It seems like it's a slippery slope from thinking of rights as property - which can be waived by contract - to medieval serfdom.
More nonsense. Parents have no right to sell children into slavery and such juridical statuses can't be passed from generation to generation. As opposed to the leftist deification of the central planner, libertarianism necessarily demands equality under the law. Leftists propound an unattainable goal of economic equality in order to seize power for themselves.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
the person who enforces an unjust contract is committing aggression. Yep.
the person who enforces an unjust contract is committing aggression.
of course, but this does not address the question... what is the difference between just and unjust contracts.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
C, has a legal claim to interfere in the affairs of A and B....there is no true self-ownership in place, instead a subtle communism,
what is the difference between just and unjust contracts.
Those are really poor and completely invalid arguments WillBlake.
the word slavery is not technical enough,
besides a contract that forces people into anything may not be just....
but let us consider if there are any unjust contracts where the contract is but a word to describe the complex phenomenon of mutual obligations forming after a meeting of the minds causes an exchange of titles over property?
Again this is all covered in Block's essay... "Ownership" = "legitimate control"
Yes, I'm aware, I've already made it clear that I disagree with what constitutes legitimate, so obviously "ownership" shall differ as well.
But why is it thought that the voluntary slave contract transfers property which is not owned, or illegitimately owned? The slave is transferring the right to control himself; and who, if not this person himself, has the right to do so? Surely, there can be no one else with this right. There is no third party C in a position to protest that the sale of A to B is a violation of C’s rights.
Because one cannot actually transfer their control of themselves. Its blatant fraud. Surely, there can be no one at all with this right. Further, I'm not protesting one "selling" themselves, if the two parties want to play make-believe thats all well and proper, its when party A leaves that party C shall step in.
All scarce objects can be physically controlled. Neo-Lockean homesteading (or some other theory) assigns legitimacy to certain modes of coming into control, then the word "ownership" applies versus mere control. In a pseudo-libertarian legal schema which forbids this form of voluntary interaction, some 3rd party, C, has a legal claim to interfere in the affairs of A and B. By the law of the excluded middle, there is no true self-ownership in place, instead a subtle communism, with public control over certain forms of trade.
See above.
The problem with this is that such clauses are used in contracts, although less frequently. I might not care about the ability to command specific performance when I sign a contract with you to have you sing Happy Birthday to me. For one thing, it would be past my birthday by the time I tracked you down, for another you might sing the song, but poorly in an annoying falsetto. The remedy for breach of contract tends towards monetary remuneration for such reasons, but clauses enabling the demand of specific performance can be and are used throughout the history of common law.
Whatever we would call a fully voluntary contract of total slavery (right to punish in any way) is possible to be carried out. The terms do not involve some impossible soul-transfer. It is just the right to exert physical force on another's body, to restrict their movement or to inflict pain in order to direct their actions.
Does a murderer have to agree with his captors in order for them to punish him? Only the intersubjective justification amongst those holding a balance of power matter for whatever form of "justice" to be carried out. The subject of an aprioristic doctrine of right's legal schema conforming to the nature of Man's preferred pattern of societal cooperation, versus the incoherent legal doctrines stemming from such ideologies of divine right or democratic civil legislation, is another matter entirely.
Because one cannot actually transfer their control of themselves. Its blatant fraud. Surely, there can be no one at all with this right. Further, I'm not protesting one "selling" themselves, if the two parties want play make-believe thats all well and proper, its when party A leaves that party C shall step in. ....... It being possible to be carried out doesn't make it any more valid (look at IP) the terms involve the future self and the current self, which aren't the same.
Because one cannot actually transfer their control of themselves. Its blatant fraud. Surely, there can be no one at all with this right. Further, I'm not protesting one "selling" themselves, if the two parties want play make-believe thats all well and proper, its when party A leaves that party C shall step in.
.......
It being possible to be carried out doesn't make it any more valid (look at IP) the terms involve the future self and the current self, which aren't the same.
does not compute
How can I clarify this for you?
you are denying that the self that hands over money to a shopkeep is the same self that expects to receive a sack of potatoes within moments of an 'exchange'?
(or i misunderstood your point)
Is it possible to:
exert physical force on another's body, to restrict their movement or to inflict pain in order to direct their actions.
???
"Control" in this sense is control by the person holding title to an external thing. The term for this is "indirect control" versus the "direct control" of an individual to blink their eyelashes or whatever. The type of voluntary slavery contract we are concerned with is only a legal transfer of rights to indirectly control. This is possible, look up videos of prisons if you don't believe me.
