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Libertarian Legal Theory and Private Protection Agencies

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EvilSocialistFellow Posted: Sun, Feb 6 2011 10:59 AM

Hi,

Looking for articles (i.e. not 600 page long books) that outline how the law courts and protection agencies would operate when privatised.

Cheers.

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http://mises.org/journals/jls/14_1/14_1_2.pdf

^ The Private Production of Defense by Hans-Hermann Hoppe

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Nielsio replied on Sun, Feb 6 2011 11:32 AM

 

Text:
http://www.vforvoluntary.com/wiki/PrivateArbitration

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MaikU replied on Sun, Feb 6 2011 11:39 AM

Matticus Rex:

http://mises.org/journals/jls/14_1/14_1_2.pdf

^ The Private Production of Defense by Hans-Hermann Hoppe

 

 

this.

"Dude... Roderick Long is the most anarchisty anarchist that has ever anarchisted!" - Evilsceptic

(english is not my native language, sorry for grammar.)

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Section I: Theory of Private Property Anarchism

    2. Police, Law, and the Courts—Murray Rothbard
    3. The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism (excerpt)—David Friedman
    4. Market for Liberty (excerpt)—Morris and Linda Tannehill
    5. Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Crime Prevention and the Legal Order—Randy Barnett
    6. Capitalist Production and the Problem of Public Goods—Hans Hoppe
    7. National Defense and the Public-Goods Problem—Jeffrey Rogers Hummel and Don Lavoie
    8. Defending a Free Nation—Roderick Long
    9. The Myth of the Rule of Law—John Hasnas

Section II: Debate

    10. The State—Robert Nozick
    11. The Invisible Hand Strikes Back—Roy A. Childs
    12. Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State—Murray Rothbard
    13. Objectivism and the State: An Open Letter to Ayn Rand—Roy Childs
    14. Do We Ever Really Get Out of Anarchy?—Alfred G. Cuzan
    15. Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy—Tyler Cowen
    16. Law as a Private Good: A Response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of Anarchy—David Friedman
    17. Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of Anarchy—Tyler Cowen
    18. Networks, Law and the Paradox of Cooperation—Bryan Caplan and Edward Stringham
    19. Conflict, Cooperation and Competition in Anarchy—Tyler Cowen and Daniel Sutter
    20. Conventions: Some Thoughts on the Economics of Ordered Anarchy—Anthony De Jasay
    21. Can Anarchy Save Us from Leviathan?—Andrew Rutten
    22. Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable—Randall Holcombe
    23. Is Government Inevitable? Comment on Holcombe’s Analysis—Peter Leeson and Edward Stringham

Section III: History of Anarchist Thought

    24. Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-statist Liberal Tradition (excepts)—David Hart
    25. Vindication of Natural Society(excerpt)—Edmund Burke
    26. The Production of Security—Gustave de Molinari
    27. Individualist Anarchism in the United States: The Origins—Murray Rothbard
    28. Anarchism and American Traditions—Voltairine de Cleyre
    29. On Civil Government—David Lipscomb
    30. No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority (excerpt)—Lysander Spooner
    31. Trial by Jury—Lysander Spooner
    32. Relation of the State to the Individual—Benjamin Tucker
    33. Political and Economic Overview—David Osterfeld

Section IV: Historical Case Studies of Non-Government Law Enforcement

34. Are Public Goods Really Common Pools? Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England—Bruce Benson
35. Property Rights in Celtic Irish Law—Joseph Peden
36. Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case—David Friedman
37. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs—Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast
38. Legal Evolution in Primitive Societies—Bruce Benson
39. American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild, Wild West—Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill
40. Order Without Law (excerpt)—Robert

 

Or buy the book Anarchy and the Law

Read until you have something to write...Write until you have nothing to write...when you have nothing to write, read...read until you have something to write...Jeremiah 

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Thanks fellows.

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AJ replied on Sun, Feb 6 2011 1:08 PM

Not how the legal theory would be, but why it would be different in each socio-cultural milieu (and why that is a good thing). These essays disagree with Rothbard, Hoppe, et al., so it's a different perspective that may be easier to get behind as there's no inherent support for capitalism entailed in the arguments. (But I've never seen an AnCap take exception to these arguments. They're kind of unifying, so by all means take a look.)

The Obviousness of Anarchy

The Depoliticization of Law

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Clayton replied on Sun, Feb 6 2011 1:32 PM

Just for clarification, I find that a common point of confusion for non-anarchists (and often, anarchists) on the issue of privatizing law and protection is the idea that privatization is an end in itself. Privatization is not an end in itself. A utilitarian argument can be made for why privatization, in general, leads to greater rationality in the utilization of scarce resources but it does not follow from this alone that privatization is, therefore, morally preferable to public production. It is possible that there could be other, weightier moral considerations that justify continued irrationality in the production of a good or service.

The problem with thinking about this issue in terms of "private production" or "public production" is that, either way, we are still thinking of society as an amorphous blob which may be molded to the will of some unspecified force. Leaving aside the fact that this is an incorrect description of society, it also assumes a frankly amoral attitude regarding the use of violence in the attempt to achieve a particular state of affairs within society (for example, the use of violence to attempt to eliminate "drug use" among all inhabitants of a given territory).

The moral problem with monopolization* of any industry is that it violates the Golden Rule and sets up a system of dual morality. What is right depends on who you are. If you are the state bureau chief of electrical production, then it is morally OK for you to engage in the business of producing electricity. But if you are anybody else, then it is not OK. What is right depends on who you are or (what is the same) what office you hold. For a moral system to be "universalizable", that is, to conform to the Golden Rule, right and wrong must be independent of the identity of the actor. If it is wrong for John to murder, then it is wrong for anybody to murder, else it is not wrong for anybody to murder.

Tribal morality, that is, unconditional loyalty to one's kin and clan is the opposite of this. Tribal morality is based solely on the identity of the actor. If a member of my tribe harmed a member of your tribe then, clearly, my tribe-member was in the right and your tribe-member was in the wrong. Moral or social progress can be understood in terms of the shift from tribal morality to reciprocal or "universalizable" morality.

The law monopoly is no different than an electric monopoly in this regard. However, the law monopoly is uniquely pernicious - a point that Hoppe has made - because the law monopolist has an incentive to actually pick fights with people for the express purpose of settling those fights in its own favor. We see this pattern of behavior in every public prosecutor's office, especially. The solution is not "privatization" as if making things private is an end in itself. The solution is to hold the law monopolist to the same standards of legal liability and excellence in legal practice as anybody else. In other words, no immunity for public judges, prosecutors and investigators. No trial of court cases in which the government is a litigant in that government's courts. These two changes alone - if taken seriously and rigorously applied - would be sufficient to collapse the entire edifice of modern government, let alone privatize the courts.

Clayton -

*I am using "monopoly" in the Hoppean sense of a legal (or other) impediment to free entry to the market, not in the mainstream sense of a single firm having a large market share

http://voluntaryistreader.wordpress.com
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