I get how self-ownership is axiomatic. I don't get how homesteading is axiomatic, yet I often hear it referred to as the "homesteading axiom" rather than the "homesteading principle." Is this it an axiom, or are some libertarians trying to prove too much?
its a method. its shorthand for "coming to own something previously unowned by anyone else, in a way for which there is evidence such that latecomers can be identified as such in relation to you and what has become your property."
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
In my view, neither self-ownership or homesteading or non-aggression are axioms, as an axiom is supposed to be something that is self-evident or an irredicible principle. They are normative concepts that are part of a system containing other concepts, and could be construed as either depending on other concepts heirarchically or more as part of a web of coherance.
I know what it is, and I see the utility in using it as a principle by which to assign property without infringing upon liberty. I'm wondering why it's often referred to as an axiom. Is it an irreducible truth?
Self-ownership is axiomatic - it is proved when one tries to disprove it.
I see that you're a fan of the performative contradiction or self-detonation argument. But that I rightfully own my body or that noone else may rightfully control me is not proved by the fact that I purposefully act. Those are two separate things.
Brainpolice:In my view, neither self-ownership or homesteading or non-aggression are axioms, as an axiom is supposed to be something that is self-evident or an irredicible principle. They are normative concepts that are part of a system containing other concepts, and could be construed as either depending on other concepts heirarchically or more as part of a web of coherance.
This. I also prefer to call them principles, even if they are first principles.
Brainpolice:I see that you're a fan of the performative contradiction or self-detonation argument. But that I rightfully own my body or that noone else may rightfully control me is not proved by the fact that I purposefully act. Those are two separate things.
Well, that seems to depend on how you define "own" and/or "control". :P
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Brainpolice: Not sure I follow what you're saying.
Rights have nothing to do with it. How are you not a self-owner exactly? How are you not in possession of your body and not acting as the controlling director of your physical person? The rest is semantics regarding the word ownership.
Sorry but I kind of want to play a little devils advocate here.
P.S. I agree with Nir on how he explains Homesteading. People call too many things axioms.
Then is nothing axiomatic?
geniusiknowit:Then is nothing axiomatic?
Humans Act.
Rights have nothing to do with it. How are you not a self-owner exactly? How are you not in possession of your body and not acting as the controlling director of your physical person? The rest is semantics regarding the word ownership. Sorry but I kind of want to play a little devils advocate here.
Well then for starters, you've shifted to a definition of "self-ownership" that robs it of all normative connotations, and hence by itself it does not support libertarianism over any other political philosophy. If this is what "self-ownership" means, then most non-libertarians believe in it too and it proves too little. Furthermore, if we are to define "self-ownership" this way, it would then seem that what one is claiming is that the mind owns the body, and this is by no means self-evident and begs questions related to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics in general.
I'm saying that the argument from performative contradiction relies on switching between a normative and descriptive sense of ownership (the right to control vs. the fact of possession), becoming a non-sequitor. The fact that I currently control something doesn't prove that I ought to. But if one is only using "self-ownership" to refer to the fact of possession, then it is much more trivial of a concept that isn't exclusive to libertarian philosophy. At such a point, it is unclear whether "self-ownership" is meant to be a principle of personal autonomy, a replacement word for free will, or some kind of metaphysical notion.
Hence why I put the term in scare quotes, as I no longer find it useful.
In your own humble opinion what is the normative definition of ownership?
Wikipedia: "Self-ownership (or sovereignty of the individual, individual sovereignty or individual autonomy) is the concept of property in one's own person, expressed as the moral or natural right of a person to be the exclusive controller of her or his own body and life."
Bold emphasis mine. Rothbard uses such a definition in his works as well. The wikipedia article also lists two specific arguments against self-ownership that I have made myself, the first of which I've already hinted at:
"The first and most serious one revolves around the point that the concept of self-ownership implies a cartesian mind-body dualism. Mainly that there needs to be something external to one's body that controls the body itself. There are serious contentions against dualism however that attack the basis of this position. Furthermore, even if one accepts a mind-body dualism, then if one accepts that it is immoral for one to own another's body, the self-ownership proposition becomes inconsistent as the act of the mind controlling the body become immoral in turn. Another contention, again based on accepting mind-body dualism, is that it would imply that an intangible entity (the mind) would own a tangible entity (the body) that is metaphysically impossible in reality (a thing without a tangible existence cannot act on a thing with a tangible existence).
