"If you have time to point out each of these points that you take offense to, why not just use that time instead to read some of the recommended material?" I have done so because I don't like it when someone claims something like "you're inconsistent" "you're ridiculous" and ends the discussion without justifying that. So I take the time so that I am not that person that doesn't answer people's points and provide reasons for everything. You also asked me about this and I felt because you took time to response, I would also do so. Is that reason good enough? Those were examples of the false assumptions, you do not need to make excuses for them. Also I don't disagree with anything that Clayton has written or those links I have been supplied with. Those are separate issue from the one I am discussing.
I'll address some of your points that I think have the most substance.
2) In no way was it a justified assumption, because we haven't agreed to assume that and I gave you reason to reject it. You can't just proclaim truth.
4) You still can't understand that your trueism "they agree or they don't agree" doesn't get you anything. The question isn't whether someone can make them abide by a decision, but whether it is ethical or justified for someone to enforce a decision.
5) You are not suing twice, there is a case [A sues B] and [B sues A]. This happens today when people sue each other over unpaid debts/property damage/etc where the events are intertwined in such a way that the decision on one of them affects the decision on the other things. Currently preponderance of evidence is used in those cases, as Rothbard pointed out. My simple question for this is in my comments to my example.
6) "I could make an assumption about pigs flying, but what good is that". It isn't any good because I would say that it is impossible. However, both you and Clayton have agreed with me that my assumptions are possible. And even if pigs could fly, that doesn't change ethics, you can ask me about that and I would give an answer consistent with all other things.
7) And I agree that it can be customary, but that is irrelevant to anything that concerns this particular discussion. There is a difference between proving something exists and proving that everything is a certain way.
8) I didn't just skip them, I actually thought about them, but they were unconvincing and I saw irrelevant bits that sounded a little like sloganeering. I may be judging wrongly.
9) "The problem you are having is assuming that people will agree to this particular process." Both of you admitted it was possible. Are you saying it is ridiculous to assume two people will never agree to be bound by a decision of a third party? My siblings and I have sometimes agreed to be bound by my parents' decisions. There you go.
11) The fascination is that if I am correct it pokes serious holes in Rothbard's reasoning and it wasn't answered in his article. How do you not understand how hypotheticals like this are really important to legal thinking?!
14) You don't know if I am a private judge. If I was would my statements be true? Why would the truth of my statements depend on my profession or the current state of the world in any way?! I'm sure you are very intelligent, but you're blinded by something and I don't understand why you are resorting to irrelevant points just to contradict me.
- In the OP, you asked what standards of evidence should be for certain types of legal disputes
- I argued that the standards of evidence are whatever the parties agree that they should be, and that this is how common law works
- You replied that you weren't talking about common law but about the situation where you have defense agencies with pre-existing contractual arrangements, and so on
- I responded that these contractual arrangements still depend on the underlying customary law.
What happens if one of the defense agencies breaches its contract with the other? Is "war" really the only recourse? Of course not but since the very contract governing the terms of dispute resolutions between them is what has been breached, it is of no use in resolving the dispute. Hence, they will have to go "out in the market" and resolve the dispute at common law, that is, law in the absence of a pre-existing agreement.
- You've gone all over the map and have not addressed this fundamental issue.
The root of the disagreement between myself and Rothbard is that he views law as something that can be deduced from first principles (a priori). Hoppe has continued the Rothbardian approach and placed it on a foundation of Argumentation Ethics (basically, self-ownership).
I do not believe that the law can be deduced from first principles - law must be discovered a posteriori. The discovery process is inherently experimental. The possibility of a network of "automatic" contracts arising between defense agencies does not change this fact. It's just one way of imaginging the particular contractual arrangements that might arise within a private law society. The character of law would remain, at root, a posteriori.
- Given my disagreement with Rothbard over the issue of whether the discovery of law is a priori or a posteriori in nature, there is no point in arguing about whether gotlucky or myself has "really" understood your ideas about defense agency contracts, and so on. We're not in a position to talk about the consequences of a private law society that would emerge from law discovered through a priori methods when we disagree over the point of whether the discovery of law is, in fact, a priori.
In other words, I can't help you answer the question in your OP because I disagree with one of your premises. This is not because I'm thick-headed or stubborn, it's because I don't see the use in reasoning about the consequences of axioms when I disagree with one or more of them.
Clayton -
Clayton: In other words, I can't help you answer the question in your OP because I disagree with one of your premises. This is not because I'm thick-headed or stubborn, it's because I don't see the use in reasoning about the consequences of axioms when I disagree with one or more of them.
Ok, thanks for the last comment. Just to let you know, I read your other stuff and watched the videos you sent me. I have some major disagreements with you, but I'll leave those for another venue and spell out the one that is relevant here. I understand where you're coming from and why you are saying we are in no position to say anything. This however contradicts almost everything you have written.
How are you all of a sudden in a position to say what is and what isn't a property right and talk about crossing property boundaries and all these other things, or even argue that they have to exist? Won't this get resolved by itself in the market through evolution and market processes? Saying that would be silly and you have implicitly conceded that we have to apply reason at some point to the whole process. It is not just trial and error. This is the erroneous empiricist approach, and Hoppe is right that it doesn't make any sense. Nor is it the way any human actually thinks. You're right that a-priorism doesn't make sense neither, but you have to understand that the way these things should and do get resolved is with a mixture of both of them. I may expand on this in another post, hopefully you'll share some comments.
What Rothbard argues is absolutely logical and in line with reason. You find certain axioms that are based on broad empirical observations, which are universally accepted among a group of people, and then you apply logic to deduce what follows from them. For example, "all people should be equal under the law" is something very simple that you can deduce much from. That way you cannot have stupid inconsistencies in law. A market may have inconsistencies. A market may evolve to make intellectual property legitimized in law, because it arguably has a positive effect. A market like evolution is quick and dirty and we need not get to the optimal right away or ever and like you said it would be ridiculous for us to argue what the market will do in the end, except to point out the ethics and incentives involved.
What keeps a society free is the culture of the people. If everyone is a socialist they will keep pushing for socialism, again and again. With your methodology they may look at the evidence and always conclude "capitalist" law caused all their problems, as the majority of the world does today. Unless you have some logic and a-priorism you can never deal with law or economics. That's my naive take on this.
It is not just trial and error.
I am by no means an empiricist - but I think that the view that the normative content of law can be discovered through a priori methods is incorrect for the same reason that I think that the proper price of oranges in downtown Galveston, TX cannot be discovered through a priori methods. We can say a lot of things about law in terms of its relationship to human action on a purely a priori basis. But what we can't say on a purely a priori basis are things that are value-laden and carry normative force.
For the normative content of law, we have to turn to the real world and see what obtains - we can look at history, we can look at culture, we can look at comparative law and culture, we can look at the evolution of man, and so on. All of these empirical sciences can contribute to helping us discover the normative content of law. "You should not murder" is true because murder is not acceptable human behavior in any society. There is a significant body of culturally universal norms. But even more vast are the culturally-relative norms. So, we have to realize that there is a bit of both - absolute norms (by "absolute", I mean "hardwired" into the human brain and, thus, culturally universal) and relative norms (norms that vary from culture to culture, place to place, time to time).
