Both Mises and Rothbard consider the disutility of labor to not be a category of action, but rather to be what Rothbard calls "a subsidiary assumption, based on empirical observation of actual human behavior." Rothbard, in MES, goes on to write, "It is not deducible from human action because its contrary is conceivable, although not generally existing."
But I think the disutility of labor is just as necessary an implication of human action as time preference is.
With regard to time preference, as Mises and Rothbard argue, there must be a disutility in waiting for consumption, or else man would forever go on producing, and never consume. But that wouldn't make any sense, because production is for the sake of consumption.
Now take labor. Labor is the expenditure of human energy for the sake of production. Similarly, there must be disutility of labor, or else man would forever go on expending his energy in production, and would never expend energy upon consumption (partaking in leisure or in the enjoyment of any other consumers' good). But, in this case too, that wouldn't make sense, because production is for the sake of consumption.
Is the word disutility interchangeable with cost? If so, then surely there is a cost to labor, namely, the next best option foregone.
"...there must be disutility of labor, or else man would forever go on expending his energy in production."
I dont think thats so, for exsample I'm drinking some of this new V8 fruit stuff, and the fact that I am not drinking a dr. pepper dosent prove I get disutlity from dr. pepper.
I'm not sure if Rothbard actually has the position you state in MES, but I think I do agree with you that he does not stress enough that it simply follows from a praxeological understanding of action. I believe you are incorrect in asserting that Mises makes the same mistake. From page 133 of Human Action (Scholar's edition):
"The fundamental praxeological insight that men prefer what satisfies them more to what satisfies them less and that they value things on the basis of their utility does not need to be corrected or complemented by an additional statement concerning the disutility of labor. Thcse propositions already imply the statement that labor is preferred to leisure only in so far as the yield of labor is more urgently desired than the enjoyment of leisure."
Admittedly he does take his time to point this out, after going through the analytical conclusions that can be gained using the "disutility of labor" as a device.
"When the King is far the people are happy." Chinese proverb
For Alexander Zinoviev and the free market there is a shared delight:
"Where there are problems there is life."
abskebabs,
Mises did indeed hold the same position as Rothbard on this question...
HA: "The disutility of labor is not of a categorial and aprioristic character. We can without contradiction think of a world in which labor does not cause uneasiness, and we can depict the state of affairs prevailing in such a world."
Hmm... then it would seem that he's at least contradicting himself. I suppose I gave the above a more charitable reading in the sense that one could logically conceive of the conditions of such a world without running into intolerable contradictions, in much the same way one could conceive the stationary economy. So for instance, we produce in order to consume. However, not all goods are necessarily "perished" in the process of consumption(e.g. paintings). If utility only required us to have things and not to "consume" them in our leisure(e.g. having a bottle of coke as opposed to drinking it), then for me there seems no reason as to why such a world without disutility of labor could not exist.
Given that most goods are perishable however, such a distinction considering the disutility of labor would be redundant. Perhaps you're right, more does need to be said on this area, requiring clarification.
I think there is a flaw in your last paragraph. In the parenthetical statement, you assume leisure to be a consumer good when you write "partaking in leisure".
But you make that assumption right in the middle of an argument that assumes the contrary. When you write "or else" in the third sentence of that paragraph, you are assuming there is no disutility of labor, i.e. that leisure is NOT a consumer good.
Put another way, there may exist a bizzaro world where people have the following preferences: Eating ice cream is better than working always. Working is better than doing nothing always.
But even in that bizzaro world it could not be that people have the following preferences: Eating ice cream later is not worse than eating it now. Because in that case, why not delay eating the ice cream forever, to keep on getting richer?
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It's easy to refute an argument if you first misrepresent it. William Keizer
"Eating ice cream later is not worse than eating it now. Because in that case, why not delay eating the ice cream forever, to keep on getting richer?"
We could conceive this to be the case if we posit absurdly the world to be populated by actors immortal in the truest sense of the word (not the age of the Universe, since we now know that to be finite).
Grayson Lilburne: Both Mises and Rothbard consider the disutility of labor to not be a category of action, but rather to be what Rothbard calls "a subsidiary assumption, based on empirical observation of actual human behavior." Rothbard, in MES, goes on to write, "It is not deducible from human action because its contrary is conceivable, although not generally existing." But I think the disutility of labor is just as necessary an implication of human action as time preference is. With regard to time preference, as Mises and Rothbard argue, there must be a disutility in waiting for consumption, or else man would forever go on producing, and never consume. But that wouldn't make any sense, because production is for the sake of consumption. Now take labor. Labor is the expenditure of human energy for the sake of production. Similarly, there must be disutility of labor, or else man would forever go on expending his energy in production, and would never expend energy upon consumption (partaking in leisure or in the enjoyment of any other consumers' good). But, in this case too, that wouldn't make sense, because production is for the sake of consumption.