I think that I have done more than enough to prove why such transfer is legitimate and anyone opposing it holds an internally contradictory theory. I will, nonetheless, "concede" two points:
1. It is highly unlikely that anyone would agree to such contracts, so whatever theory is adopted will have little application anyhow. Therefore continuing to debate this again is a waste of my time.
2. Even though I am right, people's preferences will shape the "landscape" of polycentric legal institutions regardless. Any judge can conceive of the correctness of a certain punishment yet refuse to act on it. This is what I term the via negativa of libertarian jurisprudence. I would take issue with Block on this part:
Gordon maintains that to give or sell yourself (not merely your physical property) to someone else would be a per se violation of self-ownership. I claim, very much to the contrary, that to forbid this and to fail to legally enforce such contracts would violate the rights of self-ownership of the person.
Forbidding voluntary transactions (1) is unjust. Failing to act on rights violations (2) is not unjust. To claim (2), leads to support of positive rights. A judge could refuse to prescribe punishment for a "roving band of voluntary slavery abolitionists", if he fears what he stands to gain runs so counter to public opinion that his reputation, and thus his livelihood, would suffer.
Forbidding voluntary transactions (1) is unjust.
Yes, but enforcing slavery is a different matter.
Only if you strawman me and start talking about chattel slavery. Your points above were fallacious and not worth addressing.
you are denying that the self that hands over money to a shopkeep is the same self that expects to receive a sack of potatoes within moments of an 'exchange'? (or i misunderstood your point)
Not exactly, I see how got that though, you are the same physically (although, you do change physically over a longer period of time), what I meant was your mind could change. In your example, it would be demanding your money back.
Of course.
Not necessary, I'm on the same page here.
I disagree, I don't think any sort of "legitimacy" has been proven, it has just simply been asserted.
As the 3rd party, C, the burden of proof lies on you to justify your interdiction in the mutually beneficial trade that occurs between A and B.
I'm not necessarily forbidding it...
Further, I'm not protesting one "selling" themselves, if the two parties want to play make-believe thats all well and proper, its when party A leaves that party C shall step in.
There must be thousands of BDSM people in the world, they may certainly proceed without my permission. However, assuming they've come to me for judgement:
Not all contracts are valid, any contract lacking the option to opt out isn't valid and shouldn't be upheld. Or as Jan Narveson put it " What we probably should say is that people may enslave themselves to others for as long as they want to, but beyond that, we should not uphold the contract."
However, assuming they've come to me for judgement
Good! We are in agreement now. If the only way a man could acquire the large amount of money to save his son who suffers from some rare disease was for him to sell himself to the hypothetical "deranged millionaire", I would act to save the boy's life. To each his own though I guess. This is yet another example of pathological hypotheticals not being all that useful.
The actual fun comes in evaluating various types of cases of "partial slavery", voluntarily or involuntarily occurring.
Good! We are in agreement now. If the only way a man could acquire the large amount of money to save his son who suffers from some rare disease was for him to sell himself to the hypothetical "deranged millionaire", I would act to save the boy's life. To each his own though I guess. This is yet another example of pathological hypotheticals not being all that useful
Ruling that the man wasn't a slave doesn't necessarily kill the boy, however if the man really wanted to save his son he'd honour his agreement and it wouldn't come to me at all. Saying you'd act to save the boy's life just sounds emotional, what if the father stole (We can agree that stealing is wrong? Right?) the money instead would you then act to not save the boys life?
I'm going to rule out that you can sell the rights to your left arm, for the same reasons as before.
OK, it was a bit of an emotional appeal, but I still don't think you have justified your intervention
Consider this scenario. The father works as a laborer and lives pretty much hand to mouth. He can afford to buy his kids Christmas presents, take them to the beach once a year, etc. but has little saved. The family lives modestly, but even if the parents worked harder and scrimped even more, they are never going to be millionaires.
The son gets sick, Dad "sells" himself off, the kid gets treatment, Dad escapes the wicked millionaire, the VSC abolitionists apprehend the slavemaster in the process of capturing his property, and finally Angurse's court nullifies the slave contract.
You are either then: depriving the millionaire of his money (assume the treatment money was all consumed already), or must order restitution in the sum of $1 million to be paid by the ex-slave. If Dad resists the latter judgment, what option do we have to recapture the funds besides throwing him in a prison to do hard labor? What if it is unlikely for the prisoner to live to be 250 years old, when he might pay off the million+interest?
