histhasthai:To be clear, I mean that only huans have rights. It is theorietically possible some day for computers, aliens, or genetically engineered terestrial animals to rise to the requirement for rights, but none today are remotely close.
Yes I agree completetly. However, there are some very interesting developments in AI, which may mean that day is closer than we think.
http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/
Keep in mind rationality is not a synonym for an IQ of a certain level. Smarter does not mean more rational in the context being used here (i.e. the criteria for moral agency.)
-Jon
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
leonidia: Jaynes' definition of consciousness is controversial to say the least. I don't think his definition is widely accepted. If you ask most people what it means to be conscious, they'll you use words like "aware", "awake", "sensate" etc.
Jaynes' definition of consciousness is controversial to say the least. I don't think his definition is widely accepted. If you ask most people what it means to be conscious, they'll you use words like "aware", "awake", "sensate" etc.
What definition? He only pointed out what it isn't; didn't say anything about what it is, let alone give a definition, and he's not trying to tell you what he thinks it is, he's trying to get you to acknowledge what you think it is - pointing out that the things you say you think it is are internally inconsistent.
Paul:What definition? He only pointed out what it isn't; didn't say anything about what it is, let alone give a definition, and he's not trying to tell you what he thinks it is,
Well, if you'd actually read the entire thread you'd see that he was the first to use the term, not me...therefore it's incumbent on him to define it if there's any ambiguity, isn't it? And what I said is that most people would define it differently. Whether or not that defintion is internally inconsistent is completely beside the point.
I believe that rights require the fact of repriciprocity. If an otherwise "rational" agent is by their nature incapable of understanding the concept of rights, or is otherwise incapable or unwilling to respect them in their action, then they do not fall under the protection of said rights.That's why I don't recognize rights in animals - they are by nature incapable of understanding or at least unwilling or unable to respect my own rights. They are varelse.
It would be possible to "create" an alien (i.e., not properly human) intelligence with the ability to understand and engage in the reciprocality of rights that is necessary to their practical existence. In that case, they have rights by virtue of that fact.
Pro Christo et Libertate integre!
MacFall:That's why I don't recognize rights in animals - they are by nature incapable of understanding or at least unwilling or unable to respect my own rights.
I want to clarify this a bit. Are you saying that you only expect moral agents to abide by the rights they understand?
A non-human intelligence that you see in many sci-fi stories is the "hive mind"...a species where the "individuals" are simply extensions of a central intelligence. To the hive mind the destruction of individual "beings" is no different from the way we trim our toenails.
Would you expect a hive mind species to respect your individual rights, even though they don't understand the very idea of "individual"? Or would you expect them to respect your rights because you hold them dear?
For the record, I am in the "animals are property because they don't have rights" camp. I see some validity in the "incapable of understanding rights" idea, but I am trying to clarify some sticking points I have.
Jonas:To the hive mind the destruction of individual "beings" is no different from the way we trim our toenails. Would you expect a hive mind species to respect your individual rights
Would you expect a hive mind species to respect your individual rights
That's taking for granted that a fully conscious, reasoning, hive mind with moral agency is even possible. Given the absolute subjectivity of consciousness, I doubt it.
It's fine to argue "what if", but using unicorns to inform questions of principle is irrational. You'd have to explore the nature of a so-called hive consciousness do determine, first, if it is even possible, second, what moral principles its nature implies, and third, if those principles conflict with individualist moral principles, how the conflict could/should be resolved.
The state won't go away once enough people want the state to go away, the state will effectively disappear once enough people no longer care that much whether it stays or goes. We don't need a revolution, we need millions of them.
Jonas: MacFall:That's why I don't recognize rights in animals - they are by nature incapable of understanding or at least unwilling or unable to respect my own rights. I want to clarify this a bit. Are you saying that you only expect moral agents to abide by the rights they understand?
Not "understand" as we who have read Locke, Rothbard and Long understand them, but rather are capable of recognizing them, even at a sub-conscious level. As an illustration, take a human being who is a criminal. Because he is human, and rational/moral capacity are inherent qualities of human nature, he is yet assumed to have human rights by default. So he is afforded the right to have the extent, or lack thereof, of his moral capacity fairly determined before he is dealt with for his inhuman actions, and such action is inversely proportional to that extent. That would be true even of a man who is so sick in the head that he sees nothing wrong with raping and killing children.
On the other hand, a domesticated tiger will happily eat his trainer's face off without warning and without any recognizable form of remorse. So until tigers start to exhibit different qualities, it is in the nature of tigers that they are not moral or rational agents, and therefore not in posession of any rights derived morally or rationally.
Whether or not a hive could have rights is an interesting proposition. I think it would depend on whether the individuals in the hive were rational agents or not, and whether the hive itself was a rational agent, capable of demanding those rights.
