Stephen:For an argument to count as an argument, both participants must accept the property norm that they each have exclusive control over their own bodies and standing room.
This seems to be just an assertion. Particularly, it simply states that argumentation ethics is true. Hoppe started out with something that couldn't really be interpretated as an assertion of AE, which is why I had to go through and find the equivocation:
More specifically, as long as there is argumentation, there is a mutual recognition of each other's exclusive control over such resources.
Why anarchy fails
Nielsio: Also, my other questions?
Also, my other questions?
I agree with Mises/Sanchez on morality, as far as I've seen.
Unlapped_Dog:
"What we point to in perception, ie, a sensory observation, is assumed to be different than the "objects of reality" which are the way they are even though you aren't in England to attempt to verify it."
You know, I think I agree with you. I never claimed our perception of the objects of reality is not tainted by our subjective consciousness. But surely the objects of reality still exist? We may not perceive them aright, but is their existence deniable? I think not.
So you fundamentally agree with me that there is an objective reality tainted by our subjective perception? What AJ denies is that there is an objective reality at all; he thinks perception creates the objects of perception: a circular argument.
unlapped_dog:How do you know the food exists when you believe that something has to travel between it and your retinas? What you are saying is that you strongly infer that the food exists because you are looking at it. This also implicitly assumes something about the definition of "existence," namely that existing things have the potential to influence other existing things.
This is a nice thing to incorporate into my definition, the fact that existing things can influence other existing things. I sort of neglected to mention that. New definition:
Exist (v.): belonging to the set of sensations that one deems to have practical importance for one's future actions, and being able to influence other elements of that set.
AJ, do you really think perception creates the objects of perception? Do you deny that the objects of perception are there independently?
I don't like your definition of 'exist'.
It seems like it makes sense for me to say that there is a possible world in which a bolder exists, and a man who is not aware of it, and therefore does not deem it any importance gets flattened by it.
Does the second half of the sentance contradict the first? This dude doesnt deem it important, so it doesn't exist? or are we just exposing that you have an agent relative definition of existance which is not what existance is about. existance makes a statement about the logical possibility of someone else encountering exactly that thing.
e.g. this horse exists in the world, if anyone were to go to this field at this time they would be in its presence
this unicorn that galivants in my imagination does not exist in the external world, if anyone were to go to any field at this time they would not be in its presence... its not in a real field.....
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
unlapped_dog:It's possible that physics and economics, although different in their assumptions about existence, share a common methodology. The often held critique against Austrian economics, ie, that it is unscientific because economic theory cannot be falsified or verified, holds no water in this world view. Explanations deal with existence, and the existence "out there" is assumed to be beyond knowledge, ie, one's immediate experience. Nothing about it can be verified or falsified, we can only attempt to formulate rational explanations for what we observe. I don't see why there should be any difference between economics and the physical sciences in this respect.
If we want, we can probably place physics as a sub-branch of praxeology, the science of human action. I've suggested before that mathematics is a sub-branch of praxeology. Some may ask, "Well then, AJ, what isn't a sub-branch of praxeology?" Perhaps every science is a sub-branch of praxeology. Observing, hypothesizing, theorizing, and concluding - these are all human actions aimed at improving one's state of affairs (in particular, one's state of understanding).
Of course the objection will be: All those things are human actions, but they involve physical objects. Well they don't really, except by "physical objects" we mean our perceptions of physical objects.
Perhaps everything can be subsumed under praxeology. Perhaps that would make everything cleaner. I've only thought about this for 10 minutes so far, though.
RothbardsDisciple: Do you deny that the objects of perception are there independently?
Do you deny that the objects of perception are there independently?
I agree that the objects are there if "are there"="exist" and we're using my definition of exist.
If we're using your definition of exist, then that means you are saying perception creates the objects of perception. As nirgraham demonstrated, that is false. The boulder exists independent of the man's consciousness and ends up killing him. It is objectively there even though the man didn't perceive it. That's why your definition is wrong.
aside: it is amusing that even in imagination we can posit things that in the imagined world exist or do not exist.
For example, when an author imagines a narrative and has his imagined character himself imagine something that isnt there in that world, and other characters that exist in that imagend world *really do* chastise him for his foolishness etc.
RothbardsDisciple:What AJ ... thinks perception creates the objects of perception: a circular argument.
Not if we're using my definition of "exist," in which case the word create ("to bring into existence") takes on a different meaning. No, I don't think that perceiving something makes it automatically useful as guidance for my actions - after all, I could just be daydreaming that an anvil is falling from overhead.
