An interesting project from LearnLiberty. (They conveniently put links to the subsequent videos at the end of each video, but here's a playlist anyway.)
Even disregarding the guy's general annoyingness, he really doesn't achieve what he claims to be the purpose of this series. He doesn't really do a good job of explaining exactly how a lot of these views are very different...or why these "schools of thought" are even arranged as they are. It's an interesting set up, and I think there's something to it, but it seems a bit inchoate and not very well polished. He ends up having to repeat things, but at the same time present them as if they were different views.
Overall though, I think it's still useful. I just hate when things like this (that would otherwise be great tools) become marred by various fallacies...
And you really have to love (and unfortunately expect) the fallacies when it comes to the Austrian School. He begins by asserting to outline differences between Hayek and Mises. He states that Hayek tended to focus on the "limits of knowledge" and this led him to give deference to "tradition, rules that evolve over time, common law"...and therefore "spontaneous order".
I'm not quite sure how that follows, but okay. He continues on and asserts that Hayek is therefore "cautious about self-evident truths". Again, I don't exactly see how that follows. Finally he says that Hayek thinks that "much of the order that we see in society is the result of human action, but not of human design". I don't see a problem with this part, as it essentially sounds like spontaneous order.
However, he then follows by introducing Mises. He of course begins with a laughable fallacy and claims: "Mises adopts the 'a priori deductive reasoning'. He believes that we identify certain truths — what he calls 'axioms' — that we can discover these axioms through our experience and through the use of reason."
That's literally what he said. A priori deductive truths are discovered through our experience. This guy is a professor.
I've come to accept the fact that most people (including highly educated academics and intellectuals are quite clueless when it comes to economics and political matters, and I've come to accept that at the most prestiguious "learning institutions" in the world, students are fed total garbage on a regular basis. But what really bugs me is when someone purports to be teaching about something like the Austrian School and they get even basic things completely wrong. [a hem] It's one thing if you want to teach fallacies and nonsense. That's bad enough. But to teach fallacies about subjects (like a school of thought that actually offers some truth about the world) is just inexcusible.
If you don't understand the subject, don't talk about it. And certainly don't purport to teach it.
Next, he proceeds to list some axioms of Mises...obviously the first being "human action is purposeful". Now he doesn't say so or make this connection, but I wonder if this is what he meant by the "difference" between Hayek and Mises. Because just earlier, he says how Hayek belives that order "is the result of human action, but not of human design". Now he's saying how Mises says "human action is purposeful". On the surface this can easily sound to be two opposing views, but obviously if you understand what either party was talking about, you know this isn't exactly the case.
Again, I'm not sure if that was a supposed difference he was trying to highlight, but it wouldn't surprise me.
He concludes that video by saying that Hayek belives in a set of general principles that he calls "the rule of law" that we should apply to every government action, while Mises, through his axioms, concludes that there is only a role for a minimal state protecting life, health, liberty, and property, and no role for a welfare state. Again I don't exactly see how those things are mutually exclusive, but he nonetheless alleges these are two different ideas about the role of government.
[Of course I'm not claiming Mises and Hayek agreed on government. In my view Hayek was an obvious ordoliberal...I'm just pointing out that this guy makes all these claims as if he's just illustrated them, when in fact he's done nothing of the sort.]
And finally, I don't quite understand the logic in the different classifications of these "schools of thought". Obviously the Chicago School and the Austrian School fit in that category, and perhaps a "Public Choice School" (although I've never heard of such a thing, and I don't quite see how it's different from the Chicago School, and he doesn't really make that clear)...but then he jumps to "natural rights" (a philosophical foundation), and then to "anarcho-capitalism" (a political philosophy). I don't see how he fits these all under an umbrella of separate "schools of thought", although he does give a decent try.
He says the point is that each "school of thought" arrives at the conclusion of limited government from a different angle or methodology. But the problem is, it's not that simple. By the time he gets to anarcho-capitalism, he even admits how Rothbard follows a natural rights principle, and was influenced by Mises...and David Friedman comes to the same conclusion of anarchy but through a more "Chicago School methodology" of empirical study.
However, for all faults of the series, it is nice to not only see such an honest focus on Classical liberal thought, but anarcho-capitalism in particular. He presents the position with the very same respect and humility and legitimacy as every other reasoning. It's quite refreshing.
1) Perhaps by 'experience', he meant something like introspection. Who knows? Rothbard, of course, held that the a priori axiom of action ultimately derived from experience.
2) I think the difference he was trying to draw between Hayek and Mises is the former's emphasis on the creation of customs and institutions as a side-effect of human interaction ('spontaneous order'), and the latter's central plan - so to speak - of a minimal state.