Hefty: 2) In no way was it a justified assumption, because we haven't agreed to assume that and I gave you reason to reject it. You can't just proclaim truth.
So are you saying that the following quote is false?
Clayton: The term you're looking for is preponderance of evidence. It's a really horrible principle because it implies that evidence is like some kind of massive substance which can be weighed on two sides of a scale.
The term you're looking for is preponderance of evidence. It's a really horrible principle because it implies that evidence is like some kind of massive substance which can be weighed on two sides of a scale.
Hefty: 4) You still can't understand that your trueism "they agree or they don't agree" doesn't get you anything. The question isn't whether someone can make them abide by a decision, but whether it is ethical or justified for someone to enforce a decision.
It actually does get us something, much like how the action axiom gets us something. That humans act may seem like a trivial truth, except that it forms the basis for praxeology. The fact that both parties either agree to resolve a dispute nonviolently or they resolve it violently actually helps us understand the basis of law: Most people do not want to settle disputes violently, especially because it can result it death. People have incentives to resolve disputes peacefully. The question is not whether it is ethical to enforce a decision. The question is will people agree to a solution.
Hefty: 5) You are not suing twice, there is a case [A sues B] and [B sues A]. This happens today when people sue each other over unpaid debts/property damage/etc where the events are intertwined in such a way that the decision on one of them affects the decision on the other things. Currently preponderance of evidence is used in those cases, as Rothbard pointed out. My simple question for this is in my comments to my example.
Clayton already addressed this:
Clayton: I can't imagine there being two lawsuits over the same event in a private law society because there is no advantage to having two separate arbitrations of the same dispute. I think you're (unwittingly) trying to ask is "what would happen in a private law society if a private law society was like our current monopoly law society?" The fundamental difference is that disputants settle their disputes because they want to, not because the state or a judge is compelling them to.
I can't imagine there being two lawsuits over the same event in a private law society because there is no advantage to having two separate arbitrations of the same dispute. I think you're (unwittingly) trying to ask is "what would happen in a private law society if a private law society was like our current monopoly law society?" The fundamental difference is that disputants settle their disputes because they want to, not because the state or a judge is compelling them to.
If the events intertwine in complicated ways, it does not matter. The parties have a dispute, and they wish to settle. They do not need separate lawsuits over the same dispute. However, they could have two different lawsuits if they are about different events. We have a dispute over a car accident and a dispute over a broken house window. Separate, unrelated events - two different lawsuits. If there were a scenario where we have a car accident and I sue you for damages to my car and you sue me for damages to your car...that is a result of monopoly law. In private law, the car accident is the dispute.
Hefty: 6) "I could make an assumption about pigs flying, but what good is that". It isn't any good because I would say that it is impossible. However, both you and Clayton have agreed with me that my assumptions are possible. And even if pigs could fly, that doesn't change ethics, you can ask me about that and I would give an answer consistent with all other things.
Fine. I could make an assumption that tomorrow, everyone will burn all their cold, hard cash. It is technically possible, unlike pigs flying. It's still not going to happen.
Hefty: 7) And I agree that it can be customary, but that is irrelevant to anything that concerns this particular discussion. There is a difference between proving something exists and proving that everything is a certain way.
Clayton addresses this in one of his most recent posts.
Hefty: 8) I didn't just skip them, I actually thought about them, but they were unconvincing and I saw irrelevant bits that sounded a little like sloganeering. I may be judging wrongly.
Care to share what was unconvincing? What did you find to be sloganeering?
Hefty: 9) "The problem you are having is assuming that people will agree to this particular process." Both of you admitted it was possible. Are you saying it is ridiculous to assume two people will never agree to be bound by a decision of a third party? My siblings and I have sometimes agreed to be bound by my parents' decisions. There you go.
Okay. So some people tomorrow will burn all their cold, hard cash. That still doesn't mean everyone, a majority, or even a plurality of people will burn their cold, hard cash tomorrow. There you go.
Hefty: 11) The fascination is that if I am correct it pokes serious holes in Rothbard's reasoning and it wasn't answered in his article. How do you not understand how hypotheticals like this are really important to legal thinking?!
Well, I don't consider Rothbard to be flawless. And as far as hypotheticals, I don't believe your assumptions are accurate. I'm sure hypotheticals are very important to legal thinking, but they need good assumptions.
Hefty: 14) You don't know if I am a private judge. If I was would my statements be true? Why would the truth of my statements depend on my profession or the current state of the world in any way?! I'm sure you are very intelligent, but you're blinded by something and I don't understand why you are resorting to irrelevant points just to contradict me.
Really? This is how you want to play it? If you were a private judge who enforced his rulings with violence, as soon as the state got wind of it, you would be thrown in prison. Period. At best, you could be a private mediator, but considering your disdain for private mediation, I seriously doubt that you are.
You claimed we were all entrepreneurs in this area. Specifically, you said:
Hefty: We are the market here. We are the legal entrepreneurs/engineers that are deciding. I know that I am not a professional mediator. Clayton isn't either. That leaves you. And you are most definitely not one either. This is not contradiction for the sake of contradiction. As Clayton pointed out previously:
Hefty: We are the market here. We are the legal entrepreneurs/engineers that are deciding.
We are the market here. We are the legal entrepreneurs/engineers that are deciding.
Clayton: I think that the view that the normative content of law can be discovered through a priori methods is incorrect for the same reason that I think that the proper price of oranges in downtown Galveston, TX cannot be discovered through a priori methods.
I think that the view that the normative content of law can be discovered through a priori methods is incorrect for the same reason that I think that the proper price of oranges in downtown Galveston, TX cannot be discovered through a priori methods.
Just because we know that a decentralized system would produce better results than a centralized system does not mean we necessarily know what the specific results might be. None of us here are testing our ideas on law in the marketplace. It is not contradiction for the sake of contradiction.
gotlucky: Hefty: 2) In no way was it a justified assumption, because we haven't agreed to assume that and I gave you reason to reject it. You can't just proclaim truth. So are you saying that the following quote is false? Clayton: The term you're looking for is preponderance of evidence. It's a really horrible principle because it implies that evidence is like some kind of massive substance which can be weighed on two sides of a scale.
Yes! This quote is a very nice literary illustration of what Clayton thinks, but I don't buy it. As Clayton just explained:
@Clayton: "For the normative content of law, we have to turn to the real world and see what obtains - we can look at history, we can look at culture, we can look at comparative law and culture, we can look at the evolution of man, and so on."
If you look at how humans make decisions in all possible settings, in a lab, in the market, in government, etc. They "weight" evidence for a claim and against a claim. There is even evidence that they do this only on a binary basis. That is what evolution has given us and according to Clayton we must adhere to this in ethics. What happens is that once a person assessed how likely A and notA are, he has to take into account the losses associated with making a mistake. I really don't care how aweful it is, and neither should Clayton, because he doesn't believe in normative apriori statements. So he really has no basis to claim what it is a bad principle if he has to look at the "real world" and evolution.
gotlucky: Hefty: 4) You still can't understand that your trueism "they agree or they don't agree" doesn't get you anything. The question isn't whether someone can make them abide by a decision, but whether it is ethical or justified for someone to enforce a decision. It actually does get us something, much like how the action axiom gets us something. That humans act may seem like a trivial truth, except that it forms the basis for praxeology. The fact that both parties either agree to resolve a dispute nonviolently or they resolve it violently actually helps us understand the basis of law: Most people do not want to settle disputes violently, especially because it can result it death. People have incentives to resolve disputes peacefully. The question is not whether it is ethical to enforce a decision. The question is will people agree to a solution.
