I have posted an article on a blog here on the community secion that I would be very interested in getting feedback and hopefully contribution from the readers of Mises.org. I believe I make a strong case for purposeful interaction between all living organisms. Please check it out at <a href="http://community.mises.org/economizingworld">http://community.mises.org/economizingworld</a> and I would be grateful for any and all responses.
Thank you.
On a brief glance, I think there are some things you're missing. You are blindly applying categories of (human) social science to non-human entities without comprehending the conditions under which they are valid. For example, when you speak of price signals, you are implicitly assuming voluntary exchange (catallacty) - but there is no reason to believe that the interactions between non-human entities are voluntary exchanges of any kind.
Voluntary action is a uniquely human category of behavior. So, when applying these ideas outside of the realm in which they have already been developed, it is crucial to observe the conditions under which they apply. This is why praxeology outside of catallacty is less well developed. There are no obvious "rules" (such as marginal utility, price signals, and so on) that can be derived in the broader realm of human action where we do not eliminate the consideration of destructive violence and parasitism.
Given the tenor of your blog post, you may find this thread interesting.
Clayton -
Isn't voluntary another way of saying that it is the highest valued action for someone to take in response to a situation? I know Mises argued that only humans can suppress the desire to take a reflexive response and make a conscious, well-thoughtout one but I'm not looking for that level of development or sophistication, only a more simplistic set of rules which when finaly built into humans can incorporate much more advanced and nuanced applications. Since all living things must also reject alternative responses given any specific situation do their responses not imply a purpose and either genetically encoded or internally on-the-spot determined valuation? And I think I showed why each cell would respond uniquely different based on their uniquely different spot in time, space, needs and life cycle.
Is it voluntary if, when you point a gun to my head and command me to give you my pants, I choose to do so because I value that option the greatest? I'm under threat of violence.
Voluntary:
The Anarch is to the Anarchist what the Monarch is to the Monarchist. -Ernst Jünger
I understand what you guys are saying about the voluntary nature of economic human interaction but purposeful action, value, supply and demand, etc also apply in the interaction when one is cornered or threatened and has very little apparent choice. Star Wars' let the wookie win http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mO6M4ngKRp0 is a nice example.
Currently the nature of cellular interaction is studied primarily as responses taken by cells that, in your words, are not voluntary and implied in that is that there is a one-directional component to it: They are sent chemical signals and must respond.
The problem with that argument is that, at least in cells of a living organisms, the chemical signals are being sent primarily by other cells and even if those cells reside in the brain, that brain is only made up of cells. The other is that at any given time there may be a myriad of conflicting signals to which each cell must in someway "decide" which ones to respond to.
A body is an economic masterpiece. It must deliver oxygen and nutrients to all parts of the body and decide which parts will be left without when there is scarcity or emergencies. It cleans waste and removes dead cells and other organisms. Everything it does involves economizing limited resources. In order to do this there is a tremendous amount communication and interaction, which I imagine you would object (as woudl I) to calling voluntary but I think we could agree that it is cooperative.
By using consistant rules based on a priori foundations, we can define solid non-chemical explanations to how cells interact.
@cwaidele: Again, the problem is not that you're applying praxeology (the science of purposeful action) outside of voluntary exchange, it's that you're applying the principles derived through praxeological methods that are only known to be valid under conditions of voluntary exchange to conditions outside of voluntary exchange.
@Clayton: If given a and b as true and then deducing c and d directly from them and then e directly from c and d, how can the introduction of y which does not refute a and b refute c, d and e?
Why stop at cells? Pull out all stops and go straight down to atoms, even quarks. In the case of a rock resting on the ground, don't the atoms in the rock voluntarily choose to cooperate with the atoms in the ground to bring about the most desired/valued outcome for all: a rock resting on the ground?
If you can make a comprehensive and logical case for that, go ahead. I can't. I believe I have made one, though, for cells. They are living organisms.
it is not merely that something *lives* (which is slippery to define anyway) that marks that thing out as a candidate for teleological analysis. You need to make the case that a teleological analysis is superior over the domain in question for the purposes of understanding the phenomenon you wish to understand than other approaches, like mechanistic/phsyical-causal.
