Does anybody have a good argument for free will? Not just against determinism? I mean I would like to see somebody actually have a theory for how human action is exempt from causality or how dualism would work (matter working with purely mental phenomenon and vice versa). All I seem to hear from Free Will-ists is, "well morality wouldn't exist," or, "you wouldn't be responsible for your actions," or, "well how would you know what's true?" or "why would you try and convince anyone of determinism if their thoughts are determined?" All interesting questions to be sure, but I don't think it counts as a positive case for free will.
I'm sure Robert Kane or some other philosopher has developed an intricate theory, but as I am still kind of n00bish, could anyone dumb this down for me?
Do compatibilist arguments for free will count? :P
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
I suppose so. I was thinking more along the lines of metaphysical libertarianism though.
Define "free will" first if you'd like a serious debate :) Like in debates about god vs no-god, one must be able to define "god" first. I personally haven't heard any logical/rational definition of it.
(english is not my native language, sorry for grammar.)
I always thought twins were a good proof of willpower. Twins are identical in every physiological way, yet they live entirely separate lives. Also, there really is no reason to assume determinism exists because when I will something, it happens. In an interesting departure, if determinism did exist, we would be meant to wonder about free will, which seems pointless. Almost hits upon Descartes's evil dream conjecture in style.
In my epistemology class in grad school, the professor had been studying neuroscience and said that neuroscientists had evidence showing that our brain orders our bodies to move before the brain region responsible for making decisions activates. I say bull$hit. Scientists don't know anything through science due to the limit of induction, one. Two, I'm willing to bet they'd have a hell of a time proving that.
"Is life so dear or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?" -Patrick Henry
MaikU: Define "free will" first if you'd like a serious debate :) Like in debates about god vs no-god, one must be able to define "god" first. I personally haven't heard any logical/rational definition of it.
Seems to me you would enjoy reading G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica. I don't like relativism, but linguistics certainly demands a relativistic approach. As for your God comment...it is very difficult to define. It's interesting that the religious lot often specify "their" God vs. "others'" God. I believe in God, but I certainly don't spend my time trying to rationally prove it. For me it's intuitive, thus my understanding is sufficient for myself. You can rack your brain on what intuitive means, so on and so forth, but I understand it.
I think the real limit of epistemology is in its universal attribution. Everybody wants to prove something to somebody else. That's the hard part. You know certain things, like your opinion of X, Y and Z, and you know you like eating corn bread, what feels good and doesn't feel good, whether or not you're being honest or lying. But when you bring in others trying to know about others, man, it gets tricky.
Brutus:I always thought twins were a good proof of willpower. Twins are identical in every physiological way, yet they live entirely separate lives.
Twins aren't identical in a deterministic sense.
Brutus:Also, there really is no reason to assume determinism exists because when I will something, it happens.
Can you explain what you mean by this?
Brutus:In an interesting departure, if determinism did exist, we would be meant to wonder about free will, which seems pointless. Almost hits upon Descartes's evil dream conjecture in style.
Whether determinism exists is a separate issue from whether one knows or believes that it exists.
Brutus:In my epistemology class in grad school, the professor had been studying neuroscience and said that neuroscientists had evidence showing that our brain orders our bodies to move before the brain region responsible for making decisions activates. I say bull$hit. Scientists don't know anything through science due to the limit of induction, one. Two, I'm willing to bet they'd have a hell of a time proving that.
Epistemology ultimately boils down to the definitions one uses for "know", "knowledge", and so forth. But saying that there exists evidence in favor of a proposition being true is different from saying that one knows the proposition is true. It's also different from simply saying that the proposition is true.
Personally, I think that evidence could also point to neuroscientists having misidentified "the brain region responsible for making decisions". Indeed, who's to say that there's only one such region?
Brutus:Seems to me you would enjoy reading G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica. I don't like relativism, but linguistics certainly demands a relativistic approach. As for your God comment...it is very difficult to define. It's interesting that the religious lot often specify "their" God vs. "others'" God. I believe in God, but I certainly don't spend my time trying to rationally prove it. For me it's intuitive, thus my understanding is sufficient for myself. You can rack your brain on what intuitive means, so on and so forth, but I understand it.
Could you provide your definition of "intuitive"?
