I don't understand why these are contradictory (if they are; I've boldened the propositions I'm taking about). Is something always contradictory because it fails the universability test?
Here's an exerpt from this article by Hoppe.
This is what I used to clarify the meaning of the "formal universalization test."
Why is it then that other nonlibertarian property theories fail to be justifiable? First, it should be noted, as will become clear shortly, that all of the practiced alternatives to libertarianism and most of the theoretically proposed nonlibertarian ethics would not even pass the first formal universalization test and would fail for this fact alone! All these versions contain norms within their framework of legal rules that have the form, "some people do, and some people do not." However, such rules that specify different rights or obligations for different classes of people have no chance of being accepted as fair by every potential participant in an argument for simply formal reasons. Unless the distinction made between different classes of people happens to be such that it is acceptable to both sides as grounded in the nature of things, such rules would not be acceptable because they would imply that one group is awarded legal privileges at the expense of complementary discriminations against another group. Some people, either those who are allowed to do something or those who are not, would not be able to agree that these were fair rules. Since most alternative ethical proposals, as practiced or preached, have to rely on the enforcement of rules such as "some people have the obligation to pay taxes, and others have the right to consume them," or "some people know what is good for you and are allowed to help you get these alleged blessings even if you do not want them, but you are not allowed to know what is good for them and help them accordingly," or "some people have the right to determine who has too much of something and who too little, and others have the obligation to accept that," or even more plainly, "the computer industry must pay to subsidize the farmers, the employed for the unemployed, the ones without kids for those with kids," or vice versa. They all can be discarded as serious contenders to the claim of being a valid theory of norms qua property norm, because they all indicate by their very formulation that they are not universalizable.
Why is it then that other nonlibertarian property theories fail to be justifiable? First, it should be noted, as will become clear shortly, that all of the practiced alternatives to libertarianism and most of the theoretically proposed nonlibertarian ethics would not even pass the first formal universalization test and would fail for this fact alone!
All these versions contain norms within their framework of legal rules that have the form, "some people do, and some people do not." However, such rules that specify different rights or obligations for different classes of people have no chance of being accepted as fair by every potential participant in an argument for simply formal reasons.
Unless the distinction made between different classes of people happens to be such that it is acceptable to both sides as grounded in the nature of things, such rules would not be acceptable because they would imply that one group is awarded legal privileges at the expense of complementary discriminations against another group. Some people, either those who are allowed to do something or those who are not, would not be able to agree that these were fair rules.
Since most alternative ethical proposals, as practiced or preached, have to rely on the enforcement of rules such as "some people have the obligation to pay taxes, and others have the right to consume them," or "some people know what is good for you and are allowed to help you get these alleged blessings even if you do not want them, but you are not allowed to know what is good for them and help them accordingly," or "some people have the right to determine who has too much of something and who too little, and others have the obligation to accept that," or even more plainly, "the computer industry must pay to subsidize the farmers, the employed for the unemployed, the ones without kids for those with kids," or vice versa. They all can be discarded as serious contenders to the claim of being a valid theory of norms qua property norm, because they all indicate by their very formulation that they are not universalizable.
I think I understand what the universalization test is- but does a proposition, such as any that I have boldened, failing this test automatically mean that it contains a contradiction? If so, can someone tell me the definition of contradiction that is used for these purposes and show me how a proposition is contradictory if it fails the universalization test, if that is the case? Any help would be appreciated!
If I had a cake and ate it, it can be concluded that I do not have it anymore. HHH
also, what does Hoppe mean when he says "'fair' rules"? As in, one only need to object to the rule and, in so doing, show that it is not universalizable?
I think I understand what the universalization test is- but does a proposition, such as any that I have boldened, failing this test automatically mean that it contains a contradiction?
If it's a contradiction it automatically fails the test of universalizability. If we recognize taxation as theft, then the universalizations of a statement such as "some people are obliged to pay taxes while others enjoy the right to consume them" are: 1) Theft is permissible; and 2) Theft is impermissible. These two rules are opposed to one another, and so taxation can't possibly be justified.
Can we say that because someone frames it as "some people" that this can't be universalized as formulated because it would defeat the purpose? So the universalization of "some people are obliged to pay taxes while others enjoy the right to consume them" would be "Everybody is obliged to pay taxes and everybody enjoys the right to consume them"?
Does this statement only fall if taxation is recognized as theft? Or can this step be skipped?
Can you walk me through this process?
I don't think one can make a logical argument that taxation isn't theft.
To try and justify the statement "some people are obliged to pay taxes while others can consume them." is essentially arguing that citizens are obliged to pay taxes while the government has the right to collect them. The maxims of this are: 1) Government has the right to levy taxes (i.e. steal); and 2) Those outside of government don't have the right to levy taxes, or steal. The universalizations of these maxims would be: 1) Stealing is permissible; and 2) Stealing is impermissible. This results in a logical contradiction, and therefore isn't justifiable.
In this case, "Thou shalt not steal" is what Hoppe would refer to as a "particularistic rule"; it isn't universally applicable, but rather applicable, or not applicable, to a particular group.
Wow- you made that so simple, thanks!
But on a different note- do I have that right? If something fails the universalization test it MUST be contradictory?
I just blew your mind.
