This thread is for Neoclassical and myself to debate the soundness of methodological dualism. As with my debate with Rettoper, only the two debaters can post in here. Other members are welcome to post a sidelines thread. But Neoclassical and I are not to engage in debate over this topic outside this thread until this debate is over. I would note that I recognize that my opponent seems much more well-read in epistemology than I am. Nonetheless, his position seems to me to be untenable, so I would like to grapple with it.
So, Neoclassical, how about simply this?: "Methodological dualism is the only sound approach to the pursuit of knowledge."
Me in the affirmative, you in the negative.
Hello, Grayson! Thanks for the challenge! I hope both of us learn from each other.
Your first declaration is that "methodological dualism is the only sound approach to the pursuit of knowledge."
My first objection is that "methodological dualism" presupposes substance dualism, an archaic leftover from Descartes. I contend that the human mind is a material process, wholly explicable in physical terms. Furthermore, genuine knowledge cannot be generated by viewing the human mind as Mises did: an undetermined thing with radically different properties than the rest of the universe.
Due to rapid progress in neuroscience in the last decades, I believe a correction must be made to an epistemic worry Mises had. He stated that "all that we can infer from it is that science-at least for the time being-must adopt a dualistic approach, less as a philosophical explanation than as a methodological device." For the time being, Mises may have been right (although I would even dispute that). However, currently, neuroscience has advanced far enough to explain many features of the "mental" process, debunking many long-held fictions, such as free will. As Mises stated, "We may or may not believe that the natural sciences will succeed one day in explaining the production of definite ideas, judgments of value, and actions in the same way in which they explain the production of a chemical compound as the necessary and unavoidable outcome of a certain combination of elements. In the meantime we are bound to acquiesce in a methodological dualism." We no longer need to acquiesce to methodological dualism.
Mises actually relied upon an unquestioned empirical theory. Folk psychology is an empirical theory about human behavior, embracing concepts such as "belief" and "desire." Mises used such terms to explain and predict behavior (at least within economic situations). But I contend that as science advances, such concepts (e.g., "hope") will be reduced to purely physical terms (explained within neurobiological or computational terms, probably both). Thus, folk psychology will more and more be recognized like the concept of "center of gravity"--a useful fiction for everyday discourse, but not illuminating for genuine knowledge. That is, human behavior can and will be more fully be explicated in physical terms.
As Francis Crick, the Nobel prize-winning scientist, said in 1994, "You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules." As science advances, more and more of human behavior can be explained as such, within the "panphysicalism" that Mises conceived as inapplicable to our species.
To reiterate, I hope to emphasize two points in my rebuttal:
"I'm not a fan of Murray Rothbard." -- David D. Friedman
Likewise.
This post will address the content of your post concerning neuroscience.
My first objection is that "methodological dualism" presupposes substance dualism, an archaic leftover from Descartes.
That is incorrect. Yet, it is a common misconception, which has befallen even Austrians here.
From the section of Human Action you quote (emphasis added): "We may fairly assume or believe that they are absolutely dependent upon and conditioned by their causes. But as long as we do not know how external facts--physical and physiological--produce in a human mind definite thoughts and volitions resulting in concrete acts, we have to face an insurmountable methodological dualism."
"For the time being, Mises may have been right (although I would even dispute that). However, currently, neuroscience has advanced far enough to explain many features of the "mental" process, debunking many long-held fictions, such as free will. (...) We no longer need to acquiesce to methodological dualism."
As I've written in another post:
"Methodological dualism isn't resorted to because we don't know WHETHER actions are determined. Even if it were proven that actions are indeed determined, so long as we do not know WHICH actions will be caused by WHICH factors, we still must resort to methodological dualism. It is not enough to know THAT firing neurons lead to choices. For a scientist studying human behavior to practice methodological monism, he would need to know WHICH circumstances regarding the firing of neurons would lead to deciding to compose a symphony, and WHICH circumstances regarding the firing of neurons would instead lead to deciding to read a book. So long as we can't accomplish such a mind-boggling feat as that, the only way of studying human behavior that makes sense is by considering humans as acting beings with minds, wills, and intentions."
