Ethical norms and conventions enjoy legitimacy vis a vis concepts like natural rights and objective morals largely because they produce claims capable of intersubjective verification. That is, we can determine the truth value of a statement like "respect for property is a social norm" by observing whether or not this is actually the case, while this is not the case for a statement like "respect for property is moral."
So how does a social scientist go about verifying a claim like "respect for property is a norm?" Most likely, he would observe the behaviors of the members of a society, either through surveys or historical records, and determine whether his findings reflect a respect for property. In this case though, how would he be able to distinguish between an actual social norm and a case where people simply act as if a social norm is in place? Is there a difference?
I asked my friend about this, and he thinks there is no difference. To him, people acting as if there is a customary rule of behavior is just what it means for a customary rule of behavior to exist (this is a pretty reasonable position to hold). If this were true though, how could someone tell the difference between a social norm being broken and a social norm just ceasing to be? In other words, if behaving as if property should be respected is what establishes "respect for property" as a norm, then behaving as if property shouldn't be resepected just establishes "disrespect for property" as a norm -- it becomes impossible to ever break the norm. This is similar to the argument Wittgenstein makes against following a rule privately.
I think for this reason, there has to be a difference between following a norm and acting as if you're following a norm. After all, it seems essential to what a norm is that it be able to be broken. But this brings us back to the issue of how to differentiate between the two when trying to verify or falsify existential claims about norms. A likely solution is that norms, conventions and other social/ethical phenomena are a priori structures that can't be defined by strictly positivist means.
The bigger point I want to make from this though, is that the ontology of norms and conventions, insofar as they aren't explicit, doesn't seem to be much more worked out that the ontology of natural rights and moral realism. This isn't to say that natural rights are necessarily real in the same way that social norms are, its a much more modest position: The lack of intersubjective verifiability is insufficient grounds to dismiss the possibility of natural rights because verifiability, on its own, isn't enough to properly establish much less contreversial social phenomena.
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
“how could someone tell the difference between a social norm being broken and a social norm just ceasing to be”
Social norms depend on consensus. If everyone is bluntly honest, then being delicate with other people’s feelings is not longer a social norm.
“A likely solution is that norms, conventions and other social/ethical phenomena are a priori structures that can't be defined by strictly positivist means.”
Social norms do not exist before people do. How can they be a priori? I am unsure what “strictly positivist means” is supposed to mean. I suspect that many forum readers have read what you wrote, but did not respond because they did not know what many of the words meant. There are varying levels of knowledge on philosophical jargon.
“The bigger point I want to make from this though, is that the ontology of norms and conventions,”
I had to look up ontology. It is a fancy word for “the branch of metaphysics that studies the nature of existence or being as such.”
“doesn't seem to be much more worked out that the ontology of natural rights and moral realism.”
If natural rights means like divinely ordained, I don’t buy it. “Natural rights” is an odd phrase. Are there unnatural rights?
“The lack of intersubjective verifiability is insufficient grounds to dismiss the possibility of natural rights because verifiability, on its own, isn't enough to properly establish much less contreversial social phenomena.”
Your argument seems to be about people agreeing with social norms and tying that to undefined natural rights.
It doesn't require a full consensus, or even a majority, just some sort of critical mass. Not everyone waits their turn in line, but we still say waiting in line is a social norm. The problem I'm having is that if simply observing that people regularly wait their turn in line is enough to establish that behavior as a norm, what would it look like for someone to break the norm? If we see people cutting in line, why is it that we know its a violation of the norm, and not simply the creation of a new norm?
What I mean by positivist means is the same as empiricist means - attaining knowledge solely by way of observation as opposed to deduction or other ways. Also, a priori doesn't mean before or without people, it just has to do with the way we are able to know something. The a priori of social norms would be something like logically necessary aspects -- "if x is a social norm, then x can either be obeyed or disobeyed." That would be an a priori statement about norms.
Well, I think that a lot of the opposition to natural rights is grounded in the beliefs that they fail to bridge the is-ought gap, an that they cannot produce meaningful statements that can be verified. I agree with both points for the most part especially when natural rights are treated as something divine or mystical. What I wanted to show though, was that norms and conventions which essentially replace the role of rights for libertarians like Jasay, also fail to produce verifiable statements.
The lack of intersubjective verifiability is insufficient grounds to dismiss the possibility of natural rights because verifiability, on its own, isn't enough to properly establish much less contreversial social phenomena.
I only have 10 minutes to write this so I might have to come back later and write more. Basically, each individual carries within himself or herself an intuitive theory of social norms/morality/whatever-you-want-to-call-it. This theory is basically a theory of how others will react to our actions (and how they will react to our reactions to their reactions and so on). Some of this is probably learned in childhood and some of it is certainly hard-wired into our brains. How it arises is of little importance to the question of how it works in fully-developed adults.
This intuitive theory acts as a feedback mechanism on our choices. I will feel happy if I find $1,000 and put it in my pocket and go spend it. But when you beat me up for stealing your $1,000 or call the police and they put me in jail, I will feel less happy than if I had simply left the $1,000 laying where it was. Hence, my intuitive theories about how you will react to my actions alter my schedule of wants.
Determining what social norms exist is not easy but there are some low-hanging fruit. We can use the tools of evolutionary pscyhology to identify "culturally-universal" behaviors then apply evolutionary arguments to those behaviors to construct plausible theories for how those behaviors arose. But note that, unlike natural rights theory, this is an inductive process. Natural rights theory starts with some abstract condition such as "absence of inter-personal conflict" and then attempts to derive the logically necessary conditions for its attainment. So, I see this disagreement between deductive derivation of social norms versus inductive derivation to be the root disagreement between my view of social norms and natural rights theory.
