@RobertH
No it would not be subjective because categorial impertitves are driven by reason... and reason, according to Kant, is apriori
My Blog: http://www.anarchico.net/
Production is 'anarchistic' - Ludwig von Mises
@ Epicurs ibn Kalhoun: I see no reason to think He cannot enter His creation. Entering His creation does not negate his timelessness. God has not changed His plans as you put it by throwing Adam out etc. For understanding providence, foreknowledge, etc. you need to look into Molinism aka Middle knowledge.
@ Epicurs ibn Kalhoun:
I see no reason to think He cannot enter His creation. Entering His creation does not negate his timelessness. God has not changed His plans as you put it by throwing Adam out etc. For understanding providence, foreknowledge, etc. you need to look into Molinism aka Middle knowledge.
As I said, this argument will most likely be dismissed. But it belies a fundamental flaw in the argument. For more see:
what does it even mean to say that a timeless God decided to create the universe 'at some point?' Our very concept of deciding implies a temporal process in which another temporal process, contemplation, precedes a decision. Indeed, it is extraordinarily difficult to conceive of how any 'timeless' thing--personal or not--could produce (yet another temporal process) anything... For if a perfectly static timeless state or being 'preceded' the universe, how could that perfect stasis be interrupted? This appears to be one of those perennial questions, like why there is something rather than nothing, for which no conceivable answer--other than that there never was any such timeless state or being--is available whether one assumes that God or exists or that he does not. Craig often appeals to the intuitive assumption 'from nothing, nothing comes.' We might say here that 'from timelessness, only timelessness comes.' So we are back to square one: Craig offers no convincing reason to prefer a timeless creator to an uncaused universe, and the latter may even face fewer conceptual difficulties than the former. .. http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/chris_hallquist/faith.html#ch3
what does it even mean to say that a timeless God decided to create the universe 'at some point?' Our very concept of deciding implies a temporal process in which another temporal process, contemplation, precedes a decision. Indeed, it is extraordinarily difficult to conceive of how any 'timeless' thing--personal or not--could produce (yet another temporal process) anything...
For if a perfectly static timeless state or being 'preceded' the universe, how could that perfect stasis be interrupted? This appears to be one of those perennial questions, like why there is something rather than nothing, for which no conceivable answer--other than that there never was any such timeless state or being--is available whether one assumes that God or exists or that he does not. Craig often appeals to the intuitive assumption 'from nothing, nothing comes.' We might say here that 'from timelessness, only timelessness comes.' So we are back to square one: Craig offers no convincing reason to prefer a timeless creator to an uncaused universe, and the latter may even face fewer conceptual difficulties than the former. ..
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/chris_hallquist/faith.html#ch3
Or
Grünbaum (1990) (1991) worries about the propriety of the claim, that the universe began to exist, in the context of classical Big Bang models of the origins of the universe. In particular, he considers two cases: (i) models which are closed at the Big Bang instant t=0, in which t=0 is the location of a singular, temporally first event in the history of the universe; and (ii) models which are open at the Big Bang instant t=0, in which there is no singular, temporally first event in the history of the universe. In connection with the first type of model, Grünbaum observes that it is misleading to say that in these models the universe began because this suggests that there were moments of time before t=0. Craig (1992:237f.) objects that "x begins to exist" should not be analysed as "x exists at time t and there are times immediately prior to t at which x does not exist", but rather as "x exists at t and there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists." Of course, this analysis would commit Craig to the unwanted claim that God began to exist--since, on the theistic version of this model, there is no time immediately prior to t=0 at which God exists--so Craig further suggests that, within a theistic context, the analysis should be amended to "x exists at t; there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists; and the actual world contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless existence." But this amended suggestion invokes the extremely puzzling notion of "(God's) timeless existence." Moreover, even the unamended analysis naturally provokes the question whether anything which begins to exist in this sense must have a cause http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/graham_oppy/davies.html
Grünbaum (1990) (1991) worries about the propriety of the claim, that the universe began to exist, in the context of classical Big Bang models of the origins of the universe. In particular, he considers two cases: (i) models which are closed at the Big Bang instant t=0, in which t=0 is the location of a singular, temporally first event in the history of the universe; and (ii) models which are open at the Big Bang instant t=0, in which there is no singular, temporally first event in the history of the universe.
