter into a feudal contract with a land-owning lord, or and independent land owners would voluntarily become a serf of a local lord, becoming a serf and recieving a plot of land to farm, but they would also often lose many of their rights in the process, for life. Serfs might have to ask their lords permission to marry, for example, or might be banned from leaving their plot, and on and on. But, still, it was a voluntary contract, voluntarily entered in to by both parties.
This same kind of idea seems to underlie the idea that soldiers lose their rights when they enter the military, because they sign a piece of paper waiving those rights.
The alternative idea is one that I think is far more protective of liberty in the real world - more libertarian you might say - and that is the idea of "inalienable rights." Inalienable rights are rights you can't give away - you don't 'have' them in an ownership sense, but rather they're an inseperable part of you. Since you don't own them, you can't give them up, and any attempt to do so is fraud on your part and aggression on the part of the person who would have you waive them.
Self-ownership is often thought to be compatible, or even beneficial to property rights, but I'm not sure that this is the case. How can we legitimately own something we did not buy or create? Granting the principle of self-ownership implies that we can own things we didn't buy, create or have given to us, since we do not buy ourselves, give ourselves to ourselves or create ourselves. Self-ownership introduces a case in which we supposedly can own something which we don't buy, receive or create, and in that way is corrosive to a good theory of property ownership.
Voluntarism and freedom to contract are sometimes thought of as compatible with anarchism or even being anarchistic, but I'm not sure this is true either. Enforcement of contracts is a major wellspring of government. An agency with the power to enforce contracts looks very much like a government, whether it is publicly or privately provided.
Voluntarism is mostly concerned with process, while the idea of inalienable rights is mainly concerned with outcome. The later seems preferable to me, because whether we can exercise a certain right is more important than how our ability to do so came about. Process is important too, of course, but less important than results.
I didn't know that libertarian self-ownership advocates actually believed that you could sell yourself, I can only think of two. The vast majority (that I'm familiar with) say clearly that you cannot sell oneself, that you have an inalienable right to yourself.
ravochol:So, although it sounds like a concept which would protect freedom at first, voluntarism actually creates an intellectual justification for slavery.
ravochol:That's an unlikely scenario, but this kind of situation happened all the time in Medieval Europe - someone would be hungry and landless and enter into a feudal contract with a land-owning lord, or and independent land owners would voluntarily become a serf of a local lord, becoming a serf and recieving a plot of land to farm, but they would also often lose many of their rights in the process, for life. Serfs might have to ask their lords permission to marry, for example, or might be banned from leaving their plot, and on and on. But, still, it was a voluntary contract, voluntarily entered in to by both parties.
ravochol:For example, if I were dying of thirst in a desert, and someone came by and offered to give me water only if I signed a contract becoming their slave for life,
Imagine a desert where people get lost and are in danger of dieing of thirst. Entrepreneurs could set up waystations with vending machines with water for 20 bucks. They could have buttons on them that would signal a patrol to come out for a certain price. The low cost of setting up these waystations would probably lower the price of rescue to about $1000 or less. If you want to really tease and stretch the meaning of voluntary, nothing is voluntary. We are bound by birth to this mortal coil. But we can approach pretty free consumer choice very quickly when entrepreneurs compete for our money. I will DIE if someone doesn't sell me food right now, but there's so much competition i'm not extorted. This is what you're afraid of. It doesn't happen on the market.
Now for the flip side. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the candledude, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. You can't just make up a system wher leaders are nice and pretend it will work. Moreover, there's an additional burden of proof on you, that is to show that not only should citizens form a co-op to represent their interests, but that they should also attack people who, although peaceful, do not wish to contribute to the co-op's interests.
ravochol:The alternative idea is one that I think is far more protective of liberty in the real world - more libertarian you might say - and that is the idea of "inalienable rights." Inalienable rights are rights you can't give away - you don't 'have' them in an ownership sense, but rather they're an inseperable part of you. Since you don't own them, you can't give them up, and any attempt to do so is fraud on your part and aggression on the part of the person who would have you waive them.
ravochol:Self-ownership introduces a case in which we supposedly can own something which we don't buy, receive or create, and in that way is corrosive to a good theory of property ownership.
ravochol:An agency with the power to enforce contracts looks very much like a government, whether it is publicly or privately provided.
I'm not sure what you mean about the water fountains in the desert, but my point doesn't require a scarcity of sellers.
There was a lot of indentured servitude in early America, and a lot of that was along the lines of 'I'll pay for your boat ride over here, and in return you'll be my slave for x years. There was a market of people offering and taking those kinds of conditions.