Brutus:I think the real limit of epistemology is in its universal attribution. Everybody wants to prove something to somebody else. That's the hard part. You know certain things, like your opinion of X, Y and Z, and you know you like eating corn bread, what feels good and doesn't feel good, whether or not you're being honest or lying. But when you bring in others trying to know about others, man, it gets tricky.
None of us is a mind-reader. None of us experiences exactly what others experience, and vice-versa.
Maybe this is what Plato (and others?) meant when he wrote about "higher knowledge" and the like - understanding propositions that are universally or necessarily true. It seems to be the same kind of notion as Aristotle's "laws of thought", just expressed in different terms. Semantics, semantics, semantics...
Aristotle's laws of thoughts were nothing like Plato's forms. The higher knowledge Plato has in mind are these ideal, abstract forms that stand in causal relations to objects down here on earth. Hence in Raphael's School of Athens, you see Plato pointing up to the world of the forms, while Aristotle is pointing down to earth, signifying his tendency to posit forms only in the things themselves. The forms, according to Aristotle, do not exist in an abstract realm. They are immanent in substances. These forms were a way of solving the problem universals, e.g. (redness, roundness, triangularity, etc. etc.)
How can different types of objects share the same properties? Plato identified the triangle as participating in the incorruptible, necessary, and eternal form of triangularity. The triangle is just an imperfect copy of triangularity itself. Plato also applied this to the concept of justice and the polis (the Republic). This is why Plato preferred abstract contemplation to empirical research. One has to move past the corruptible and contingent truths as exemplified by physical reality and discover what really is. Physical reality is but a shadow of how things really are and should be. Notice that there is a combination of the factual and the normative here.
Plato thought that our souls originally associated with the forms in a 'Platonic heaven', and so when we are born, we are attached to a corruptible body, offering distractions, which we constantly battle our entire lives. There is no such thing as progress, and there is no such thing as new knowledge. All knowledge is just remembering what we once knew perfectly when we existed as souls in the Platonic heaven. Socrates attempts to demonstrate this in one of the dialogues when he draws out a geometric proof from an ignorant slave, thus 'proving' his hypothesis of the theory of forms, since this knowledge of geometry was not taught; so it must've been innate.
Aristotle rejected all of this. Sensibly, I think. Instead, he solved the problem of universals by holding that they do not exist in some abstract realm. They exist only in the substances (things) themselves, and we gain knowledge of the essential properties of an object by abstraction. The need for empirical observation arises because we may have seen one 'retarded' duck, and concluded that duckness must entail a lack of intelligence. So we have to abstract from a large multitude of ducks, and only then can we identify the universal properties. We also, incidentally, find that 'retardedness' was an accidental property, a defect, rather than something essential that makes up _what it is to be a duck and not something else_.
The laws of thought were just first principles that one had to accept in order to engage in any rational argumentation whatsoever. All inquiry requires it.
Twins are identical in every physiological way, yet they live entirely separate lives.
Wrong. Our final brain structure is not shaped by our DNA. In fact, DNA doesn't contain nearly enough bandwidth to specify our final brain structure. The only things that does - stimulus from the real world. Our brains are shaped by the signals we receive.
Earlier, when these things were not as frowned-upon, researchers took newborn kittens and sowed their eyes shut. Months later, they opened their eyes and they could not understand the real world, because the brain never received a stimulus to develop in that direction. This shows that the brain doesn't simply develop because the DNA tells it to develop - the environment provides very important signals. Signals which will be different for two different twins.
>>>>Define "free will" first if you'd like a serious debate :)>>>>
this. "will" is what you want, your sense of desire. So is the question whether all desires are whims? What is the will supposed to be "free" of? Or "free" to do?
Eric,
Here's my epistemological argument for free will.
The atoms tell the atoms so, for I never was or will but atoms forevermore be.