In connection with the first type of model, Grünbaum observes that it is misleading to say that in these models the universe began because this suggests that there were moments of time before t=0. Craig (1992:237f.) objects that "x begins to exist" should not be analysed as "x exists at time t and there are times immediately prior to t at which x does not exist", but rather as "x exists at t and there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists." Of course, this analysis would commit Craig to the unwanted claim that God began to exist--since, on the theistic version of this model, there is no time immediately prior to t=0 at which God exists--so Craig further suggests that, within a theistic context, the analysis should be amended to "x exists at t; there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists; and the actual world contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless existence." But this amended suggestion invokes the extremely puzzling notion of "(God's) timeless existence." Moreover, even the unamended analysis naturally provokes the question whether anything which begins to exist in this sense must have a cause
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/graham_oppy/davies.html
Or especially this article. It shows a clear incoherent disconnect in this hypothesis based on it's self-contradictory definition of "timeless."
In States a fresh law is looked upon as a remedy for evil. Instead of themselves altering what is bad, people begin by demanding a law to alter it. ... In short, a law everywhere and for everything!
~Peter Kropotkin
@Eric080
I think history shows that people do not always act as if there is an objective morality. Not to take a jab at the atheist posters, but the last century surely shows us what atheistic dictators do in situations where they are creating morality. I do not think this is a fruitless argument because if there are objective moral laws then there is a law giver. If morals are the products of socio-biological evolution they are subjective and arbitrary. Subjective because they are dependent on man and arbitrary because we could pick (or will, I suppose you could say) anything to be ‘good’ and ‘evil.’
Interesting quote, btw.
@Dinkum
No, I didn’t fail at noticing anything. You cannot just assert, “Maybe He’s evil” like that is some kind of argument. Show me why I would think that in the first place based on the Biblical text or even on what man calls morality today in western societies compared to what He has revealed in the Bible.
That is not an Appeal to nature fallacy, sorry.
No, that is a false analogy. A more appropriate analogy would be: “You can stay on that escalator taking you to the alligator infested water or you can get off and come to me.”
@Bert
While I am a Christian theist I am only using the moral argument to show that since morals are objective there is something outside our finite realm. While it alone does not go far enough to pointing to the Trinity it is part of a cumulative case.
@”Izzy”
I disagree, who decided what these categorical imperatives are? If it is human reason then it is subjective; it is dependent upon humans, we could have picked something else.
@Epicurus
Just because someone does not understand how God enters his creation does not mean therefore it cannot happen. That is a fallacy of personal incredulity. I’ll look into your quotes and read up, further.
RobbertH:who decided what these categorical imperatives are?
Humans develop these categorial imperatives(remember the rule:Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. ) this is driven by human reason which is apriori. (keep in mind, this should sound really familar if you have studied Misesian Praxeology since alot of Praxeology is influenced by Kantian framework)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbirUdSnZLU&feature=related
Here is a good link about timelessness.
Wow. It went over your head. The actual argument was not that he could be evil. That was merely a way of illustrating the fallacy you were falling into by showing that you are implying goodness. Geez. Biblical text gets you no where in this regard either since it's allegedly coming from the same source that handed down "objective morality." Your own value judgments are dubing it as good.
Also, when you say, "Show me why I would think that..." you give away the game. The whole point you've been attempting to make is that you can't think otherwise.
It sure is. Look it up. I was assuming your argument was true and then explaining how you don't get "goodness" out of it unless you tack on some extra assumptions which are unproven. It's merely your own bias. This is also why appeals to "natural law" fail. I could grant you all day long the notion that God has handed down an objective moral code, but nothing about that would make it good; it would only make it an existent.