Nope. What you said was [A xor not A]. Everybody knows that and it is just a fragment of logic. This is nowhere near the praxeological truth that humans act. "Humans act" is a circumstancial necessity that is assumed to always be the case, it is the nature of humans. If a human did not act we would have trouble saying he is a human. This is exactly what Rothbard meant by having axioms based on simple evident facts and logic. Also you have failed to show what it leads to.
Can you tell the difference between the following three scenarios:
What you have been trying to do is a classic bate and switch, where you are trying to get me to equate 1 and 2. This is what I mean by ethics matters. Because in some cases 1 and 2 are ethically equivalent to libertarians (and I dare say everyone except pacifists). And in other cases 1 and 2 are not equivalent and we would like to not have any cases of 2.
I haven't read the rest of your reply, I'll do so perhaps later.
No, this is not how humans make decisions - Mises gives a very detailed treatment of how we make decisions in the opening chapters of Human Action. Humans choose from among the means available to them that course of action which they believe will satisfy their most valued end. They don't weigh what is true or try to find a preponderance of evidence. They simply do what they want to do the most. This is true by definition, it's like saying that a bachelor is an umarried man. To decide (act) is to apply the means at your disposal to bring about your highest preference.
Knowledge is not an acting process. That is, there is no one whose sole end is "to know", at least, there is no human being whose sole end is to know. We can imagine a supernatural scientist who does not need to eat and values nothing other than knowledge - this being would act like what you are describing... weighing evidence, choosing hypotheses and in every way acting in the service of truth and knowledge. But knowing is not the end of human beings; satisfaction (pleasure, absence of pain or want) is the end which every human being has.
It is easy to see the consequences of this fact in legal disputes or even verbal arguments between a married couple, siblings or co-workers. Such disputes are filled with lies, distortions, false accusations, pretense of innocence, special pleading and blatantly fallacious reasoning. Disputants are not interested in the truth, they're interested in getting their way. This is a simple consequence of the fact that we are not disinterested supernatural beings whose solve value is truth and right knowledge. We are acting beings, each seeking our own satisfaction, whether at the expense of others or not.
Clayton: If you look at how humans make decisions in all possible settings, in a lab, in the market, in government, etc. They "weight" evidence for a claim and against a claim. There is even evidence that they do this only on a binary basis. That is what evolution has given us and according to Clayton we must adhere to this in ethics. What happens is that once a person assessed how likely A and notA are, he has to take into account the losses associated with making a mistake. I really don't care how aweful it is, and neither should Clayton, because he doesn't believe in normative apriori statements. So he really has no basis to claim what it is a bad principle if he has to look at the "real world" and evolution. No, this is not how humans make decisions - Mises gives a very detailed treatment of how we make decisions in the opening chapters of Human Action. Humans choose from among the means available to them that course of action which they believe will satisfy their most valued end. They don't weigh what is true or try to find a preponderance of evidence. They simply do what they want to do the most. This is true by definition, it's like saying that a bachelor is an umarried man. To decide (act) is to apply the means at your disposal to bring about your highest preference. Knowledge is not an acting process. That is, there is no one whose sole end is "to know", at least, there is no human being whose sole end is to know. We can imagine a supernatural scientist who does not need to eat and values nothing other than knowledge - this being would act like what you are describing... weighing evidence, choosing hypotheses and in every way acting in the service of truth and knowledge. But knowing is not the end of human beings; satisfaction (pleasure, absence of pain or want) is the end which every human being has.
I don't accept arguments by authority from a person that believes ethics can be justified by looking at evolution. I assume you have to be above that type of a-priori argument. By my description of decision making is in line with Mises, even though you don't realize it. "Humans choose from among the means available to them that course of action which they believe will satisfy their most valued end". The key is "they believe". They arrive at their beliefs through weighing of evidence. Like I said and this is in line with the subjective view, they only consider binary decisions. I never said this was in the persuit of knowledge, but when humans do pursue knowledge, knowledge may be "their most valued end". Even if it isn't knowledge is a proxy for further action. Who are you to say that food is more important than getting to the truth?
Then you are making the silly error of looking at knowledge and food as classes of goods, rather than units. Obviously if someone has food, they might trade some of it for knowledge.
Clayton: It is easy to see the consequences of this fact in legal disputes or even verbal arguments between a married couple, siblings or co-workers. Such disputes are filled with lies, distortions, false accusations, pretense of innocence, special pleading and blatantly fallacious reasoning. Disputants are not interested in the truth, they're interested in getting their way. This is a simple consequence of the fact that we are not disinterested supernatural beings whose solve value is truth and right knowledge. We are acting beings, each seeking our own satisfaction, whether at the expense of others or not.
Yes, but someone that wants to discern who is guilty will be interested in the truth. Can nobody get satisfaction from justice? I know I do. What's your issue?
For the sake of record gotlucky has mistated the statement "humans act". The correct one is "humans acts purposefully", which is far richer in content and can actually be used to deduce things and differentiate humans. So if anyone feels a need to dispute my argument, notice that what I said is a fortiori to this.
Hefty: Yes! This quote is a very nice literary illustration of what Clayton thinks, but I don't buy it.
Yes! This quote is a very nice literary illustration of what Clayton thinks, but I don't buy it.
What do you consider to be false? That "preponderance of evidence...implies that evidence is like some kind of massive substance which can be weighed on two sides of a scale"? Or that it is a horrible principle? From its wikipedia page:
The standard is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true. Effectively, the standard is satisfied if there is greater than 50 percent chance that the proposition is true.
So I would say that it does imply that scale. So are you saying that preponderance of evidence is a horrible principle is false? Is it a good principle? If it is so good, why don't we use it in criminal court?
Hefty: If you look at how humans make decisions in all possible settings, in a lab, in the market, in government, etc. They "weight" evidence for a claim and against a claim. There is even evidence that they do this only on a binary basis. That is what evolution has given us and according to Clayton we must adhere to this in ethics. What happens is that once a person assessed how likely A and notA are, he has to take into account the losses associated with making a mistake. I really don't care how aweful it is, and neither should Clayton, because he doesn't believe in normative apriori statements. So he really has no basis to claim what it is a bad principle if he has to look at the "real world" and evolution.
Okay. Let's suppose, arguendo, that people weigh evidence for whether or not something is more than 50% likely in everyday life? So what? Why should we take such a weak standard and apply that to criminal trials? What exactly are you taking issue with in Clayton's statement?
Hefty: Nope. What you said was [A xor not A]. Everybody knows that and it is just a fragment of logic. This is nowhere near the praxeological truth that humans act. "Humans act" is a circumstancial necessity that is assumed to always be the case, it is the nature of humans. If a human did not act we would have trouble saying he is a human. This is exactly what Rothbard meant by having axioms based on simple evident facts and logic. Also you have failed to show what it leads to.