If the inidividuals were not rational agents, but the hive was, and could express itself, then I suppose it's possible that the hive could have rights. In this case the individuals would be nothing more than semi-autonomous cells with an organic whole.
If the individuals were not rational agents, and the hive was unable to express itself (even though it appeared to be rational) then it couldn't have rights.
Lastly, if the individuals were rational agents, then the hive would be a collective, a society of rational individuals, in which case the individuals would have rights, but the hive wouldn't, even if it claimed to have them.
Jonas:To the hive mind the destruction of individual "beings" is no different from the way we trim our toenails.
I would be cautious bestowing human rights on hive-members. They might ingratiate themselves into society, then suddenly launch a vicious attack on all humans. True, such an attack would probably not be in their economic interests. But their biological interests might take precedence. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.For that matter, the OP's android might have a "bug" which causes it to go beserk at some point in the future, and start smashing up everthing in sight. In that case, I think its creator should be held responsible.So I don't think that the android should necessarily win its freedom just by passing some kind of "moral agency" test. And, in any case, it would be in no one's interests to invent androids if he made nothing out of it.Slaves end up getting emancipated because the owner finds it more profitable to sell them their freedom. And they do better work for him as free men on a market wage than as slaves on a living wage.Surely the builder of an android is in a similar position. He has created what is in practical terms a slave. It is a slave in practice because the builder need merely withhold the android's limbs and thus deny the android any freedom of movement. I suggest that the builder should have the right to strike a contract with his helpless android, e.g. by offering him property in his limbs in return for 50% of his future income.That should satisfy all parties. The builder becomes rich, the android wins his freedom, and the victims of any unfortunate future attacks at least have a wealthy inventor to sue rather than someone saddled with a lerge construction-debt and no assets to show for it.
Jon Irenicus:Keep in mind rationality is not a synonym for an IQ of a certain level. Smarter does not mean more rational in the context being used here (i.e. the criteria for moral agency.)
What I find intriguing in this thread is that "rights" are being decided based on whether or not the agents are rational. However, from an outsider's perspective, who is to say an agent is rational? What difference does it make? I can walk up to a wild bear and say: "You do not have the right to steal my breakfast. These fried eggs are my rightful property. I will defend my rightful property to the death, if I must." but the bear will still eat me and my breakfast. In fact, I would be wise to assume that the bear treats me as an invader of bear-territory, translation: I am violating his property rights. He will certainly treat me that way. Effectively, all I can observe are his actions and he might certainly be acting rationally.
LanceH: Jonas:To the hive mind the destruction of individual "beings" is no different from the way we trim our toenails.I would be cautious bestowing human rights on hive-members.
Charles Anthony: LanceH: Jonas:To the hive mind the destruction of individual "beings" is no different from the way we trim our toenails.I would be cautious bestowing human rights on hive-members. By doing what? In practical terms, what exactly would that "caution" entail?
I think we'd first have to study them to understand them.If they possess weapons that are powerful enough to kill all humans, and yet they refrain from using them, then that is good reason to trust them.If they're like smart ants or bees then they are simply sisters with common genetic material which primes them for self sacrifice in the common interest, but that needn't preclude them. They do not always obey the queen when she is acting against the best interests of the hive, and sometimes they stage a coup d'etat to replace her.Even if the queen directs many of their actions is no reason to bar them, any more than we should bar employees of a domineering company.We need to understand their motivation. We need scouts in their community, talking to them, finding out what it is they expect to gain by co-operating with humans.We must find out whether they make war with neighbouring hives, and if so for what reason.Actually, if you look back on human history, with all its wars and murders and bigotry, it is perhaps more likely that THEY won't trust US.
In virtue of what does the bear possess rights? It's silly to speak of a bear violating a right, as one cannot even in principle demand compensation for it - it's just an animal.
Jon Irenicus:In virtue of what does the bear possess rights?
Jon Irenicus:It's silly to speak of a bear violating a right, as one cannot even in principle demand compensation for it - it's just an animal.
1) Your rights are not conditional upon how you deal with a violation. Whether you seek compensation or revenge is irrelevant. In fact, you may forgive too.
2) It is only silly if you know for certain it is actually a bear. It could be a human in a bear's costume. Alternatively, it could be dark out and you may not be able to see whether it is a bear or a human. Furthermore, it could very well be a human acting like a wild animal.
LanceH,
It sounds like you are suggesting that we treat them as a newly discovered human race. In other words, we give them the benefit of the doubt of having human rights.
Do we do so because it is morally correct? [I do not know for certain.]
or
Do we just do so because it is prudent and in our self-interest?
Ultimately, no matter what the choice, what motivates our behavior can not be observed.
Ok, I think we agree. The second is an epistemological problem, not ontological.