I don't think you've really considered the implications of my definition on its own terms. I'm not saying you have to accept it, but in order to give my definition a test drive you'll have to at least set aside your own definition for a moment.
"But surely the objects of reality still exist? We may not perceive them aright, but is their existence deniable? I think not."
What about hallucinations? My buddy's grandma talks to little elf people that she sees. Do the elf people exist outside of her imagination?
If you want to remain consistent throughout a dissertation then I think it is crucial to draw this distinction between what we imagine and what it is assumed to represent. Certainly, if I see the hat on the table then I think it's perfectly reasonable to conclude that this physical object exists. But what about when we start dealing with things we can't see, like warped spacetime, or black holes, or zero dimensional particles? Are we sure they exist? How could that be if we can't even visualize these objects? If we can't visualize them then how could we possibly formulate explanations with them or connect those explanations to the observed evidence? "So you fundamentally agree with me that there is an objective reality tainted by our subjective perception?" I don't know how objective reality connects to subjective perception, or whether there is "truly" a difference, I assume that they are different for the purpose of formulating consistent and rational explanations. So yes I agree in that I assume there is a reality which is not my immediate experience. In the context of the physical sciences I represent it with shapes separated by space.
shape: that which occupies but does not blend with space
space: formlessness, shapelessness, emptiness, nothingness
These may appear circular, but these definitions are descriptions, ie, mere verbal pointers to something which we all have the ability to conceive of. There is even a blind painter who can engage in spatial reasoning and paint objects after having tactile contact with them. This ability seems to be common to humans in general.
Here is the def of existence for the physical sciences I think I've settled on then:
existence: that which is assumed to be represented by shape
represent: to be in the likeness of, but not identical to
RothbardsDisciple:The boulder exists independent of the man's consciousness and ends up killing him. It is objectively there even though the man didn't perceive it. That's why your definition is wrong.
This is getting amusing. You keep using your definition to "prove" my definition "wrong." Let me change it to the first person for added clarity:
Exist (v.): belonging to the set of sensations that I deem to have practical importance for my future actions, and being able to influence other elements of that set.
Now of course you will see the boulder and say it exists (if using my definition), because it has practical importance for you (e.g., you might not want me to get killed). Now under my definition, I wouldn't be able to say the boulder exists overhead unless I knew about it. What sense would it make for me to say "There is a boulder overhead" if I had not seen a boulder overhead? Now of course if you warn me about it, I will move.
You will say "It exists," but it could be a figment of your imagination. The whole point is that until I deem a boulder to have potential practical importance for my actions (like, "I'd better get out of the way"), it makes no sense for me to say "It exists."
This is simply a matter of keeping track of who judges what to be important.
>>You will say "It exists," but it could be a figment of your imagination.
you can't say that there is no fact about the existance of anything just because there is a possibility of someone erring in making such a judgement because in so doing you presuppose the possibility of error, i.e. that it might not *really* exist, well waht you mean error? how can he error in your definition where it belongs to a set of sensation that he deems to have pracitacl importance for his future actions and which he thinks would influence other elements of that set....your definition proves too muchas no-one could ever be wrong about the existance of anything
The real point is that although you cant be expected to 'say' that the suprise boulder that kills you existed, in the world in which the boulder killed you, it existed, and this is apart from what you 'say' about it. your sayings are irrelevant to existance because existance is not agent-relative, even though an agents awareness of what non-agent relative things there are out there IS agent-relative.
nirgrahamUK: It seems like it makes sense for me to say that there is a possible world in which a bolder exists, and a man who is not aware of it, and therefore does not deem it any importance gets flattened by it. Does the second half of the sentance contradict the first? This dude doesnt deem it important, so it doesn't exist?
Does the second half of the sentance contradict the first? This dude doesnt deem it important, so it doesn't exist?
Not "it doesn't exist," just "he cannot coherently say it exists" (since he doesn't deem it important, or at least potentially important, or at least able to influence other things in the set of things he considers important).
nirgrahamUK:or are we just exposing that you have an agent relative definition of existance
Yes, it is agent-relative because all experience is agent-relative, hence all communication is performed from an agent-relative position. That's really what this discussion has been about. You think you could go ride the unicorn, but I don't. Now sure it may be that one person has an ill-judged perception that they can ride a unicorn, and will be disappointed. We cannot "know absolutely-objectively-with-BBQ-sauce" that the boulder falling toward Joe is actually going to result in a loss of a good friend, but we can deem it so, and in so doing we accept it as guidance for our actions. Perhaps we will scramble to rescue him.
nirgrahamUK:your definition proves too muchas no-one could ever be wrong about the existance of anything
Definitions don't prove anything, and there is no such thing as being right and wrong about existence. You can have useful beliefs about existence or un-useful beliefs (ones that end up netting you more pain and less pleasure). To be in "error" is to hold a less-than-useful belief.