Also, here's something I wrote that's been sitting in my Google Docs to maybe someday include in a primer to Austrian social science:
"Mises actually relied upon an unquestioned empirical theory. Folk psychology ..."
Praxeology is distinct from every kind of psychology. Praxeology spells out the logical implications of end-seeking behavior. It says nothing about whatever phenomena may lie behind those ends.
But praxeology is empirical in a sense, because it does rely on experience. But it relies on the experience of reflection, not the experience of the senses.
For all I know, you may be a fiction in a fevered dream, or a freak coalescence of particles in an infinite universe that made my macbook manifest seeming evidence of a fellow purposive being. But if I know anything, I know what action is. With every sentence I write in order to challenge your contentions, I live it. I know intentionality, ends and means. Should I try to deny intentionality, means and ends, I find myself caught in the manifest absurdity of trying to deny the reality of trying.
Furthermore, as a neoclassical, I presume you accept the law of diminishing marginal utility. When I reason carefully about the evident notions of action, means, and ends, I can derive that law in my mind. If panphysicalism is as ready from prime-time as you say it is, shouldn't you at least be able to discover such a basic element of neoclassical economics using neurobiology? Has anybody ever done so?
Grayson Lilburne:For all I know, you may be a fiction in a fevered dream, or a freak coalescence of particles in an infinite universe that made my macbook manifest seeming evidence of a fellow purposive being. But if I know anything, I know what action is. With every sentence I write in order to challenge your contentions, I live it. I know intentionality, ends and means. Should I try to deny intentionality, means and ends, I find myself caught in the manifest absurdity of trying to deny the reality of trying.
Many people have seen flying witches, but I discount their claims. Likewise, I am not sure what "trying" is in a non-physical sense. Could you satisfactorily explain "trying" without appealing to natural science?
Grayson Lilburne:Furthermore, as a neoclassical, I presume you accept the law of diminishing marginal utility. When I reason carefully about the evident notions of action, means, and ends, I can derive that law in my mind. If panphysicalism is as ready from prime-time as you say it is, shouldn't you at least be able to discover such a basic element of neoclassical economics using neurobiology? Has anybody ever done so?
My point is a little more simple: neoclassical economics, its whole mentalistic baggage, can be reduced to more physicalistic terms, if one wanted to do so. Austrian economics forbids this according to methodological dualism, which asserts an unbridgeable gap between natural science and the human mind.
To address your "law of diminishing marginal utility," I consider it an empirical theory that can be disproven by counterevidence, such as by a real instantiation of Nozick's utility monster. As Rothbard stated of the "disutility of labor," It is not deducible from human action because its contrary is conceivable, although not generally existing.
Grayson Lilburne:Praxeology is distinct from every kind of psychology. Praxeology spells out the logical implications of end-seeking behavior. It says nothing about whatever phenomena may lie behind those ends.
I consider this untrue. Methodological dualism, by its very nature, claims to have access to the human mind in a psychological sense--otherwise it would just be natural science, right?
In my ideal study of behavior, I would observe the input and the output of a human subject, attempting to understand the entire process intelligibly (from sensory stimuli to the sound waves emitted from the subject's mouth). This is a Quinean behaviorism, a methodology at odds with dualism. So, clearly, Mises added something more.
To understand this more sharply, you will agree that Mises used the term "satisfaction." By that term, what did he mean?
Grayson Lilburne:[T]he only way of studying human behavior that makes sense is by considering humans as acting beings with minds, wills, and intentions.
Do you believe these are pragmatic fictions?
If we enlarged a human brain, Grayson, and took a tour within it: we would find the electrochemical mechanics of neurons, synapses, and so on. If we enlarged it even more, we would find the movement of molecules.
I contend that we would only see mechanistic, determined movements. There would be no break in causality. One movement triggered the next.
Now, what do you make of free will? Does it exist or not? If so or if not, what consequences are present for the Misesian notion of "choice"?
Grayson Lilburne:For example, imagine on a windy day, you see a rock roll down a hill into a creek. You might think that happened because the rock was knocked loose by the wind and that gravity pulled it down into the creek. You probably would not think it happened because the rock felt dry and purposefully rolled into the creek. But imagine you see a man covered in dirt calmly walk down that same hill, and into the creek. You probably would think that happened because the man wanted to wash the dirt off of himself and so he purposefully walked into the creek.
