gotlucky: Anenome: It is possible therefore, in principle, for a government to use force and never aggress. It is possible in theory that a government could have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and never aggress, but it is also possible in theory that everyone in America could burn all their cash tomorrow at noon.
Anenome: It is possible therefore, in principle, for a government to use force and never aggress.
It is possible therefore, in principle, for a government to use force and never aggress.
It is possible in theory that a government could have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and never aggress, but it is also possible in theory that everyone in America could burn all their cash tomorrow at noon.
And if you were standing here telling me that cash will not ignite, that would be relevant.
Anenome: And if you were standing here telling me that cash will not ignite, that would be relevant.
No, that is not the point. In theory, you could have a monopoly on anything without using aggression, but it would only be on a small scale, because otherwise someone else would enter the market. For example, look at cable tv monopolies in towns. Many areas, and hopefully most, in America allow competition in cable tv now. The only way Comcast or Verizon could have a monopoly in any given town would be through force, unless the town was small enough where it would not be profitable for the competitor to set up shop.
It's like that with government. You could not have a government monopoly in an area unless it was a small town. There would just be too much competition otherwise. The only way you could maintain a government monopoly in, say, the city of New York would be to aggress against any competitors.
So, we can imagine a government monopoly existing in New York without using aggression, and we can imagine all people in New York burning all their cash tomorrow at noon. But neither will happen in the real world.
gotlucky: In theory, you could have a monopoly on anything without using aggression, but it would only be on a small scale, because otherwise someone else would enter the market. For example, look at cable tv monopolies in towns. Many areas, and hopefully most, in America allow competition in cable tv now. The only way Comcast or Verizon could have a monopoly in any given town would be through force, unless the town was small enough where it would not be profitable for the competitor to set up shop. It's like that with government. You could not have a government monopoly in an area unless it was a small town. There would just be too much competition otherwise. The only way you could maintain a government monopoly in, say, the city of New York would be to aggress against any competitors. So, we can imagine a government monopoly existing in New York without using aggression, and we can imagine all people in New York burning all their cash tomorrow at noon. But neither will happen in the real world.
So you're qualifying that non-aggression in a state would only be possible in small jurisdictions, because "otherwise someone else would enter the market."
Good. In the autarchic republic I propose, the size of a jurisdiction is dependent on the number of people whom accept that jurisdiction and subscribe to it.
So, say that New York overnight became autarchic. We tell all the people that they may form or join any jurisdiction they like.
Undoubtedly, many cities within New York state and New York City itself would immediately be split into smaller enclaves along ethnic and cultural boundaries, as well as idological boundaries, and the like.
This is precisely what I'd like to occur. I want to encourage competition between jurisdictions, competition for citizens.
These are not monopolies established by forced but rather established by voluntary cooperation. Precisely that.
No, I am not saying that. A state by definition has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, aggressive or otherwise. I specifically was talking about governments. A government does not have to be a state. For example, you can have the Olympic government. It is the governing body of the Olympics.
The problem with your autarkic jurisdictions is that they are still jurisdictions. They still hold the monopoly on legitimate violence. They are still states, however free they may be in comparison to what we have today.
And the point I was making regarding the size of these non-aggressive governments was that they would have to be incredibly small. New York City wouldn't cut it. The area population would have to be so small that no other government would form due to competition.
gotlucky:A state by definition has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, aggressive or otherwise. I specifically was talking about governments. A government does not have to be a state. For example, you can have the Olympic government. It is the governing body of the Olympics.
Those are largely voluntary associations, where if you disagree with the 'governing body' your recourse is generally to leave the organization. In a sense, this autarchic state converts jurisdictions to that same mechanism.
gotlucky:The problem with your autarkic jurisdictions is that they are still jurisdictions. They still hold the monopoly on legitimate violence. They are still states, however free they may be in comparison to what we have today.
Therefore what? They are jurisdictions because within their boundaries there is law, and law by its nature has a monopoly within its jurisdiction on what is legal.
Are you saying that a jurisdiction would prevent another jurisdiction from cropping up inside its boundaries? Because that's precisely what can indeed happen within this autarchy, and the original jurisdiction cannot stop the formation of a new jurisdiction within its boundaries, precisely because the limits of each jurisdiction is made up of the property boundaries of those whom accept that jurisdiction. So, for a new jurisdiction to crop up within the old, all that's required is for a one or more citizens to repudiate X existing jurisdiction and declare a new charter city-Y made up of the contiguous property boundaries of these founding member(s).
Again, there's a significant change in what a jurisdiction means, how it is established and how it maintained in this new idea of autarchy, and applying old concepts of immovable and eternal jurisdictions does not work.
I begin with the assumption that jurisdictional boundaries should serve people rather than the other way around, and that the government owns no territory or land at all. It's jurisdiction is limited to those whom accept it and nothing more. And they can secede from it at will and join a new jurisdiction or even live in a jurisdiction-free zone.
gotlucky:And the point I was making regarding the size of these non-aggressive governments was that they would have to be incredibly small. New York City wouldn't cut it. The area population would have to be so small that no other government would form due to competition.
I conceive of a poplitical structure of increasingly abstract principles governing the extension from city to nation. It would go something like this:
Nation --> State --> City
So far so good, anyone familiar with the American system will be quite familiar. But the definitions of those terms is going to be quite different in order to serve this idea of autarchy.
In this structure, the term 'nation' would be more like the UN than the US Federal government, because the Nation in an autarchy has only one law that it will enforce: voluntaryism.
For anyone to join the society, they must agree to abide by pure voluntaryism. The national government is a confederal government, one which the states and cities can secede from at will and start their own national government, but that is besides the point.
States will be more like the US Federal government, controlling a territory made up of the contiguous boundaries of member cities and the unpopulated regions in-between. States in this capacity have too a very limited law set, composed of enforcing a statement of negative restrictions on itself and member cities within it (akin to the bill of rights and nothing more).