It may have been "peaceful," but I think everyone has every right - a duty even - to interfere with the arrangement if the terms are violating fundamental rights of the servant - like if the servant can't quit until their term is up. Same with modern day military personnel for example - everyone has every right, and maybe even a duty to help a soldier go AWOL if he or she wants to, I don't think the fact they signed a contract is really relevant to the issue.
I didn't know that libertarian self-ownership advocates actually believed that you could sell yourself, I can only think of two.
But if you can't sell or dispose of something, what does it mean to say you "own" it? What kind of ownership is that?
If it's not real ownership if you can't sell it, why not just drop the language of "self-ownership" altogether for being misleading?
Ownership in every other case is a relationship between two entities, but a person is only one entity, so I don't really even understand it in the first place.
You can sell it. But doing so wouldn't change anything.
But if you can't sell or dispose of something, what does it really mean to say you "own" it? What kind of ownership is that? Since that's not real ownership, why not just drop the language of "self-ownership" altogether for being misleading?
But if you can't sell or dispose of something, what does it really mean to say you "own" it? What kind of ownership is that?
Since that's not real ownership, why not just drop the language of "self-ownership" altogether for being misleading?
That type of thinking can be extended, as no libertarian agrees you can do anything you want with your property, do they all reject ownership entirely? Or perhaps ownership is conditional, somethings can be sold others cannot, some things can be aimed at others faces others cannot. There is quite a bit of work on the topic, read for yourself.
No it isn't (see above), again, you and your stuff don't exist in a vacuum. Also, a mind/body dichotomy can be made in respect to the person, so its you (mind) and your body (body, obviously)
ravochol:I'm not sure what you mean about the water fountains in the desert, but my point doesn't require a scarcity of sellers.
ravochol:There was a lot of indentured servitude in early America, and a lot of that was along the lines of 'I'll pay for your boat ride over here, and in return you'll be my slave for x years. There was a market of people offering and taking those kinds of conditions.
ravochol:It may have been "peaceful," but I think everyone has every right - a duty even -
ravochol:to interfere with the arrangement if the terms are violating fundamental rights of the servant - like if the servant can't quit until their term is up.
Would you oppose indentured servitude if entrepreneurs made no profit on it? How much profit are they allowed to make untill you attack them?
ravochol:Same with modern day military personnel for example - everyone has every right, and maybe even a duty to help a soldier go AWOL if he or she wants to, I don't think the fact they signed a contract is really relevant to the issue.
Has nobody seen the show dollhouse?
If one can't sell themself or kill themself, they don't truly own themself. Moans about chattel slavery are not valid arguments to limiting the actions of individuals. detailed explanation here
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
After all, if you "own yourself," you can also "sell yourself," into slavery for example.
And a contract that forces you into slavery is not a valid contract.
Incorrect. Read my link.
As with any contract you can change your mind at any time and owe only what you received in the exchange. That is the flaw in the military argument. You can't just snap people into a ball and chain to stop them from quitting their jobs.
For example, if I were dying of thirst in a desert, and someone came by and offered to give me water only if I signed a contract becoming their slave for life, it would apparently be justifiable under a theory of voluntary contracts for that person to enforce that contract, because it was 'voluntarily' entered in to.
I'm left wondering what alternative system would work better here? The person with water can just give it to the thirsty guy for free if he wishes. Or the slave can breach this contract.
The slave could also sue the slave owner over the contract. The courts could decide the contract is "unfair" or whatever. It not only depends on the theory of justice being used, but whatever the courts decide. Typically, laws have a lot to do with cultural norms.
This is just another "hypothetical hopeless guy" scenario, and I personally don't buy into them. I've lived enough around "hopeless" and "poor" people to know that most of them (at least the ones I grew up around) don't even deserve what little they get.
Yeah, I'm going to disagree with Block on this one. Not all contracts are valid, any contract lacking the option to opt out isn't valid and shouldn't be upheld. Or as Jan Narveson put it " What we probably should say is that people may enslave themselves to others for as long as they want to, but beyond that, we should not uphold the contract." Now, maybe, if you could actually remove ones will from ones body it would be valid, but until then...
I don't know if I agree, but Angurse has a good point. To not be able opt out seems like not valid contract. I don't say, that "slave man" wouldn't have to pay a price in money then to his contactor though.
P.S. I mean, I agree with "voluntary slavery contracts" (even though it looks to me as oxymoron), but I higly disagree with certain type of contracts - contracts which are made for a man to no be able to opt out (change his mind).