Yes. I said they will will agree or not agree. But this is important. If two parties cannot solve a dispute peacefully, it will necessarily lead to violence. There is no other option. That is their incentive to settle it peacefully. Even wild animals do this. Wolves challenge each other to become the alpha male. This challenge does not always result in an actual violent confrontation. It often results in posturing and one wolf backing down. The one that didn't is the obvious winner. What is so hard to understand about this?
Hefty: Can you tell the difference between the following three scenarios: A agrees with B because B is a nice guy, and A would rather have a friend. A agrees with B because B is holding a gun to A's head, and A would rather live than preserve ownership over his property. But otherwise A would disagree with B. A disagrees with B
Look, it doesn't matter why they agree. The point is that they do or do not. Have you ever heard of a criminal backing down when surrounded by police officers? Have you ever heard of a criminal not backing down and shooting it out to the death (or escape!)? Both happen. The criminal can either agree to be arrested or not agree. I'm not talking about whether it is moral for him to agree or not. I'm saying he can either do one or the other. Most people choose to agree. In a private law society, there is no monopoly police force. There are disputes, and people can either agree to solve it peacefully or not. When people choose to resolve it peacefully, the resulting solutions over time end up becoming custom, which results in law.
Hefty: What you have been trying to do is a classic bate and switch, where you are trying to get me to equate 1 and 2. This is what I mean by ethics matters. Because in some cases 1 and 2 are ethically equivalent to libertarians (and I dare say everyone except pacifists). And in other cases 1 and 2 are not equivalent and we would like to not have any cases of 2.
There is no bait and switch here, at least not by me. First of all, you are not accurately portraying my argument. Second of all, if you had actually read Clayton's work, number 2 would have read more like: A and B have a dispute, both are unarmed and about equal in size and weight, they decide to try to work things out peacefully instead of fighting. But instead, you just used a new transgression as an example. Perhaps you might prefer representing my argument accurately next time.
Hefty: I haven't read the rest of your reply, I'll do so perhaps later.
I look forward to your response when you get the chance.
For the sake of the record Hefty has misunderstood what human action is. From Further Implications of Human Action from Man, Economy, and State by Murray Rothbard:
Human action is defined simply as purposeful behavior.
Yes, but someone that wants to discern who is guilty will be interested in the truth. Can nobody get satisfaction from justice? I know I do.
I would argue that this is the fundamental flaw of the entire corpus of Western law: the weighing of the opinions (valuation) of people who are not party to the dispute; third-parties with a conceited (and false) belief that they have a greater interest in a just outcome to the dispute than the disputants themselves.
In my view, disputes arise as a conflict between the chosen means (which, in turn, are chosen on the basis of the valuation or preference of the individuals involved in the dispute) of two individuals. From this, we can easily see the two possible extremes of any dispute: the dispute being resolved solely to the satisfaction of one or the other party. This is the universe of discourse of the dispute - John the Thief wants to keep the stolen property and not pay restitution and Bob the Merchant wants John the Thief to pay 100 times the value of the stolen property as restitution. Somewhere in between these two extremes is the right answer.
That is, until you enter third-party interests (such as the State or disembodied "concerned citizens" such as yourself) - all of a sudden, the two-dimensional universe of discourse of the dispute is no longer a tradeoff between the values (ends) of one and the other individual. Rather, the third-party has values entirely of his own. He may, through conceit, imagine that his ends correspond with the true ends of one or both individuals (i.e. justice, punishment, correction and character development, etc.) but this is not only conceited, it is false in the case of the State. The fact that the disputants must be compelled to accept the State's resolution to their dispute is proof that they did not believe that the resolution that they could expect the State would impose would be the resolution that they would want.
This fact can be difficult to see because the State's courts generally operate in a manner of de facto partiality - the "victim" is whoever the State has chosen to play the role of the good guy and the State's prosecutor and judge will generally resolve the dispute entirely in favor of the victim. Since the victim is "the good guy", spectators feel that "justice has been done" and that the victim would of course have wanted to retain the State's court as his adjudicator if he did have a choice. This is analogous to the way in which the beneficiaries of price controls would of course voluntarily opt to have the market controlled by the State if they did have a choice. It is a form of redistribution of wealth.
A feature of Somali law (Xeer) is that no one but a victim or a family relative of the victim may bring a legal dispute against someone else. You can't have "prosecutors" in Somali law. I would argue that the Somalis are light-years ahead of Western law on this point. Who is not allowed to contribute to a decision is just as important as who is allowed. This is the very basis of private property, in fact. All others but the owner are excluded from making a decision regarding the disposition of the owned property. Western law effectively makes legal disputes "public property" and the quality of the legal decisions that come out of our courts is reflective of this.
gotlucky: Hefty: 5) You are not suing twice, there is a case [A sues B] and [B sues A]. This happens today when people sue each other over unpaid debts/property damage/etc where the events are intertwined in such a way that the decision on one of them affects the decision on the other things. Currently preponderance of evidence is used in those cases, as Rothbard pointed out. My simple question for this is in my comments to my example. Clayton already addressed this: Clayton: I can't imagine there being two lawsuits over the same event in a private law society because there is no advantage to having two separate arbitrations of the same dispute. I think you're (unwittingly) trying to ask is "what would happen in a private law society if a private law society was like our current monopoly law society?" The fundamental difference is that disputants settle their disputes because they want to, not because the state or a judge is compelling them to. If the events intertwine in complicated ways, it does not matter. The parties have a dispute, and they wish to settle. They do not need separate lawsuits over the same dispute. However, they could have two different lawsuits if they are about different events. We have a dispute over a car accident and a dispute over a broken house window. Separate, unrelated events - two different lawsuits. If there were a scenario where we have a car accident and I sue you for damages to my car and you sue me for damages to your car...that is a result of monopoly law. In private law, the car accident is the dispute.
Just because the don't need it doesn't mean they won't have it. Currently they have obviously done these counter-suits voluntarily, so I assume that even in the absence of the state they would still do it voluntarily. Next point for me: you are not an entrepreneur so you have no credibility predicting what is and isn't required. Third: If you have 2 counter-suits at the same time, it saves court time and saves both parties money on legal fees, since the judge has to load all the data at the same time. If you still think there can never be judges, just you wait, I'm going to tear apart this phoney baloney with the mediators!
gotlucky: Hefty: 6) "I could make an assumption about pigs flying, but what good is that". It isn't any good because I would say that it is impossible. However, both you and Clayton have agreed with me that my assumptions are possible. And even if pigs could fly, that doesn't change ethics, you can ask me about that and I would give an answer consistent with all other things. Fine. I could make an assumption that tomorrow, everyone will burn all their cold, hard cash. It is technically possible, unlike pigs flying. It's still not going to happen.
It's like arguing with a statist or minarchist, "you can never have a stateless society so stop talking about it". Don't make me dig up all the dodgy assumptions you've answered in the past. The money burning assumption you're talking about leads to has no ethical consequences, no moral consequences, and I'd gladly answer any question that involves it. Want to try one?
gotlucky: Hefty: 9) "The problem you are having is assuming that people will agree to this particular process." Both of you admitted it was possible. Are you saying it is ridiculous to assume two people will never agree to be bound by a decision of a third party? My siblings and I have sometimes agreed to be bound by my parents' decisions. There you go. Okay. So some people tomorrow will burn all their cold, hard cash. That still doesn't mean everyone, a majority, or even a plurality of people will burn their cold, hard cash tomorrow. There you go.