And City-states will be more like the US state-system. Here is where the major legislation is proposed and accepted or not by each individual citizen.
The main purpose of a structure like this is to provide an overarching principle that anyone can agree with in order to extend others into it. For instance, should a country like say the Phillipines decide to accept voluntaryism and adopt an autarchic system, they could contract to join the confed as a State by agreeing to voluntaryism and them begin setting up autarchic cities out of their existing cities.
Similarly, if anyone believes they need a better bill of rights, or that the old one isn't serving, they can leave that state and set up a new one without leaving the nation at large. The confed's National role is to make sure the states live up to voluntaryism.
In essence, were it to succeed on an international level, the principle of voluntaryism would be catapulted to the central governing legal principle of humanity.
Which, I think, would be a fantastic turn of events for the entire world.
It looks like you have put a lot of thought into this idea of yours, but there are still certain aspects of it that are contradictory. In another thread, Autolykos pointed out that a court of last resort must necessarily use aggression to maintain its status as a court of last resort. Therefore, your autarkic governments are still states. And all states are aggressive.
Anenome: Those are largely voluntary associations, where if you disagree with the 'governing body' your recourse is generally to leave the organization. In a sense, this autarchic state converts jurisdictions to that same mechanism.
See above. Also, the problem with a jurisdiction over any specific physical area (as opposed to perhaps jurisdiction over specific people or groups instead) is that it ends up being a "love it or leave it" argument. So long as the governing body maintains control over a geographic area, leaving the organization requires leaving the area.
Anenome: Therefore what? They are jurisdictions because within their boundaries there is law, and law by its nature has a monopoly within its jurisdiction on what is legal.
This is not true. Law by its nature is not a monopoly. Laws are social norms that are enforced through violence. Statutory law is when the state issues decrees as to what these norms shall be. Case law is more decentralized, as judges build upon precedent to decide what these norms shall be. Customary law is the most decentralized, as instead of a group of individuals (such as the state or judges) deciding what is to be law, the customs and traditions of the community are what cause certain norms to become law.
Law is just a set of rules, only people or groups of people can have monopolies. However, there cannot be conflicting laws within the same area, as they are also norms. Perhaps that is what you meant.
Anenome: Are you saying that a jurisdiction would prevent another jurisdiction from cropping up inside its boundaries? Because that's precisely what can indeed happen within this autarchy, and the original jurisdiction cannot stop the formation of a new jurisdiction within its boundaries, precisely because the limits of each jurisdiction is made up of the property boundaries of those whom accept that jurisdiction. So, for a new jurisdiction to crop up within the old, all that's required is for a one or more citizens to repudiate X existing jurisdiction and declare a new charter city-Y made up of the contiguous property boundaries of these founding member(s).
The problem with this idea is that there is still aggression. The governments controlling these jurisdictions necessarily are aggressive, otherwise they would not be in control of the particular geographic area defined as its jurisdiction.
This all has to do with the idea of a court of last resort. Either these governments have the final say or they do not. If they do not have the final say as to what goes on in their jurisdiction, then there is no reason to claim that there is a singular government in any given area.
Anenome: Again, there's a significant change in what a jurisdiction means, how it is established and how it maintained in this new idea of autarchy, and applying old concepts of immovable and eternal jurisdictions does not work. I begin with the assumption that jurisdictional boundaries should serve people rather than the other way around, and that the government owns no territory or land at all. It's jurisdiction is limited to those whom accept it and nothing more. And they can secede from it at will and join a new jurisdiction or even live in a jurisdiction-free zone.
I think you would greatly benefit from reading Clayton's two articles, What Law Is and A Praxeological Account of Law.
Anenome: I conceive of a poplitical structure of increasingly abstract principles governing the extension from city to nation. It would go something like this: Nation --> State --> City
Regarding this quote and the rest of your post, your concept of an autarkic structure is still a state. It has courts of last resort, which are necessarily aggressive. So long as you have courts of last resort, your idea is minarchist in nature.
It depends how you define "liberty."
I define it as: freedom from aggression.
Thus defined, liberty is IMO the most important political value, i.e. the value which should be honored to the exclusion of all others in all political considerations.
But it is not the ultimate value in life.
Saying that we ought to have liberty is easy in comparison to saying what we ought to do with that liberty.
gotlucky:It looks like you have put a lot of thought into this idea of yours, but there are still certain aspects of it that are contradictory. In another thread, Autolykos pointed out that a court of last resort must necessarily use aggression to maintain its status as a court of last resort. Therefore, your autarkic governments are still states. And all states are aggressive.
This seems to be the theme so I'll stop your quote here, with respect.
Thanks for the articles, I'll do my homework and come back. I hope to be able to show with principled rationale why my courts of alst resort are not innately aggressive.
All I'll say for now is that they do not control a jurisdiction they exist in, they do not have "final say on what goes on in their territory," they are only there for dispute resolution both civil and criminal.
I agree they are something akin to a state, because they use public-sanctioned coercion, but I do not agree that they are necessarily aggressive.
Liberty is not the ultimate value
This seems like a non sequitur, since it could easily be spun against a socialist, in that they are only 'armchair socialists' since they use and consume capitalist products and private property in a society where there are thriving private enterprises, and should move to North Korea if they'd like a more socialistic society.
But in both cases, the ancap and the socialist aren't violating anything in their beliefs. The ancap doesn't say to stop using government controlled services, or that belief in ancap necessitates the cessation of all public property, but that the status of such 'property' is illegitimate, vice versa for the socialist/communist who doesn't believe that using private property in the current order violates their belief system, only that private property is illegitimate/leads to 'exploitation'.
@Gotlucky:
From your suggested reading:
Hans Hoppe, in a recent lecture[2], defines the State in the following manner:
Let me begin with the definition of a state. What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state? This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decision-making or be subject to his final review. In particular, this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving himself be adjudicated by him or his agent. And, implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge, as the second defining characteristic of a state, is the agent's power to tax: to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services.