(english is not my native language, sorry for grammar.)
ravochol: The problem with both is that they don't actually protect human freedom, because they allow for freedom to be 'voluntarily' given away. After all, if you "own yourself," you can also "sell yourself," into slavery for example. So, although it sounds like a concept which would protect freedom at first, voluntarism actually creates an intellectual justification for slavery. For example, if I were dying of thirst in a desert, and someone came by and offered to give me water only if I signed a contract becoming their slave for life, it would apparently be justifiable under a theory of voluntary contracts for that person to enforce that contract, because it was 'voluntarily' entered in to. That's an unlikely scenario, but this kind of situation happened all the time in Medieval Europe - someone would be hungry and landless and enter into a feudal contract with a land-owning lord, or and independent land owners would voluntarily become a serf of a local lord, becoming a serf and recieving a plot of land to farm, but they would also often lose many of their rights in the process, for life. Serfs might have to ask their lords permission to marry, for example, or might be banned from leaving their plot, and on and on. But, still, it was a voluntary contract, voluntarily entered in to by both parties. This same kind of idea seems to underlie the idea that soldiers lose their rights when they enter the military, because they sign a piece of paper waiving those rights. The alternative idea is one that I think is far more protective of liberty in the real world - more libertarian you might say - and that is the idea of "inalienable rights." Inalienable rights are rights you can't give away - you don't 'have' them in an ownership sense, but rather they're an inseperable part of you. Since you don't own them, you can't give them up, and any attempt to do so is fraud on your part and aggression on the part of the person who would have you waive them. Self-ownership is often thought to be compatible, or even beneficial to property rights, but I'm not sure that this is the case. How can we legitimately own something we did not buy or create? Granting the principle of self-ownership implies that we can own things we didn't buy, create or have given to us, since we do not buy ourselves, give ourselves to ourselves or create ourselves. Self-ownership introduces a case in which we supposedly can own something which we don't buy, receive or create, and in that way is corrosive to a good theory of property ownership. Voluntarism and freedom to contract are sometimes thought of as compatible with anarchism or even being anarchistic, but I'm not sure this is true either. Enforcement of contracts is a major wellspring of government. An agency with the power to enforce contracts looks very much like a government, whether it is publicly or privately provided. Voluntarism is mostly concerned with process, while the idea of inalienable rights is mainly concerned with outcome. The later seems preferable to me, because whether we can exercise a certain right is more important than how our ability to do so came about. Process is important too, of course, but less important than results.
Slavery is defined as involuntary servitude to a person or persons. If it is voluntary then it is not slavery.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
but I higly disagree with certain type of contracts - contracts which are made for a man to no be able to opt out (change his mind).
Like ones that involve slavery?
Angurse, have you read a Narveson book?
Indeed I have.
Angurse: but I higly disagree with certain type of contracts - contracts which are made for a man to no be able to opt out (change his mind). Like ones that involve slavery?
yes, true slavery by definition.
Actually, the applicable definition here is "right to punish in any way".
There has to be repercussions for squelching on one's deals. None of these objections are new and all are covered in the paper I linked:
Further, the voluntary slave agreement is not a “mere” promise. Rather, it is a bona fide contract where consideration crosses hands; when it is abrogated, theft occurs. If you pay $1 million for the right to enslave me, and I spend it, work for a week at your plantation, change my mind, escape, and the forces of law and order refuse to turn me over to you, then I have in this manner stolen that amount of money as surely as if I broke into your vault and absconded with it. It is difficult to see why this commercial arrangement does not meet the specifications of Rothbard’s own “title transfer” theory of contracts.
Angurse:Not all contracts are valid, any contract lacking the option to opt out isn't valid and shouldn't be upheld.
So party A (you) has a say as to the content or validity of a voluntary contract between parties X and Y? By what justification? Isn't that a slippery slope?
That doesn't equate opt out at all, if he has to pay back the money (+ interest/damages/etc...) then its valid, but then it wouldn't be a slave contract.
No more of a slippery slope than saying an assassination contract is valid. Party A (as in arbitrator!) obviously has a say in what contracts are valid and invalid.
Why would an opt-out clause be required for selling one's body (permanently), but not an apple or a car? In each case a decision is made by the individual to transfer title to something which He has untrammeled ownership of. I could just as well regret my decision to sell my tasty apple or favorite car and have to resort to criminal action to "get my stuff back", in the case of slavery "stuff" being freedom from punishment.