>>You think you could go ride the unicorn, but I don't
lol, no, the unicorn is there as a clear example of one that I don't think I can *really* ride, since I put it in my imagination. putting it in the imagination and not in existance is saying that its not at all agent neutral but agent relative. in a way in which a particularly existing horse is not. a particular horse that exists has its existance *in principle* verifiable by all agents.
>>Now sure it may be that one person has an ill-judged perception that they can ride a unicorn, and will be disappointed
why would they be dissapointed unless there is an agent neutral fact that their agent relative understanding butts up against?
"Certainly, if I see the hat on the table then I think it's perfectly reasonable to conclude that this physical object exists."
To correct my own statement...You assume that the hat exists and then use your assumptions to explain the observation, ie, light bounces off the hat and hits your retinas. I think it's reasonable to conclude that this explanation accounts for the observation and reflects what is really happening.
AJ: nirgrahamUK:your definition proves too muchas no-one could ever be wrong about the existance of anything Definitions don't prove anything, and there is no such thing as being right and wrong about existence. You can have useful beliefs about existence or un-useful beliefs (ones that end up netting you more pain and less pleasure).
Definitions don't prove anything, and there is no such thing as being right and wrong about existence. You can have useful beliefs about existence or un-useful beliefs (ones that end up netting you more pain and less pleasure).
But why should your beliefs ever be unuseful? in common-sense-land beliefs are unuseful because they may not be in good alignement with the way things really are....
nirgrahamUK: >>Now sure it may be that one person has an ill-judged perception that they can ride a unicorn, and will be disappointed why would they be dissapointed unless there is an agent neutral fact that their agent relative understanding butts up against?
I think you have this backwards. It's not that he is disappointed because he butts up against a "fact," but that he will afterward call it a fact because his belief led to disappointment. In other words, we give the names "fact," "exist," or "real" to things that we decide have the capacity to affect our pain and pleasure, to disappoint or delight us.
nirgrahamUK:a particular horse that exists has its existance *in principle* verifiable by all agents.
If I go to verify that the horse exists, and I see a horse right there, but some other people are standing around saying it's just an illusion, how do I verify it's real? Maybe I'll reach out and push it, then it turns and bites me, which hurts. Now I am more ready to take it seriously and say this thing exists, it really does matter for my future actions - e.g., I'd better not push it again. Still, someone could say all this is just an illusion. So there's no way to really verify it, beyond simply making a judgment, and maybe seeing if other people make the same judgment.
There is no magical "definite objective existence that is unimaginable to the human mind."
nirgrahamUK:in common-sense-land beliefs are unuseful because they may not be in good alignement with the way things really are....
They may not be in good alignment with the rest of that set of sensations I call "the way things really are." That's in my revised definition above already.
no. the confusion here stems from the fact that something that really exists, in an agent neutral sense, may well affect your pain and pleasure and may dissapoint or delight you. This is because there was a universe existing before *mind* (humans evolved from simpler organisms that way down the line we wouldnt call *agents*). We have evolved to make sense of what we can in the world, this is an evolutionary adaptation which has benefits over being soooooo divorced from reality that we die before we procreate.
maybe we miss much because of our imperfections, maybe there are some inneffable mysteries out there, but there *really is an out there* that we are really in. I expect that you would admit that at least this much *seems true* to your agent-relative intellect, given the evidence you have gathered in your life. consider all the facts that you had mustered about things like the universe and humans and evolution, and the stock you place in science to be useful to *you*. I hope that this wealth of knowledge that your possess subjectively should amount to an acknowledgement that to your best understanding you exist somewhere.
AJ: nirgrahamUK:a particular horse that exists has its existance *in principle* verifiable by all agents. If I go to verify that the horse exists, and I see a horse right there, but some other people are standing around saying it's just an illusion, how do I verify it's real? Maybe I'll reach out and push it, then it turns and bites me, which hurts. Now I am more ready to take it seriously and say this thing exists, it really does matter for my future actions - e.g., I'd better not push it again. Still, someone could say all this is just an illusion. So there's no way to really verify it, beyond simply making a judgment, and maybe seeing if other people make the same judgment. There is no magical "definite objective existence that is unimaginable to the human mind."