Based on this definition of a state, it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist. For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws. And he who can legislate can also tax. Surely, this is an enviable position.
Comparing this to my proposal for autarchy, there are considerable differences. Perhaps the most glaring being that I would prohibit any form of compulsory taxation constitutionally (clearly a violation of voluntaryism otherwise), relying on fee for service and voluntary subscription-payments.
Neither would the court be able to insist that "all conflicts... be brought to him for ultimate decision-making or be subject to his final review." As court of last resort, it must be appealed to by a complainant and cannot demand conflcits come to it. Indeed, I assume most conflicts would be resolved in private courts.
Neither does my proposal allow that conflict involving the state-mechanisms be adjudicated by "himself or his agent" as any conflict involving the state-mechanisms would be adjudicated by a 3rd party court outside that jurisdiction, taking that jurisdiction and the complainant as equal parts.
Lastly, does the court in my proposal even have a monopoly, even as a court of last resort?
That really depends on how the court is brought into being. You might assume that courts in this proposal would arise the way they do now, as permanent entities, with marble halls as political appointees. But I'm very much a fan of ad hoc processes in a libertarian political system. These courts of last resort could very well be drawn from the private judges of the region, or a collection of judges from local jurisdictions, operating as a panel, with or without jury depending.
I see a need for a court to be able to use coercion at some point, by which I mean to use the function known as a court order, in order to right certain wrongs, meaning to effect justice. As long as this coercion is always used to oppose aggression, meaning it is responsive coercion only, then the court is not innately aggressive.
Neither is it innately aggressive if it doesn't tax, nor demand final say on things.
The one area where I see problem is that as court of last resort combined with fee for service it comes close to being able to de facto tax and demand any price it wants.
However, I think this is checked by the fact that jurisdictions compete with each other for citizens. Should one court become unreasonable, it's a simple thing to repudiate that jurisdiction and walk across the street and join another or form your own.
Competition for courts is the result. Which means, no monopolies.
Though, I want to improve that mechanism if possible.
@Autolykos:
From Clayton's What is Law post:
This definition immediately raises the question of how disputes can be resolved between asymmetrically powerful parties. In modern law systems, the aggressor (accused) has an incentive to resolve the conflict with his victim by means of law because the state will immediately retaliate against the accused for failure to comply with a court trial. In other words, the state offers the options of non-violent dispute resolution or immediate, overwhelming retaliatory violence (appear in court or be arrested or possibly even killed for failure to comply). In a stateless society, it appears that an aggressor would have no incentive to seek non-violent resolution of a dispute with his victim. After all, an aggressor usually will not attack unless he reasonably believes he can get away with the attack in the first place. That is, he has already calculated that he can win a martial contest with the victim.
Therefore, the victim must be able to present a sufficient threat to the accused in order to motivate the aggressor to come to court. That is, both parties must have an incentive to seek a peaceful settlement of the matter. Law and security, then, are inseparable. You cannot have real rights without the capacity to present a real threat to aggressors who refuse peaceful settlement of disputes. In other words, if you steal my television, and I send you a notice saying, “You must appear in court regarding the matter of the theft of my television,” I must also be able to take forcible action in the event you refuse to settle the matter through non-violent means. Otherwise, you will simply ignore my summons.
This seems to be the central flaw of Anarchism in practice, namely that the powerful can avoid justice. I've never read anyone suggest anything that seems to mitigate this flaw.
You yourself even suggested that the party obtaining a judgment against an aggressor is the one whom should also carry out the enforcement of the ruling. Implicitly, you think this would become a contract for sale, a sort of enforcement market. Someone with a judgment against another could sell his claim to an enforcer at a discount and leave it to them to enforce it. They would then show up at the defendant's place, army in tow, and threaten them into paying. Apparently.
That is supposed to be better than simply having a court with coercive ability issue a judgment and have neutral third-parties peaceably sanction bank accounts or property in order to rectify a claim.
It should be noted that none of the coercion used by a court in this process can be categorized as aggression. It would all be responsive coercion in the pursuit of justice. Thus, there are no moral grounds to oppose such an action.
Anenome: Comparing this to my proposal for autarchy, there are considerable differences. Perhaps the most glaring being that I would prohibit any form of compulsory taxation constitutionally (clearly a violation of voluntaryism otherwise), relying on fee for service and voluntary subscription-payments. Neither would the court be able to insist that "all conflicts... be brought to him for ultimate decision-making or be subject to his final review." As court of last resort, it must be appealed to by a complainant and cannot demand conflcits come to it. Indeed, I assume most conflicts would be resolved in private courts. Neither does my proposal allow that conflict involving the state-mechanisms be adjudicated by "himself or his agent" as any conflict involving the state-mechanisms would be adjudicated by a 3rd party court outside that jurisdiction, taking that jurisdiction and the complainant as equal parts.
What happens when the state appeals? The state might be forced to go to a third party initially, but so long as it controls the court of last resort, the dispute will eventually fall under its own domain. Also, don't forget that today, not all SCOTUS cases are brought to them by agents of the state. People appeal to the SCOTUS all the time, though it may take a long time to work its way up there. So, even if the court of last resort itself doesn't have the power to demand cases be brought to it, so long as someone appeals the case enough (whether it is citizens or agents of the state), the case will go to the court of last resort. That is what makes it a court of last resort.
Anenome: Lastly, does the court in my proposal even have a monopoly, even as a court of last resort? That really depends on how the court is brought into being. You might assume that courts in this proposal would arise the way they do now, as permanent entities, with marble halls as political appointees. But I'm very much a fan of ad hoc processes in a libertarian political system. These courts of last resort could very well be drawn from the private judges of the region, or a collection of judges from local jurisdictions, operating as a panel, with or without jury depending. I see a need for a court to be able to use coercion at some point, by which I mean to use the function known as a court order, in order to right certain wrongs, meaning to effect justice. As long as this coercion is always used to oppose aggression, meaning it is responsive coercion only, then the court is not innately aggressive.