Also, how would you enforce any sort of indentured servitude or employment agreement without the concept of detrimental reliance on the part of the employer? If a contract specifies the right to demand specific performance on th epart of either party, such is known to both at the time of title transfer. A hypothetical voluntary slave contract could include such clauses.
Then there is the problem of involuntary but justified slavery when people are convicted of crimes. A convicted murderer is, in the same sense of "slavery" we are talking about, owned by the heir(s) of the victim.
It'd basically be fraud, wouldn't it? Trying to sell something you could never in principle deliver upon.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
E. R. Olovetto: Why would an opt-out clause be required for selling one's body (permanently), but not an apple or a car? In each case a decision is made by the individual to transfer title to something which He has untrammeled ownership of. I could just as well regret my decision to sell my tasty apple or favorite car and have to resort to criminal action to "get my stuff back", in the case of slavery "stuff" being freedom from punishment.
Hm, good point. Gotta think about it more.
Because you are selling your services, not simply your body, which cannot be transferred like a car or an apple.
You can't, thats the point. Contracts can be breached (its just costly), a contract that has a clause saying "if you breach this contract, you are still a slave" isn't any more valid than a slave contract without said clause.
Who agreed to that?
You don't have to attack anyone.
No, but the entrepreneur has to attack their servant if their servant tries to leave before the contract is up - otherwise it's unenforcable.
ravochol:No, but the entrepreneur has to attack their servant if their servant tries to leave before the contract is up - otherwise it's unenforcable.
Enforcement of contracts is not "aggression". It is merely coercion.
Exactly my point! Any extreme of aggression can be redefined as "not aggression" by voluntarism, as long as some piece of paper was signed or some word sounds made at some point in history.
My contention is that word sounds and pieces of paper in no way change people's fundamental rights; that the person who waives rights in contract is committing fraud, and the person who enforces an unjust contract is committing aggression.
Shylock is an aggressor.
Increasing liberty means making conditions voluntary in the present tense, voluntary contract theory is only concerned with whether they were voluntary in the past tense.
>>Shylock is an aggressor.
how so? what was the nature of his act of aggression?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Demanding a pound of flesh. Trying to get someone's foot off with a butcher's knife is aggression whether or not you can point to a fancy piece of paper or some word sounds made in the past.
You should see Shrek IV, it does a really good send up of aggression via contract, the main villain is Rumplestiltskin.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7__TG7swg0
Angurse:Because you are selling your services, not simply your body, which cannot be transferred like a car or an apple.
Again this is all covered in Block's essay... "Ownership" = "legitimate control"
Let us begin with self-ownership (in so doing, we will ignore the issues of whether contract is incompatible with property rights, and what justifies contracts). Gordon maintains that to give or sell yourself (not merely your physical property) to someone else would be a per se violation of self-ownership. I claim, very much to the contrary, that to forbid this and to fail to legally enforce such contracts would violate the rights of self-ownership of the person. If you really own something, whether an unimportant piece of your property (such as a car or house) or an important part of your property (such as your own person), then you should be able to sell or give it away. The extent to which you cannot do with yourself what you will is the extent to which you do not really own yourself. We consider the charge that the voluntary slave case implies an abnegation of property rights in favor of contracts (in this discussion, we avoid the issue of whether this doctrine is false per se, and again the justification of contracts themselves). I have no disagreement with Gordon insofar as his main contention is concerned. Property rights are, indeed, logically prior to contract. Be the latter ever-so-important for libertarian theory, they must of necessity rest on the bedrock of property rights, for in engaging in commercial arrangements, one can legitimately only do so with one’s own property. To do so with that properly belonging to someone else is hardly compatible with the freedom philosophy. But why is it thought that the voluntary slave contract transfers property which is not owned, or illegitimately owned? The slave is transferring the right to control himself; and who, if not this person himself, has the right to do so? Surely, there can be no one else with this right. There is no third party C in a position to protest that the sale of A to B is a violation of C’s rights.
Let us begin with self-ownership (in so doing, we will ignore the issues of whether contract is incompatible with property rights, and what justifies contracts). Gordon maintains that to give or sell yourself (not merely your physical property) to someone else would be a per se violation of self-ownership. I claim, very much to the contrary, that to forbid this and to fail to legally enforce such contracts would violate the rights of self-ownership of the person. If you really own something, whether an unimportant piece of your property (such as a car or house) or an important part of your property (such as your own person), then you should be able to sell or give it away. The extent to which you cannot do with yourself what you will is the extent to which you do not really own yourself.