Thats a good paragraph about the struggle to determine what the facts are, and about how ever present the danger of erring we come.
Your scenario would make perfect sense in a world of objective facts populated by imperfect agents as it does a crazy heraclation kaleidoscope populated by agents. so really proves nothing either way. Yet it probably does contradict your own best understanding of science, of accumulated evidence etc, because presumably you *subjectively believe* that the universe existed before you did based. Or at least you said you did to get a good grade at school ;-)
nirgrahamUK:there was a universe existing before *mind*
There's nothing in my definition that precludes any of this. Note simply that when you make that statement, you're making it from the perspective of your current perceptions. You're perhaps seeing an image of planet earth in your mind, floating in the universe, with no people on it, and then you're experiencing something else that signals to you that that image is supposed to be a long time in the past.
But these are all sensations, with no exceptions. You deem those sensations you call "a universe ... before mind" to be useful to guiding your future actions, do you not? This is all "there was a universe existing before mind" really means to you - that's the only reason it matters to you. Otherwise why would you mention it?
Make sense now?
no. the confusion here stems from the fact that something that really exists, in an agent neutral sense, may well affect your pain and pleasure and may dissapoint or delight you. This is because there was a universe existing before *mind* (humans evolved from simpler organisms that way down the line we wouldnt call *agents*). We have evolved to make sense of what we can in the world, this is an evolutionary adaptation which has benefits over being soooooo divorced from reality that we die before we procreate. maybe we miss much because of our imperfections, maybe there are some inneffable mysteries out there, but there *really is an out there* that we are really in. I expect that you would admit that at least this much *seems true* to your agent-relative intellect, given the evidence you have gathered in your life. consider all the facts that you had mustered about things like the universe and humans and evolution, and the stock you place in science to be useful to *you*. I hope that this wealth of knowledge that your possess subjectively should amount to an acknowledgement that to your best understanding you exist somewhere.
Yes, nirgraham, you make this so clear. Thanks for the clarity in what I was already thinking.
On a side note, aren't we empiricists in the old tradition? Isn't that the basic concept we're arguing? (Please correct me if I'm wrong, as I very well could be).
Wikipedia says that this is what we are arguing about:
Anti-realism is the view of idealists who are skeptics about the physical world, maintaining either: 1) that nothing exists outside the mind, or 2) that we would have no access to a mind-independent reality even if it may exist. Realists, in contrast, hold that perceptions or sense data are caused by mind-independent objects. An "anti-realist" who denies that other minds exist (i. e., a solipsist) is different from an "anti-realist" who claims that there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not there are unobservable other minds (i. e., a logical behaviorist).
Wikipedia says that this is what we are arguing about.
Ah, that makes sense. Thanks!
Yes, they are my sensations , but that is the least interesting thing about them, the interesting thing is how that fits in with all the other evidence I have subjectively gathered in my jaunt so far.
The world simply makes *more sense* existing without me in its past, than not, given the way it presents itself to me in my present existence. If you are going to adopt a pragmatic approach to truth, then you should adopt the *agent-neutral things outside my mind exist* position for this reason precisely !
Does the world make more or less sense to you , given what you think you know about things, if it had been present before your mind came to be than otherwise?
unlapped_dog:You assume that the hat exists and then use your assumptions to explain the observation, ie, light bounces off the hat and hits your retinas.
I find it cleaner to say that you experience something involuntarily (i.e., you observe it), then you voluntarily imagine some objects and try to make a movie of them in your head that ends with the observation. That is, the objects interact in such a way as to produce the observation. No need for the idea of existence. All we need to do is explain. Anyone who has observed the same phenomena will need no convincing that the observed phenomena "exist."
In other words, something appears in your experience involuntarily. You then voluntarily conjure up experiences that would deterministically result in that involuntary experience because of the very nature of those experiences (in physics, those experiences would be shapes). Once you find some simple experiential movie that ends that way, you share it with other people who have experienced the same involuntary thing, and see if they like your explanation. This sidesteps the complicated-to-talk-about notion of existence. There is just explanation. Just cinematography.
nirgrahamUK: Anti-realist arguments Anti-realism is the view of idealists who are skeptics about the physical world, maintaining either: 1) that nothing exists outside the mind, or 2) that we would have no access to a mind-independent reality even if it may exist. Realists, in contrast, hold that perceptions or sense data are caused by mind-independent objects. An "anti-realist" who denies that other minds exist (i. e., a solipsist) is different from an "anti-realist" who claims that there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not there are unobservable other minds (i. e., a logical behaviorist).