Doesn't the word "labor" imply disutility? Isn't labor defined as being disutilitious?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
abskebabs: "Eating ice cream later is not worse than eating it now. Because in that case, why not delay eating the ice cream forever, to keep on getting richer?" We could conceive this to be the case if we posit absurdly the world to be populated by actors immortal in the truest sense of the word (not the age of the Universe, since we now know that to be finite).
I agree. I was merely summarizing Grayson's argument of how time preference follows from the action axiom.
You probably knew that and are trying to say that if weposit bizzaro worlds we can make any world we want, and hinting that my whole "proof from bizzaro world" thesis is flawed.
BUT, it ain't so. The quotes on this thread mention the masters' saying that empirical observation of how people behave teach us the disutility of labor; that it was possible to be otherwise. In other words, a bizzaro world of workacholics does not violate the nature of the physical universe as we know it. But yours does.
Bottom line, I think I've got something.
Labor is just people doing work to get what they want [=money]. In theory, they may so love their work that they prefer working to idleness. Saying labor has disutility is asserting people would rather lie in the sun than work, all other things being equal.
Smiling Dave: Labor is just people doing work to get what they want [=money]. In theory, they may so love their work that they prefer working to idleness. Saying labor has disutility is asserting people would rather lie in the sun than work, all other things being equal.
I don't think so. If someone "love[s] their" labor so much that "they prefer [it] to idleness", I don't think that you should anymore refer to it as "labor" from their perspective. What you are saying depends on assuming that what people consider labor is immutable, which of course isn't true. Saying that labor is defined as being disutilitious isn't saying that someone "would rather lie in the sun than work, all other things being equal". What if he considers lieing in the sun simply as labor to get enough vitamin D so his body may properly function so he may do something else that he considers leisure?
I guess I wasn't clear enough. I think the standard common usage of labor is different than the technical definition of labor that Mises adopted.
So to spell it out:
Mises' definition of labor as used in his works is people doing work to get what they want [=money].
Given that definition, is it immediate from the definition that people would rather not engage in labor? Mises says no. In theory, maybe most people love their work, and would rather work than not work. Only getting out there and seeing the world shows us that people would rather acheive their ends [=money] with out working for it.
Now we are ready to address your last post:
1. With the above understanding, someone who loves their work would still call it "labor", if he is sticking with Mises' definition of labor.
2. A definition in a scholarly work, once laid out, is indeed immutable. It doesn't depend on what people consider, but what the author decided.
3. I didn't say labor is DEFINED as disutilitous. Quite the opposite. Putting those words in me mouth hints to me that you may have lost the thread of the argument somewhere along the line.
4. If he is lying in the sun for Vitamin D, then he is not an example of what I'm talking about. I intended to give a picture of someone merely NOT WORKING, as opposed to laboring. Hope that's cleared up now.
"You probably knew that and are trying to say that if weposit bizzaro worlds we can make any world we want, and hinting that my whole "proof from bizzaro world" thesis is flawed."
Not at all, I was merely making an inference. If I was actually criticizing you on those grounds I would not be able to accept the praxeological method; the use of imaginary constructions, on top of the many unrealisable constructions used in physics in order to be logically consistent(although for slightly different reasons).
In actual fact, I should have mentioned this has led me to the belief that the time horizon or lifespan in which one's actions have perceived future effects for oneself forms the instrumental aspect in determining the level of time preference, and thereby the interest rate. I believe one could actually even calculate primitive interest rates and elaborate one's investigations to produce a more complete theory of interest, showing time preference to be a consequence and not a category of action. Such is the subject of a paper I've been scratching the details and notes for so far.
N.B. I feel we should avoid jumping to the conclusion that every comment made on one's point is somehow "in opposition" to the other participant, as opposed to advancing our knowledge with argument and deduction.
OK, my bad.
Smiling Dave: Mises' definition of labor as used in his works is people doing work to get what they want [=money].
Sounds like a circular definition. "Labor" and "work" mean the same thing. Exactly where does he give that definition?
Smiling Dave: A definition in a scholarly work, once laid out, is indeed immutable. It doesn't depend on what people consider, but what the author decided.
A definition in a scholarly work, once laid out, is indeed immutable. It doesn't depend on what people consider, but what the author decided.