Clayton -
“If we see people cutting in line, why is it that we know its a violation of the norm, and not simply the creation of a new norm?”
First-come, first-served is likely the basis of the line. If customers are arguing about who can check out first, that will discourage people from shopping at that place, so any business will likely insist on orderly lines to keep a peaceful atmosphere.
“What I wanted to show though, was that norms and conventions which essentially replace the role of rights for libertarians like Jasay, also fail to produce verifiable statements.”
I did not know you were arguing about Anthony de Jasay and I do not know what he said about justifying libertarianism. Providing quotes would be helpful.
I doubt many libertarians use “norms and conventions which essentially replace the role of rights”. If the basis of libertarianism was just social norms, then libertarianism is quite elastic subject to any social change.
Clayton:We can use the tools of evolutionary pscyhology to identify "culturally-universal" behaviors then apply evolutionary arguments to those behaviors to construct plausible theories for how those behaviors arose. But note that, unlike natural rights theory, this is an inductive process. Natural rights theory starts with some abstract condition such as "absence of inter-personal conflict" and then attempts to derive the logically necessary conditions for its attainment.
I more or less agree with this, except that I don't think it is purely inductive. It just isn't enough to observe the behavior and determine that it constitutes a norm, even if the behavior is culturally-universal, because we can't observe the difference between breaking a norm and following a new one. The way we know a norm exists is by observing the behavior, so any change in the behavior should be interpreted as a new norm, not a deviancy. But since we actually interpret a behavioral change as a breaking of a rule, then the norm itself has to be logically separate from from the behavior it influences, and the norm itself isn't observable.
Gero:I did not know you were arguing about Anthony de Jasay and I do not know what he said about justifying libertarianism. Providing quotes would be helpful.
I wasn't really explicitly attacking Jasay which is why I didn't quote him. Heres one though:
Jasay:Admittedly, it could at a pinch be argued that these rules have been conceived and put in place to protect the rights in question. They are what they are because the rights are what they are. This argument, which is often made, though seldom explicitly, is defective for several reasons. The main, and sufficient, one is that the assertion that we have a right to peaceful pursuits (and other convenient and desirable facilities of life) is supported by no intersubjectively verifiable evidence, but only by a particular moral intuition many share but which is woefully subject to interpretation and twisting, contestable in a way that plain wrongdoing is not. How can one possibly know that this right to this particular pursuit really exists, or rebut an assertion that it does not?
The rules that he is talking about here are norms and conventions. When I said that libertarians use norms to replace rights, I mean that libertarians who oppose the natural rights approach believe that social norms and conventions already prohibit acts of aggression between individuals and that the state warps this normal state of affairs. A polycentric, market based legal order wouldn't need to worry about principles like the NAP because it would naturally tend towards a libertarian society by virtue of it being a market order.
The main, and sufficient, one is that the assertion that we have a right to peaceful pursuits (and other convenient and desirable facilities of life) is supported by no intersubjectively verifiable evidence, but only by a particular moral intuition many share but which is woefully subject to interpretation and twisting, contestable in a way that plain wrongdoing is not. How can one possibly know that this right to this particular pursuit really exists, or rebut an assertion that it does not?
Since when is the only ethical epistemology intuitionism? This is news to me...
MrSchnapps,
I don't think Jasay denies that natural rightsters and moral realists attempt to support their arguments with numerous epistemological positions. He probably just means that (in his view) they fail on any other grounds besides intuitionism.
I agree with your qualification, but Jasay seems to be using sloppy langauge, here: "supported by no intersubjectively verifiable evidence, but only by..."
Only by, means only by. He's defining an exclusive domain in which moral intuitionism is the only member. If he didn't wish to say that, he should have said otherwise. I'm sure if someone called him on it directly, he'd concede the point. Jasay is a pretty bright guy.
I realize this isn't quite related to your argument, but I really don't see why it is so difficult to "derive" an ought from an is. For example, we can say, "If you want to win the race, you ought to run quickly," or, "If you want to bake a cake, follow the recipe." In other words, if it is the case that you seek this end, you ought take the following steps, what's called the problematic hypothetical imperative. The values to which you are already committed necessarily commit you to further values of which you were not previously aware. If you will an end, you must will the means to the end, or else give up the end.
Certainly we can analyze and test hypothetical imperatives, at least in principle; we can see which economic system will best raise the general standard of living, for example, and then tell everyone who shares that goal to adopt such-and-such an economic system. Hume did precisely this in the very same volume where he observed there was no necessary link between what is and what ought to be (a perfectly valid observation, since you have to introduce another premise to make that connection). I presume what I'm saying isn't very controversial.
All the natural rights people have ever claimed is that there is a goal at which all human beings aim, call it X, such that the problematic hypothetical becomes assertoric, i.e. "Since you seek X, you ought to pursue Y," which can simply be truncated to, "You ought to pursue Y," which is the typical form moral commandments take. For my part, X is flourishing and Y is rational self-interest, which presupposes individual rights. This seems to me like a simple enough claim that can at least be debated by reasonable people, yet it's remarkable to me how much verbal abuse natural rightsers are subjected to.
Tunk,
I think the problem with natural rights is 90% bad publicity and 10% bad ideas. I don't want this to turn into another thread about objective morality, as there are more than enough of those already, but I agree up to the point of an ultimate end shared by all humans. Once potentiality and actuality enter the scene the arguement becomes way less straight forward.