This is what you guys think I am arguing about, but this this not what I am saying - I am neither a realist nor an anti-realist. I am not an "-ist" of any kind on this. I am simply trying to formulate a useful definition. Definitions are not propositions. It seems like I have to say this a lot these days.
Philosophers generally try to prove definitions. To me, this just indicates they are mightily confused and just shuffling words around. I am actually trying to get at the experiential, 5-sense aspects of what our everyday terms mean, because that is the only way we can be confident we are communicating. If I mention the smell of lemons, perhaps you will all imagine roughly the same thing. I want to have that level of clarity and consistency for every important or strategic word in science.
Nir, you're arguing as if I'm an anti-realist. I am simply trying to clarify what - precisely - we mean when we use words like "real" and "exist." I am not taking a position; in fact I don't even think it makes any sense to "take a position" on ontology. For me it is purely a matter of clarification, and I wish I had more time today to make it, well, clear.
My issue is with the whole "creating your own definitions for already existing words" idea. Why not (a) use the old, correct definition or (b) make a new word?
If I mention the smell of lemons, perhaps you will all imagine roughly the same thing. I want to have that level of clarity and consistency for every important or strategic word in science.
well cool.
but your definition is poor compared to my definition by my lights. since to you existance means your awareness of something and your expectation that that thing should prove a benefit or disservice to you. but this does not distinguish between agent relative and agent neutral quality that so marks our the real world from the dream world. did you know people can have lucid dreams, they can be aware that they are dreaming and not in the agent-neutral world they wakingly share with other agents, in theses dreams things *exist* in their imaginations in the way you have it, with their pragmatic element etc, yet we can credit a lucid dreamer with being comfortable with the fact that when they wake up the next day the dream elements that so affected their pleasure pain affected no-one else in the waking world since it was agent relative and not agent neutral, whereas things are different in the waking world.
now you can play around with, how do you know this isnt a dream, and maybe the dream is really real etc, but thats not the relevant aspect, its the extent to which you believe something to be accessable to other parties that is the demarkation between existance and imagination. on reflection it seems to me that by your definining existance not based on such agent-neutral/relative distinctions but rather on pragmatism/relevance that you really demarcate existance from 'things that we dont care whether they exist or not' (rather than demarcating existence from imagined)
now my headhurts, so I bid you farewell for the moment. thanks for the enjoyable discussion.
@ AJ
He has a number of different formulations of the same proof. Some more specifically address the point about equivocating between descriptive and prescriptive statements than others.
The quote you were criticising was from Four Critical Replies. It can be found on pg. 412 of The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. He goes into much more detail in From The Economics of Lassez Faire To The Ethics of Libertarianism in the same book, on pg. 317-318.
Hence, one would have to conclude that the norm implied in argumentation is that everyone has the right to exclusively control his own body as his instrument of action and cognition. It is only as long as there is at least an implicit recognition of each individual's property right in his or her own body that argumentation can take place. Only if this is recognized is it possible for someone to agree to what has been said in an argument and can what has been said be validated, or is it possible to say no and to agree only on the fact that there is disagreement. Indeed anyone who would try to justify any norm would have to presuppose the property right in one's body as a valid norm, simply in order to say this is what I claim to be true and objective. Any person who would try to dispute the property right in one's own body would become caught up in a contradiction. Thus it can be stated that whenever a person claims that some statement can be justified, he at least implicitly assumes the following norm to be justified: "nobody has the right to uninvitedly aggress against the body of any other person and thus delimit or restrict anyone's control over his own body." This rule is implied in the concept of argumentative justification. Justifying means justifying without haveing to rely on coercion. In fact, if one formulated the opposite of this rule, then it is easy to see that this rule is not and never could be defended in argumentation. To do so would presuppose the validity of precisely its opposite.
Hence, one would have to conclude that the norm implied in argumentation is that everyone has the right to exclusively control his own body as his instrument of action and cognition. It is only as long as there is at least an implicit recognition of each individual's property right in his or her own body that argumentation can take place. Only if this is recognized is it possible for someone to agree to what has been said in an argument and can what has been said be validated, or is it possible to say no and to agree only on the fact that there is disagreement. Indeed anyone who would try to justify any norm would have to presuppose the property right in one's body as a valid norm, simply in order to say this is what I claim to be true and objective. Any person who would try to dispute the property right in one's own body would become caught up in a contradiction.