You don't understand what I meant. I didn't mean that the definition shouldn't be immutable. A definition in a "scholarly work" of course should be immutable. I meant that what the word applies to isn't immutable. It depends on the attitudes of real people. Most people probably consider lieing in the sun as leisure. But that doesn't mean that they couldn't change their attitudes. Their attitudes aren't immutable. And it doesn't mean that there couldn't be exceptions. You said that what I said implies that "people would rather lie in the sun than work, all other things being equal". But that isn't true, because people could change their attitudes and start considering lieing in the sun as labor, or there could be exceptions.
Smiling Dave: I didn't say labor is DEFINED as disutilitous. Quite the opposite. Putting those words in me mouth hints to me that you may have lost the thread of the argument somewhere along the line.
I didn't say labor is DEFINED as disutilitous. Quite the opposite. Putting those words in me mouth hints to me that you may have lost the thread of the argument somewhere along the line.
I didn't say that you said that "labor is DEFINED as disutilitious". The fact that I already was talking about labor being defined as disutilitious before we even started arguing should alert you to the fact that I wasn't trying to say that you defined it as that. When I said "[s]aying that labor is defined as being disutilitious", I was referring to what I said, not what you said.
Smiling Dave: If he is lying in the sun for Vitamin D, then he is not an example of what I'm talking about. I intended to give a picture of someone merely NOT WORKING, as opposed to laboring. Hope that's cleared up now.
If he is lying in the sun for Vitamin D, then he is not an example of what I'm talking about. I intended to give a picture of someone merely NOT WORKING, as opposed to laboring. Hope that's cleared up now.
I should have been more clear about what I was responding to. I was responding to you saying that "[s]aying labor has disutility is asserting people would rather lie in the sun than work, all other things being equal". I wasn't responding to the other thing that you said, that, "[i]n theory, they may so love their work that they prefer working to idleness". In fact, I don't even understand the reason why you said that. Why would people not "prefer working to idleness"? Why is that "in theory"? Many people everyday show that they prefer "working to idleness". How is that remarkable?
Smiling Dave: Only getting out there and seeing the world shows us that people would rather acheive their ends [=money] with out working for it.
Only getting out there and seeing the world shows us that people would rather acheive their ends [=money] with out working for it.
We could change that to "[o]nly getting out there and seeing the world shows us that people" would prefer to get "their ends" without employing the means. Only observing someone could demonstrate that they would prefer to get their ends without using the means.
But I don't think that is true. Saying the opposite, that someone would prefer using the means to not using them, is saying nonsense. If they were to prefer getting their ends with using the "means", the "means" wouldn't be means, they would be ends in themselves.
Which I think is what Lilburne was saying here:
Grayson Lilburne: Similarly, there must be disutility of labor, or else man would forever go on expending his energy in production, and would never expend energy upon consumption (partaking in leisure or in the enjoyment of any other consumers' good). But, in this case too, that wouldn't make sense, because production is for the sake of consumption.
Similarly, there must be disutility of labor, or else man would forever go on expending his energy in production, and would never expend energy upon consumption (partaking in leisure or in the enjoyment of any other consumers' good). But, in this case too, that wouldn't make sense, because production is for the sake of consumption.
If there were no disutility of labor, people would forever "produce" but never consume. But, that is nonsense, because production is for consumption. If someone were to forever "produce", the "production" wouldn't be production, it would be consumption.
Ryan,
Sorry we got so tangled up here.
1. Let me start from the most difficult part for me, your request for a quote from Mises defining labor. I can't give you one, not being familiar enough with the book. But we need go no further than Grayson's first post, where he says "Labor is the expenditure of human energy for the sake of production." Which is what I was saying, although phrased more impressively.
2. OK, now since we seem to be looking at things from completly different angles, I'll sum up my understanding of this thread.
Grayson assumed the definition of labor to be "expending energy to get something". Note that there is no assumption in the definition about the atitude people have to doing that. And he is going to assume that definition to be immutable, at least until the end of his post.
He also is assuming what Mises and Rothbard asserted to be something they observed in the real world, that people like NOT expending energy. They like it so much, in fact, that it is considered a valuable thing to have time in which one can do nothing if one so wishes. One can go so far as to call it a consumer good.
Now the fact that people actually do go out there and work does not disprove that assertion, of course. They work because although they value idleness, it is not at the top of the charts for them. They value a roof over the head and minimal food and clothing even more than they value idleness. So while lesiure time is not the most valuable consumer good, it is one of SOME value.
Grayson then went on to make a new claim, apparently hitherto undiscovered in Austrian thought. Mainly, that one need not go out in to the streets and check if people like idleness. One can PROVE from first principles [meaning the action axiom] that people enjoy idleness. [I have my doubts about Grayson's proof, mentioned in an earlier post. But that's besides the point, so let's move on].
Your post asked "Doesn't the word "labor" imply disutility? Isn't labor defined as being disutilitious?"