It still seems most fair to me to honor agreements and that there is nothing special about transactions involving one's body. There's a really interesting book, Discipline and Punish by Michel Foucalt, on judges washing their hands of responsibility for the suffering of prisoners by shifting the form of punishment from body to "soul", via such institutions as psychologists, over the past ~200 years.
I see this continuing myth of inalienability as a remnant of the limited state and constitution worship of classical liberalism, along with the facade of "humane punishment" in the modern penal system.
This is simply touching on a bigger issue: what do you do when the criminal cannot be made whole again? It applies to all crimes and criminals.
Criminal made whole again? You mean victim right? This is a problem, but in this case we can solve it. The millionaire was deprived of the guy who agreed to be his slave.
As I've said before, I disagree, property in oneself, shouldn't bee seen (or treated) in the same manner as inanimate objects. I'll look the book up.
I agree, there is a different procedure between ius gentium (law of men) and ius res (law of things). Partial slavery is more relevant to cases of less severe crimes, especially when the crime is only suspected. In my writing on guardianship, I've distinguished between the default set of negative rights common to all children, invalids, sleeping people, etc. and anterior, contingent rights.
This latter division of right is the result of the changes in the world which we will as rational beings. We issue or enact legal norms by our own volition (perhaps by a genuine representative as well). This can happen in re (without disputants), as in the case of drafting a will of last testament when we assign title to our belongings, in the event of our death, in the matter we see fit. This same source of claim and obligation, one's will, is at the center of legal mechanisms such as contracts. It's what lets a person agree to all sorts of things which would be seen, without voluntary agreement, as rights violations.
I really don't think people have natural inalienable rights at all (at least along the lines of most natural law theorists), however, the idea of a contract that has no end that cannot be opted out of is very similar to the social contract theory. (To be avoided!) If it makes you feel better though, I'm fine with good old corporal punishment.
I know you aren't a natural rights guy. I really don't feel I am either in the traditional sense. That comment was more for the people who gave one-liners about contracts and put no thought to such things as the body/will dichotomy.
I don't think this is at all social contract theory. Social contract presupposes agreement based on one being a member of a certain society, class, whatever. It authorizes a state to rise, while what I am talking about is more of a scientific assessment for anyone who wants to understand and follow the guidelines.
Your points above were fallacious and not worth addressing.
Whoops... good catch. Anyways, you can't solve it in many places, there isn't anything new about that, this one is almost completely avoidable though.
I agree, there is a different procedure between ius gentium (law of men) and ius res (law of things). Partial slavery is more relevant to cases of less severe crimes, especially when the crime is only suspected. In my writing on guardianship, I've distinguished between the default set of negative rights common to all children, invalids, sleeping people, etc. and anterior, contingent rights. This latter division of right is the result of the changes in the world which we will as rational beings. We issue or enact legal norms by our own volition (perhaps by a genuine representative as well). This can happen in re (without disputants), as in the case of drafting a will of last testament when we assign title to our belongings, in the event of our death, in the matter we see fit. This same source of claim and obligation, one's will, is at the center of legal mechanisms such as contracts. It's what lets a person agree to all sorts of things which would be seen, without voluntary agreement, as rights violations.
This is pretty good, however, as I've pointed out, one's will can change.
Angurse:This is pretty good, however, as I've pointed out, one's will can change. ... Both presuppose that there is a valid agreement, one which is perpetual and cannot be discontinued.
Every transaction is an agreement (contract) that changes reality into perpetuity as far as that agreement (contract) is concerned. When I exchange my apple for your orange, I'm apple-less and you are orange-less in perpetuity. When I sell you my kidney, I'm kidney-less in perpetuity. The fact that my will (mind) could change after the transaction (agreement) was executed has no bearing whatsoever on the other party or any third party for that matter.
Two consenting individuals should be able to freely enter into any voluntary contract (agreement, exchange involving their own person and property) they want, especially if it doesn't affect anyone else. As ERO suggested, the burden is on the third party interferer (regulator, coercer) to justify his imposition into this free exchange.
Z.
If it is impossible to sell the future how can you sell future punishment? I could be dead tomorrow and default by means not in my control.
I don't think the proper context of slave is involuntary nor do I think the proper context of slave is punishment. The proper context of slave is future and selling the future is impossible.
Second if rights + property = society, then one must consider validity of contracts. A valid contract must be enforceable.
In a master/slave relationship how can a slave possibly enforce a breach of contract? A slave is not free to do so.
http://mises.org/books/ownership.pdf
Robert LeFevre to the rescue!
Instead of just linking an entire literary work can you apply any relevant arguments from it to the thread? I have absolutely no interest in reading something based on a subjective claim of "to the rescue" if you can't at least apply some relevent arguments.