3) Public Choice looks at politics through the lens of economics. It therefore isn't an entire school of economics in the way the Austrian and Chicago schools are, but is still a school of thought that focuses on problems through its own particular assumptions. In terms of being classified as a school, it's more akin to the Law and Economics school but with a focus on political rather than on legal systems.
Aristippus:1) Perhaps by 'experience', he meant something like introspection. Who knows?
You'd have to explain that one to me.
Rothbard, of course, held that the a priori axiom of action ultimately derived from experience.
You're saying that Rothbard rejected a priori methodology? Source?
I think the difference he was trying to draw between Hayek and Mises is the former's emphasis on the creation of customs and institutions as a side-effect of human interaction ('spontaneous order'), and the latter's central plan - so to speak - of a minimal state.
I still don't see an ultimate difference. And it's funny that you'd put it that way, because if you look at what these men wrote and said, Hayek was obviously the "central planner".
Public Choice looks at politics through the lens of economics. It therefore isn't an entire school of economics in the way the Austrian and Chicago schools are, but is still a school of thought that focuses on problems through its own particular assumptions. In terms of being classified as a school, it's more akin to the Law and Economics school but with a focus on political rather than on legal systems.
Either way, it still doesn't make complete sense in that setup...unless you want to try and make the case that "Natural Rights" and "anarcho-capitalism" are schools of economic thought.
"You'd have to explain that one to me."
See Mises, Ultimate Foundation:
"What we know about our own actions and about those of other people is conditioned by our familiarity with the category of action that we owe to a process of self-examination and introspection as well as understanding of other peoples' conduct."
'Experience' could imply this kind of understanding.
"You're saying that Rothbard rejected a priori methodology? Source?"
No, he didn't reject it as being a priori in some sense, he simply believed that this a priori basis derived from empirical observation. From Rothbard, In defence of extreme a priorism:
"Whether we consider the Action Axiom “a priori” or “empirical” depends on our ultimate philosophical position. Professor Mises, in the neo- Kantian tradition, considers this axiom a law of thought and therefore a categorical truth a priori to all experience. My own epistemological position rests on Aristotle and St. Thomas rather than Kant, and hence I would interpret the proposition differently. I would consider the axiom a law of reality rather than a law of thought, and hence “empirical” rather than “a priori.” But it should be obvious that this type of “empiricism” is so out of step with modern empiricism that I may just as well continue to call it a priori for present purposes. For (1) it is a law of reality that is not conceivably falsifiable, and yet is empirically meaningful and true; (2) it rests on universal inner experience, and not simply on external experience, that is, its evidence is reflective rather than physical7; and (3) it is clearly a priori to complex historical events."
"I still don't see an ultimate difference."
You don't see a difference between, for example, customs of property enforcement arising through long-term interaction between various parties vs. being imposed by a single body?
"And it's funny that you'd put it that way, because if you look at what these men wrote and said, Hayek was obviously the "central planner"."
Indeed, but Mises still wanted to centrally plan the protection of liberty. It's still true, though, that in some of his works Hayek emphasised spontaneous order, while Mises flatly rejected it (see his remarks on Anarchism in Human Action, for example).
"Either way, it still doesn't make complete sense in that setup...unless you want to try and make the case that "Natural Rights" and "anarcho-capitalism" are schools of economic thought."
Well, I'm not sure that the analogy is apt, but sure you don't have to classify them as a school of economics. Perhaps merely 'Public Choice theorists'.
Thanks for the Mises and Rothbard quotes. I'm still not sure I agree with that use of "experience", even if he's referring to what Mises was saying there. I think it's still misleading at best.
I'll have to look into that Rothbard paper more. I had seen bits of it before, but never gave it a good read. On the surface, the idea that "'knowledge prior to experience' is derived from experience" doesn't really sit right with me.
Aristippus:You don't see a difference between, for example, customs of property enforcement arising through long-term interaction between various parties vs. being imposed by a single body?
Not if the customs enforced by a single body were already arisen from long-term interaction between various parties, and the single body was simply established to maintain, enforce, or formalize or bureaucratize them.
From Rothbard, In defence of extreme a priorism
Wow, that is an uncharacteristically confusing and obscure quote from Rothbard...
Clayton -
Glad I'm not the only one who was taken on a little ride with that.
Well, guessing from footnote 9, I think he is calling into question the usefulness of the synthetic/analytic distinction. If my guess is correct, in this paragraph, he is using "a priori" virtually synonymously with "analytic a priori" and "empirical" virtually synonymously with "synthetic a priori", even though "empirical" would ordinarily be synonymous with synthetic a posteriori. But there's no clear mapping to the Kantian categories because he's basing his taxonomy of epistemological categories on Thomist theory, not on Kant. So, the language is muddied by this.