My answer to that, [which I may not have made clear], is that no, that is not the definition Grayson is using here. He is taking the word "labor" to mean "expenditure of energy to get something." That does NOT imply that people would rather not expend the energy, and see it as a bad thing [despite its good consequences of getting money]. In other words, the definition does not imply that labor is a neccessary evil in people's eyes.
Perhaps in popular speech the word labor has that connotation, but he is being careful to purposefully omit that connotation in his definition.
OK, hope we have things starightened out a bit.
Hi Grayson
I think what you are grappling with is the tension that exists between the older, objective conceptions inherited from classical economic science, and the newer, formal conceptions Mises was utilizing.
Action is the utilization of means for the sake of ends (borrowing your phrase "for the sake of").
In your two passages, I believe you have simply given different definitions of action using various content, rather than defining action formally using only the terms means and ends. You are admixing content with the formal definition of action, and this is leading to confusion.
"Now take labor. Labor is the expenditure of human energy for the sake of production."
Substitute: "Now take action. Action is the utilization of means for the sake of ends."
"Production is for the sake of consumption."
Substitute: "Means are for the sake of ends."
I believe that any objective definition of labor, production, or consumption is ultimately incompatible with Misesian praxeology.
Examples:
(1)
Person A to person B who is lying on a towel on the beaach: "I see you are enjoying leisure and forsaking labor."
Person B: "No. I'm working for person C. C told me to put brand X suntan lotion on my right leg, and brand Y suntan lotion on my left leg, and lie here on this towel."
(2)
Person A to person B who is drinking a glass of wine: "I see you are consuming and not producing."
Person B: "No, I'm producing a wine rating report."
As I understand the formal approach, each action has a "dissatisfactory" aspect. Mises conceives this dissatisfactory aspect as the "cost" associated with any action (however this may be conceived). But this is not an "objective" quality of the act concerned, rather it is a formal or logical entailment that comes with the supposition of any and all acts. If we suppose an act, we thereby suppose a cost associated with that act. "Labor" refers to a particular material content. As far as I can see, there is nothing that happens in the act which is "labor" that doesn't happen in any other act. There is a "cost" or "uneasiness" or "dissatisfaction" logically entailed in every act. When we say that there is a "disutility" entailed in "labor" we provide an example of a particular cost associated with a particual act.
We can also say that there is effort involved in walking, expenditures involved in business, etc. These are different material examples of the conception that cost (or some "dissatisfactory" element) is part of every action.
*****
"Similarly, there must be disutility of labor, or else man would forever go on expending his energy in production, and would never expend energy upon consumption (partaking in leisure or in the enjoyment of any other consumers' good)."
Here is an alternative way to express the same thing:
As you write, production (A) is for the sake of consumption (B) (formally, means are for the sake of ends).
We have thus put forth a logical construct whereby A and B are logically entailed.
Then, by this very defintion, it is nonsensical to conceive that "man would forever go on [..... in production], (A), and would never [......partake in consumption] (B).
If we put forth a logical construct in which A always entails B, how can we then suppose A without supposinig B?
If A and B are logically entailed, then when we suppose A we suppose B.
Adam
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Great post Adam. I agree that labor being disutilitous is not an empirical observation, but is contained in the formal construct of praxeology.
This is very closely linked to the discussion in this thread and this thread. Hulsmann points out that an actor must always value his end higher than he values the means to achieve that end. Mises and Rothbard apparently both failed to see this fact or its profound implications. He explains this mistake as a case of intellectual path-dependency from Bohm-Bawerk. I think we are looking at the same thing here.
Government Explained 2: The Special Piece of Paper
Law without Government
I think you both missed the boat. Am I alone in this?
@ Dave. A man must always value his end more than he values the means he needs to attain his ends.
From Mises' definition of labor ("Labor is the expenditure of human energy for the sake of production."), it is clear that he is defining labor as a means to attaining an end. I like my job. But if someone paid me the same money* to sit on my ass, I would take this option. This shows that I would rather sit on my ass, so I must consider my labor disutilitous. If, on the other hand, I would work even given the option to not work and still get paid, then it is technically no longer a job and no longer labor. It would not be "for the sake production", but for its own sake, an end rather than a means.
So the disutility of labor is not an empirical assumption, but is contained in the very definition of the word labor. This is what I mean by it being part of the formal construct of praxeology.
*All the other benefits of having a job would have to be equal as well, e.g. prospects for promotion, skills learned, job perks, etc. To be precise, I should say "If I got all the same benefits/products from sitting on my ass..."
I don't know... sitting on your ass may be laborious :-)
anyhow, I agree with you and Adam on this
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Hey Nir, what about me, the OP?
