In 1997 Critical Review editor Jeffrey Friedman published his paper, “What’s Wrong with Libertarianism” in Critical Review. In sum, Friedman argued that libertarians are guilty of lapsing into “philosophical” defenses of liberty when they run into trouble on consequentialist grounds. He called this move the “libertarian straddle.” Eleven years later, Friedman still seems firmly committed to the relevance of his argument. His comments on this blog attest to this. Here, Friedman suggests that “Rothbardian philosophy” ultimately motivates and characterizes the contributions of younger “libertarian economists,” such as Chris Coyne, Ben Powell, and others. But are the younger economists really guilty of the “libertarian straddle,” or has Friedman just fallen into the unfortunate habit of seeing the “straddle” everywhere he looks? The evidence suggests he has and that it’s time let the “libertarian straddle” trumpeting go. For younger “libertarian economists,” who are economists first and foremost and libertarians only second, the “straddle” is irrelevant. The younger crop of self-described libertarian economists is consequentialist in its argumentation, not natural rights-oriented. Having learned from the generation before them, for which this is also true—economists such as Pete Boettke, Steve Horwitz, Marrio Rizzo, Roger Koppl, and others—the libertarianism of the younger generation is an outflow of their positive economics, which when combined with a normative stance that sees improving standards of living as a “good” thing, makes their worldview “libertarian.” Their argumentation is consequentialist the whole way through. There’s no “straddling” here. Consider, for example, Chris Coyne’s work on post-war reconstruction. Chris objects to foreign intervention, not because of some principled stance against it, but because he finds the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that intervention fails to achieve its ends, often making things worse from the perspective of the interveners’ stated goals rather than better. Notably, Chris does not claim that this is true in all cases. He points to post-WWII Germany and Japan as examples of successful intervention and through positive analysis identifies the factors that made this so. Benjamin Powell’s work on Somalia is another excellent example. Ben’s argument isn’t that life is good in Somalia because Somalia doesn’t have a government and therefore doesn’t have coercion. His argument is that there’s plenty of coercion in Somalia, but compared to surrounding countries with similar backgrounds that have governments, Somali anarchy has produced greater welfare improvements for Somalia than government has in neighboring countries. J. Robert Subrick’s and Scott Beaulier’s research on Botswana is another example of straight-up, consequentialist reasoning. Subrick and Beaulier applaud Botswana’s post-colonial embrace of private property rights and limited government, not because of any alleged inherent “goodness” or “rightness” of private property rights and limited government, but rather because private property rights and limited government in Botswana led to the highest economic growth rate in Africa for thirty years. Through such research, the younger generation of libertarian (“second) economists (“first”) is contributing important empirical work that finds markets tend to do better than governments when it comes to enhancing prosperity. Ludwig von Mises deserves much credit here, as he has had an impressive influence on these young scholars and the generation that preceded them in this regard. To paraphrase Mises, capitalism is desirable in a normative sense because of its superiority in producing wealth, which economics demonstrates in a positive sense. If socialism were the superior wealth creator, Mises points out, he would embrace socialism instead of capitalism. Many in the younger generation agree wholeheartedly with Mises. Thus, thorough going consequentialism is embedded in the thinking of young economists who work in this tradition. Ironically, what J. Friedman has called “economic imperialism” also deserves much credit for this. It’s precisely this unswerving devotion to economic logic that has produced an unswerving devotion to consequentialist analysis. “Economic imperialism” means there’s no room for “philosophical” justifications. “Philosophical” justifications are squeezed out by the pure logic of choice. Most recently, in an effort to rescue the relevance of the “straddle” argument, Friedman has expanded his definition of “libertarian straddling” to include: 1. Analyses of foreign intervention. 2. Analyses of decentralized institutions of order. Thus, “straddling” under his new and expanded definition refers not only to marshaling “philosophical” arguments when consequentialism puts one in a tough place, but also to a set of specific topics that are themselves “off limits” for some reason—even if their analyses are purely positive and fully consequentialist. This is a curious way to redefine “straddling.” Indeed, if taken seriously, this redefinition would have the bizarre effect of making the sizeable number of *explicitly non-libertarian* social scientists who analyze the topics J. Friedman points to guilty of “libertarian straddling.” (See, for instance, the important work of Jack Hirshleifer, Avinash Dixit, Avner Greif, Robert Ellickson, Lisa Bernstein, and Karen Clay, among other top-flight scholars). If this is what it takes to save the relevance of the “libertarian straddle” argument, its modern irrelevance could hardly be plainer. It’s time to put the “straddle” argument to bed.