When self-ownership is not based on cartesian dualism it creates an arbitrary separation within one human, i.e. within yourself and yourself. It implies that an entity can be owned by itself, which is impossible given the definition of "ownership," which explains the relation between two different entities, a subject and an object. Thus it would mean that one human is both the owner and the owned at once and therefore turning self-ownership into an oxymoron.
Another vector of attack is the chicken/egg issue. Specifically self-ownership manifests a property rights concept and then defines self-ownership on the basis of those property rights. However it simulataneously the case that self-ownership tries to justify the existence of property rights as if they are stemming from it. This in effect creates a circular argument fallacy. To put it short, if property rights justify self-ownership, then the latter cannot be used to justify the former on the basis of someone owning the result of their actions. If self-ownership is used to justify property rights on the other hand, then a different justification must be found for the concept of self-ownership itself that does not rest of people owning themselves (thus presupposing property rights)."
For some reason I thought I asked for the definition of ownership. Not self-ownership.
And not that it matters, more of a nit-pick, but how can we derive a "normative" definition of "Self-Ownerhsip" when it's concept is something that is not widely known of outside the libertarian circles? Kind of a biased "normative" definition wouldn't you say?
Sorry, you're right, although we've been talking about self-ownership. Quite simply, normative definitions of ownership inherently involve some notion of property rights which determine someone's rightful title to possession. But if you're specifically asking what my own normative position is, I think that's not relevant to this topic.
@BP
So would you claim that ownership is its self an irrelavant term? There is simply resource control, not ownership?
Read until you have something to write...Write until you have nothing to write...when you have nothing to write, read...read until you have something to write...Jeremiah
What is it called when you are in permanent physical possession of something?
Brainpolice:Quite simply, normative definitions of ownership inherently involve some notion of property rights
Rights are a claim on human action(Often a claim involving the action over some scarce object). The term "Property-Right" is technically redundant. But again I am nit-picking.
I don't think ownership is irrelevant, but that these particular arguments fail horribly at establishing a case for any particular normative position on ownership and that the concept of self-ownership as it is often used by libertarians is either unecessary or hopelessly confused.
Filc: This will almost certainly end up in a dualism/materialism debate. Technically your statement begs the question in favor of dualism.
Brainpolice:
I don't think that's quite proper. You'e assuming, in order to prove that it's wrong to own another's body, that the mind and the body are two separate and distinct persons.
I've heard of these types of criticisms before, but I've never had the opportunity to dialog with someone who held this position. So I'm glad that you're here.
I don't think you've successfully shown--other than just asserting it--that abstract causation is metaphysically impossible. I agree, but with certain caveats. I don't believe that a mind falls into the same intangible category as do other abstract objects like numbers, ideas, etc.
I think you carry the burden of proof if you are to make such an assertion.
*shrug* Ownership? So what?
It isn't redundant if, like me, you simply don't think it makes any sense to think of human beings in terms of property.
In order to sidestep thinking of humans as property, could we outsource ownership to an abstract principle like the will? Thus, we could say that the body is property of the will which first homesteaded the body?
I don't think that's quite proper. You'e assuming, in order to prove that it's wrong to own another's body, that the mind and the body are two separate and distinct persons. I've heard of these types of criticisms before, but I've never had the opportunity to dialog with someone who held this position. So I'm glad that you're here. I don't think you've successfully shown--other than just asserting it--that abstract causation is metaphysically impossible. I agree, but with certain caveats. I don't believe that a mind falls into the same intangible category as do other abstract objects like numbers, ideas, etc. I think you carry the burden of proof if you are to make such an assertion.
For clarification, I haven't made the argument as it is exactly worded in that wikipedia quote. What I would argue is that it doesn't make sense for something to own itself because the notion of ownership depends on a relation between subject and object, and if one wants to say that the mind is the subject and the body is the object then I would say that it is still strange to treat this as ownership in the same sense that we otherwise would because we're really talking about a much more direct kind of control (obviously, my ownership of a chair isn't the same thing as a telepathic bond which allows me to move it with my mind). I don't think that a physiological kind of control is the same thing as ownership.
This is the point at which I want to say "What does any of this have to do with property? Are we not just argueing for free will?". If by "self-ownership" we're really talking about the capacity of people to autonamously make decisions in the process of action, then it's a replacement term for free will. And I would want to challenge why it's necessary to use property as a metaphor for this, as it seems to confuse matters.