WillBlake:You want to enforce slavery plain and simple, not 'voluntary' slavery.
Oh noes, you found me out.
Live Free Or Die:If it is impossible to sell the future how can you sell future punishment? I could be dead tomorrow and default by means not in my control. I don't think the proper context of slave is involuntary nor do I think the proper context of slave is punishment. The proper context of slave is future and selling the future is impossible.
One isn't "selling the future". It is not much different than me agreeing to deliver milk to your doorstep every day. The same is true under a hypothetical "voluntary slave situation" as in the older practice of chattel slavery: The slave has no rights. Its juridical status is no different than a rock or a rooster to his master. Any sensible person agreeing to a slavery contract would simultaneously assign the rest of his property to whomever, because he has no further right to anything.
A valid contract must be enforceable.
It is both.
A slave enforce? The only reason anyone would agree to such a thing is for some dire reason like a large sum of money to help a friend or family member. It is like a lump sum payment to a third party. The slave can't default. He is in legal limbo. A slave could escape. Some judges might then find for restitution, but the correct answer is that the owner could demand the return of the slave.
t3hsauce: http://mises.org/books/ownership.pdf Robert LeFevre to the rescue!
Best I know he says nothing about voluntary slave contracts.
Isn't that selling the future? If the economy completely crashes will prepaid service contracts be enforcable if you don't get your milk providing prepayments are not escrowed?
A slave enforce?
What if the contract stipulated certain punishments for certain acts?
What if the contract stipulated impossible physical demands can not be punished?
What if the contract was for a fixed term?
How would a non free person enforce other than excape?
When you exchange your apple for my orange the contract has been fulfilled, neither side is obligated to continue exchanging. However, a "slave" contract cannot be fulfilled, its perpetual. Also, there's the whole opt out part.
And this has been addressed repeatedly.
Angurse:This is pretty good, however, as I've pointed out, one's will can change. ... Both presuppose that there is a valid agreement, one which is perpetual and cannot be discontinued. Every transaction is an agreement (contract) that changes reality into perpetuity as far as that agreement (contract) is concerned. When I exchange my apple for your orange, I'm apple-less and you are orange-less in perpetuity. When I sell you my kidney, I'm kidney-less in perpetuity. The fact that my will (mind) could change after the transaction (agreement) was executed has no bearing whatsoever on the other party or any third party for that matter. Two consenting individuals should be able to freely enter into any voluntary contract (agreement, exchange involving their own person and property) they want, especially if it doesn't affect anyone else. As ERO suggested, the burden is on the third party interferer (regulator, coercer) to justify his imposition into this free exchange. Z.
A couple nitpicks, otherwise I agree: Not all transactions arise from agreement, see Mises on autistic exchange. "Coercer" is kind of a lame term, because what is important is if the coercion is justified.
Angurse:Whoops... good catch. Anyways, you can't solve it in many places, there isn't anything new about that, this one is almost completely avoidable though.
There's a good amount where you can, or at least come close, like cases involving homogenous or nearly-so goods. Otherwise, we just do the best we can. A lot of cases can be solved by the two parties reaching an agreement or agreeing to abide by a certain judge's decision. No matter what, this system is better than absurd legislation and purely arbitrary, taxpayer-funded prison stints.
Your typo reminded me of some interesting but difficult, viz. very case specific, problems such as regarding a prisoner's right to medical care and other obligations.
Thanks, but Block demolishes Barnett on "changing one's mind" after pg. 22 of the article. This speaks to Hoppe's refutation of ex post utilitarian evaluation for ethics as well.
Both presuppose that there is a valid agreement, one which is perpetual and cannot be discontinued.
I'm not presupposing agreement. One could very well go on a killing spree then say nobody is justified to punish him for it. The ultimate justification of libertarian ethics is that any ethic must be universalizable, then moreover that anyone proposing a non-libertarian ethic is in a state of performative contradiction, especially when they demonstrate their preference in such way as killing innocent people. Anyhow, let's not get into all that... Social contract theory imposes the hegemonial will of the ruling elite under the guise of "representation". Genuine representation comes about by purely voluntary decisions. The same is true of any act of promise and the concomitant concepts of claim and obligation. When a claim is satisfied, the obligation dissolves. Switching a slavery contract from "forever" to 100 years serves little practical purpose. Allowing "latecomer ethics" promotes an infinite regress to not knowing if my newspaper delivery boy will show up tomorrow or if he will change his mind.