Yours sincerely,
Physiocrat
Brutus: MaikU: Define "free will" first if you'd like a serious debate :) Like in debates about god vs no-god, one must be able to define "god" first. I personally haven't heard any logical/rational definition of it. Seems to me you would enjoy reading G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica. I don't like relativism, but linguistics certainly demands a relativistic approach. As for your God comment...it is very difficult to define. It's interesting that the religious lot often specify "their" God vs. "others'" God. I believe in God, but I certainly don't spend my time trying to rationally prove it. For me it's intuitive, thus my understanding is sufficient for myself. You can rack your brain on what intuitive means, so on and so forth, but I understand it. I think the real limit of epistemology is in its universal attribution. Everybody wants to prove something to somebody else. That's the hard part. You know certain things, like your opinion of X, Y and Z, and you know you like eating corn bread, what feels good and doesn't feel good, whether or not you're being honest or lying. But when you bring in others trying to know about others, man, it gets tricky.
Not sure I would like it, because I am probably one of those commiting "naturalistic fallacy" haha :D but I'll try to read it. Good point about belief in God and absolutely no need to rationalize it. I, in a way, admire people who believe for the sake of believing rather than following some cultish (aka religious) rules, which are easily proven to be inconsistent and even crazy in some cases.
Even those who advocate free will do not know what is the will supposed to be free of (thanks Malachi). Is it gravity and other physical laws? I doubt it. I think this belief is problematic when one tried to prove it scientifically. Surely, it's not hard to prove it through argumentation (I think Stef almost convinced me once in one of his old videos, hehe), but I favour scientific method, especially, when it comes to proving something about physical world, and human brain is physical, will, that arises in it is also part of.. It's not the same like Mises says "human acts". It's self evident. But with free will we delve into much deeper problem (and again, I'm not determinist) I stated in my first sentence.
Furthermore, I think we have an ilusion of free will. And also, I'd like to believe that quantum mechanics will be able to tell us in a future much more about "free will" than any armchair philosopher.
Free Will (the ability to choose A or non-A) is practically not open to the scientific method. It would require a test on the same person over time whilst wiping their memory for future tests as knowledge of the purpose of the event over time would influence his decision along with keeping all variables constant. However this clearly is impossible since the individual would age so even theoretically (time travel is ridculous though makes good stories) so you can never test in the same conditions.
As I argue in my linked artice the will is basic and is uncaused; thus is the pure beginning of a causal change hence why it is free. One could argue that it is dependent on the person's existence and thus on physical laws which would be true but once in existence the will is free of all causal laws. Now since the physical laws are determinsitic (quantum theory doesn't necessitate pure randomness, it's one of many interpretations of the phenomena) the root of will must not be physical. Hence anyone who wishes to hold free will cannot be also a materialist. This account could be described as somewhat mysterious however I cannot find any reason to doubt it. All systems must have an element of mystery due to the regress argument- one's foundations cannot be rationally accounted for since they are pressuposed in any attempt to justify them.
So you define free will as ability to choose between A or non-A? Maybe you are also one of those, who think, that if people make choices, then they must have free will? Or maybe you just talk about general free will, not a philosophical one? I am confused. And not joking, by the way.
Well I'm not sure if you say I'm talking generally or philosophically althought I believe it is the latter. Did you read the link to my short article on the subject above? And I do believe that choice implies free will though that doesn't form any part of my argument.
At what point do we gain free will? Do bacteria have free will? Worms? Birds? Cats? People? At what point did we suddenly gain this thing called "free will?"
MrSchnapps:Aristotle's laws of thoughts were nothing like Plato's forms. The higher knowledge Plato has in mind are these ideal, abstract forms that stand in causal relations to objects down here on earth. Hence in Raphael's School of Athens, you see Plato pointing up to the world of the forms, while Aristotle is pointing down to earth, signifying his tendency to posit forms only in the things themselves. The forms, according to Aristotle, do not exist in an abstract realm. They are immanent in substances. These forms were a way of solving the problem [of] universals, e.g. (redness, roundness, triangularity, etc. etc.)
My point was that Plato saw his "forms", and Aristotle his "laws of thought", as kinds of "higher knowledge" in the sense of understanding propositions that are universally or necessarily true. Sorry if I was playing fast-and-loose with words before.
Whether abstract form or material substance "came first" seems like a chicken-or-egg kind of question to me. But I also fail to see how the two notions are necessarily mutually exclusive. One could say that abstract forms exist in a (necessarily) abstract realm, and also that they are immanent in material substances.