This is really childish of you. I just proved to you that it happens. A plurality of people will also not murder tomorrow. "A plurality" is not what we are concerned with or what the legal discussions need to be based on. I can't go on, I'm dying here.
gotlucky: Hefty: 14) You don't know if I am a private judge. If I was would my statements be true? Why would the truth of my statements depend on my profession or the current state of the world in any way?! I'm sure you are very intelligent, but you're blinded by something and I don't understand why you are resorting to irrelevant points just to contradict me. Really? This is how you want to play it? If you were a private judge who enforced his rulings with violence, as soon as the state got wind of it, you would be thrown in prison. Period. At best, you could be a private mediator, but considering your disdain for private mediation, I seriously doubt that you are.
That wasn't my point. My point was it shouldn't matter. This is like hitler with his "jewish science" and "german science". Does it matter who I am or that the government has outlawed a profession, that I can't speculate or reason or what I say has to be disregarded.
By the way, isn't everyone a private mediator? I though you subscribed to the 3 man island scenario. I don't see you saying "there can never be an island with three men on it". Just because you aren't doing something doesn't mean you're no good at it or are not in a position to reason about it.
gotlucky: Hefty: Just because we know that a decentralized system would produce better results than a centralized system does not mean we necessarily know what the specific results might be. None of us here are testing our ideas on law in the marketplace. It is not contradiction for the sake of contradiction.
Hefty: Just because we know that a decentralized system would produce better results than a centralized system does not mean we necessarily know what the specific results might be. None of us here are testing our ideas on law in the marketplace. It is not contradiction for the sake of contradiction.
This is the exact problem with both you and Clayton. You are contradicting yourselves all the time. Here is the essence of some of your statements
I guess you don't see any contradiction there, or are you just smart enough to know what the market will produce, and what assumptions are plausible for discussion but others aren't?
I am compelled to ask you how exactly your last comments answered my question. Are you telling me people value justice because of the state? If so how is that relevant how people come by their preferences. I see a pattern in your comments, you tend to dismiss anything that flies in the face of your theory on the basis that it is simply a fragment of statism, and if we didn't have a state we needn't think about that.
In any case you cannot possibly claim to know what drives people or their preferences. This can never be observed. So you have to accept that people can value truth and justice for their own sake. I expect now gotlucky will step in to equate this assumption with pigs flying.
Can you state the claim here explicitly so we know what we are disputing?
I am compelled to ask you how exactly your last comments answered my question.
I wasn't responding to the question "can nobody get satisfaction from justice?", I was responding to your statement that you do. My point is: who cares? It's irrelevant to any dispute to which you are not a party that you value justice.
Are you telling me people value justice because of the state? If so how is that relevant how people come by their preferences. I see a pattern in your comments, you tend to dismiss anything that flies in the face of your theory on the basis that it is simply a fragment of statism, and if we didn't have a state we needn't think about that.
*shrug - that's not what I think but I'll take it as feedback because I don't want to create that impression. The current state of affairs (statism) matters and possible future states of affairs (varying degrees of statism, minarchism, anarchism, etc.) all deserve discussion.
Note that the theory of law I present in A Praxeological Account of Law is not a "wishlist" for a future "free society" - it's a description of law as it is (and how it arose), irrespective of statism.
In any case you cannot possibly claim to know what drives people or their preferences. This can never be observed.
No, it can be observed whenever peopel choose (revealed preference). But you are correct that we cannot observe the "internal world" of another person. But that fact makes my point.
So you have to accept that people can value truth and justice for their own sake.
Well, of course they can. It's just irrelevant to any real disputes since your values have no standing in the dispute unless you're a party to the dispute. And we can praxeologically predict that the parties to the dispute will each sacrifice truth and justice for an advantage in the dispute. Hence, truth and justice are not - a priori - relevant to disputes. Their relevance arises as a result of the existence of social norms, legal customs, and so on, that make it in the disputants' interests to care about truth and justice.
Well, our disagreements are all still just a consequence of the fact that we disagree over whether the normative content of the law can be discovered through a priori means or not. But the point of my last post in a sentence is: the inclusion of the preferences of third-parties in resolutions of disputes only discoordinates the process of dispute-resolution.
A real-world illustration that might help you understand what I mean by this is the case of the wife who is hit by her husband and then doesn't call the police because she believes that the consequences to her husband will be disproportionate to his crime. Does that mean she's OK with him hitting her? Of course not. But because the State unilaterally imposes its own terms of resolution to domestic violence disputes, she doesn't have an option to seek a punishment that she believes is propotional. She either has to accept the State's disproportionate punishment of her husband or settle for no punishment at all. The perverse effects of many such "tough on crime" laws on the interests of victims are myriad.
Hefty: Just because the don't need it doesn't mean they won't have it. Currently they have obviously done these counter-suits voluntarily, so I assume that even in the absence of the state they would still do it voluntarily.
Just because the don't need it doesn't mean they won't have it. Currently they have obviously done these counter-suits voluntarily, so I assume that even in the absence of the state they would still do it voluntarily.
What is the reason that they file these counter-suits now? It is because of the structure of the current system. I believe that in a private law society, the structure would be fundamentally different. Given that difference, I do not believe that there would necessarily be counter-suits, for reasons previously stated.
Hefty: Next point for me: you are not an entrepreneur so you have no credibility predicting what is and isn't required.
Next point for me: you are not an entrepreneur so you have no credibility predicting what is and isn't required.
That does not follow logically. We have previously stated that an economist cannot predict what the price of oranges should be. We have not stated that the economist cannot predict that the free market will produce the proper price of oranges. Likewise, you I cannot predict what the appropriate resolution should be for any given dispute. But I can predict that without state interference, both parties would require higher standards than a preponderance of evidence. In other words, in civil cases now, a preponderance of evidence is all that is needed for most cases. Do you think OJ Simpson would have required a higher standard than that in his civil trial? I don't believe that he was satisfied with the outcome of his civil trial. Another example, currently, the police are not held accountable for many of their crimes (false arrest and false imprisonment of innocent people). If there were strict, unlimited liability, the amount of people who are falsely arrested would go down. It's logical. The state only requires preponderance of evidence for civil trials, but requires higher standards in criminal trials...do you think without the state that people's standards would go up or down?
Hefty: Third: If you have 2 counter-suits at the same time, it saves court time and saves both parties money on legal fees, since the judge has to load all the data at the same time. If you still think there can never be judges, just you wait, I'm going to tear apart this phoney baloney with the mediators!
Third: If you have 2 counter-suits at the same time, it saves court time and saves both parties money on legal fees, since the judge has to load all the data at the same time. If you still think there can never be judges, just you wait, I'm going to tear apart this phoney baloney with the mediators!
I see. You misunderstand what I am saying. I am not saying that the claims would not be dealt with. I am saying that they would be dealt with at the same time. In other words, if we are in a car accident, and we both claim the other is a fault, we would not need to have two ongoing lawsuits, as the actual accident itself is the dispute. Both claims are settled through one dispute. I already stated this, but I see that you misunderstood me.