I have a strong recollection that Daniel S wrote well on this issue in a debate thread some time ago. I might look it up later.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Jargon:Is it voluntary if, when you point a gun to my head and command me to give you my pants, I choose to do so because I value that option the greatest? I'm under threat of violence.
Strictly speaking, your choice is still voluntary. But it was in no way voluntary on your part for someone else to point a gun to your head, presenting a clear and present danger to your life. That's the key difference.
(Also, was I the only one who thought of The Terminator with the above? :P)
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
strgonly disagree Autolykos. its semantic, but you are right in so far as the word voluntary has different meanings in different contexts and to different groups, it does *smush* together notions of choice-making and consent giving. But you are clearly favouring the choice-making to the detriment of consent giving. It is part of the libertarian lexicon to understand voluntary under the *consent* umbrella, i.e. free of NAP breach.
Sure, you could say that the interaction as a whole is involuntary in an absolute sense, because there's at least one component of it (the gun being pointed to your head) that isn't voluntary. Does that make sense?
@nirgrahamUK: What specific arguments in the article about cells (linked to at the top of this thread) do you consider incorrect?
its not a specific argument. the language you adopt is rife with the assumption that you set out to conclude. That all biological units are *purposeful* and perform *actions* etc.
I suppose you're right in that I posted both the reasons for developing a formal proof and my attempt to develop one in the same article. The actual argument without any presupositions and starting with only the constraints of time and space can be found under the "cellular economics" heading. I'll work on breaking that up under seperate tabs.
... and thank you.
@cw: But I don't think you fully understand the economic arguments themselves. Can you explain why the welfare principle (people do better by virtue of exchanging with one another) does not hold outside of conditions of voluntary exchange, for example?
@Clayton: My contention is that there is scarcity by the fact that no living thing can do everything at once so all living things must economize. Plain and simple . Now from that we demonstrate purposefulness and that some basic laws of economics that can be derived directly from the two assumptions also apply.
To argue that because I have not taken it far enough and not included a law or axiom that you consider important negates anything thus far explored seems to miss the point. What I have focused on is either, on its own, right or not. I make no claims to completeness just hoping for accuracy in what I have tackled. And I believe that unless someone can punch holes in the few pieces I've so far focused on, that these conclusions are quite significant.
There is no need to explore the use of money or many other concepts that are uniquely human and to not do so does not take away from the contribution that the application of some of the rules will shed light on explaining cellular interaction. Furthermore, if this works at a cellular level which is the smallest form of life we know of, how much richer will the arguments be for primates and other more highly developed animals?
cwaidele: If you can make a comprehensive and logical case for that, go ahead. I can't. I believe I have made one, though, for cells. They are living organisms.
Why is your thesis restricted to "living organisms"? What is it in a cell, that a rock does not possess, which makes the former amenable to your thesis, while excluding the latter?
Again, if you can than go ahead.
I'll respond as if you're serious and not trying to make reductio ad aburdum argument. Cells eat, breath, procreate, live and die and respond to stimuli. They also have an extremely rich set of internal organs (called organelles) that perform many of the same functions as our organs. They cooperate and in many ways you can say that we humans are the ultimate result of cellular cooperation since that's all (on a non-spiritual level) that we're made of. They also adapt.
Do you feel that I am taking something away from the action axioms or Austrian economics by extrapolating them to something that could be useful to biologists and other scientists? I certainly don't. Nor do I wish to.
@z1235, @Clayton: You may find this interesting: http://www.ted.com/talks/bonnie_bassler_on_how_bacteria_communicate.html
To argue that because I have not taken it far enough and not included a law or axiom that you consider important
My point was that you cannot explain the welfare principle when it is a very basic delimiter between conditions under voluntary exchange and conditions outside of that.
negates anything thus far explored seems to miss the point.
Quite the opposite. I said I have made similar arguments regarding consciousness and even the "inanimate" physical world all the way down to the smallest scale below fundamental particles.
And I believe that unless someone can punch holes in the few pieces I've so far focused on, that these conclusions are quite significant.
The praxeological method is, indeed, significant and the results which can be derived through its careful use. I think you're abusing the praxeological method and I've pointed out how. Do with it what you will.