Eleven years later, Friedman still seems firmly committed to the relevance of his argument. His comments on this blog attest to this. Here, Friedman suggests that “Rothbardian philosophy” ultimately motivates and characterizes the contributions of younger “libertarian economists,” such as Chris Coyne, Ben Powell, and others.
But are the younger economists really guilty of the “libertarian straddle,” or has Friedman just fallen into the unfortunate habit of seeing the “straddle” everywhere he looks? The evidence suggests he has and that it’s time let the “libertarian straddle” trumpeting go. For younger “libertarian economists,” who are economists first and foremost and libertarians only second, the “straddle” is irrelevant.
The younger crop of self-described libertarian economists is consequentialist in its argumentation, not natural rights-oriented. Having learned from the generation before them, for which this is also true—economists such as Pete Boettke, Steve Horwitz, Marrio Rizzo, Roger Koppl, and others—the libertarianism of the younger generation is an outflow of their positive economics, which when combined with a normative stance that sees improving standards of living as a “good” thing, makes their worldview “libertarian.” Their argumentation is consequentialist the whole way through. There’s no “straddling” here. Consider, for example, Chris Coyne’s work on post-war reconstruction. Chris objects to foreign intervention, not because of some principled stance against it, but because he finds the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that intervention fails to achieve its ends, often making things worse from the perspective of the interveners’ stated goals rather than better. Notably, Chris does not claim that this is true in all cases. He points to post-WWII Germany and Japan as examples of successful intervention and through positive analysis identifies the factors that made this so. Benjamin Powell’s work on Somalia is another excellent example. Ben’s argument isn’t that life is good in Somalia because Somalia doesn’t have a government and therefore doesn’t have coercion. His argument is that there’s plenty of coercion in Somalia, but compared to surrounding countries with similar backgrounds that have governments, Somali anarchy has produced greater welfare improvements for Somalia than government has in neighboring countries. J. Robert Subrick’s and Scott Beaulier’s research on Botswana is another example of straight-up, consequentialist reasoning. Subrick and Beaulier applaud Botswana’s post-colonial embrace of private property rights and limited government, not because of any alleged inherent “goodness” or “rightness” of private property rights and limited government, but rather because private property rights and limited government in Botswana led to the highest economic growth rate in Africa for thirty years. Through such research, the younger generation of libertarian (“second) economists (“first”) is contributing important empirical work that finds markets tend to do better than governments when it comes to enhancing prosperity. Ludwig von Mises deserves much credit here, as he has had an impressive influence on these young scholars and the generation that preceded them in this regard. To paraphrase Mises, capitalism is desirable in a normative sense because of its superiority in producing wealth, which economics demonstrates in a positive sense. If socialism were the superior wealth creator, Mises points out, he would embrace socialism instead of capitalism. Many in the younger generation agree wholeheartedly with Mises. Thus, thorough going consequentialism is embedded in the thinking of young economists who work in this tradition. Ironically, what J. Friedman has called “economic imperialism” also deserves much credit for this. It’s precisely this unswerving devotion to economic logic that has produced an unswerving devotion to consequentialist analysis. “Economic imperialism” means there’s no room for “philosophical” justifications. “Philosophical” justifications are squeezed out by the pure logic of choice. Most recently, in an effort to rescue the relevance of the “straddle” argument, Friedman has expanded his definition of “libertarian straddling” to include: 1. Analyses of foreign intervention. 2. Analyses of decentralized institutions of order. Thus, “straddling” under his new and expanded definition refers not only to marshaling “philosophical” arguments when consequentialism puts one in a tough place, but also to a set of specific topics that are themselves “off limits” for some reason—even if their analyses are purely positive and fully consequentialist. This is a curious way to redefine “straddling.” Indeed, if taken seriously, this redefinition would have the bizarre effect of making the sizeable number of *explicitly non-libertarian* social scientists who analyze the topics J. Friedman points to guilty of “libertarian straddling.” (See, for instance, the important work of Jack Hirshleifer, Avinash Dixit, Avner Greif, Robert Ellickson, Lisa Bernstein, and Karen Clay, among other top-flight scholars). If this is what it takes to save the relevance of the “libertarian straddle” argument, its modern irrelevance could hardly be plainer. It’s time to put the “straddle” argument to bed.
Source.
One thing that disturbs me is the readiness with which Rothbard is dismissed and Mises praised. Libertarianism is a political philosophy - not a mere branch of economics. Why should it be surprising if philosophical arguments are given in addition to economic ones? Pure consequentialism does not cut it.