That analogy doesn't help you. God created the escalotor with the alligator pit at the bottom and put man on it. And I can anticipate your response. Something like, "God gave man free will, thus, man chose to get on the escalator." Two responses: (1) God would have forseen man get on the escalator and is therefore responsible, and (2) even if God could not forsee because of free will, he would still have known that getting on the escalotor was a possible choice for man given how he created mankind. If he knew it was even possible (i.e. as long as God is not an idiot) he is depraved for creating man in the first place, given that the possibility existed that he would create a conscious being that potentially could be tortured forever.
Put another way, God created the scenario in the first place: he created the necessity of choosing X or Y. So your argument fails on its own grounds. Poor God should have been content to twiddle his thumbs for eternity and not get into this man-creating business.
"It is the dull man who is always sure, and the sure man who is always dull." - H.L. Mencken
I discovered a reformulation of the dilemma discussed above which incorporates your objection, and the dilemma remains: Is God's nature the way it is because it is good; or is God's nature good simply because it is God's nature? This will hopefully bring some clarity to this issue for you.
Explained here:
In any case, appealing to God's character only postpones the problem since the dilemma can be reformulated in terms of His character. Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character good simply because it is God's character? Is there an independent standard of good or does God's character set the standard? If God's character is the way it is because it is good, then there is an independent standard of goodness by which to evaluate God's character. For example, suppose God condemns rape because of His just and merciful character. His character is just and merciful because mercy and justice are good. Since God is necessarily good, God is just and merciful. According to this independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use this standard to evaluate peoples' character and actions based on this character. They could do this whether or not God exists. Suppose God's character is good simply because it is God's character. Then if God's character were cruel and unjust, these attributes would be good. In such a case God might well condone rape since this would be in keeping with His character. But could not one reply that God could not be cruel and unjust since by necessity God must be good? It is true that by necessity God must be good. But unless we have some independent standard of goodness then whatever attributes God has would by definition be good: God's character would define what good is. It would seem that if God could not be cruel and unjust, then God's character must necessarily exemplify some independent standard of goodness. Using this standard one could say that cruelty and injustice are not good whether God exists or not. This attempt to avoid the dilemma by basing objective morality on God's necessary character has another problem. It assumes that there would not be an objective morality without God. However, this seems to beg the question against an objective atheistic ethics. After all, why would the nonexistence of God adversely affect the goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice? Yet, this is precisely what would happen if being part of God's character created the goodness of mercy, compassion and justice. This point can perhaps be made in another way. One could affirm the objective immorality of rape and deny the existence of God with perfect consistency. There is no contradiction in claiming "Rape is objectively evil and God does not exist."[
In any case, appealing to God's character only postpones the problem since the dilemma can be reformulated in terms of His character. Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character good simply because it is God's character? Is there an independent standard of good or does God's character set the standard? If God's character is the way it is because it is good, then there is an independent standard of goodness by which to evaluate God's character. For example, suppose God condemns rape because of His just and merciful character. His character is just and merciful because mercy and justice are good. Since God is necessarily good, God is just and merciful. According to this independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use this standard to evaluate peoples' character and actions based on this character. They could do this whether or not God exists.
Suppose God's character is good simply because it is God's character. Then if God's character were cruel and unjust, these attributes would be good. In such a case God might well condone rape since this would be in keeping with His character. But could not one reply that God could not be cruel and unjust since by necessity God must be good? It is true that by necessity God must be good. But unless we have some independent standard of goodness then whatever attributes God has would by definition be good: God's character would define what good is. It would seem that if God could not be cruel and unjust, then God's character must necessarily exemplify some independent standard of goodness. Using this standard one could say that cruelty and injustice are not good whether God exists or not.