Not really. It is valid to say that you won't act to uphold legitimate (albeit extreme, slaveholder) rights. The voluntary actions of A and B are still safe from any justification of intervention.
Exactly.
Thanks, but Block demolishes Barnett on "changing one's mind" after pg. 22 of the article. This speaks to Hoppe's refutation ofex post utilitarian evaluation for ethics as well.
Page 22? I think you mean 52. Block doesn't so much demolish it as set up his own theory of "true" ownership and morality that I've made clear I don't accept.
I'm not presupposing agreement.
How did you enter the slave contract without agreeing?
Not really. It is valid to say that you won't act to uphold legitimate (albeit extreme, slaveholder) rights.
As I've already said, the slaveholder has no legitimate rights (that is, to a slave, not to restitution of some form)
The voluntary actions of A and B are still safe from any justification of intervention.
Of course they are, as they actually don't constitute slavery.
Angurse:When you exchange your apple for my orange the contract has been fulfilled, neither side is obligated to continue exchanging.
Both sides are obligated to stick to the results of the exchange and not "change their minds" with respect to that exchange. This finality (perpetuity) is the bedrock of free markets and civilization. If you change your mind and you want to bring reality to where it was before the exchange (you want your orange back), you would have to nicely ask for a new voluntary exchange with me (or someone else) under terms that have nothing whatsoever to do with our previous exchange.
Moreover, you're bothered by the "continued" aspect of the contract (exchange), for some reason? Am I not obligated to pay my mortgage, then? 30 years is not chump change, you know. What about life insurance contracts in which premium is paid in perpetuity (until death)? Whether a contract contains default (opt-out) clauses or not has no bearing whatsoever on its validity. Opt-out clauses are a non-issue, btw. Every contract can be bought/sold, or it can become a part of a new contract (exchange) reflecting the dynamically changing subjective valuations (wills, minds) of the agents in the marketplace.
Finally, what if the only contracts I find "legitimate" are the ones written in pink (in the same way you limit legitimacy to strictly non-perpetual ones)?
Angurse:However, a "slave" contract cannot be fulfilled, its perpetual. Also, there's the whole opt out part.
If two parties voluntarily agreed to a contract, this obviously implies their conviction (belief) that the same contract can be fulfilled, your convictions (beliefs) notwithstanding. Otherwise, why would they enter it?
And this doesn't apply to the "slave" contract at all, as it doesn't end so a new voluntary exchange is obviously impossible.
You can opt out of your mortgage and life insurance, so that comparison falls short. Almost every contract has terms on default/termination, it would only be unnecessary where there is a common legal precedent for penalising parties that breach their contracts. The "slave" cannot make a new contract on new terms, he would have no ground to do anything.
We can take this further, "what if the only contracts I find "legitimate" are the ones entered into without consent, or the ones on uninvolved third parties (assassination contracts and the like)?
It doesn't imply that both parties believe what they are saying, as one side could be committing fraud. If you and I entered into a contract whereby I sold you a "4 legged triangle" is it valid just because you believe it can be fulfilled? People's beliefs alone are meaningless.
The voluntary actions of A and B are still safe from any justification of intervention. Of course they are, as they actually don't constitute slavery.
I think it is necessary to distinguish between "slavery" over a period of time, and the punctual act of one agreeing to become a slave. Anyhow I'm not really up for another day of this. You are okay with people committing suicide right Angurse?
You are okay with people committing suicide right Angurse?
Sure.
" Olovetto: Oh noes, you found me out.
So, if you ever manage to understand that a contract that tries to alienate the will of one of the parties is not valid, drop me a line.
"Those are really poor and completely invalid arguments WillBlake."
Awesome quote, I agree with it 100%.
Angurse:Sure.
They are both basically the same thing, a person willing a certain state of affairs to obtain. There is a social aspect of any contract, but within it is the same individual act of willing given into illocutionary force by forming agreement. Dad makes a promise to submit to any punishment from a certain person in return for the $1 mill. to save his son. This brings about a dual set of claim and obligation on both parties. When the $1 mill. is handed over, the wicked millionaire has fulfilled his obligation and Dad's claim disappears.
So, the objection that (an attempt to enslave) is impossible is obviously wrong. The argument that I don't have a "right" to act with permanent determinance over my own legitimate property is obviously wrong. I don't see what is left. I could hold an obligation that you will deliver milk to my doorstep next week, or each week for a year. What is the difference between such agreements and one to deliver milk "in perpetuity"? The difference is that a certain willing individual (versus a corporate entity) has no "ability to act on claims" beyond an individual actor's death.