Hefty: It's like arguing with a statist or minarchist, "you can never have a stateless society so stop talking about it". Don't make me dig up all the dodgy assumptions you've answered in the past. The money burning assumption you're talking about leads to has no ethical consequences, no moral consequences, and I'd gladly answer any question that involves it. Want to try one?
Well, the burden of proof is on you at this point. You have made a claim that disputes would be settled by judges, and the participating parties would willing agree to this process. I countered that just because you can cite one case where it has happened, that it does not necessarily follow that a private law society will adopt this process. You have to provide the case for why it should happen. I don't need to provide another counter-example, as you have yet to respond to this one and then make the case for your own argument.
Another example would be the bitcoin debate on this forum. Some people claim that bitcoin is money. Others claim that it is like the tulip mania. Basically, there are some people out there who will value tulips, but this in no way means that enough people will value it to become money. I believe it's the same thing here. Just because there are some people who may agree to judges to decide a verdict and then enforce the decision through violence, I see no reason as to why an entire private law society would form around this. Please provide an actual argument.
Hefty: This is really childish of you. I just proved to you that it happens. A plurality of people will also not murder tomorrow. "A plurality" is not what we are concerned with or what the legal discussions need to be based on. I can't go on, I'm dying here.
So what? Some people buy bitcoins. Tomorrow the US dollar will still be the currency of America. What's your point?
Hefty: That wasn't my point. My point was it shouldn't matter. This is like hitler with his "jewish science" and "german science". Does it matter who I am or that the government has outlawed a profession, that I can't speculate or reason or what I say has to be disregarded.
Look. You do not know what the proper price of oranges is. You do not know what the proper price of a barrel of oil is. You do not know the proper price of a plane ticket from New York to Vienna. You do not know what the proper resolution to any given dispute is. Speculate away. You still won't know the answer.
Hefty: By the way, isn't everyone a private mediator? I though you subscribed to the 3 man island scenario. I don't see you saying "there can never be an island with three men on it". Just because you aren't doing something doesn't mean you're no good at it or are not in a position to reason about it.
No. Not everyone is a private mediator. I don't believe anyone has brought a dispute to me to help them resolve. Perhaps you have been so lucky at some point in your life as to have helped resolve a dispute. There is nothing wrong with simplifying problems to get at the heart of the matter. Those assumptions are useful. All sorts of disciplines do it. Economics and physics are two that come to mind. Your assumptions do not simpifly the question at hand. Apples and oranges.
You cannot know what legal principles will be used.
Clayton has pointed out that some of these principles are a result of state interference. So, we can know that if they are a result of the state, and then you take away the state, that certain principles will not be used.
You claim perponderance of evidence is a bad principle.
Yes. I believe it is highly unlikely that both parties in any given dispute would willingly settle for such a low standard. Perhaps one party would, but the there to be a solution, both parties would have to. And for it to be a useable principle, it would have to be widespread, which I find to be highly unlikely.
You claim property rights are a good principle and intellectual property is a bad principle.
Given that IP is a product of the state, I find it highly unlikely that it would exist in a private law society.
You just told me counter-suits would not be required and nobody would want them
Why would it be required? Two people have a dispute, so they go to court. They discuss the dispute and hopefully resolve it. Why complicate the process with counter-suits?
You cannot predict the structure of the law market.
I don't remember making that claim.
You claim you know with certainty that there won't be any judges, only mediators.
I did not make that claim. I have repeatedly stated that while it is certainly possible, it is highly unlikely that it will be widespread. And you have yet to prove that it would be. Why are you misrepresenting my argument?
You claim all law will be customary
As opposed to statutory law, yes. What else would it be?
You said assumptions need to be plausible to be worthy of your wisdom
Unless your assumptions are meant to help simplify and clarify the issue at hand, I see no reason to enterain dubious assumptions.
You refered me to videos where it was assumed three men were stranded on an island. And you have no problem with basing your whole theory on observations obtained from the 3-man scenario.
Well, I didn't, but I assume this point is meant for Clayton. Again, I have no problem with making assumptions that simplify and clarify the issue.
Hefty: I guess you don't see any contradiction there, or are you just smart enough to know what the market will produce, and what assumptions are plausible for discussion but others aren't?
Hopefully the above responses clarified things for you.
I think what I wrote about OJ Simpson could be explained better. There were two trials, a criminal and a civil, with two different requirements for evidence of guilt. He was innocent in one but guitly in another. Only something like this could happen in a statist structure.
Clayton: I wasn't responding to the question "can nobody get satisfaction from justice?", I was responding to your statement that you do. My point is: who cares? It's irrelevant to any dispute to which you are not a party that you value justice.
The third party involved in the dispute as the "arbitrator" can value justice and we are discussing what means that person uses to arrive at a decision. You said my understanding of how people make decisions is wrong because the don't make them based on valueing truth.
This was your defense of your refutation that people "weigh" evidence. You defended it on the grounds that people don't seek truth as an end. That was a weak defense, but now you admit that they do.
I demand that you admit that people weigh evidence because they consider alternative choices in a world of uncertainty. For example, when you hand over your money over a counter there is uncertainty that you will get the item, you have to weight the evidence for and against that you will lose your money. You also take into account the possible losses from an incorrect prediction in both ways. That is the decision process that I described before, please accept it, it is in perfect sync with praxeology and the subjective view of austrian economics.
They do not have to do decide this in just seeking truth, but that will be true in particular, since you admitted truth can be an end like any other good.
This is what I mean here by counter-suit. If A sues B involving a statement X, a counter-suit is when B sues A involving the statement notX (there may be other related statements). Like I said it is more efficient to consider the evidence in a common case. People today don't have to do this, they can wait their trial and then launch the counter-suit separately. But they don't do this. In these kinds of trials perponderance of evidence is used. People still agree to them, which gives you some evidence that they have no problem with going to a judge and accusing the accuser. It can feel very nice to do that, because in defense-only cases you can only provide evidence in your defense and it saves you money. People go into these things expecting the judge to rule in their favour so they are more than willing to accept perponderance of evidence. Sometimes they just don't know legal principles and think they are in the right.
I'm pretty certain these will exist in a free society.
Hefty: In these kinds of trials perponderance of evidence is used. People still agree to them, which gives you some evidence that they have no problem with going to a judge and accusing the accuser.
In these kinds of trials perponderance of evidence is used. People still agree to them, which gives you some evidence that they have no problem with going to a judge and accusing the accuser.
And what is their alternative?
"That does not follow logically. We have previously stated that an economist cannot predict what the price of oranges should be. We have not stated that the economist cannot predict that the free market will produce the proper price of oranges. Likewise, you I cannot predict what the appropriate resolution should be for any given dispute."
But YOU are prediction the proper resolution. You are also prediction what products will be produced by the market. The proper price will be the price of the trial. Now tell me what exactly doesn't follow logic?
Hefty: But YOU are prediction the proper resolution. You are also prediction what products will be produced by the market. The proper price will be the price of the trial. Now tell me what exactly doesn't follow logic?
And what, pray tell, was my prediction of the proper resolution?
The third party involved in the dispute as the "arbitrator" can value justice and we are discussing what means that person uses to arrive at a decision. You said my understanding of how people make decisions is wrong because the don't make them based on valueing truth. This was your defense of your refutation that people "weigh" evidence. You defended it on the grounds that people don't seek truth as an end. That was a weak defense, but now you admit that they do.