We consider the charge that the voluntary slave case implies an abnegation of property rights in favor of contracts (in this discussion, we avoid the issue of whether this doctrine is false per se, and again the justification of contracts themselves). I have no disagreement with Gordon insofar as his main contention is concerned. Property rights are, indeed, logically prior to contract. Be the latter ever-so-important for libertarian theory, they must of necessity rest on the bedrock of property rights, for in engaging in commercial arrangements, one can legitimately only do so with one’s own property. To do so with that properly belonging to someone else is hardly compatible with the freedom philosophy.
But why is it thought that the voluntary slave contract transfers property which is not owned, or illegitimately owned? The slave is transferring the right to control himself; and who, if not this person himself, has the right to do so? Surely, there can be no one else with this right. There is no third party C in a position to protest that the sale of A to B is a violation of C’s rights.
See also the points on the body/will dichotomy and how our inability to transfer a "will" is, for the sake of a theory of commodification, but a technological or ontological consideration.
All scarce objects can be physically controlled. Neo-Lockean homesteading (or some other theory) assigns legitimacy to certain modes of coming into control, then the word "ownership" applies versus mere control. In a pseudo-libertarian legal schema which forbids this form of voluntary interaction, some 3rd party, C, has a legal claim to interfere in the affairs of A and B. By the law of the excluded middle, there is no true self-ownership in place, instead a subtle communism, with public control over certain forms of trade.
The problem with this is that such clauses are used in contracts, although less frequently. I might not care about the ability to command specific performance when I sign a contract with you to have you sing Happy Birthday to me. For one thing, it would be past my birthday by the time I tracked you down, for another you might sing the song, but poorly in an annoying falsetto. The remedy for breach of contract tends towards monetary remuneration for such reasons, but clauses enabling the demand of specific performance can be and are used throughout the history of common law.
Whatever we would call a fully voluntary contract of total slavery (right to punish in any way) is possible to be carried out. The terms do not involve some impossible soul-transfer. It is just the right to exert physical force on another's body, to restrict their movement or to inflict pain in order to direct their actions.
Then there is the problem of involuntary but justified slavery when people are convicted of crimes. A convicted murderer is, in the same sense of "slavery" we are talking about, owned by the heir(s) of the victim. Who agreed to that?
Does a murderer have to agree with his captors in order for them to punish him? Only the intersubjective justification amongst those holding a balance of power matter for whatever form of "justice" to be carried out. The subject of an aprioristic doctrine of right's legal schema conforming to the nature of Man's preferred pattern of societal cooperation, versus the incoherent legal doctrines stemming from such ideologies of divine right or democratic civil legislation, is another matter entirely.
ravochol:My contention is that word sounds and pieces of paper in no way change people's fundamental rights; that the person who waives rights in contract is committing fraud, and the person who enforces an unjust contract is committing aggression.
Nonsense. Do you consider yourself a socialist (of some form)? Your username is that of a communist murderer.
Define "just contract". Would it be a "just contract" for an employer to hire scabs at a correct market price, i.e. less than a striking union is willing to accept?
I've also been surprised when researching the middle ages, how much of the bad stuff comes from the idea of 'rights as property.'
Hereditary serfdom was justified because the children or serfs were born serfs - freedom was something you inherited, like property. You could be "born free" or "born into serfdom."
Likewise, "titles of nobility" were just that - titles to land. The king's son would inherit the kingdom because the the king owned the land of the kingdom, and passed on the land to his son, and with it the right to create and set law, declare war and peace, etc. Political rights were just property to be inherited, like any other property.
It seems like it's a slippery slope from thinking of rights as property - which can be waived by contract - to medieval serfdom.
>>Demanding a pound of flesh. Trying to get someone's foot off with a butcher's knife is aggression whether or not you can point to a fancy piece of pa??per or some word sounds made in the past.
demanding anything by merely pointing to a fancy piece of paper or some word sounds made in the past is legitimate because...?
I don't see how shrek is relevant at all.
I speculate that a court would find that shylock is owed money in lieu of the (alienable) flesh that is denied him, and this would entail the seizure of assets and garnished wages etc.
>>It seems like it's a slippery slope from thinking of rights as property - which can be waived by contract - to medieval serfdom.
afraid i dont see an argument, just an illusion...., something seems like something and it all seems pretty bad.
well, ok.
ravochol : Any extreme of aggression can be redefined as "not aggression" by voluntarism,
the person who enforces an unjust contract is committing aggression.