-Jon
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Indeed, if you try to build a society on consequentialism, you're going to have some serious problems with arbitration without recourse to morality.
You can use consequentialism to describe the best system of government (or lack thereof) for a society, but when it comes down to individuals, using consequentialism to justify them adhering to your idea breaks down. You can say "respecting private property and not stealing will yield the highest average standards of living for society", but you then have to compel individuals to not steal. How do you do this? You cannot really appeal to consequences in the form of punishments because punishment for theft are also based on the morality and ethics of private property as derived from self-ownership...
I may be just talking rubbish though.
Fred Furash: Indeed, if you try to build a society on consequentialism, you're going to have some serious problems with arbitration without recourse to morality. You can use consequentialism to describe the best system of government (or lack thereof) for a society, but when it comes down to individuals, using consequentialism to justify them adhering to your idea breaks down. You can say "respecting private property and not stealing will yield the highest average standards of living for society", but you then have to compel individuals to not steal. How do you do this? You cannot really appeal to consequences in the form of punishments because punishment for theft are also based on the morality and ethics of private property as derived from self-ownership... I may be just talking rubbish though.
Agreed. I see consequentialist arguments are being secondary to arguments based in natural law and virtue, although they are still important.
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
I think what the libertarian movement needs is to convince more Friedmans to get into economics.
I agree with the author insofar that using nonconsequentialist arguments is somewhat pointless. The vast majority of people are not interested in rights but in consequences. They erroneously believe that more government intervention is needed to make the poor, minorities, etc. better off and that monopolies, business cycles, and involuntary unemployment are the result of a free market. Nobody wants to hear why a free market is morally superior, they want to hear how it will leave them and their peers better off.
I'd go further than the author and say that people are interested in utilitarian arguments, not consequentialist ones. Most people aren't interested in how laissez faire capitalism is better from an ethical egoist standpoint (which is also consequentialist), instead, they prefer to inflate their egos and their "Christian-ness" by believing they want to help everyone, so they essentially take a utilitarian standpoint.
However, I disagree with the author about Murray Rothbard. Rothbard showed how a libertarian society would be much better consequentialy as well as from his nonconsequentialist natural rights based view. There is nothing wrong with that. I don't care if you argue for capitalism from a non-utilitarian standpoint (i.e. Rothbard & natural rights or Rand & ethical egoism) as long as you also include arguments which will appeal to your average wannabe utilitarian.
Then again I'm a nihilist, so why listen to me?
JohnSchreimann: I think what the libertarian movement needs is to convince more Friedmans to get into economics.
LOL.
Political Atheists Blog
Well the thing is, many people do in fact think capitalism is immoral. So bursting that bubble is a victory in itself. Of course one cannot divorce ethics from consequences entirely - to do so is foolish - and I definitely think Rothbard contributed decisively in showing how the free market is best at producing and distributing scarce resources.
Jon Irenicus: Well the thing is, many people do in fact think capitalism is immoral. So bursting that bubble is a victory in itself. Of course one cannot divorce ethics from consequences entirely - to do so is foolish - and I definitely think Rothbard contributed decisively in showing how the free market is best at producing and distributing scarce resources. -Jon
But don't most people approach morality from a utilitarian standpoint? Children are taught from a young age how Robin Hood was great and how capitalism only steals from the poor, discriminates against minorities, and gives unfair wages to essentially everyone. People associate capitalism with things like the Great Depression, pollution, unemployment, monopolies, etc. They all view this as morally bad, from a "utilitarian" viewpoint (I put "utilitarian" in quotes since most people tend to think among those lines but are not utilitarian at all inpractice).
I think the key to arguing for pure, unfettered capitalism is from this utilitarian POV. Explain to your opponents how a free market produces superior results for the average person, how pollution would become a problem of the past, how deforestation would be reversed, how involuntary unemployment would cease (except for frictional unemployment), how wages would begin to rise, etc.
Now, when you explain that, you can begin to convert them to whatever your preferential ethical system is (i.e. natural rights, contractarianism, ethical egoism, etc.). I agree that you can't have a free market side-by-side with a society that practices utilitarianism. I believe Ayn Rand did a rather good job of bringing people over to libertarianism and keeping them with her brand of ethical egoism. Once people understood libertarianism as economically feasible, they would learn how it is morally superior according to Miss Rand, and thus become permanent converts. Rothbard's approach, unfortunately, never received as much publicity.