This is where we disagree, I think. I don't think that courts ought to have that power. My ideal is mediation. After all, the reason people bring disputes to a court is precisely because they want to avoid violent conflict. I don't believe that courts should be binding, as they would not have resolved the conflict. This does not mean that I don't believe violence shouldn't be used. It's just that so long as a third party, such as a judge, decides what the proper punishment should be, we can't really know what the actual resolution would have been. I want to get rid of third parties ruling over others.
Let's just take an extreme case to look at, such as murder. The only reason a murderer would go to mediation is because he does not want death by the family/friends of his victim. So he goes to mediation in order to resolve the dispute. If the murderer and the family of the victim cannot come to an resolution, the murderer is kind of screwed. Essentially, he will be put to death if he does not seek mediation and find a mutually agreeable solution with the family of the victim.
So there is the threat of violence looming over the murderer, and unless he resolves the dispute, he will be killed. The court itself does not need to order some arbitrary punishment in order to seek justice. After all, what would be justice for the victims family? Maybe they do desire the murderer be put to death. Maybe they are a poor family and they have rent to pay and food to put on the table, so they accept money as restitution instead of execution. It's up to the family of the victim what they consider to be a resolution. But if it's up to the judge, it may very well not line up with justice for the victim, which is what justice really ought to be about.
The form of law that I prefer is customary law. Law is formed by social norms and customs in a customary law society. In other words, the process of resolving disputes is the mechanism that ends up creating the law. Have you read about the Somali Xeer? They have a very interesting and robust customary law system that has been serving them well. It isn't perfect, but it also hasn't had much outside influence. Anyway, it's nice to see that the standard of living in Somalia has been improving dramatically ever since the collapse of their state.
Anenome: This seems to be the central flaw of Anarchism in practice, namely that the powerful can avoid justice. I've never read anyone suggest anything that seems to mitigate this flaw.
It is a flaw the nature of reality in general, not anarchism in particular. In any form of society, if someone is powerful enough, he will be able to avoid justice. Roderick Long addresses this concern here.
Anenome: You yourself even suggested that the party obtaining a judgment against an aggressor is the one whom should also carry out the enforcement of the ruling. Implicitly, you think this would become a contract for sale, a sort of enforcement market. Someone with a judgment against another could sell his claim to an enforcer at a discount and leave it to them to enforce it. They would then show up at the defendant's place, army in tow, and threaten them into paying. Apparently. That is supposed to be better than simply having a court with coercive ability issue a judgment and have neutral third-parties peaceably sanction bank accounts or property in order to rectify a claim. It should be noted that none of the coercion used by a court in this process can be categorized as aggression. It would all be responsive coercion in the pursuit of justice. Thus, there are no moral grounds to oppose such an action.
I realize that this was addressed to Autolykos, but I think my post above addresses this issue, specifically the example about the murderer and mediation.
the powerful can avoid justice
... which is infinitely preferable to the present social order where the powerful never come to justice because they are the very ones who administer it.
Clayton -
Clayton -"
+1
The only one worth following is the one who leads... not the one who pulls; for it is not the direction that condemns the puller, it is the rope that he holds.
I'm becoming more and more skeptical that there has ever been a just war at all. This is not because I believe violence is never justifiable, it clearly is sometimes justifiable. It's just that I don't know of any form of organized fighting force that has ever been free of aggressive tendencies, though perhaps some have come close (medieval Europe, and maybe some tribal cultures). The idea of a highly organized yet purely property defensive army has never existed that I know of. So, every war has involved some aspect of aggression on both sides, even when one side was apparently just defending itself.
The concept of "army" includes the phenomenon that Napolean described as electrifying men into self-sacrifice. A prerequisite for joining an army as we know it is subordinating all moral judgement to superior command. You are a killing device retaining of your human traits only the cognitive ability to outsmart the enemy on the battlefield. By contrast the only sort of army that I would fight in is one of temporary common interest, a sort of mercenary army where my only compensation is the tactical result, and I alone decide what actions are permissable in every single case to obtain that result.
Liberty is most definitely the ultimate goal and has innate value.
gotlucky: It looks like you have put a lot of thought into this idea of yours, but there are still certain aspects of it that are contradictory. In another thread, Autolykos pointed out that a court of last resort must necessarily use aggression to maintain its status as a court of last resort. Therefore, your autarkic governments are still states. And all states are aggressive.
**Starting to think Auto is sockpuppeting gotlucky **
@Anenome - Is your 'autarchy' based on De Puydt's 'panarchy' (a less confusing name in English) or are the similarities a coincidence?
thetabularasa,
I can assure you that I am not Autolykos. I don't see how my post would give anyone that idea.
ok getting back to the topic .liberty is natural i think because slavery is unnatural. anyone agree
liberty itself is not a virtue, but is a condition under which humans may act
I agree but I don't think it proves much... after all, there's no necessary reason why people need to have moral latitude. Perhaps we're all better off by virtue of the reduction in the degrees of moral freedom, kind of like how it's easier to read in a library where everyone is required to keep quiet versus in a subway station where people are free to be basically as loud as they want.
Aristippus: @Anenome - Is your 'autarchy' based on De Puydt's 'panarchy' (a less confusing name in English) or are the similarities a coincidence?
I've never heard of him, so must be coincidence. Thanks for the research lead. Let's see here...
Panarchism is a political philosophy emphasizing each individual's right to freely join and leave the jurisdiction of any governments they choose, without being forced to move from their current locale.
Wow, I'm impressed so far.