Likewise, I could claim that souls are what animates living creatures. This can be explanatory: it can differentiate such beings from inanimate ones, like rocks. However, the problem is that it can blind us to still greater possibilities, like the truths of biology.
Methodological dualism can lead to accurate predictions; I don't doubt it. I, however, find it to be a bit too constricting. To be clear, I consider your defense of methodological dualism (Austrian economics) to be a rejection of empiricism.
I also want to compare methodological dualism to an empirico-mathematical methodology by contrasting what fruits have grown from each.
To quote Caplan, Here are a few of the best new ideas to come out of academic economics since 1949:
Are you able to comprise a similar top-10 list for Austrian discoveries since 1949?
Many people have seen flying witches, but I discount their claims.
What does that have to do with what we're talking about?
Likewise, I am not sure what "trying" is in a non-physical sense. Could you satisfactorily explain "trying" without appealing to natural science?
Are you not trying to show that I'm wrong? Do you not have intentions in typing these words? If you recognize that you are and that you do, then you know what trying is in a non-physical sense.
Grayson Lilburne:What does that have to do with what we're talking about?
Just because you are reporting to me an experience of "trying" no more proves its truth than testimony about witches.
Grayson Lilburne:Are you not trying to show that I'm wrong? Do you not have intentions in typing these words? If you recognize that you are and that you do, then you know what trying is in a non-physical sense.
What I am suggesting, and what I think most have missed, is that what you consider "self-evident" is actually theory-laden; what we introspect is largely determined by our folk psychological framework, which must be considered an empirical theory, as revisable as any other. I contend that folk psychology is irredeemably flawed and will be lost in scientific discourse, much like phlogiston, the luminiferous aether, or élan vital.
That is, praxeology conceives of the human mind in a scientifically backwards way, and it does so proudly, championing an approach that disregards a naturalistic understanding.
If you attempt to define "trying" or "choice" as I asked, you might start grappling with the problem I am addressing. Your plea that "but you must know what I mean!" doesn't work.
My point is a little more simple: neoclassical economics, its whole mentalistic baggage, can be reduced to more physicalistic terms, if one wanted to do so.
It seems that's more of a hopeful assertion, than a point.
The law of diminishing utility and the disutility of labor are two different notions. The latter, according to Mises and Rothbard, while generally observed, is not a necessary logical implication of action, and therefore, according to that conception, is not an economic law. The opposite is true of the former.
Nozick's utility monster, conceived in a way so as to disprove the law of diminishing marginal utility, can no more be instantiated than can a square circle. To disprove the law, the monster would need to allocate an additional quantity of a homogenous good to serve an end (end D) more important than what he would have allocated it to (end C) had he not had the additional quantity. But that would be a contradiction of terms, because if end D were more important than end C, than it would, by definition, had allocative priority even without the additional quantity.
Methodological dualism, by its very nature, claims to have access to the human mind in a psychological sense--otherwise it would just be natural science, right?
Mises, Human Action:
"The field of our science is human action, not the psychological events which result in an action. It is precisely this which distinguishes the general theory of human action, praxeology, from psychology. The theme of psychology is the internal events that result or can result in a definite action. The theme of praxeology is action as such."
In my ideal study of behavior, I would observe the input and the output of a human subject, attempting to understand the entire process intelligibly (from sensory stimuli to the sound waves emitted from the subject's mouth).
Good luck with that.
Nothing with regard to emotional states or endorphin levels...
Mises, HA: "
We call contentment or satisfaction that state of a human being which does not and cannot result in any action."
True, but what about your own experience of trying?
Grayson Lilburne:It seems that's more of a hopeful assertion, than a point.
Fair criticism. I ultimately mean that nothing prohibits the methodology of neoclassical economics from using a non-mentalese language (e.g., physics), whereas Austrian economics can't step outside of those bounds, since it defines itself by dualism.