I just wanted some attention from you Lil', so I cunningly crafted a plan....
but it was a pleasure in itself and not at al laborious
(Excellent work as ever Grayson)
First thing trulib, thank you for the explanation in simple English. I am impressed by the clarity of your exposition.
But I disagree. I think that disutility of labor means that people will LOSE MONEY WILLINGLY [sometimes] for the joy of idleness. That, I think we can agree, doesn't follow from your analysis. It is an empirical obseravtion that cannot be deduced. There may well be a bizzaro world where the action axiom [and all others, as well as all consequences] are true, but those bizzaro people won't willingly lose money just to have a day off.
Thank you Trulib. I added comments to those two threads.
"Hulsmann points out that an actor must always value his end higher than he values the means to achieve that end."
I haven't read where Hulsmann argues this, but I believe Hulsmann is one of the most perceptive among current Austrian theorists.
Just based on the sentence you have provided, I might argue that Hulsmann has partially himself adopted conceptions not warranted by, or not fully consistent with, the subject matter. The way I would approach this in a discussion would be to ask for a precise definition of "higher" that did not refer to relative position in space. This would, in my opinion, if the discussant were willing to continue, bring forth a problem contained in the theory that remains hidden when natural-scientific concepts are left unquestioned in the midst of a social-theoretical construct.
The same principle is involved when one tries to use the concepts "internal" and "external". When these concepts form the basis of a social theory, we need only ask whether they are meant to refer to "internal" and "external" in the spatial sense. If the answer is yes, this creates theoretical problems of a given sort. If the answer is no, then we can request a definition of those terms that does not refer to spatial position. And this will bring to light a hitherto unrealized problem.
As I have argued, if praxeological social theory will be consistent, it cannot be founded on the concept of the spatial position or relation of two objects.
Praxeological social science is founded on the notion of an object or state of affairs present for an actor, relative to his want or desire for an object or state of affairs different from the one that is present to him.
"He explains this mistake as a case of intellectual path-dependency from Bohm-Bawerk. I think we are looking at the same thing here."
Yes. : - )
I disagree. I think that disutility of labor means that people will LOSE MONEY WILLINGLY [sometimes] for the joy of idleness. That, I think we can agree, doesn't follow from your analysis.
why doesn't it follow from the analysis? people want to consume some things that are not mere leisure and hence require production. so they will produce. there is a disutility to labouring, so at the margin they will forego producing some additional stuff (making more money) in order to enjoy some leisure
This reply is going to be in stages. Each stage will have a number in front of it.
1. Let's begin with an extreme example so that things will be clear.
Imagine a bizzaro world where everytime someone took a day off from work, he lost a million dollars. Is it obvious that people are willing to lose a million dollars for one day off? Does it follow from the action axiom that this is the case? I don't think so.
And if we still have any doubts, just up the ante to a billion or a zillion until it becomes obvious that people will not value a day off in exchange for losing all their wealth and being imprisoned forever in a torture chamber. I think we can agree that such is the reality here on planet Earth.
2. Ok then. Now it's just a question of price. If it does not follow from the action axiom that people will lose their all in order to have a day off, it also cannot possibly follow that they are willing to lose a single penny of their previous earnings to enjoy a day off.
3. Your post is talking about not making more money. I've been talking until now about losing previous wealth.
But once we have established that it cannot be proven from the axioms that people are willing to lose previous earnings in order to enjoy idleness, how can it follow that they are willing to forgo profits in order to enjoy idleness.
4. And don't tell me that people work to get things, and how can they enjoy things if they are working 24/7? Firstly, how does it follow from the action axiom that people work for things that they cannot enjoy chained to their workplace? That is a mere empirical observation. Second, just because people work to be able to afford things that releive pain and give pleasurable sensations, it does not follow that they will work just to able to be idle later. That is an empirical observation.
Sorry Dave, I'm puzzled about what this disagreement stems from... perhaps its the ceteris parabis analysis....
1)ok,
2)no.it follows that people are willing to lose that definite something that they are willing to lose, which to them represents the spread between the marignal utility of labouring for some benefits (this has disutility of labour factored in) they are considering doing marginally less of in favour of reaping a gain from the leisure they can get a marginal increase of for so doing
It seems you have set up a strawman whereby disutility of labour implies that you will pay any price, however large up and over infinity, only so that you can just stop working and start getting in some leisure. That has not been asserted.......so it does not require a disproof on your part.
3).so you are making it impossible to do ceteris parabis analysis........
4). don't tell me people work even though they do not get benefits from working. yes, i agree it is an empirical observation that it is a contingent possibility for people to not labour, and therefore to gain a spread between the disutility of labouring for a return smaller than the marginal utility of simply ceasing to labour. it is apriori true that the tradeoff would be a formal possibility even if humans contingently were not able to express it, by some really bizarro world.