Although, I'm still not sure if it would be practical to truly allow people to remain in place when changing jurisdictions. I currently assume that a jurisdiction must have contiguous borders. Still considering consequences of any other system. In such cases, my default position has been to leave it up to the city charter of what they want members to agree to going in. I assume most would ask seceders to leave the contiguous boundaries simply for practical reasons.
The system I propose does rely heavil on foot voting as a limit on government power and even the slightest whiff of aggression or overreach:
"Here's Milton Friedman's perspective on foot voting...
Here's Friedrich Hayek's perspective on foot voting (via Alan O. Ebenstein)
The section on the Tiebout model is especially interesting, a quick section:
Tiebout describes municipalities within a region as offering varying baskets of goods (government services) at a variety of prices (tax rates). Given that individuals have differing personal valuations on these services and varying ability to pay the attendant taxes, individuals will move from one local community to another until they find the one which maximizes their personal utility. The model states that through the choice process of individuals, jurisdictions and residents will determine an equilibrium provision of local public goods in accord with the tastes of residents, thereby sorting the population into optimum communities. The model has the benefit of solving two major problems with government provision of public goods: preference revelation and preference aggregation.
The Tiebout model relies on a set of basic assumptions. The primary assumptions are that consumers are free to choose their communities, enjoying perfect mobility and perfect information. This essentially means that they can move from community to community at no cost, and that they know everything they need to know about services provided by local governments and the tax rates of all local governments. The Tiebout model has been shown to be most accurate in suburban areas with many different independent communities.[citation needed] Moving between communities in these areas tends to have the lowest costs, and the set of possible choices is very diverse. In areas subject to rural flooding, Tiebout sorting explains why more affluent residents live in communities protected by river levees, while poorer residents tend to live without those expensive and rarely utilized protections.
The exact assumptions Tiebout made in his first statement of the model were:
Mobile Consumers: Consumers are free to choose where they live. There are no costs associated with moving.
Complete information.
Many communities to choose from.
Commuting is not an issue.
Public Goods do not spill over in terms of benefits/costs from one community to the next.
An optimal city size exists: Economies of scale.
Communities try to achieve "optimal size".
Communities are rational and try to keep the public 'bad' consumers away.
Now, what I find interesting here is that a oceanborne community with internet access, such as the seasteading society I suggest, fulfills most and perhaps all of these assumptions:
1. My concept of easily created micro-jurisdictions established at no cost. And moving property that floats is the cheapest way to move anything, a floating house or a factory or the like moves cheaply, whereas costs would be prohibitive on land to move large installations.
2. Closest we can humanly come to this is open information available online from anywhere.
3. My system would facilitate and encourage this, and I think it would arise naturally.
4. In a floating community without property tax or rent and more space than you know what to do with, it makes sense to move your floating house close to your place of employment, thus commuting could be absolutely minimized to basically nothing. Ignoring the increasing numbers telecommuting as well.
5. Since public policy is individually decided upon, something like welfare cannot be forced upon anyone, much less other outside jurisdictions. You'd likely have many cities with the equivalent of leftist and rightist jurisdictions living next door and not interfering in each other's governance concepts (and with no one to blame but their own ideas when things go wrong).
6. Optimal size would change based on many factors and there would be no artificial limits either way.
7. Since communities wouldn't be forced to accept members, this is possible.
8. I assume many communities would expel bad neighbors, polluters or law-breakers otherwise, and because there's no communal property this would be possible.
- Polycentric law: this I'll need to research more in depth, sounds interesting, dunno if it gels with my autarchic concept yet.
- Also my first time seeing anything written on open source governance--I'd come to the same conclusion myself in terms of methodology, though I wouldn't combine it with democracy.
@gotlucky:
I have one caveat for you, which is that in the system I will propose, because most of the character of a jurisdiction is set forth in its founding charter, much like the US sets up its states, and most law is made at that same level, you'd be free to setup a jurisdiction which had no court of last resort and pursued the legal system you set forth in your reply to me.
I was merely setting for how I would setup a jurisdiction I wanted to live in.
A primary goal of this society is conceptual competition in politics. To be an experimental ground for political ideas of all stripes--as long as they remain voluntary.
Which is why I've always maintained that people would be free not only to change jurisdictions at will, but to refrain from joining any jurisdiction at all, in which case they'd be only under the national label and left alone as long as they maintain voluntaryism within their borders.
That, I think, is the closest anyone could come to creating a real ancap society that would survive long-term.
I hope at least someone can appreciate that aspect of my idea.
A libertarian system can tolerate not merely anarchy, but even communism. I'm sure under the system I propose that some would setup communist charter systems. Honestly, neither I, nor I think you or anyone else here, would have any problem with people trying to live communistically as long as they do so willingly, do not prevent dissenters from leavint their sphere of influence, and do not try to force it on the rest of us.
mikachusetts:I'm kind of busy at work, so I'm only responding to a few points. Don't take it as a dodge from the other ones.
Okay, but do you plan on ever responding to the other ones?
mikachusetts:No, but there are factors that effect one commodity becoming money over another. Non-perishibility, dvisibility, recongizeability, etc. -- these factors effect what becomes money and what doesn't. That gold and silver became monies is no coincidence, its simply because they were desireable commodities which also met the various other criteria better than any other commodity on hand. Ceteris paribus, if gold didn't have these properties (even if it was still highly desired), it would not have become as widespread a medium of exchange as it did.
Ceteris paribus, if gold didn't have these properties (even if it was still highly desired), it would not have become as widespread a medium of exchange as it did.
My point was that people are bound by no law of nature to use gold, silver, cockle shells, etc. as their medium of exchange. As far as whether it's a coincidence that certain things have been preferred over others in that area, it depends on the definition being used for "coincidence". What's yours?
mikachusetts:I think the is-ought gap is over-extended and invoked as a quick excuse without being properly understood.
If you're accusing me of not properly understanding the is-ought problem, the least you could do is say so explicitly. I'd also appreciate it if you'd go on to show just how my understanding of it is improper.
mikachusetts:I also think that you have something else in mind than I do when you talk about value judgements being objective.