MrSchnapps:How can different types of objects share the same properties? Plato identified the triangle as participating in the incorruptible, necessary, and eternal form of triangularity. The triangle is just an imperfect copy of triangularity itself. Plato also applied this to the concept of justice and the polis (the Republic). This is why Plato preferred abstract contemplation to empirical research. One has to move past the corruptible and contingent truths as exemplified by physical reality and discover what really is. Physical reality is but a shadow of how things really are and should be. Notice that there is a combination of the factual and the normative here.
I haven't read much of Plato first-hand (let alone in the original Ancient Greek), but I think there could be another interpretation. This interpretation relates the "higher knowledge" of the abstract forms with the perception of the human mind.
MrSchnapps:Plato thought that our souls originally associated with the forms in a 'Platonic heaven', and so when we are born, we are attached to a corruptible body, offering distractions, which we constantly battle our entire lives. There is no such thing as progress, and there is no such thing as new knowledge. All knowledge is just remembering what we once knew perfectly when we existed as souls in the Platonic heaven. Socrates attempts to demonstrate this in one of the dialogues when he draws out a geometric proof from an ignorant slave, thus 'proving' his hypothesis of the theory of forms, since this knowledge of geometry was not taught; so it must've been innate.
Well, in a way, nothing is ever really invented - just discovered. In the same way, nothing is ever really created (or destroyed) - just rearranged. Again, this is why I maintain that semantics is of paramount importance in these discussions.
MrSchnapps:Aristotle rejected all of this. Sensibly, I think. Instead, he solved the problem of universals by holding that they do not exist in some abstract realm. They exist only in the substances (things) themselves, and we gain knowledge of the essential properties of an object by abstraction. The need for empirical observation arises because we may have seen one 'retarded' duck, and concluded that duckness must entail a lack of intelligence. So we have to abstract from a large multitude of ducks, and only then can we identify the universal properties. We also, incidentally, find that 'retardedness' was an accidental property, a defect, rather than something essential that makes up _what it is to be a duck and not something else_.
All objects are perceptual, however. The only real objects in the universe are its fundamental particles (whatever those turn out to be). Everything we call "an object" - including oneself - is simply an arrangement of these fundamental particles that, strictly and formally speaking, is completely arbitrary.
MrSchnapps:The laws of thought were just first principles that one had to accept in order to engage in any rational argumentation whatsoever. All inquiry requires it.
Would you say that these principles "exist"? If so, where? (Note that this depends on how you define "exist". Semantics strikes again!)
Wheylous:At what point do we gain free will? Do bacteria have free will? Worms? Birds? Cats? People? At what point did we suddenly gain this thing called "free will?"
As I've mentioned elsewhere, I define "free will" essentially as "unpredictable actionability". However, I've also mentioned elsewhere that, in order to predict any future state of the universe, one would have to know literally everything that happpened before. That not only means calculating all future states leading to the future state in question, but also knowing all past states. Since that's currently very far beyond our grasp (at best), it would appear that we should consider the universe as a whole to have "free will" in this sense.
What's important here is to note that this is in no way incompatible with determinism. It just means that we can never be completely certain of the mechanism that drives it.
Wheylous:Wrong. Our final brain structure is not shaped by our DNA.
Wrong. Our final brain structure wouldn't exist in the first place without our DNA.
Wheylous:In fact, DNA doesn't contain nearly enough bandwidth to specify our final brain structure. The only things that does - stimulus from the real world. Our brains are shaped by the signals we receive.
That presupposes some precursor nervous structure. Where does this come from?
Wheylous:Earlier, when these things were not as frowned-upon, researchers took newborn kittens and sowed their eyes shut. Months later, they opened their eyes and they could not understand the real world, because the brain never received a stimulus to develop in that direction. This shows that the brain doesn't simply develop because the DNA tells it to develop - the environment provides very important signals. Signals which will be different for two different twins.
By the same token, try removing all the DNA from the nucleus of a just-fertilized cat zygote and see what happens.
Physiocrat:Eric, Here's my epistemological argument for free will.
Quoting from your argument:
[Libertarian Free Will, or LFW - the ability to choose A or non-A] is necessarily true since otherwise one couldn't evaluate the truth value of the question "Is LFW true?" because you could only conclude what you were determined to do which gives no foundation for truth[.]
Can you elaborate on this? More specifically, can you explain what you mean by "giving a foundation for truth" and why that matters?