Grayson Lilburne:Nozick's utility monster, conceived in a way so as to disprove the law of diminishing marginal utility, can no more be instantiated than can a square circle. To disprove the law, the monster would need to allocate an additional quantity of a homogenous good to serve an end (end D) more important than what he would have allocated it to (end C) had he not had the additional quantity. But that would be a contradiction of terms, because if end D were more important than end C, than it would, by definition, had allocative priority even without the additional quantity.
Suppose you had the choice of receiving a free $10 Amazon gift certificate or the opportunity to pay seven dollars for a $20 Amazon gift certificate.
Most people instinctively chose the free $10 Amazon gift certificate, even though purchasing the $20 gift certificate brings you more profit – $10 vs $13 ($20-$7) – and thus is the better choice.
Could Austrian economists have made this prediction?
Grayson Lilburne:True, but what about your own experience of trying?
Does the sun rise and set? It sure looks that way. In fact, the geocentric theory confirmed it, adding to an observer's sense of certainty.
I disbelieve in folk psychology, which adds mentalese fictions like "trying" or "desire."
Grayson Lilburne:Mises, Human Action: "The field of our science is human action, not the psychological events which result in an action. It is precisely this which distinguishes the general theory of human action, praxeology, from psychology. The theme of psychology is the internal events that result or can result in a definite action. The theme of praxeology is action as such."
Once again, this is fundamentally untrue.
To see why, explain what praxeology demands of a human's mental content (e.g., satisfaction, desire, etc.). I contend that praxeology is a stripped-down version of psychology, including only what seems necessary for purposeful behavior, but even that only makes sense within the context of a larger conception of the psyche.
I want to add that it's not that I am simply confused by what you mean by "trying." I get it. I really do.
I simply don't conceive of "trying" the same way you do: as a motivational umph possessed by a self-determining being that acts apart from the causal world.
Once again, what appears "self-evident" to the Austrian epistemology is not: the ideas are theory-laden, which colors your observations, much like the geocentric theory helped color our view of the sun.
What I am suggesting, and what I think most have missed, is that what you consider "self-evident" is actually theory-laden
What theory do you suppose lies behind the notion of trying?
If a certain approach is not useful for explaining something one wants to understand (like why interest rates rise and fall), then it is that approach that is backward, and that should be disregarded. To do otherwise is to make the given approach itself a fetish.
Trying is behavior with an objective. Are you or are you not trying to show me that I'm wrong?
I also want to compare methodological dualism to an empirico-mathematical methodology by contrasting what fruits have grown from each. To quote Caplan, Here are a few of the best new ideas to come out of academic economics since 1949: Human capital theory Rational expectations macroeconomics The random walk view of financial markets Signaling models Public choice theory Natural rate models of unemployment Time consistency The Prisoners' Dilemma, coordination games, and hawk-dove games The Ricardian equivalence argument for debt-neutrality Contestable markets
That list is meaningless, unless you show me (a) how each of these items are demonstrated by an empirico-mathematical approach and (b) how each of these items is useful in understanding the economy.
Grayson Lilburne:What theory do you suppose lies behind the notion of trying?
There isn't a satisfactory one. I am an eliminative materialist about propositional attitudes.
Grayson Lilburne:If a certain approach is not useful for explaining something one wants to understand (like why interest rates rise and fall), then it is that approach that is backward, and that should be disregarded. To do otherwise is to make the given approach itself a fetish.
I totally agree. The academic stagnation of Austrian economics attests to its epistemological fetish.
Grayson Lilburne:Trying is behavior with an objective. Are you or are you not trying to show me that I'm wrong?
In what sense does a "choice" control a human's behavior? Do you believe that the world surrounding a particular human fully conforms to causality?
Fair criticism. I ultimately mean that nothing prohibits the methodology of neoclassical economics from using a non-mentalese language (e.g., physics)
[EDIT: Replaced old response with the following new one, since I originally misunderstood you] Well, there's the fact that the very notions of "goods", "money", "profit", "loss", "income", etc. are meaningless outside of a means-ends framework. That seems pretty prohibitive to me.