People like Robin Hood because they believe he was good (it turns out, by the way, that he was, but not for the reasons they attribute to him.) You will not win people over with consequentialism, because consequentialist arguments can be pushed aside as irrelevant. "Sure, free-markets produce more efficiency and more output - but it's distributed unfairly." You can try all you want, but you won't convince a socialist that the free-market produces the same kind of equality that they're seeking, because it doesn't. If you want to convince them, you need to convince them why there's something wrong with the kind of equality they're seeking.
Personally, I'm with Long, who says (paraphrasing) "It can't be that free markets work really well in making people happy, but that's entirely irrelevant to the discussion - but it also can't be the whole discussion." In other words, I don't think we need to draw a consequentialist/deontological divide and say "liberty must be justified on either of these grounds." The defense of liberty needs to not just include both factors, but integrate both factors seamlessly. Now all we have to do is figure out how to do that.
JAlanKatz: People like Robin Hood because they believe he was good (it turns out, by the way, that he was, but not for the reasons they attribute to him.) You will not win people over with consequentialism, because consequentialist arguments can be pushed aside as irrelevant. "Sure, free-markets produce more efficiency and more output - but it's distributed unfairly." You can try all you want, but you won't convince a socialist that the free-market produces the same kind of equality that they're seeking, because it doesn't. If you want to convince them, you need to convince them why there's something wrong with the kind of equality they're seeking.
Most socialists aren't socialists because they believe in equal distribution, but because they believe equal (or close to equal) distribution of economic goods will cause the greatest average happiness. That's where we have to fight them and their misconceptions about the market economy.
That's pretty much what I already said, and I'm pretty sure people like Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand have already been doing that.
krazy kaju:Most socialists aren't socialists because they believe in equal distribution, but because they believe equal (or close to equal) distribution of economic goods will cause the greatest average happiness. That's where we have to fight them and their misconceptions about the market economy.
I don't see much use in fighting about "happiness," it's too hard to tie down. Why not ask why someone has the right to make himself happy at someone else's expense? Just how are you going to convince them anything about happiness without violating your principle of subjective values?
krazy kaju:That's pretty much what I already said, and I'm pretty sure people like Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand have already been doing that.
I see an attempt, not necessarily successful, in Rothbard. I don't see where Rand many any effort to go beyond deontological ethical statements by integrating them with claims about utility, as opposed to simply saying both next to each other without showing a relationship between them.
But don't most people approach morality from a utilitarian standpoint?
No. Utilitarianism is itself a deontic system. Few, if any, people would accept the system when stretched to its logical conclusions. I'm not sure why people think utilitarianism is more intuitive or metaphysically non-burdensome. It isn't. Personally, I am an Aristotelian, so I am unwilling to accept this massive divide between deontic and consequentialist accounts - and see more in happiness than mere satisfaction of desires, especially when this is at the expense of others.
Children are taught from a young age how Robin Hood was great and how capitalism only steals from the poor, discriminates against minorities, and gives unfair wages to essentially everyone. People associate capitalism with things like the Great Depression, pollution, unemployment, monopolies, etc. They all view this as morally bad, from a "utilitarian" viewpoint (I put "utilitarian" in quotes since most people tend to think among those lines but are not utilitarian at all inpractice).
A lot of them, based on this misinformation, also see exchange as inherently exploitative and incapable of bringing about a situation in which one person treats another as an end, and not a mere means, or owners as doing nothing but stealing from the workers. IOW, they reject capitalism due to what they see as one of its consequences, but their ultimate reasons for doing so are not purely consequentialist. Not all cases are like this though - if someone sees capitalism as wrong due to its basis on selfishness, it is necessary to engage in moral argumentation to get the person to change their viewpoint - because no mere consequence will change their minds in this case.
Now, when you explain that, you can begin to convert them to whatever your preferential ethical system is (i.e. natural rights, contractarianism, ethical egoism, etc.).
Yep, as I said consequences do matter to the ethical system, so I don't really differ on this.
If socialism were the superior wealth creator, Mises points out, he would embrace socialism instead of capitalism. Many in the younger generation agree wholeheartedly with Mises.
To be honest, if they have this as their guiding principle, I would question whether or not they are really even libertarians. As libertarians, shouldn't we support liberty regardless of consequences? Regardless of what "superior wealth creators" might exist? IMHO, liberty is good in itself.
Morty:To be honest, if they have this as their guiding principle, I would question whether or not they are really even libertarians. As libertarians, shouldn't we support liberty regardless of consequences? Regardless of what "superior wealth creators" might exist? IMHO, liberty is good in itself.
I'd call this position "wealthitarianism" not libertarianism.