Maybe this response is simplistic, and I'm a total newbie myself. But I experience the process of making choices and acting on those choices. I experience this in a way that FEELS like I originate my choice/action.
Two things are possible. 1) I'm experiencing an illusion, or 2) I am experiencing the world as it really is.
#2 appears to be the simplest answer, and also the only one that has any PRACTICAL application. If my experiences are illusory then I have no practical way of analyzing my existence or taking action, and in order to explain the existence of illusion I must construct a fairly elaborate set of assumptions.
Don't get me wrong. The DNA provides for the actual cell design and some basic connections. However, the big, finals capacities of the brain as dictated by its growth in structure are determined by stimulus.
Furthermore, I agree with you that to calculate the future you would need the states of all current molecules and their properties, though I do not see why you would need all past states if you know the current state.
Autolykos: Can you elaborate on this? More specifically, can you explain what you mean by "giving a foundation for truth" and why that matters?
Here's a copy and paste response from the blog from one of the comments:
If determinism is true, you can still evaluate the truth value of the question: your evaluation is predetermined, but you can still get things right or wrong. First let us define the conditions under which someone can know whether something is true (here I steal a set up from a guy I debated with on this issue) 1. A truth exists. (This is necessarily the case since to deny it presupposes it and therefore, in principle, knowledge thereof 2. It is in principle knowable. 3. One has a method by which to determine whether to believe it is true, false or indeterminate. (Belief is basic by necessity) Now supposing that you believe at time t that statement x is true. Now at time t+1 you evaluate your belief and demonstrate, by using the laws of logic or some empirical evidence, that the statement is in fact false. If determinism is true then you would be in the odd situation in which you can identify whether a statement is true yet you cannot change your belief. From which it would follow that you cannot change you belief on the basis of its truth value which would therefore undermine the truth value of all your beliefs; in fact one could argue that this separation of belief and knowledge undercuts the cogency of knowledge itself. The only situation under determinism which you can change your belief is if you were determined to change it at t+1 which would be question begging. Therefore determinism gives no foundation for the knowledge of truth.
Addendum: When I say foundation for truth I more precisely mean foundation for the knowledge of the truth. As shown above we must assume a truth, a true statement, to exist since to deny it pressuposes it. Now you could say that the idea of the existence of a truth is an arbitrarily chosen axiom. Indeed it cannot be justified since it is an axiom however to deny it would lead to outright scepticism- even to the extent of denying our own existence and all laws of economics. So to say a truth exists and it is in principle knowable I take to be a self evidently true statement. It follows from this as shown above that free will is necessary or we could not, in principle, know that truth.
This does not mean we have exhaustive knoweldge but provides a foundation of any knowledge whatsoever.
As may be clear I'd hold to something similar to the correspondence theory of knoweldge.
Physiocrat:Here's a copy and paste response from the blog from one of the comments: If determinism is true, you can still evaluate the truth value of the question: your evaluation is predetermined, but you can still get things right or wrong. First let us define the conditions under which someone can know whether something is true (here I steal a set up from a guy I debated with on this issue) 1. A truth exists. (This is necessarily the case since to deny it presupposes it and therefore, in principle, knowledge thereof 2. It is in principle knowable. 3. One has a method by which to determine whether to believe it is true, false or indeterminate. (Belief is basic by necessity)
If determinism is true, you can still evaluate the truth value of the question: your evaluation is predetermined, but you can still get things right or wrong. First let us define the conditions under which someone can know whether something is true (here I steal a set up from a guy I debated with on this issue) 1. A truth exists. (This is necessarily the case since to deny it presupposes it and therefore, in principle, knowledge thereof 2. It is in principle knowable. 3. One has a method by which to determine whether to believe it is true, false or indeterminate. (Belief is basic by necessity)
With all due respect, I don't find this setup satisfying. What do you mean by "knowable"? How do you distinguish between "knowledge" and "belief"? How is "belief" basic by necessity? Do you see a distinction between the existence of a truth and awareness thereof?