That could very well be true. What definition for "objective" are you using?
mikachusetts:Simply put, some values are constitutive of others. That is, you can't actually achieve some ends without also aiming at a variety of other ends. If you value end X, and end X requires that you also value Y and Z, then you ought to value Y and Z. Everyone values end X, therefore everyone ought to value Y and Z. This is roughly the logical format of the neo-Aristotelians. If you think this runs aground of the is-ought gap, than so does any statement about means and ends, such as "if you want to satisfy your hunger, than you ought to eat something." The only places you can argue the syllogism above is whether or not there are constitutive values, and whether or not everyone holds the same end. I'm not going to argue those points though, because I don't agree / understand the justifications for them.
If you value end X, and end X requires that you also value Y and Z, then you ought to value Y and Z.
Everyone values end X, therefore everyone ought to value Y and Z.
This is roughly the logical format of the neo-Aristotelians. If you think this runs aground of the is-ought gap, than so does any statement about means and ends, such as "if you want to satisfy your hunger, than you ought to eat something." The only places you can argue the syllogism above is whether or not there are constitutive values, and whether or not everyone holds the same end. I'm not going to argue those points though, because I don't agree / understand the justifications for them.
Well, I think it's more complicated than that. I see an ought-statement as really expressing the speaker's expectation about something. "You ought to eat something" then would mean "I expect you to eat something". The implication of this, as I see it, is that no one is physically bound (i.e. by some law of the universe) to do what one expects him to do. So for example, I can tell someone all day that, if he's hungry, then I expect him to eat something, but that doesn't mean he will. Even simply telling him that I expect eating something to satisfy his hunger doesn't mean he will eat something or that he'll even want to eat something. Does that make sense? It's an issue of expectations vs. reality.
mikachusetts:First off, I've never seen someone use objective to mean "this is how it must be." The statement "that tree has green leaves" is objective, but it doesn't mean that under different circumstances, it couldn't have been otherwise. And I don't think I implied anything that would suggest some independent force in the universe which dictates norms in advance.
Would you take the statement "it's wrong for a tree to have green leaves" to be subjective or objective? I would take it as subjective, because there's no way to determine objectively (i.e. empirically) whether something is wrong or not (I don't mean "wrong" in the sense of "incorrect").
mikachusetts:But regarding Austrianism, I don't see a problem. Value subjectivism, as it relates to AE, is simply the fact that the value of goods comes from the various individual preferences for that good, and not from the nature of the good itself. It says that if someone acts, it is because they value the expected end of that action over all other expected ends. This is all that AE requires regarding value subjectivism.
I think phrases like "the value of goods comes from..." can easily be taken as objective statements - i.e. that even if the value of a good doesn't come from the nature of the good itself, it nevertheless necessarily has a particular value (i.e. its value can't change). But certainly two people can value a good differently, so it makes no sense to me to even say that a good has a value (i.e. one that's independent of any mind/observer).
mikachusetts:So if it turns out that we can say "that value was incorrect," or "this value is moral, but not that one," this hasn't changed a single thing. If I point out that some items became money becuase people recognized inherent traits in those items which made them better mediums of exchange than others, then again, this hasn't change a thing.
Here I'd say that certain commodities became widely used as media of exchange because people valued the characteristics those commodities had vis-a-vis media of exchange. That doesn't mean people were bound to value those characteristics to those extents. The characteristics in those commodities were inherent, but the values that people imputed to them weren't.
However, it seems we might be using different definitions for "morality". My own definition for it has nothing to do with choosing correct means for given ends.
Hopefully I haven't jumped around too much with the above. Please let me know if anything I've stated seems inconsistent or unclear to you.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
thetabularasa:**Starting to think Auto is sockpuppeting gotlucky **
That's absolutely not true. GotLucky and I are different people.
Anemone:
First off, do you plan on responding to me in the other thread? It seems you're ignoring my last post there.
Second, what Clayton believes has no necessary bearing on what I believe. His beliefs are ultimately his own.
Anemone:This seems to be the central flaw of Anarchism in practice, namely that the powerful can avoid justice. I've never read anyone suggest anything that seems to mitigate this flaw.
First off, It's possible for anyone to avoid justice. There are many different forms of "power".
Second, on the one hand there's the fact that aggressors, by definition, do not seek peaceful, voluntary resolutions to disputes. On the other hand, it's possible for the aggressor to miscalculate his chances of success. It's also possible for the aggressor to not be successful at all, either immediately or ultimately.
I think the above muddies the waters quite a bit. The notion of a world where "the strong prey on the weak" is a simplistic Hobbesian fantasy. Things are much more complex than that in reality.
Anemone:You yourself even suggested that the party obtaining a judgment against an aggressor is the one whom should also carry out the enforcement of the ruling. Implicitly, you think this would become a contract for sale, a sort of enforcement market. Someone with a judgment against another could sell his claim to an enforcer at a discount and leave it to them to enforce it. They would then show up at the defendant's place, army [sic] in tow, and threaten them into paying. Apparently.
Your use of strawmen continues unabated, I see.
If the judgement is in favor of the plaintiff, why wouldn't the plaintiff himself actually possess the right to enforce the ruling? He's the injured party, after all. By ruling in favor of him, the court has granted legitimacy to the plaintiff to recover damages, forcibly if necessary. That doesn't mean he now has a license to use any amount of force he wishes, of course. If he and/or his agents are overzealous in recovering the damages, then the original defendant now has a cause of action against the original plaintiff and/or his agents.
Anemone:That is supposed to be better than simply having a court with coercive ability issue a judgment and have neutral third-parties peaceably sanction bank accounts or property in order to rectify a claim.