This attempt to avoid the dilemma by basing objective morality on God's necessary character has another problem. It assumes that there would not be an objective morality without God. However, this seems to beg the question against an objective atheistic ethics. After all, why would the nonexistence of God adversely affect the goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice? Yet, this is precisely what would happen if being part of God's character created the goodness of mercy, compassion and justice. This point can perhaps be made in another way. One could affirm the objective immorality of rape and deny the existence of God with perfect consistency. There is no contradiction in claiming "Rape is objectively evil and God does not exist."[
Just because someone does not understand how God enters his creation does not mean therefore it cannot happen. That is a fallacy of personal incredulity. I’ll look into your quotes and read up, further
No, you're misunderstanding. He can't enter it's creation because action requires a temporal process, and she is timeless; i.e. without time. As the articles show, you can either mean God existed forever and created the universe at t=0. Or you could mean God was simultaenously created with the universe at t=0.
Seeing as how it is contradictory to say a timeless being "came into existence" at a given point, we can throw the latter out as an argument all together.
The former rationalization (Timeless God created the universe at t=0) doesn't make God any better than any other explanation, including the multiverse, quantum fluctuation, or spaghetti monster, as you are breaching into the realm of the "unknowable." In fact, it is weaker than some of these other explanations, as they are at least based on a little math.
Why must this thread dive itself into a foray of apologetic garbage? My e-mail has never been so flooded by comments from a thread before, with so many being desperate arguments of faith as if personal experience is not enough. It's also a bad hijacking from the main point.
Harking back to the original point of the thread:
Libertarianism does require reason - but it is also unreasonable to rule out ideologies in which coincides with one's personal life solely out of personal preference (actions which can be considered similar to how a state runs). Libertarian thought certainly coincides with religion. The anti-theistic position that faith is unreasonable, that faith is psychologically damaging, that it is this and it is that, also begs horrible existential questions that existential and absurdist philosophies point out. Unreasonability is not contingent with religion - it's contingent with life as a whole. The same dogmatic attacks on the certainty one has for the existence of a theistic God, I say, can be used to attack the very reasons for living, and thus what I believe the whole arguments comes to is individual existence and personal experience.
To assume that one shouldn't believe in God is a personal preference of and in itself. I for one say all truth is God's truth. To find deep truth, one must be reflective and introspective with their experiences. It all comes inward.
Further, libertarianism requires us to be skeptical. Skepticism can lead in many directions - skepticism does not mean you should lose faith. If at all, it should strengthen it. Libertarianism is coincident with us living our lives as we see fit so long as we do not commit a social tort against somebody else. This has no say of religion, which is necessarily gained by us living our lives as we see fit. There is no harm in faith any more than there is harm in science. That is to say, both are fine until abused.
@ Eternal Mind
1) You are correct to say that it is wrong to take scientism all that seriously. But frankly, it is for the same reason one can not take religion all that seriously. They both ignore the existential reality of egoism, and the exteremly unique and undefinable realities it creates and destroys at every second and how such a thing is intrinsically tied to materialism. And while those who say they listen to science for the sake of listening to science are indeed nuts (perhaps being deliberatley reactionary or boring for the sake of shock), they at least put up models of a utilizable material world that one can make sense out of.
2) I think it is the ultimate nature of libertarianism, or the market mentality, to assume radical atomism, materialism, and egoism. Furthermore the dealings with everyday society ought to confirm it on every basis. This ought to be anathemic to any religion that actually matters (that is I don't care about space aliens, materialistic deism, reincarnation, or a list of other who cares). Furthermore it ought to demonstrate that the more this feature is put in culture (such as in the West) the less relevence religion shows and the more it is ignored.
Religion, at least the more traditional ones, are in a position to fade away due to the very nature of the more realized market / egoistic reality of The West. So , in my speculating, ultimately no religion (or any concern for the spiritual) can be libertarian in that sense. It is the nature of the world and the ultimate conclusions of libertarianism to disintigrate unuseful things that have no real application in peoples life. The more people interact and trade, the more this will manifest.