Thanks for this topic, Grayson. It's been stuck in my mind today, and I was able to reach an epiphany because of it.
I have been lazy with respect to getting a job recently. This, combined with the notion of demonstrated preference would mean that I prefer not working to working. I know that I should be working though. So why aren't I? It's because the disutility of labor I would experience would be greater than the satisfaction I would experience. (the removal of some uneasiness) Now if I move out of the house and stop living by the consumption of my parent's capital (they are very gracious) I will soon come to a point where I must labor to meet some "necessities" like food and rent. I will be pressured to get a job, as there is no capital to consume, and I'll start being useful again.
So today I decided to move out, and it's happening.
Thanks, Grayson! Thanks, praxeology!
P.S. I just realized that this demonstrates the effect of employment insurance wrt subsidizing idleization of labor.
>>Rothbard, in MES, goes on to write, "It is not deducible from human action because its contrary is conceivable, although not generally existing.
There could be a world in which play is productive, 'new socialist man' loves to work he thinks its fun. he would feel bad if left off to do 'leisure'. only his productive play, is not labour, its is not a means to an end and only a means to an end (this is a narrow definition of labour which necessitates disutility of labour) but and end in itself, which just happens to also be a means to further ends. perhaps it can be decomposed into elements? perhaps not. The 'leisure' that such a weird person would shy away from would in fact be an absence of his play, it would be a non-pleasurable timeout, but whereas 'labour' in our world is at least productive, this persons disutility of 'leisure' is not even that. such a person would surely never engage in 'unproductive leisure', and would also never engage in 'productive work, indirectly striving at his ends' (because he simply finds great intrinsic pleasure in the act of production, remember we chose that for his psycohlogy); he would only 'play-and-produce, directly attaining his ends and getting spill over positive effects into the future'
the thymology/contingency is about the psychology of whether some productive task (it would serve further ends) is decomposable into purely forward looking activity as one part and present satiation another part. Another way of saying this is that some productive tasks only bear fruit in the future, whilst others provide benefits presently throughout the act of producing future goods.
Of course we could adopt a wider definition of labour, as simply that human action which is productive, regardless of whatever else could be said about it(i.e. does it give present benefits?), if we do as such, disutility of labour would indeed by contingent and empirical question. You can argue from some of what Mises wrote to such a position. But so too I think you can argue the other way.
in this way, i see both sides of the argument; taking the apriori categorical road seems to me to be a greater tool for clarity, and also has the benefit of jibing with my personal notion of labour (i.e. i dont associate the term to the wider notion for whatever reason of my psychology and cultural upbringing)
Ya know, I think you got me. I stand corrected.
However, I still have an arrow or two in the quiver.
Let's take an example from geometry. Geometry can tell us that IF something is a triangle, it has such and such properties. But the axioms of geometry cannot tell us that the walls of the pyramids are triangles. One would need to go out and inspect them to find that out.
Similarly, the other axioms of set theory tell us that IF something is a set, it has such and such properties. But an addtional axiom is needed to assert the existence of a set.
OK then.
The action axiom asserts that IF people experience "discomfort", then [under certain conditions] they will do something about it, in fact will pay a price to get rid of that discomfort. But it cannot prove that any particular thing is a discomfort. And it is certainly cannot prove that "lack of idleness" is a discomfort.
Lilburne: Both Mises and Rothbard consider the disutility of labor to not be a category of action, but rather to be what Rothbard calls "a subsidiary assumption, based on empirical observation of actual human behavior." Rothbard, in MES, goes on to write, "It is not deducible from human action because its contrary is conceivable, although not generally existing." But I think the disutility of labor is just as necessary an implication of human action as time preference is. With regard to time preference, as Mises and Rothbard argue, there must be a disutility in waiting for consumption, or else man would forever go on producing, and never consume. But that wouldn't make any sense, because production is for the sake of consumption. Now take labor. Labor is the expenditure of human energy for the sake of production. Similarly, there must be disutility of labor, or else man would forever go on expending his energy in production, and would never expend energy upon consumption (partaking in leisure or in the enjoyment of any other consumers' good). But, in this case too, that wouldn't make sense, because production is for the sake of consumption.
I think you're absolutely right, and the connection is this:
Labour and leisure are both alternative uses of our own physical bodies. However, leisure is always consumption, while labour is always a factor of production, or roundabout consumption. So the disutility is a disutility of waiting, just as in production in general.
Further thoughts on the concept 'disutility of labor.'
If we conceive of something called the 'disutility of labor,' this implies that there is also something called the 'utility of labor.'