Do you understand the the difference between necessity and possibility? A person might or might not value the truth at any given point in time. But he will necessary value his satisfaction whenever he acts since that's the definition of what it means to act - to seek one's satisfaction (elimination of uneasiness). There is no necessary reason why people should value truth in acting and - in the case of a dispute - we can praxeologically predict that they will dispose of truth and justice whenever it gives them an advantage in the dispute.
Any action assumes that the chosen means will bring about the desired end. This assumption may be correct or incorrect and it is - again, by definition - in the interests of the acting being to be correct. We can frame this in the language of modern epistemology and talk about "models" and "prediction" and so on but the danger of this kind of language is that it is umoored from human intentionality. Mises points out in Human Action that a thing is only a means with respect to the intentions of an acting being - there is nothing intrinsic within any object that makes it a means to one or another thing. So, when we speak of "truth in the abstract", we are in danger of unmooring truth from its relation to human intentionality, that is from its role as a means to attaining human ends.
You're right here. I don't think they have an alternative, at least not in america. But are you claiming nobody would agree to this? That would definitely be a prediction of a market outcome. It is definitely not true today. I at least have precendent on my side, I can ask a few people to see what they think. I would agree to it and I just need to find one more person to agree and we've got a proof. Actually, you know what... I know a few lawyers that would agree to such a trial. Need I say more?
gotlucky: Hefty: But YOU are prediction the proper resolution. You are also prediction what products will be produced by the market. The proper price will be the price of the trial. Now tell me what exactly doesn't follow logic? And what, pray tell, was my prediction of the proper resolution?
You said it cannot possibly use perponderance of evidence. I won't remind you you also predicted nobody would agree to a judge as understood today.
Clayton: The third party involved in the dispute as the "arbitrator" can value justice and we are discussing what means that person uses to arrive at a decision. You said my understanding of how people make decisions is wrong because the don't make them based on valueing truth. This was your defense of your refutation that people "weigh" evidence. You defended it on the grounds that people don't seek truth as an end. That was a weak defense, but now you admit that they do. Do you understand the the difference between necessity and possibility?
Do you understand the the difference between necessity and possibility?
Yes I do. First you claimed necessity (remember? food is better than truth/knowledge?), then you admitted possibility. That's a contradiction. In fact I only need possibility for my argument. I don't need to assume it is always the most valued end. In fact I admitted it by saying I would trade food for knowledge.
I'd like a clarification. Accoding to both of you, what is the difference between a "judge" and a "mediator". And can you please provide a definition of a mediator?
Hefty: You're right here. I don't think they have an alternative, at least not in america. But are you claiming nobody would agree to this? That would definitely be a prediction of a market outcome. It is definitely not true today. I at least have precendent on my side, I can ask a few people to see what they think. I would agree to it and I just need to find one more person to agree and we've got a proof. Actually, you know what... I know a few lawyers that would agree to such a trial. Need I say more?
Your missing the point. People in America have no legal alternative to the state for dispute resolution. If two parties have a dispute, and they want it resolved, they must take it to the state or resolve it amongst themselves. The disputes that go to trial go there because the parties involved cannot resolve it themselves...their only alternative to resolving it with violence is to bring it to the state - they cannot bring it to a mediator because the only reason parties would bring it to a mediator is the threat of violence between the two. And that threat is illegal. So, the plaintiff has an incentive to go to the state court in the current system. The defendant has no choice.
Hefty: You said it cannot possibly use perponderance of evidence. I won't remind you you also predicted nobody would agree to a judge as understood today.
I said it is highly unlikely, and I see no reason why it should be. I also said the same thing for the use of a judge. I have been saying this and I stated it again in a recent post. Please stop mischaracterizing my argument.
Hefty: I'd like a clarification. Accoding to both of you, what is the difference between a "judge" and a "mediator". And can you please provide a definition of a mediator?
From a post of mine on the first page of this thread:
gotlucky: A judge is someone whose decision is final. A mediator is someone who helps two people reach a mutally agreeable solution. Clayton is using arbitrator in the sense of mediator.
A judge is someone whose decision is final. A mediator is someone who helps two people reach a mutally agreeable solution. Clayton is using arbitrator in the sense of mediator.
Why are we rehashing old ground on something so simple?
@Clayton "Any action assumes that the chosen means will bring about the desired end."
I'd dispute this use of "assumes". It isn't true. When you loan money to someone, there is risk you will not get the desired end. You know that there's risk and you take obvious actions to show that, such as getting collateral and/or insuring yourself. Even moving your hand has an uncertain end. Everyone is obviously aware of uncertainty.
I think "assume" should be "believe" and I think Mises used that word. You used that word in your other quote, but now you run away from it because it is an obvious allude to my decision theory. Can you link to the quote? It actually doesn't matter if it says "assume". Even if we "assume", like a judge "assumes" guilty after a trial. You have to arrive at this assumption somehow. I'm giving you the process by which you do that. Same point I made before about the beliefs.
gotlucky: Hefty: You said it cannot possibly use perponderance of evidence. I won't remind you you also predicted nobody would agree to a judge as understood today. I said it is highly unlikely, and I see no reason why it should be. I also said the same thing for the use of a judge. I have been saying this and I stated it again in a recent post. Please stop mischaracterizing my argument.
I'm sorry, then, I was under the impression you thought perponderance should not be used. We don't really have an argument, then. We agree that perponderance of evidence is an ok concept, at least in your world, because the market might choose it. Now I have to convince the natural law people and I'm set. Thanks.
Hefty: I'm sorry, then, I was under the impression you thought perponderance should not be used. We don't really have an argument, then. We agree that perponderance of evidence is an ok concept, at least in your world, because the market might choose it. Now I have to convince the natural law people and I'm set. Thanks.
I don't believe preponderance of evidence should be used. That doesn't mean that it won't be, just that I find it highly unlikely. I also believe that there is no necessary reason why it would be used, either.
gotlucky: Hefty: I'd like a clarification. Accoding to both of you, what is the difference between a "judge" and a "mediator". And can you please provide a definition of a mediator? From a post of mine on the first page of this thread: gotlucky: A judge is someone whose decision is final. A mediator is someone who helps two people reach a mutally agreeable solution. Clayton is using arbitrator in the sense of mediator. Why are we rehashing old ground on something so simple?
Because I want to try to smash the concept because I think it's phony baloney. I want to get the concept right so I don't have to dispute the definition or the distinction between a judge. I will use your definition to give it a fair dealing.
@Clayton "Any action assumes that the chosen means will bring about the desired end." I'd dispute this use of "assumes". It isn't true. When you loan money to someone, there is risk you will not get the desired end. You know that there's risk and you take obvious actions to show that, such as getting collateral and/or insuring yourself. Even moving your hand has an uncertain end. Everyone is obviously aware of uncertainty. I think "assume" should be "believe" and I think Mises used that word. You used that word in your other quote, but now you run away from it because it is an obvious allude to my decision theory. Can you link to the quote? It actually doesn't matter if it says "assume". Even if we "assume", like a judge "assumes" guilty after a trial. You have to arrive at this assumption somehow. I'm giving you the process by which you do that. Same point I made before about the beliefs.