Physiocrat:Now supposing that you believe at time t that statement x is true. Now at time t+1 you evaluate your belief and demonstrate, by using the laws of logic or some empirical evidence, that the statement is in fact false. If determinism is true then you would be in the odd situation in which you can identify whether a statement is true yet you cannot change your belief. From which it would follow that you cannot change you belief on the basis of its truth value which would therefore undermine the truth value of all your beliefs; in fact one could argue that this separation of belief and knowledge undercuts the cogency of knowledge itself. The only situation under determinism which you can change your belief is if you were determined to change it at t+1 which would be question begging. Therefore determinism gives no foundation for the knowledge of truth. [Emphasis added.]
If determinism is true then you would be in the odd situation in which you can identify whether a statement is true yet you cannot change your belief. From which it would follow that you cannot change you belief on the basis of its truth value which would therefore undermine the truth value of all your beliefs; in fact one could argue that this separation of belief and knowledge undercuts the cogency of knowledge itself. The only situation under determinism which you can change your belief is if you were determined to change it at t+1 which would be question begging. Therefore determinism gives no foundation for the knowledge of truth. [Emphasis added.]
I fail to see how, in the bolded statement above, the conclusion follows from the premise. Determinism to me in no way prevents a person from "changing his mind" later. Furthermore, what question do you think is being begged by the notion that one is determined to "change his mind" at time t+1?
One of the biggest issues in epistemology, in my opinion, is the semantics of the terms "know", "knowledge", vel sim. Another one is the semantics of "true" and "truth". I'm not sure which issue to consider bigger here. But in any case, the conclusions one reaches in epistemology will depend greatly on the definitions he presumes for these terms.
Physiocrat:Addendum: When I say foundation for truth I more precisely mean foundation for the knowledge of the truth. As shown above we must assume a truth, a true statement, to exist since to deny it pressuposes it. Now you could say that the idea of the existence of a truth is an arbitrarily chosen axiom. Indeed it cannot be justified since it is an axiom however to deny it would lead to outright scepticism- even to the extent of denying our own existence and all laws of economics. So to say a truth exists and it is in principle knowable I take to be a self evidently true statement. It follows from this as shown above that free will is necessary or we could not, in principle, know that truth. This does not mean we have exhaustive knoweldge but provides a foundation of any knowledge whatsoever. As may be clear I'd hold to something similar to the correspondence theory of knoweldge.
If denying a proposition requires presupposing it, that would make it justified, wouldn't it? Essentially that's a proof by contradiction. On the other hand, to say a truth exists is to invite (if not beg) the question of what this truth is.
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ” Alice said. Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’ ” “But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument’,” Alice objected. “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master that’s all.” Alice was too much puzzled to say anything, so after a minute Humpty Dumpty began again. “They’ve a temper, some of them—particularly verbs, they’re the proudest—adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the whole lot! Impenetrability! That’s what I say!
Lewis Carrol, Through the Looking Glass
"As in a kaleidoscope, the constellation of forces operating in the system as a whole is ever changing." - Ludwig Lachmann
"When A Man Dies A World Goes Out of Existence" - GLS Shackle
What's your point?
Sorry for the late reply. I've been rather busy the past few days.
Autolykos: With all due respect, I don't find this setup satisfying. What do you mean by "knowable"? How do you distinguish between "knowledge" and "belief"? How is "belief" basic by necessity? Do you see a distinction between the existence of a truth and awareness thereof?
Yes, I do see a distinction between existence and awareness (or knowledge) of a truth. The former pressuposes the latter- metaphysics is logically prior to epistemology though we do not know what exist without applying epistemology.
Knowable- the essence of a substance (I'm not necessarily implying an Aristotilean position here it's just the language seems appropriate) is apprehendable by our reasonable faculties.
(I believe man to have two major faculties: reason ( broadly speaking the epistemology of metaphysics and ethics) and imagination (the epistemology of aesthetics). Their domains do cross over though they are primarily within the boundaries stated. If you're interested in this area, this lecture is rather interesting.
Autolykos: If denying a proposition requires presupposing it, that would make it justified, wouldn't it? Essentially that's a proof by contradiction.
If denying a proposition requires presupposing it, that would make it justified, wouldn't it? Essentially that's a proof by contradiction.