The court is (or at least is supposed to be) the neutral third party. Certainly there's no reason that, after the court has ruled in favor of the plaintiff, either the plaintiff or someone on his behalf - including, perhaps, the court itself - couldn't peaceably sanction bank accounts or other property in order to recover the damages. To maintain their reputation as "upstanding citizens", bankers and so forth would certainly be motivated to comply with court requests. Indeed, their refusal to comply could be considered obstruction of justice (I never thought that term could be used in a legitimate way in a voluntaryist society).
Anemone:It should be noted that none of the coercion used by a court in this process can be categorized as aggression. It would all be responsive coercion in the pursuit of justice. Thus, there are no moral grounds to oppose such an action.
Presuming that the court actually made the correct judgement (which may be impossible to determine), then I agree. But that's beside my point. It's not this coercion that I find necessarily aggressive - it's the coercion that the single "court of last resort", in order to maintain its status as such, uses against those who (would) try to compete against it.
Autolykos: Your use of strawmen continues unabated, I see.
I'd call that a good-faith summary of previous statements of yours and others along the same lines. Seems to me you're prone to labelling anything not a direct quote as a strawman, but w/e. I don't see anything unfair to your position or ridiculing it or unfairly diminishing it in that quote.
Autolykos:If the judgement is in favor of the plaintiff, why wouldn't the plaintiff himself actually possess the right to enforce the ruling?
I never said nor implied they couldn't. But most wouldn't because they aren't equipped for it. Those who tried it would likely step over the line into aggression and face repurcussions. In practice then, a retribution market would arise, as I suggested.
Autolykos: Anemone:That is supposed to be better than simply having a court with coercive ability issue a judgment and have neutral third-parties peaceably sanction bank accounts or property in order to rectify a claim. The court is (or at least is supposed to be) the neutral third party. Certainly there's no reason that, after the court has ruled in favor of the plaintiff, either the plaintiff or someone on his behalf - including, perhaps, the court itself - couldn't peaceably sanction bank accounts or other property in order to recover the damages.
The court is (or at least is supposed to be) the neutral third party. Certainly there's no reason that, after the court has ruled in favor of the plaintiff, either the plaintiff or someone on his behalf - including, perhaps, the court itself - couldn't peaceably sanction bank accounts or other property in order to recover the damages.
So you're supporting the idea of a court order? That is in fact a publicly sanctioned use of force. I didn't realize you agreed with me on this issue.
Autolykos:To maintain their reputation as "upstanding citizens", bankers and so forth would certainly be motivated to comply with court requests. Indeed, their refusal to comply could be considered obstruction of justice (I never thought that term could be used in a legitimate way in a voluntaryist society).
Not necessarily. And here's where you need a court of last resort. In a situation where anyone can set up a private court and try to get any conflict into it, businessmen would be foolish to accept any court's order to give up property for a judgment, because that would be too easy a scam.
That's not an easy problem to solve unless you have a recognized court with public sanction for use of responsive coercion.
Neither do we have arbitration courts today handing out court orders to banks to pay up. At least, I don't think we do...
It's a question of how you make any court order legally binding. It can be done through a court connected explicitly with the law of that society, and not so much with a private court.
Autolykos: Anemone:It should be noted that none of the coercion used by a court in this process can be categorized as aggression. It would all be responsive coercion in the pursuit of justice. Thus, there are no moral grounds to oppose such an action. Presuming that the court actually made the correct judgement (which may be impossible to determine), then I agree.
Presuming that the court actually made the correct judgement (which may be impossible to determine), then I agree.
Well, good, but such can never be known ultimately. If your goal is perfect cosmic justice, then we will never see it. Closest we can get is to have a reasonable standard of justice and not outright miscarriages.
Autolykos: But that's beside my point. It's not this coercion that I find necessarily aggressive - it's the coercion that the single "court of last resort", in order to maintain its status as such, uses against those who (would) try to compete against it.
But that's beside my point. It's not this coercion that I find necessarily aggressive - it's the coercion that the single "court of last resort", in order to maintain its status as such, uses against those who (would) try to compete against it.
In the autarchic society I will propose, a court comes about because of voluntary agreement between two or more people whom can setup a court in their charter for a new city-state (or not). The court has jurisdiction over only those whom accept that jurisdiction explicitly by joining that city-state. The court ceases to exist when the last citizen repudiates the jurisdiction and walks away from the charter leaving it member-less.
Thus, in an autarchic society predicated on voluntaryism, a court comes about as a result of voluntary choice, has jurisdiction as a result of voluntary choice, and ceases to exist as a consequence of voluntary choice.
There is no room in there for your theory of ultimate coercion to maintain its position.
I agree that your definition would apply to other currently existing political systems, both in theory and in practice, but at least in theory it should not apply to my proposal.
Anemone:I'd call that a good-faith summary of previous statements of yours and others along the same lines. Seems to me you're prone to labelling anything not a direct quote as a strawman, but w/e. I don't see anything unfair to your position or ridiculing it or unfairly diminishing it in that quote.
So you did not intend the following to ridicule my position? "Then would then show up at the defendant's place, army in tow, and threaten them into paying. Apparently." Really? I don't believe you. Hence I stand by my accusation.
Anemone:I never said nor implied they couldn't. But most wouldn't because they aren't equipped for it.
Possessing the right to enforce the ruling says nothing about being "equipped" to enforce it. So once again, you're barking up the wrong tree, perhaps intentionally.
Anemone:Those who tried it would likely step over the line into aggression and face repurcussions. In practice then, a retribution market would arise, as I suggested.
Here you seem to be more concerned with reassuring yourself rather than convincing me. Tell me, what makes you think that those who tried to enforce rulings in their favor would likely step over the line into aggression?
Anemone:So you're supporting the idea of a court order? That is in fact a publicly sanctioned use of force. I didn't realize you agreed with me on this issue.
I don't really understand your point here. It would ultimately be the plaintiff (if the ruling is found in his favor) who in effect has public sanction to use a certain amount/kind of force against the defendant. What effectively gives public sanction there is his case being heard in a reputable court.