A little less bravado would go a long way to making the discussion more productive.
I should have said "presupposes" instead of "assumes" - the point is that belief that the chosen means will bring about the desired end is a precondition (is presupposed by) any action. So, we can reason backwards: Since Bob is acting, Bob believes that the means he is using will bring about his desired end.
Of course there's uncertainty. Mises has an entire chapter on it. But there's no improvement to the theory by saying that a means "might" or "could" bring about the desired end. It is not a more accurate description of reality, it is a less accurate description of the desired end. In other words, allowing yourself to say "might" or "could" is to allow yourself to be lazy in identifying the purpose at which the acting individual is aiming.
The reason this matters is - as Mises explains in HA - acting presupposes that acting matters. That is, it presupposes that the world is governed by cause-and-effect law and that the utilization of means will bring about the desired end. If this were not the case, there would be no difference between acting and not acting, so there would be no reason for the individual to attempt to apply means to bring about a desired end.
In the case of a loan, the fact that default is possible shows that the end in sight is not repayment - the end is profit (or, to be as accurate as possible, the improvement of one's state-of-affairs). This is, again, definitionally true, it's not a matter of measurement or evidence. The fact that repayment is not the end is evidenced by the fact that the person giving the loan might take collateral or make sure he has legal recourse to collect or has some other kind of insurance. The creditor doesn't care how he profits, so long as he profits.
Clayton: Bob believes that the means he is using will bring about his desired end.
Bob believes that the means he is using will bring about his desired end.
Exactly what I said. Again, I am not claim anything except what the process is by which Bob comes to his beliefs.
Clayton: ... allowing yourself to say "might" or "could" is to allow yourself to be lazy in identifying the purpose at which the acting individual is aiming.
... allowing yourself to say "might" or "could" is to allow yourself to be lazy in identifying the purpose at which the acting individual is aiming.
The purpose is there and we can observe it through the action. However even the individual is not certain that it will bring the desired end. But what we can observe is that the individual believes that the action is more likely to bring the desired end, according to the individual's opportunity costs and preferences.
Clayton: ...That is, it presupposes that the world is governed by cause-and-effect law and that the utilization of means will bring about the desired end. If this were not the case, there would be no difference between acting and not acting, so there would be no reason for the individual to attempt to apply means to bring about a desired end.
...That is, it presupposes that the world is governed by cause-and-effect law and that the utilization of means will bring about the desired end. If this were not the case, there would be no difference between acting and not acting, so there would be no reason for the individual to attempt to apply means to bring about a desired end.
This isn't true. Because the cause and effect law is not known by the individual, nor is the individual necessarily certain in the law. There is plenty of reason to attempt to apply means to get to an end, even if you aren't sure you will get there. Otherwise people would never act. You might not even be sure to how to apply the means.
Clayton: In the case of a loan, the fact that default is possible shows that the end in sight is not repayment - the end is profit ... The creditor doesn't care how he profits, so long as he profits.
In the case of a loan, the fact that default is possible shows that the end in sight is not repayment - the end is profit ... The creditor doesn't care how he profits, so long as he profits.
I never said he seeked repayment. He does not know for certain that he will profit, he merely believes he will more than he believes he won't.
@Clayton: "A little less bravado would go a long way to making the discussion more productive."
I am just a little wary of cycling around through the various claims and having to go back to explaining logical principles. Given that I have to keep doing that, my best guess is that you and gotlucky are not being sincere and open-minded here. I have accepted many things that you have said, such as your idea that judges need not exist and the way law can be created. I am willing to accept many more things. I don't think you've accepted anything I have said.
I think what I just said is pretty obvious, and if you disagree we'd better end this thread.
Causality and Action
Means and Ends
Uncertainty and Action
"A means is what serves to the attainment of any end, goal, or aim. Means are not in the given universe; in this universe there exist only things. A thing becomes a means when human reason plans to employ it for the attainment of some end and human action really employs it for this purpose."
As Mises says in Chapter 6, the uncertainty in the attainment of the given end is a necessary condition to calling the application of means to attain that end, action. You seem to think I'm saying a person can or does obtain certainty in acting. Quite the opposite. But the uncertainty of a means in attaining the end does not change the fact that the end is certainly aimed at by the chosen means.
What is crucial to note is that the individual simply ranks the available means and chooses that which he believes is the best (most suitable) for attaining his highest end. I cannot recommend highly enough the first seven or eight chapters (about 150 pages) of Human Action.
Hefty: I am just a little wary of cycling around through the various claims and having to go back to explaining logical principles. Given that I have to keep doing that, my best guess is that you and gotlucky are not being sincere and open-minded here. I have accepted many things that you have said, such as your idea that judges need not exist and the way law can be created. I am willing to accept many more things. I don't think you've accepted anything I have said. I think what I just said is pretty obvious, and if you disagree we'd better end this thread.
As far as I'm aware, the only logical principal you have discussed was xor, and you missed the implications of the specific statement too. You have misrepresented my viewpoint on at least one occassion (but I believe more), and it seems that you are now misrepresenting how many times you have actually explained logical principals. There are a number of my arguments that you have failed to respond to, and I have accepted the implicit concessions to them. If you would like to end this thread, feel free to stop posting in it, but I will respond whenever you post to me.
Clayton wrote: The defendant cannot dismiss the suit pro forma along the above line of argument because it simply does not apply - the victim is dead and, by virtue of the fact that he is homeless, there is probably no family who could sue on his behalf. In this case, why shouldn't any interested party be able to investigate and file suit on the matter? The monetary award (if any) should go to the party that took an interest in the matter since - by taking action - they have homesteaded it.
So, if I owe money to Bob and he dies without descendants, anyone can homestead this debt and sue me for it? What if I pay, and then we discover Bob's will that donated all its assets to a local church. Can the church sue me as well, while I should sue the guy whom I just paid?
There are cases nowadays when a credit card company sells its debt to a debt-collecting agency X. Then the agency goes out of business. Then someone who borrowed money from the credit card company gets sued by the agency Y that says it bought X's assets. Oftentimes, in court, the defendant's lawyers ask for the proper evidence, through paperwork of Y acquiring the loan from X. If it fails to show such documentation, the case is dismissed.
So, do you think it should not show the documentation? I.e., the mere fact that Y found out about the loan means it has homesteaded it after X has gone bankrupt? (Assuming that the defendant cannot bring positive evidence that someone else had bought the loan.)
@FlyingAxe: Good points. Maybe that's why Somali law (as far as I understand) doesn't allow it.
However, I'm inclined to say why shouldn't assets like debts and tort claims be homesteadable like material assets upon the passage of someone who has no descendants and has not left a will? If Bob had died without descendants and without a will but left behind a mint condition, classic Thunderbird, it would become the property of whoever homesteaded it. Perhaps common law would impose some kind of "cooling off" period to allow an unknown will to turn up before such homesteaded property claims could be made binding - I imagine this would apply to all asset classes, including debts and tort claims.
The "multiplying lawsuits" scenario you described is clearly problematic. But I'm more interested in discovering the conditions for the solution of the problem than the actual solution itself (which we may not be able, in any case, to determine in the absence of a market in dispute-resolution).