It is a proof by contadiction but it must assume that the law of identity exists which itself is not justifiable. You could say that language presupposes it but one could still argue they use language on pragmatic grounds for their own subjective happiness as such a justification of the type we are discussing is not necessary. Consequently to use the Law of Identity presupposes belief in its existence hence belief is basic by necessity, for knowledge. This does open the door to belief in anything and to claim it's true since the believer in Marxism is doing the same thing as the Libertarianism. This is where the intutitions play there part. As a method I believe taking the most basic of intutions and building upon them is the way forward for epistemology.
Autolykos: On the other hand, to say a truth exists is to invite (if not beg) the question of what this truth is.
On the other hand, to say a truth exists is to invite (if not beg) the question of what this truth is.
I agree but agreement on the fact that something obscures the sun is more basic, and more easily agreed upon, than what that thing is beyond the fact it obscures.
If determinism is true then you would be in the odd situation in which you can identify whether a statement is true yet you cannot change your belief.
Autolykos: I fail to see how, in the bolded statement above, the conclusion follows from the premise. Determinism to me in no way prevents a person from "changing his mind" later. Furthermore, what question do you think is being begged by the notion that one is determined to "change his mind" at time t+1?
Sorry bad communication on my part. The bolded statement above should have based on that analysis at the end. My point is in the absence of freedom of the will you cannot judge the truth value of a statement based on evidence; you can only believe that which you are determined to believe. The question being begged is how determinism can lead to true knowledge. The options are fallible or infallible determinsim; the latter is clearly false and the former would give one no means to evaluate their beliefs so could not justify there beliefs. Even if we assume you can determine the truth value independent of determinism as I tried to do in my previous post we always come back to the question of on what basis do you change your mind. Freedom of the will allows change on the basis of evidence (clearly not in all cases Mr Krugman) whereas fallible determinism does not.
Autolykos: One of the biggest issues in epistemology, in my opinion, is the semantics of the terms "know", "knowledge", vel sim. Another one is the semantics of "true" and "truth". I'm not sure which issue to consider bigger here. But in any case, the conclusions one reaches in epistemology will depend greatly on the definitions he presumes for these terms.
As you can see above I entirely agree with that. I would say knowledge is apprehending what is. This does not however require exhusative apprehension of all things that are is.
Physiocrat:Yes, I do see a distinction between existence and awareness (or knowledge) of a truth. The former pressuposes the latter- metaphysics is logically prior to epistemology though we do not know what exist without applying epistemology.
Do you mean the latter (awareness) presupposes the former (existence)? Certainly things must exist before they can be apprehended by other things that exist.
Physiocrat:Knowable- the essence of a substance (I'm not necessarily implying an Aristotilean position here it's just the language seems appropriate) is apprehendable by our reasonable faculties.
"Reasonable faculties" meaning what exactly? "Reasonable" seems like a loaded word to me.
I don't think you've answered my questions about belief. How do you distinguish between belief and knowledge? And how is belief "basic by necessity"?
Physiocrat:It is a proof by contadiction but it must assume that the law of identity exists which itself is not justifiable. You could say that language presupposes it but one could still argue they use language on pragmatic grounds for their own subjective happiness as such a justification of the type we are discussing is not necessary. Consequently to use the Law of Identity presupposes belief in its existence hence belief is basic by necessity, for knowledge. This does open the door to belief in anything and to claim it's true since the believer in Marxism is doing the same thing as the Libertarianism. This is where the intutitions play there part. As a method I believe taking the most basic of intutions and building upon them is the way forward for epistemology.
So you don't consider proof by contradiction to be a justification? A proposition which can be proven in such a way is not inherently justified?
If one must believe in the Law of Identity in order to use it, where does knowledge ever factor in? It doesn't seem necessary to know that the Law of Identity is "true", it's only necessary to believe (i.e. assume) it's "true". So why bother with knowledge here?
Physiocrat:I agree but agreement on the fact that something obscures the sun is more basic, and more easily agreed upon, than what that thing is beyond the fact it obscures.
My point was that, when you say "to say a truth exists and it is in principle knowable I take to be a self evidently true statement", I fail to see how it's a self-evidently true statement.