Anemone: Autolykos:To maintain their reputation as "upstanding citizens", bankers and so forth would certainly be motivated to comply with court requests. Indeed, their refusal to comply could be considered obstruction of justice (I never thought that term could be used in a legitimate way in a voluntaryist society). Not necessarily.
Not necessarily.
Well why not?
Anemone:And here's where you need a court of last resort. In a situation where anyone can set up a private court and try to get any conflict into it, businessmen would be foolish to accept any court's order to give up property for a judgment, because that would be too easy a scam. That's not an easy problem to solve unless you have a recognized court with public sanction for use of responsive coercion.
I agree that they would be foolish to accept just anyone's request to give up property in their care. But ultimately it's up to them, isn't it? In any case, I see no reason why only a single (i.e. one and only one) "court of last resort" could mitigate this. There could just as well (at least) be many courts that are considered reputable.
Anemone:Neither do we have arbitration courts today handing out court orders to banks to pay up. At least, I don't think we do...
So what? I don't see how that's relevant, as we live in a highly statist world today.
Anemone:It's a question of how you make any court order legally binding. It can be done through a court connected explicitly with the law of that society, and not so much with a private court.
Have you looked into common law? Do you understand what it is? I fear that you're trying to carry over the statist concept of statutory law into a libertarian culture, because you think that the concept of statutory law itself is legitimate.
Anemone:Well, good, but such can never be known ultimately. If your goal is perfect cosmic justice, then we will never see it. Closest we can get is to have a reasonable standard of justice and not outright miscarriages.
Even if "cosmic justice" or (better IMO) "perfect justice" is ultimately unattainable, I don't see why it's therefore not a goal worth striving for. It could be treated like an asymptote. But that doesn't really address my point, which was that I think there still could be moral grounds to oppose coercion which was believed to be defensive but is actually aggressive.
Anemone:In the autarchic society I will propose, a court comes about because of voluntary agreement between two or more people whom can setup a court in their charter for a new city-state (or not). The court has jurisdiction over only those whom accept that jurisdiction explicitly by joining that city-state. The court ceases to exist when the last citizen repudiates the jurisdiction and walks away from the charter leaving it member-less. Thus, in an autarchic society predicated on voluntaryism, a court comes about as a result of voluntary choice, has jurisdiction as a result of voluntary choice, and ceases to exist as a consequence of voluntary choice. There is no room in there for your theory of ultimate coercion to maintain its position. I agree that your definition would apply to other currently existing political systems, both in theory and in practice, but at least in theory it should not apply to my proposal.
Why can a court only come from a charter for a new city-state? Indeed, why must a new city-state be chartered (and chartered to who)? Who or what enforces these things?
What constitutes joining a city-state? Can a person leave a city-state without having to leave land that he owns?
Of course Liberty is not the ultimate value. Liberty like commerce is a product of two, if not ultimate values then pretty high up the importance scale, values being:
1. Non-Aggression
2. Respect for Private Property
If people have these values and act according to their precepts then society will be prosperous, peaceful and have a vibrant commercial life, otherwise there is violence, destitution and misery.
Of course Liberty is not the ultimate value. Liberty like commerce is a product of two, if not ultimate values then pretty high up the importance scale, values being: 1. Non-Aggression 2. Respect for Private Property If people have these values and act according to their precepts then society will be prosperous, peaceful and have a vibrant commercial life, otherwise there is violence, destitution and misery.
The absolute right to property is a fundament of libertarianism. That the real world application of absolute rights over property would devolve into retardation necessitating a foregoing of that right in order to meaningfully interact doesn't detract from the flaws of having it as a keystone of the philosophy. To whit, even though the real world consequences, in libertopia, of shooting someone for stealing my bread would be that i would be shunned and probably murdered by my community, the community wouldn't be able to arrest me or posse up to hunt me (or the rights respecting equivalent) because the killing would be in self-defence (of the labour imbued in my bread). To disagree with this implies that it is acceptable to take some portion of my labour if it will save another person's life - in fact, it justifies taxation.
Of course Liberty is not the ultimate value. Liberty like commerce is a product of two, if not ultimate values then pretty high up the importance scale, values being: 1. Non-Aggression 2. Respect for Private Property Liberty or is the result of selfreliance. Freedom just means mastering your life - Mastering your life is achived by nurturing certain virtues and it requires some inherent characteristics and personality traits as well. On that bases you will be able to engage and enjoy liberty. Sure piece and certainty of respect for your property will help you with that, too. This is however not a given as it is often assumed.
Of course Liberty is not the ultimate value. Liberty like commerce is a product of two, if not ultimate values then pretty high up the importance scale, values being: 1. Non-Aggression 2. Respect for Private Property
The absolute right to property is a fundament of libertarianism.
Uhm, then there is a problem. Since there is no absolute right to property. Something like that is just legal fiction with no real base in reality.
I'd hope the right to property isn't an absolute. Good response, by the way.
I'd hope the right to property isn't an absolute.
Absolutely not. Property is an elastic concept. I would go so far as to say that looking at any property right as some "absolute" would fly in the face of Misean calculation, Hayekian knowledge problems, and post Keynesian / Chapter 12 Keynesian / Austrian uncertainty concepts.
A system of property as a value would be a return to LTV and neo-Ricardian economics
"As in a kaleidoscope, the constellation of forces operating in the system as a whole is ever changing." - Ludwig Lachmann
"When A Man Dies A World Goes Out of Existence" - GLS Shackle
Can you explain more on this, please? For example, how Austrolibertarians and animal spirit Keynesians disagree with LTV theorists on whether property is absolute?
Mustang, what do you even mean by "the absolute right to property"?
It's a good question, Autolykos. I'm wondering what he means too.
The right to defend your property to the fullest extent. What did the other guy think I meant?