The 'utility' of labor seems obviously to be that it is a means to the individual's end.
The opposite of this, the 'disutility of labor,' would seem to indicate that labor is a non-means towards the individual's end. On the face of it at least, it doesn't make sense to conceive that an individual chooses a 'non-means' toward his end.
I don't think we can say (as an example) that labor undertaken for the sake of leisure (or any other end) has, for this reason, 'disutility.' Rather, we would simply conceive in this case that the utility of labor is that it produces leisure (or some other end).
The disutility of labor seems to have some other meaning.
The notion that comes to mind and which seems to be meant by this term is that labor has 'disutility' because the individual is forced by the nature of things to resort to labor to attain his ends, when he would rather not have to.
Here, the plain meaning is not that an actor is forced absolutely to resort to labor (he could instead resort to coercion, intimidation, deceit, persuasion, etc.), but that as a practical matter, by the nature of life and society, he is often forced to resort to labor. At the same time, if he could achieve his end by some other means more agreeable to him, he would choose these means instead.
But now we have put forth a general definition that applies not only to the means labor, but to other means as well. For example, a person is often forced by the nature of things to attend a social event he would rather not attend (not forced to absolutely, but as a practical matter). If he could attain the same end without having to attend the social event he would. Thus, we would have to conceive of something called the 'disutility of social events.'
If we continue on like this, it will eventually become apparent that for every means posited, we can say of that means, that if the actor knew of a more agreeable means, he would choose it.
But now we can see the formal and tautological nature of the praxeological reasoning Mises was involved in.
*******
Another way to see this issue. Here is an important quote from Mises:
"There is no action in which the praxeological categories do not appear fully and perfectly. There is no mode of action thinkable in which means and ends or costs and proceeds cannot be clearly distinguished and precisely separated."
If we accept Mises's conception, and we argue that the disutility of labor is a category of action, then we must hold that the disutility of labor is present in each and every action.
If we hold that every action entails labor, and a disutility of such labor, then we have changed the plain meaning of the term labor, which generally refers to a certain kind of action, and generally does not refer to actions such as thinking, talking, viewing, relaxing, etc...
If the term labor is interpreted as denoting something this general---if it refers to something disagreeable in each and every action---it seems to mean something like "dissatisfaction." But in keeping with traditional usage, the term 'labor' would seem to be more suited to denote a specific concrete example of action, while the term 'dissatisfaction' would seem to be more suited to denote a general phenomenon present in each and every action.
As Mises writes, "Praxeology is not concerned with the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and its categorial structure." (HA, 3rd rev. p.47)
Labor, as a specific means, can thus be viewed as a specific content of action. Disutility, can be viewed as dissatisfaction, which is a categorial component of each and every action.
At least this is how I might approach the problem as consistent with the Misesian conception of praxeology.
"Hulsmann points out that an actor must always value his end higher than he values the means to achieve that end." I haven't read where Hulsmann argues this, but I believe Hulsmann is one of the most perceptive among current Austrian theorists.
A Theory of Interest by Joug Guido Hulsmann.
I don't know what you're talking about with the rest of that post. Higher means higher on one's (ordinal) value scale, i.e. nearer the top. This is not a controversial use of the word, as far as I know. Nothing to do with relations in space, merely rankings in mind.
Trulib:
I read part of the article, and he clarifies use of the term. Here it is:
"Human choice by its very nature involves preference for the things that the acting person does—more precisely, it involves preference for certain things over other things that the person also could have done, but did not do because of the very choice he made. We express the same fact in different words when we say that the things he does have a higher value for him than the things he does not do." p.88
My criticism wouldn't apply to this.
But it would apply to your use of the term "top."
It is the same principle as was discussed in this thread with I.Ryan:
http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/15904.aspx
The notion that someone had a value that was "on top" and another value that was "beneath" it.
In Hulsmann's article, if we wanted to press the point, we could try to press it w/r/t his repeated use of the notion of "value spread," and ask in what sense the two values are "spread apart."?