Suppose you had the choice of receiving a free $10 Amazon gift certificate or the opportunity to pay seven dollars for a $20 Amazon gift certificate. Most people instinctively chose the free $10 Amazon gift certificate, even though purchasing the $20 gift certificate brings you more profit – $10 vs $13 ($20-$7) – and thus is the better choice.
That conflates gift certificate credit and cash as identical goods. They are not. Choosing the free $10 gift certificate simply means keeping the $7 in cash to spend on whatsoever the person pleases (in addition to the $10 certificate) is preferred over having the extra $3 which can only be spent on Amazon.
Given the above, the more appropriate question would be, "would Austrian economists have committed this error in reasoning?" Likely not.
[EDIT: With that, I've gotta run some errands. I'll respond to your other posts when I get back.]
Once again, this is fundamentally untrue. To see why, explain what praxeology demands of a human's mental content (e.g., satisfaction, desire, etc.).
To see why, explain what praxeology demands of a human's mental content (e.g., satisfaction, desire, etc.).
Reference to mind makes something what David Hume called a "moral science", and what German scholars refer to as Geisteswissenschaft, and what now in America is called part of the "humanities" or "social sciences". It does not make it psychology. Again psychology refers to, 'the internal events that result or can result in a definite action", not action as such.
I do not conceive of trying as a motivational umph. That would describe feelings that may impel a person to try, not the trying itself.
Grayson Lilburne:What theory do you suppose lies behind the notion of trying? There isn't a satisfactory one.
There isn't a satisfactory one.
Then what unsatisfactory theory do you suppose lies behind the notion of trying?
In what sense does a "choice" control a human's behavior?
Choice does not control a human's behavior. It is an aspect of human behavior. It is what qualifies any change in the world as human.
Do you believe that the world surrounding a particular human fully conforms to causality?
Yes. But, again, so long as I don't know how specific external facts produce in a human mind definite thoughts and volitions resulting in specific, concrete acts, the mechanistic approach to studying human society doesn't do me any good.
Neoclassical: Grayson Lilburne:[T]he only way of studying human behavior that makes sense is by considering humans as acting beings with minds, wills, and intentions. Do you believe these are pragmatic fictions?
No more than are causation and ampliative induction.
I suspect that I have strayed too far into favored philosophies, rather than focusing on the argument itself.
You claim that "methodological dualism" is an approach for "genuine knowledge."
You, rightfully, clarified that such an approach isn't substance dualism; I used hyperbole. My fundamental point is that, epistemologically, Mises theorizes as if substance dualism is true, separating human minds and ascribing them properties contradictory to the rest of the universe.
You, likewise, seem to agree that humans are determined beings, inseparable from the mechanistic nature of the universe. However, you assert, to properly explain and predict economic phenomena, it is wiser to assume methodological dualism.
I then present several questions:
I hope you can answer each of those issues. And, for the debate so far, I say thank you! I believe that, unlike some sideline viewers, you actually understand my arguments and are treating them sensibly, and I've valued your responses.
Neoclassical,
Thank you for your kind words. I appreciate your manifest sincerity in endeavoring to understand what I am saying too.
If we are assuming "methodological dualism," despite what we know to be true, then isn't Mises simply subscribing to Friedman's methodology for positive economics? That is, Mises is erecting an unreal foundation for the sake of pursuing knowledge that clarifies and predicts observations.
The two things are fundamentally different. While our purposiveness does have mechanistic causes, it is as real for me and for any other being like me (in that they experience purposive life) as anything is, because to explore any other real thing is itself intentional behavior. Economics itself is something that we intentionally pursue. Furthermore, the very primary impetus for pursuing it has been to know how the workings of society can best serve our own wants. Economics with no regard to intentionality is an empty notion.
Mises, HA:
"If we had not in our mind the schemes provided by praxeological reasoning, we should never be in a position to discern and to grasp any action. We would perceive motions, but neither buying nor selling, nor prices, wage rates, interest rates, and so on. It is only through the utilization of the praxeological scheme that we become able to have an experience concerning an act of buying and selling, but then independently of the fact of whether or not our senses concomitantly perceive any motions of men and of nonhuman elements of the external world. Unaided by praxeological knowledge we would never learn anything about media of exchange. If we approach coins without such preexisting knowledge, we would see in them only round plates of metal, nothing more. Experience concerning money requires familiarity with the praxeological category medium of exchange."