Anyway, Gman1944, your explanation of Hoppe is slightly off base. Its not that non universalizeable propositions are contradictory in and of themselves. Hoppe's position is that in order for a property norm to be valid, it must at least be universalizeable, because the act of argumentation pressuposes such. The proposition that "some people are obliged to pay taxes while others can consume them" and other non-universalizeable propositions set up a latecomer ethic which essentially says "sometimes a latecomer has a valid claim on property." The problem with this, is that when arguing for such a norm, we automatically presuppose that we have a valid property claim in ourselves as first-comers. This is where the contradiction arises: one cannot argue in favor of non-universalizeable property norms without acting upon the pressuposition of a universalizeable property norm, namely, that every individual has a valid property claim in one's self.
ThatOldGuy:If something fails the universalization test it MUST be contradictory?
Nope. The proposition itself isn't where the contradiction lies. Hoppe is talking about a performative contradiction, which isn't even a true contradiction in the logical sense. "Sometimes it is okay to use violence" -- this is a non-universalizeable proposition which would be completely in line with Hoppe's argument, becuase we don't need to assume the opposite in order to make the claim.
Also, don't take my explanation here as an endorsement of Hoppe's argument, because I don't really agree with it.
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
mikachusetts:The proposition that "some people are obliged to pay taxes while others can consume them" and other non-universalizeable propositions set up a latecomer ethic which essentially says "sometimes a latecomer has a valid claim on property." The problem with this, is that when arguing for such a norm, we automatically presuppose that we have a valid property claim in ourselves as first-comers. This is where the contradiction arises: one cannot argue in favor of non-universalizeable property norms without acting upon the pressuposition of a universalizeable property norm, namely, that every individual has a valid property claim in one's self.
RIght. In otherwords, the person arguing so should shut up until every person on earth comes to him and tells him it's ok to argue, but before that, they must receive permission to do so, and so on, which is impossible. HI-LARIOUS!
Thanks for the explanation mikachusetts- this is really helping to clarify things, especially the segment above. HHH elaborates on this in Economics and Ethics of Private Property, no? Should be in the mail today :)
mikachusetts:"Sometimes it is okay to use violence" -- this is a non-universalizeable proposition which would be completely in line with Hoppe's argument, becuase we don't need to assume the opposite in order to make the claim.
If this were universalized, then it would assume the existence of someone else against which violence could be comitted. So if everyone were such a parasite, they would have to find, first someone else that is a non-parasite, non-parasites off of which they may feed. Also by argumentation, those involved recognize property rights (by the act of arguing) and conflict avoidance (by not physically attacking each other). So this can't be universalized and if one were to argue otherwise, they'd be caught in a performative contradiction. Still learning, but do I have this right?
mikachusetts:Also, don't take my explanation here as an endorsement of Hoppe's argument, because I don't really agree with it.
I wouldn't imagine thinking so! ;) Out of curiosity, what's your critique of Hoppe's argument?
More or less, this is about right.
Well, this was probably a bad example for me to give. The point I was trying to make was that we don't need to run around testing every proposition for universalizeability because its okay to make non-universalizeable propositions -- there isn't inherently anything contradictory about them. It becomes relevent when arguing about property norms, because like I said, it risks establishing a latecomer ethic.
Out of curiosity, what's your critique of Hoppe's argument?
Hopefully this doesn't derail the educational nature of this thread. First, there is no such thing as a performative contradiction. Contradictions can't exist in reality because the law of non-contradiction is a foundational building block of reality; its absolutely impossible to "perfom" a contradiction. I think "performative contradictions" are better thought of as uttering meaningless propositions. If I said "I am not breathing right now," I can't possibly mean what we take that statement to mean. Maybe I'm confused about how to speak English, or I'm lying, but I'm certainly not putting forth an argument.
The other issue I have with argumenation ethics is that it doesn't really do what we want it to. At best, it shows how ethical propositions can be thought of as valid or invalid through the norms we pressupose during argumentation. But its not clear that something being valid inside of the argument makes it valid outside of the argument. So even if we accept Hoppe's proof, its not like libertarianism as a thing-in-itself is valid. Its just that we can't effectively make a claim otherwise.
The best way I can describe what I mean by that is through chess. During a game, we talk about good and bad, legal and illegal moves. But if I'm not playing the game, grabbing a white pawn and throwing it accross the room is neither good, bad, legal, or illegal. LIkewise, in argumentation, we can determine that such and such proposition is valid, but if I'm not arguing, it might very well be the case that acting upon an invalid proposition is good for some other reason.
mikachusetts:It becomes relevent when arguing about property norms, because like I said, it risks establishing a latecomer ethic.
Oh, okay. That makes sense. So a norm must be universalizable (now reading a bit into A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism where Hoppe is talking a bit about Kantian norms) as no other particularistic rule, regarding property rights, can be accepted as valid by all.
mikachusetts:Hopefully this doesn't derail the educational nature of this thread.
If anything, finding a reason to disagree with something is educational- it's not like you're saying that you disagree with Hoppe because "you feel like it" or some other such nonsense. I understand your semantic concerns; I was arguing with someone else this morning regarding the nature of performative contradictions and he kept posting wikipedia entries of what constitutes a formal contradiction. Maybe a new term is necessary.
I've read Hoppe's articles (Argumentation and Self-Ownership, Ethics and Economics of Private Property) and it seems that all he attempts to do is to argue that positions other than libertarianism (I'm guessing, specifically, anarcho-capitalism or private law advocates) fail to be even argumentatively justifiable as violating his property rights ethic. Whether or not libertarianism as a philosophy/ethic is valid can, and is, of course be subject to scrutiny outside the realms what is necessarily presupposed for argumentation purposes.