This case is not helped when this is tied to a type of energetic assertion, which is pretty much what property is, as sort of an atomic fact initself
Also some minor, but worthwhile, things to consider:
Libertarian thought certainly coincides with religion
Libertarianism is a product of the Enlightenment and the philosophies and culture that arouse out of it, I think it is no coincendence that all philosophies that arose from that era have negated relgion in some form or another (yes they may have brought up their own kooky ghosts with them such as Man, but still)
The anti-theistic position that faith is unreasonable, that faith is psychologically damaging, that it is this and it is that, also begs horrible existential questions that existential and absurdist philosophies point out. Unreasonability is not contingent with religion - it's contingent with life as a whole. T
Market philosophy deals with "unreasonable" actions quite well. And the results are apparent as to what it leads to.
I'm an extropian.Does that count as a religion? Probably not.
Glad the topic kind of went into its original direction. A response:
I highly doubt that under the writings of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky that it ignores the existential egoism within anybody. There is no way that an individual, who becomes conscious of sin and transforms their life individually and begins to attempt to follow the teachings of Christ, is not fulfilling their own existential truth egostically. Anyone can make sense out of the basic tenets of Christ's ethical teachings - to resist evil not with evil, have a preference for those who are poor, and to love one's neighbor as one's self, all of which share an undersatnding to the individual to have self-realization and expand to the universal of humanity. The Other, so to speak. These are all utilizable, all one can make sense out of, and all one can push to strive. The realization and consciousness of sin is exactly a real world event in an individual's life. As Wittgenstein puts it:
"Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life. For 'consciousness of sin' is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith. Those who speak of such things are simply describing what has happened to them, whatever gloss anyone may want to put on it."
I do think you're pulling libertarianism beyond its limits. Egoism is one thing - that every individual commits their own choice, and has total freedom. however, radical atomism and materialism are not something that is necessarily contingent to libertarianism. What should be totally contingent to libertarianism is freedom. That is the most fundamental thing about it, and I see egoism fitting perfectly, and existentialism. However, radical atomism and materialism? That's going to take some pushing to do, and more so than necessary for it to be practical. Religion will always show relevance through its own existential epiphany for each individual that commits to it, as mentioned above.
Religion, at least the more traditional ones, are in a position to fade away due to the very nature of the more realized market / egoistic reality of The West. So , in my speculating, ultimately no religion (or any concern for the spiritual) can be libertarian in that sense. It is the nature of the world and the ultimate conclusions of libertarianism to disintigrate unuseful things that have no real application in peoples life. The more people interact and trade, the more this will manifest. This case is not helped when this is tied to a type of energetic assertion, which is pretty much what property is, as sort of an atomic fact initself
There is true application in having the will to continue to live or to do something, and to existentially commit to something. Religion's acceptance ebbs and flows - it is not in a set direction, and neither is it static. Everything spiritual is libertarian, for it follows the notion of living freely without any institution putting it on you a command that can't be disavowed. Anyone religious follows their own existential battle to hold their faith, as any one individual will follow their own existential battle to hold to their own truth. There is nothing that will go away in that regard. Religion is a real event in a person's life and applies to anyone anywhere.
Many people were Christian, Kierkegaard was Christian, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy - existentialism is discovered with Christianity - on religion. It has, as I've stated, ebbed and flowed throughout history. They have never fully negated religion as an entire concept.
Religion is not necessarily designed to be libertarian. Put that aside, however. Would a libertarian go around telling someone they aren't allowed to be religious? If anything, the libertarian, if indeed he or she does believe that we can live our lives freely, should not object to someone being religious, socialist, a constant drooler, or whatever. Taking that into account, I can understand arguing logical points when it comes to religion, but what is the point of asking if religion is capable of being libertarian? Hell, a religion could be as simple as holding oneself to a certain code. By such standard, libertarianism in a stoic and earnest individual can be a religion. Surely you don't claim that it is impossible for someone to believe in a god or have a moral code and still exist in a free world?