The use of economic models in neoclassical economics is on an entirely different footing from that.
How do you explain the research findings of neoclassical economics?
Insofar as they are alleged to have been derived from observations, they are untenably supported. Insofar as they are derived, free of fallacy, from the categories of choice and intentionality, then they are sound, whether they call the reasoning "Austrian", "praxeological", or not. Insofar as they are not economics proper, but instead, economic history, then they must be judged by the soundness of the economic theory they use and by how well they handled the relevant data.
Do you agree with Rothbard that even the first axioms of Austrian economics are empiric in nature?
Only in the limited sense I explained earlier (with regard to the experience of reflection, and not of the sense organs).
(A) the logical positivists believed that analyticity was tautology (e.g., "Bachelors are unmarried")
Analytic judgments are not tautologies (in the sense of "Bachelors are unmarried"). In an analytic judgment, the conclusion is contained in the premise. In a tautology (in the sense of "Bachelors are unmarried"), the conclusion is the premise. For the person who is unaware of everything that is packed into a premise, an analytic judgment does give that person knowledge that is new to him.
(B) Quine believed that a priori thinking was an unjustified category and our entire web of belief was linked to observations--that is, empirical sources.
Any kind of inference from observation itself must be based on the a priori categories of causation and ampliative induction.
Hey, I'm curious, was that gift card thing from a neoclassical textbook?
Grayson Lilburne:Analytic judgments are not tautologies (in the sense of "Bachelors are unmarried"). In an analytic judgment, the conclusion is contained in the premise. In a tautology (in the sense of "Bachelors are unmarried"), the conclusion is the premise. For the person who is unaware of everything that is packed into a premise, an analytic judgment does give that person knowledge that is new to him.
From a Wikipedia article, According to the analytic explanation of the a priori, all a priori knowledge is analytic; so a priori knowledge need not require a special faculty of pure intuition, since it can be accounted for simply by one's ability to understand the meaning of the proposition in question. In short, proponents of this explanation claimed to have reduced a dubious metaphysical faculty of pure reason to a legitimate linguistic notion of analyticity.
Grayson Lilburne:Hey, I'm curious, was that gift card thing from a neoclassical textbook?
I found it on a blog, actually. I was searching from an example I read in one of Bernanke's textbook, though! The example I had wanted to use actually maintains a homogenous good being saved, so let me explain it.
Would you travel downtown to purchase a video game if the price is $10 less than the $25 copy you can purchase nearby? Most people surveyed said yes. Would you travel down to purchase a computer if the price is $10 less than the $2,250 copy you can purchase nearby? Most people surveyed said no.
Here's that passage in more context:
"One theory, popular among the logical positivists of the early twentieth century, is what Boghossian calls the "analytic explanation of the a priori."[3] The distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions was first introduced by Kant. While Kant's original distinction was primarily drawn in terms of conceptual containment, the contemporary version of the distinction primarily involves, as Quine put it, the notions of "true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact."[4] Analytic propositions are thought to be true in virtue of their meaning alone, while a priori synthetic propositions are thought to be true in virtue of their meaning and certain facts about the world. According to the analytic explanation of the a priori, all a priori knowledge is analytic; so a priori knowledge need not require a special faculty of pure intuition, since it can be accounted for simply by one's ability to understand the meaning of the proposition in question."
By "special faculty of pure intuition", I assume this passage basically means the logical structure of the human mind.
How is the a priori category of causality analytic? If we know causality due to an analytic judgment, then what premise is the category of causality contained in?
Once again, I deny any a priori knowledge whatsoever. For instance, I would claim that causality is part of our theory of the world, but revisable.
I found it on a blog, actually. I was searching from an example I read in one of Bernanke's textbook, though! The example I had wanted to use actually maintains a homogenous good being saved, so let me explain it. Would you travel downtown to purchase a video game if the price is $10 less than the $25 copy you can purchase nearby? Most people surveyed said yes. Would you travel down to purchase a computer if the price is $10 less than the $2,250 copy you can purchase nearby? Most people surveyed said no.