Probably best discussed in another thread.
http://www.libertarianmonarchy.com/
The Disutility of Labour
Mises in Human Action: “The disutility of labor is not of a categorial and aprioristic character. We can without contradiction think of a world in which labor does not cause uneasiness, and we can depict the state of affairs prevailing in such a world. But the real world is conditioned by the disutility of labor. Only theorems based on the assumption that labor is a source of uneasiness are applicable for the comprehension of what is going on in this world. Experience teaches that there is disutility of labor. But it does not teach it directly. There is no phenomenon that introduces itself as disutility of labor. There are only data of experience which are interpreted, on the ground of aprioristic knowledge, to mean that men consider leisure—i.e., the absence of labor—other things being equal, as a more desirable condition than the expenditure of labor. We see that men renounce advantages which they could get by working more—that is, that they are ready to make sacrifices for the attainment of leisure. We infer from this fact that leisure is valued as a good and that labor is regarded as a burden. But for previous praxeological insight, we would never be in a position to reach this conclusion.”(p.65)
Rothbard in Man, Economy and State: “It is a subsidiary assumption, based on empirical observation of actual human behavior. It is not deducible from human action because its contrary is conceivable, although not generally existing.”(p.43)
Both Mises and Rothbard are clearly mistaken in this case. The disutility of labour can be proven aprioristically and can be deduced from praxeology. It is not a “subsidiary assumption” because of some physiological aversion towards labour.
Traditionally, leisure is considered a good while labour is considered a burden. This statement is misleading. Correctly defined, leisure is your body. You own your own body. It is your private property. You will use your private property, your body, in any such way that maximizes utility. Leisure is constantly consumed, often in different ways. Labour, on the other hand, is just the giving away of leisure. Labour is when your privately owned body is temporarily exchanged, commonly, for a salary.
Basically, it can be deduced through praxeology that humans never want to give up private property (unless they have so much that marginal utility has gone negative). Humans act to remove uneasiness and the more property you own, presumably, the less constraints on physical reality there will be which better allows you to maximize utility. Put simply, most people want as much private property as possible. Giving up private property brings disutility just like receiving private property brings utility.
When humans engage in labour they are making an exchange. The individual is giving up his privately owned body(leisure) for a salary. The leisure brings utility but it is valued less than the salary so the exchange takes place. By engaging in labour you must do what your employer wants you to do instead of what you want to do. Considering that your action will maximize utility doing anything else will lower utility, hence disutility.
In a normal transaction where someone purchases a good with money it always(except when marginal utility has gone negative because too much money is owned) brings disutility to give up the money. The transaction only occurs because something of higher value is exchanged in return.
Only in the case where you have too much of a certain unit of private property will you choose to give it up without anything in return. For example, if you eat too many hamburgers you eventually get sick and choose to throw the rest out or if you have too much clothing in your dresser it could be an inconvenience so you throw out clothing.
This can also occur with labour. A popular expression goes “I’m bored, I have too much time on my hands”. Although, time is constant, it is impossible to have “too much time”. The clock does not tick any slower just because you’re bored. The problem is not too much time, rather, it is too much leisure. Boredom comes from having so much excess leisure that marginal utility reaches negative territory. It is perfectly feasible that someone who is stuck at home with nothing to do would accept a job even if there was no compensation. However, this is rare and it would likely take a while before this was the case because leisure can be consumed in many different ways.
A good such as wood can be burned to make a fire or used to build a house. The same good can be used as a means to attain different ends. Similarly, leisure can be consumed through many different activities which is why it is rare to have too much of this good.
An easy way to illustrate the main concept of this article is through the example of apple-picking. Apple-picking is sometimes associated with leisure. People pick apples as an activity because it brings utility. However, apple-picking from a different perspective can be taken as employment and therefore brings disutility. How can the same activity be considered leisure and labour? The answer is clear. It is considered leisure when the individual owns their own body and is choosing to maximize utility through such means. It is considered labour when the individual has exchanged his body for a salary. The individual’s employer can now tell the individual what he must do. Human action is the link between the mind and reality(private property). If you have temporarily exchanged your body for a salary then you do not own it. Your mind cannot link with your body(private property) and so human action does not occur, which means you cannot act to maximize utility.
My explanation of how labour is giving up your body may sound like slavery. However, it is not. It is merely a voluntary exchange. What differentiates it from slavery is that there is no coercion involved. The loss of one’s body(leisure) is contingent on the salary received.
Lawrence,
I think you may be focused on wage labor to the exclusion of all other forms. In the apple picking example, if one does not enjoy being outside, up a ladder, avoiding bees, on a hot afternoon, but does want an apple pie later in the evening, apple picking is labor, despite the fact that there is no salary, and in fact, no other person involved at all. Labor is simply means to an end, means that would not otherwise be employed if the laborer did no have that end or could conceive of a more tolerable means to the same end.
faber est suae quisque fortunae
I do not understand this point:
Labor: A value neutral, voluntary transaction where an individual subjectively values a transfer of owned energy equal to that which is received.
Production: The process of transferring energy from labor to goods.
Consumption: The process of transferring energy from goods to individuals. (For instance, TV components deteriorate from use. When an individual uses a TV, energy is trasnferred from the lifespan of the TV via human senses to knowledge)
The only part of the above defintions that can not be accurately or reliably measured is "energy".