Brainpolice:It isn't redundant if, like me, you simply don't think it makes any sense to think of human beings in terms of property.
Even conceding your point, the term is still redundant. But it's really off topic and me nit-picking.
I don't mind the nitpicking. My original reply could be considered nitpicking and to have derailed the thread.
I wouldn't say that it's simply control, though. It's exclusive control along with incorrigible and private mental states.
So even if it is just exclusive control, I see no reason why it doesn't function in the same exact way as "ownership" would.
The latter term is sexier than the former, however. Would you say that we don't have exclusive control? If I don't, who bought my shares?
I wouldn't say that it's simply control, though. It's exclusive control along with incorrigible and private mental states. So even if it is just exclusive control, I see no reason why it doesn't function in the same exact way as "ownership" would. The latter term is sexier than the former, however. Would you say that we don't have exclusive control? If I don't, who bought my shares?
The difference I pointed out is that in the case of physiological control, there is a direct link with your mind or your will. I can will my arm to move upwards. I can't will an external object to raise off the ground. Hence my telepathy reductio ad absurdum. In the case of external property, we don't have direct physiological control over objects - they aren't part of us. Exclusivity isn't the distinction, direct connection to the will is.
So, at a minimum, it would have to be aknowledged that "self-ownership" is a special kind of ownership, one inalienable to the will and much more direct in control. It would simply be incorrect to consider it the same kind of ownership involved with external objects.
BrainPolice:The difference I pointed out is that in the case of physiological control, there is a direct link with your mind or your will. I can will my arm to move upwards. I can't will an external object to raise off the ground. Hence my telepathy reductio ad absurdum. In the case of external property, we don't have direct physiological control over objects - they aren't part of us. Exclusivity isn't the distinction, direct connection to the will is.
With a tool you can lift an object off the ground however. Which is exactly what your muscles are, tools used for lifting your bones, and structure. I use them everyday in my crossfit gym. And they most certainly are tools.
I don't see this as a counter to the underlying point. In one case you literally just have to will something to be the case, while in the other case you have physically move something. Your example of muscles is still one step removed from the will, and it is presumed to be the will here that is doing the controling. In the case of external objects, let's say a chair, your will obviously does not directly control them. If I say that I own a chair, I am not saying that through a sheer act of will I can control its movement. Unless I adhered to some radical kind of idealism.
BrainPolice:Your example of muscles is still one step removed from the will,
And in the case of employing a hammer, it's one step added. But you wouldn't say "I Willed that hammer into action"? Or would you?
In so much as you can assert power and control over something, I suppose that is axiomatic. Homesteading as a legal term is an elastic principle of custom that is proably better clearly defined not by "ownership" but better defined by an effecient use of land within the perspective of the legal authority.
Brainpolice: So, at a minimum, it would have to be aknowledged that "self-ownership" is a special kind of ownership, one inalienable to the will and much more direct in control. It would simply be incorrect to consider it the same kind of ownership involved with external objects.
that's what I mean too, when use "self-wonership" :)
(english is not my native language, sorry for grammar.)
I'm not sure I understand why the the owner must be separate from the object owned.
geniusiknowit:I'm not sure I understand why the the owner must be separate from the object owned.
I think this is a very good point. For example, take the term "self-control". This is a much less controversial term. Does anyone assume that, since "control" is otherwise used in a binary relationship (one thing controlling another), controlling oneself means that the controller must also be somehow separate from the controlled? If not, then why is that objection raised for "self-ownership", which seems to me to be a very similar term?
Because self-control refers to different things. The conscious mind controlling the actions of the body.
scineram:Because self-control refers to different things. The conscious mind controlling the actions of the body.
Grammatically/linguistically speaking, the word or phrase "self-control" doesn't imply mind-body dualism.
Immortality?
In States a fresh law is looked upon as a remedy for evil. Instead of themselves altering what is bad, people begin by demanding a law to alter it. ... In short, a law everywhere and for everything!
~Peter Kropotkin
Filc:What is it called when you are in permanent physical possession of something?
Epicurus ibn Kalhoun:Immortality?
You deserve criticism over such a silly response. Was this meant as a joke? Correct me if I am wrong but I am pretty sure thats a strawman. It's deceptive to, and now your degrading what has otherwise been a healthy/positive discussion.
It was a facetious comment in response to your use of the word "permanent." Nobody but the Highlander could ever be in permanent possesion of anything. It doesn't go with you when you die.