I think the analytic/synthetic distinction is useful but dangerous. It helps us superficially separate thought into two kinds - thinking about real things and thinking about abstract things. The key is to realize that all analytic thought is ultimately synthetic in that we are real and we are thinking, so whatever we are thinking is real in at least the sense of "being thought about by something that is real". More importantly, the action axiom tells us that all thought is action (I believe Mises says in HA that epistemology is posterior to action) and all action is with respect to real things, so all thought - whether superficially analytic or synthetic - is ultimately with respect to something real.
Consider the trigonometry used in surveying, for example. You learn the trigonometry (analytic) in order to do surveying (synthetic). The mathematician who claims to study trigonometry "for its own sake" really does not - he does it for the sake of his satisfaction, because he - like all humans - acts. And even the surveyor is not learning trigonometry "in order to survey", he's learning it in order to earn an income and purchase the things he needs to be satisfied (again, he acts). So there is no difference between the trigonometry of the pure mathematician and the trigonometry of the surveyor with respect to action.
I think Rothbard's point is something along these lines but that paper does not state it very clearly.
John James: Rothbard, of course, held that the a priori axiom of action ultimately derived from experience. You're saying that Rothbard rejected a priori methodology? Source?
How else would the action axiom be established?
The Anarch is to the Anarchist what the Monarch is to the Monarchist. -Ernst Jünger
Jargon:How else would the action axiom be established?
Outside of experience? Through a priori deductive reasoning.
John James: Jargon:How else would the action axiom be established? Outside of experience? Through a priori deductive reasoning.
I don't get it. Don't you need to start with something? How do you "start" without an observation? I don't understand how one would establish the action axiom without first experiencing man? We know that man acts in the first place because we see him do it. It seems simple to me: observe man's action, establish action axiom. What's wrong about that?
EDIT:
I'm reading this paper: http://mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae10_2_4.pdf and thinking that I might be understanding a priori / a posteriori incorrectly. I would still appreciate a response however.
Perhaps you need to look up the definition of the term "a priori"?
:EDIT in response to your edit:
This was my response.
I don't understand how one would establish the action axiom without first experiencing man?
Big word of the day: supervenience.
A description of an analytical object (e.g. a number) can be said to supervene upon the number. There is no fact about the number which is not also a fact about the number's description. So when we describe mathematical facts with axioms, all the relevant information, without exception, about the mathematical facts is present in the axioms.
This is not the case with synthetic axioms like the action axiom. The proposition, "humans engage in purposive behavior, applying available means to attain the ends sought" does not supervene on the facts of human action. There are a lot more facts about human action than are represented by the action axiom. But we don't actually need to "experience" anything in order to posit the action axiom and to manipulate it formally, that is, deductively. Of course, the reason we do posit the action axiom is that we experience acting ourselves and observe the external marks of action in others. We know about the fact that the action axiom does not supervene on the reality of action because we act and we know that there's more to acting than simply "humans act."
I think Hoppe takes an "impossibility of the contrary" approach to basically argue that we believe the action axiom because we must believe it, because it is undeniable. I find this approach unsatisfying for a variety of reasons (David Friedman has tackled some of these problems with respect to Hoppe's argumentation ethics). But I think with Hoppe's approach, we need not have any experience at all. By virtue of the fact that we are cogitating at all, we are acting and, therefore, we must assume the action axiom. I think this is what Rothbard means by treating the action axiom as a "law of thought". I think Rothbard is advocating something closer to what I described in the prior paragraph where the action axiom is itself an abstract representation of reality and is, therefore, a law of reality, though it is different from the law of gravity in that it is an undeniable law of reality.
Here's an interesting take...
The lecturer says:
"Mises adopts the 'a priori deductive reasoning'. He believes that we identify certain truths — what he calls 'axioms' — that we can discover these axioms through our experience and through the use of reason."
Comment on Youtube:
he is not defining APDR in that sentence. That a Cauchy sequence approachs a limit is mathematically provable, therefore represents a priori knowledge. This does NOT mean the axiom was discovered w/o experience or examples. It means the axiom's validity is not dependent on experience and can be derived or proven w/o evidence.
Reactions?
The comment is true but raises other issues:
a) The consequences of axioms are always independent of experience. They can be "cranked out" using mechanistic deductive processes. If the results disagree with reality, then this tells us there is something wrong with the axioms, it tells us nothing more than we already know about logic and deduction.
b) Axioms do not have to be meaningful. We can take a set of symbols and posit rules for the manipulation of the symbols. There may be no meaning to either the symbols or the rules but the entire system is still a deductive system.
c) Experience informs actual mathematics in ways that most people (including mathematicians) do not understand. Steven Pinker (yes, he's my hero!) talks about the "intuitive theory of physics" embedded in language - and it is our intuitive theories of physics are actually the foundation of our mathematics. Mathematics can be thought of as physics divorced from reality, that is, form without the constraints of noise, friction, entropy, mass, and so on.