Yes, I actually have a copy of that Bernanke textbook, which actually has the higher computer price at $2,020.
It is a simple fact that people like getting high-percentage discounts on their purchases (a rule of thumb that is lucrative over the course of many purchases), and that will be a factor in the preferences they demonstrate. Daniel Kahneman's research (which is what Bernanke draws from for his "decision pitfalls" in chapter 1) sounds interesting. But, insofar as it is like the example above, it is concerned with factors which have led to action (psychology) and actions that have taken place in the past (history), not with the logical implications of action as such. Therefore it is not economics. For economics to be a distinct discipline, it cannot be defined as "any words strung together that have to do with money"
Upon what basis do we formulate this theory? On the basis of induction with regard to the regularity of contiguity and succession? As David Hume pointed out, contiguity and succession are not enough in-and-of-themselves. From A Treatise of Human Nature:
Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? By, no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as its cause. There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention'd.
Here again I turn the object on all sides, in order to discover the nature of this necessary connexion, and find the impression, or impressions, from which its idea may be deriv'd. When I cast my eye on the known Qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not in the least on them. When I consider their relations, I can find none but those of contiguity and succession; which I have already regarded as imperfect and unsatisfactory. (...) What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together. Upon this head I repeat what I have often had occasion to observe, that as we have no idea, that is not deriv'd from an impression, we must find some impression, that gives rise to this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea. In order to this I consider, in what objects necessity is commonly suppos'd to lie; and finding that it is always ascrib'd to causes and effects, I turn my eye to two objects suppos'd to be plac'd in that relation; and examine them in all the situations, of which they are susceptible. I immediately perceive, that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we -call cause precedes the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any farther, nor is it possible for me to discover any third relation betwixt these objects. I therefore enlarge my view to comprehend several instances; where I find like objects always existing in like relations of contiguity and succession. At first sight this seems to serve but little to my purpose. The reflection on several instances only repeats the same objects; and therefore can never give rise to a new idea. But upon farther enquiry I find, that the repetition is not in every particular the same, but produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin'd by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity.(...) I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are all nearly synonymous; and therefore 'tis an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest. (...) The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression convey'd by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be deriv'd from some internal impression, or impression of reflection. (...) This therefore is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor -is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies. (...) the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other.
Here again I turn the object on all sides, in order to discover the nature of this necessary connexion, and find the impression, or impressions, from which its idea may be deriv'd. When I cast my eye on the known Qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not in the least on them. When I consider their relations, I can find none but those of contiguity and succession; which I have already regarded as imperfect and unsatisfactory. (...)
What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together. Upon this head I repeat what I have often had occasion to observe, that as we have no idea, that is not deriv'd from an impression, we must find some impression, that gives rise to this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea. In order to this I consider, in what objects necessity is commonly suppos'd to lie; and finding that it is always ascrib'd to causes and effects, I turn my eye to two objects suppos'd to be plac'd in that relation; and examine them in all the situations, of which they are susceptible. I immediately perceive, that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we -call cause precedes the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any farther, nor is it possible for me to discover any third relation betwixt these objects. I therefore enlarge my view to comprehend several instances; where I find like objects always existing in like relations of contiguity and succession. At first sight this seems to serve but little to my purpose. The reflection on several instances only repeats the same objects; and therefore can never give rise to a new idea. But upon farther enquiry I find, that the repetition is not in every particular the same, but produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin'd by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity.(...)
I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are all nearly synonymous; and therefore 'tis an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest. (...)
The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression convey'd by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be deriv'd from some internal impression, or impression of reflection. (...)
This therefore is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor -is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies. (...)
the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other.
Locke said "there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses", to which Leibniz appended, "except the intellect itself".
And Hume would have agreed with both Mises and Leibniz on that account. He recognized that there must be some "determination of the mind" to make the leap from regular contiguity/succession to causation. This leap is an a priori from which we theorize, not a theory itself.
Furthermore, inferences from regularity (or any other kind of induction) are themselves based on an a priori. Hume's problem of induction only fails to be a practical problem for us, because the structure of our minds simply accepts induction on an a priori basis.