Physiocrat:Sorry bad communication on my part. The bolded statement above should have based on that analysis at the end. My point is in the absence of freedom of the will you cannot judge the truth value of a statement based on evidence; you can only believe that which you are determined to believe. The question being begged is how determinism can lead to true knowledge. The options are fallible or infallible determinsim; the latter is clearly false and the former would give one no means to evaluate their beliefs so could not justify there beliefs. Even if we assume you can determine the truth value independent of determinism as I tried to do in my previous post we always come back to the question of on what basis do you change your mind. Freedom of the will allows change on the basis of evidence (clearly not in all cases Mr Krugman) whereas fallible determinism does not.
At the risk of going around in circles, what do you mean by "true knowledge"? It seems that your issue here is semantic - certain words (such as "judge") imply to you this notion of free will, or at least non-determinism, because you see them as denoting activities which inhere within subjects. However, the kind of determinism I hold to be true is compatible with free will, because the two concepts require different points of view. Determinism here requires a "universal" or "God's-eye" point of view, whereas free will requires a non-universal subjective point of view. Hopefully that makes sense. Free will, then, simply denotes one's inability, as a subject, to know what any other subject will do at any given point in the future. Note here that his future self can be considered another subject as well.
So yes, determinism does mean that one can only believe that which he is determined to believe. But the latter isn't set in stone. His beliefs may be determined to change at some point - and this seems to me to be completely compatible with determinism. At the same time, however, many people will indeed not change their beliefs, even in the face of their beliefs being proven to be contradictory.
Physiocrat:As you can see above I entirely agree with that. I would say knowledge is apprehending what is. This does not however require exhusative apprehension of all things that are is.
Okay. Given that definition of "knowledge", we now "fall prey" to the Clintonesque question of what the definition of "is" is. :P As you yourself noted above, metaphysics is logically prior to epistemology. It seems to me that we'll need to make inquiries in the former area to better understand our differences in the latter area.
Autolykos: Do you mean the latter (awareness) presupposes the former (existence)? Certainly things must exist before they can be apprehended by other things that exist.
Yes.
Autolykos: "Reasonable faculties" meaning what exactly? "Reasonable" seems like a loaded word to me.
I used it in contrast to imagination. Imagination and rationality are two attributes of man. In principle the world could be entirely mysterious and thus not apprehendable by the reason but solely through imagination. As I stated before there is a cross over.
Autolykos: If one must believe in the Law of Identity in order to use it, where does knowledge ever factor in? It doesn't seem necessary to know that the Law of Identity is "true", it's only necessary to believe (i.e. assume) it's "true". So why bother with knowledge here?
Prove to me that the law of identity exists without first assuming that it exists.
Autolykos: My point was that, when you say "to say a truth exists and it is in principle knowable I take to be a self evidently true statement", I fail to see how it's a self-evidently true statement.
Try and live consistently in the world without believing that to be so.
Autolykos: At the risk of going around in circles, what do you mean by "true knowledge"? It seems that your issue here is semantic - certain words (such as "judge") imply to you this notion of free will, or at least non-determinism, because you see them as denoting activities which inhere within subjects. However, the kind of determinism I hold to be true is compatible with free will, because the two concepts require different points of view. Determinism here requires a "universal" or "God's-eye" point of view, whereas free will requires a non-universal subjective point of view. Hopefully that makes sense. Free will, then, simply denotes one's inability, as a subject, to know what any other subject will do at any given point in the future. Note here that his future self can be considered another subject as well.
This sounds uncannily like the Calvinsitic/ Augustinian view of predestination. Before the creation of the world God predestines the elect to salvation and the heathen to eternal torment. However each actor play his own free part in the world play except that his script has already been written.
Autolykos: So yes, determinism does mean that one can only believe that which he is determined to believe. But the latter isn't set in stone. His beliefs may be determined to change at some point - and this seems to me to be completely compatible with determinism. At the same time, however, many people will indeed not change their beliefs, even in the face of their beliefs being proven to be contradictory.
Again my point wasn’t they can’t change their beliefs but they cannot change them on the basis of the evidence because as you outline above, we can only believe what we’re determined to believe.
Autolykos: Okay. Given that definition of "knowledge", we now "fall prey" to the Clintonesque question of what the definition of "is" is. :P As you yourself noted above, metaphysics is logically prior to epistemology. It seems to me that we'll need to make inquiries in the former area to better understand our differences in the latter area.
Fair enough. Please outline your Metaphsyics 101.