Thus it can be stated that whenever a person claims that some statement can be justified, he at least implicitly assumes the following norm to be justified: "nobody has the right to uninvitedly aggress against the body of any other person and thus delimit or restrict anyone's control over his own body." This rule is implied in the concept of argumentative justification. Justifying means justifying without haveing to rely on coercion. In fact, if one formulated the opposite of this rule, then it is easy to see that this rule is not and never could be defended in argumentation. To do so would presuppose the validity of precisely its opposite.
So, his argument does not rest on equivocation. He is clearly saying, in this formulation, that it is the norm that must be recognized, and not just the fact of control over one's body.
AJ: "Actually, the issue is whether it is an objective norm."
And by what criteria are you going with "objective"? Pity you're attacking a strawman.
AJ: "Hilarious? No one has ever addressed that equivocation, and your copypasta does not even mention it. That "tripe" isn't going away just because people try to heap on more text to evade it. Hoppe was caught in a bald equivocation, revealing how he floundered into his argument by making a basic error."
Yes, most amusing. My post referenced Hoppe's universalizability video, you're the one who has ignored it. The post was addressed adequately by Nir, and Knight of B... that you contend otherwise, need not make it so.
You're yet to show Hoppe in any kind of equivocation.
Second, there is the logical gap between “is-” and “ought-statements” which natural rights proponents have failed to bridge successfully-except for advancing some general critical remarks regarding the ultimate validity of the fact-value dichotomy. Here the praxeological proof of libertarianism has the advantage of offering a completely value-free justification of private property. It remains entirely in the realm of is-statements and never tries to derive an “ought” from an “is.” The structure of the argument is this: (a) justification is propositional justification-a priori true is-statement; (b) argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle-a priori true is statement; and (c) then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified-a priori true is-statement. The proof also offers a key to an understanding of the nature of the fact-value dichotomy: Ought-statements cannot be derived from is- statements. They belong to different logical realms. It is also clear, however, that one cannot even state that there are facts and values if no propositional exchanges exist, and that this practice of propositional exchanges in turn presupposes the acceptance of the private property ethic as valid. In other words, cognition and truth-seeking as such have a normative foundation, and the normative foundation on which cognition and truth rest is the recognition of private property rights. http://www.hanshoppe.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/hoppe_ult_just_liberty.pdf
Will you address the content of the earlier post thanks.
Graham Wright: "Question for Nir / Conza... if I were to make the statement that "Picasso paintings are beautiful" and you disagree and we have an "argument" about it, would this be an "argument" in the sense Hoppe uses that term? I mean, it's not like this is going to be "settled". One of us is not going to prove the other person incorrect. Even if I persuaded you to change your mind, neither of us would say you were 'incorrect' before."
"Argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting. Not in the sense that there is always agreement on the things said, but in the sense that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth)." (TSC, p. 158)
Why is it relevant? Where is the property conflict? It is a proof that it is impossible to propositionally justify non-libertarian principles without falling into contradictions. Were they trying to justify non-libertarian principles?
Nielsio: "AJ, Do you agree/disagree with Murphy @ http://www.anti-state.com/murphy/murphy19.html ? If you agree with Murphy, what is your opinion on morality? Do you side with Mises/Daniel James Sanchez? Is anyone aware what Murphy's stance is?"
"Is Utilitarianism Viable?" - No, it isn't.
Kinsella's rebuttal to that article.
nirgrahamUK:now you can play around with, how do you know this isnt a dream, and maybe the dream is really real etc, but thats not the relevant aspect, its the extent to which you believe something to be accessable to other parties that is the demarkation between existance and imagination. on reflection it seems to me that by your definining existance not based on such agent-neutral/relative distinctions but rather on pragmatism/relevance that you really demarcate existance from 'things that we dont care whether they exist or not' (rather than demarcating existence from imagined)
This is getting pretty close. There is "consensus reality" that involves other parties; however before I can even talk about other parties I have to decide whether they are "real or not" (relevant or not), so that is a question for after we settle on a definition of existence/reality, not before.
In the case of lucid dreams, as per my definition, it entirely matters whether the person thinks they are dreaming, which just means they deem the sensations they experience to be relevant/irrelevant to their more long-term future actions. To say "I know this is just a dream" is to say that I know whatever I do here won't matter for my actions later today.
I believe I'm not dreaming now. But my typing those words is simply me saying that I'm going to -for example - have to deal with the repurcussions of posting this. (Such as missing my work deadline.....)