At what point does stolen property become legitimate property?
For example, land stolen from Native Americans... how can it rightfully be deeded to a US citizen and then passed on to subsequent heirs?
This is something I've long wondered about. The problem is that almost everything has a history of violence attached to it, so how can there be any rightful property at all?
So, chapter nine in the Ethics of Liberty is entirely relevant to this thread. I suggest that you read the whole chapter (or even the whole book), but I will quote the most relevant portion:
The answer is that the criterion holds as we have explained above: The right of every individual to own his person and the property that he has found and transformed, and therefore “created,” and the property which he has acquired either as gifts from or in voluntary exchange with other such transformers or “producers.” It is true that existing property titles must be scrutinized, but the resolution of the problem is much simpler than the question assumes. For remember always the basic principle: that all resources, all goods, in a state of no-ownership belong properly to the first person who finds and transforms them into a useful good (the “homestead” principle). We have seen this above in the case of unused land and natural resources: the first to find and mix his labor with them, to possess and use them, “produces” them and becomes their legitimate property owner. Now suppose that Mr. Jones has a watch; if we cannot clearly show that Jones or his ancestors to the property title in the watch were criminals, then we must say that since Mr. Jones has been possessing and using it, that he is truly the legitimate and just property owner. Or, to put the case another way: if we do not know if Jones’s title to any given property is criminally-derived, then we may assume that this property was, at least momentarily in a state of no-ownership (since we are not sure about the original title), and therefore that the proper title of ownership reverted instantaneously to Jones as its “first” (i.e., current) possessor and user. In short, where we are not sure about a title but it cannot be clearly identified as criminally derived, then the title properly and legitimately reverts to its current possessor. But now suppose that a title to property is clearly identifiable as criminal, does this necessarily mean that the current possessor must give it up? No, not necessarily. For that depends on two considerations: (a) whether the victim (the property owner originally aggressed against) or his heirs are clearly identifiable and can now be found; or (b) whether or not the current possessor is himself the criminal who stole the property. Suppose, for example, that Jones possesses a watch, and that we can clearly show that Jones’s title is originally criminal, either because (1) his ancestor stole it, or (2) because he or his ancestor purchased it from a thief (whether wittingly or unwittingly is immaterial here). Now, if we can identify and find the victim or his heir, then it is clear that Jones’s title to the watch is totally invalid, and that it must promptly revert to its true and legitimate owner. Thus, if Jones inherited or purchased the watch from a man who stole it from Smith, and if Smith or the heir to his estate can be found, then the title to the watch properly reverts immediately back to Smith or his descendants, without compensation to the existing possessor of the criminally derived “title.”[7] Thus, if a current title to property is criminal in origin, and the victim or his heir can be found, then the title should immediately revert to the latter. Suppose, however, that condition (a) is not fulfilled: in short, that we know that Jones’s title is criminal, but that we cannot now find the victim or his current heir. Who now is the legitimate and moral property owner? The answer to this question now depends on whether or not Jones himself is the criminal, whether Jones is the man who stole the watch. If Jones was the thief, then it is quite clear that he cannot be allowed to keep it, for the criminal cannot be allowed to keep the reward of his crime; and he loses the watch, and probably suffers other punishments besides.[8] In that case, who gets the watch? Applying our libertarian theory of property, the watch is now—after Jones has been apprehended-in a state of no-ownership, and it must therefore become the legitimate property of the first person to “homestead” it—to take it and use it, and therefore, to have converted it from an unused, no-ownership state to a useful, owned state. The first person who does so then becomes its legitimate, moral, and just owner. But suppose that Jones is not the criminal, not the man who stole the watch, but that he had inherited or had innocently purchased it from the thief. And suppose, of course, that neither the victim nor his heirs can be found. In that case, the disappearance of the victim means that the stolen property comes properly into a state of no-ownership. But we have seen that any good in a state of no-ownership, with no legitimate owner of its title, reverts as legitimate property to the first person to come along and use it, to appropriate this now unowned resource for human use. But this “first” person is clearly Jones, who has been using it all along. Therefore, we conclude that even though the property was originally stolen, that if the victim or his heirs cannot be found, and if the current possessor was not the actual criminal who stole the property, then title to that property belongs properly, justly, and ethically to its current possessor.
The answer is that the criterion holds as we have explained above: The right of every individual to own his person and the property that he has found and transformed, and therefore “created,” and the property which he has acquired either as gifts from or in voluntary exchange with other such transformers or “producers.” It is true that existing property titles must be scrutinized, but the resolution of the problem is much simpler than the question assumes. For remember always the basic principle: that all resources, all goods, in a state of no-ownership belong properly to the first person who finds and transforms them into a useful good (the “homestead” principle). We have seen this above in the case of unused land and natural resources: the first to find and mix his labor with them, to possess and use them, “produces” them and becomes their legitimate property owner. Now suppose that Mr. Jones has a watch; if we cannot clearly show that Jones or his ancestors to the property title in the watch were criminals, then we must say that since Mr. Jones has been possessing and using it, that he is truly the legitimate and just property owner.
Or, to put the case another way: if we do not know if Jones’s title to any given property is criminally-derived, then we may assume that this property was, at least momentarily in a state of no-ownership (since we are not sure about the original title), and therefore that the proper title of ownership reverted instantaneously to Jones as its “first” (i.e., current) possessor and user. In short, where we are not sure about a title but it cannot be clearly identified as criminally derived, then the title properly and legitimately reverts to its current possessor.
But now suppose that a title to property is clearly identifiable as criminal, does this necessarily mean that the current possessor must give it up? No, not necessarily. For that depends on two considerations: (a) whether the victim (the property owner originally aggressed against) or his heirs are clearly identifiable and can now be found; or (b) whether or not the current possessor is himself the criminal who stole the property. Suppose, for example, that Jones possesses a watch, and that we can clearly show that Jones’s title is originally criminal, either because (1) his ancestor stole it, or (2) because he or his ancestor purchased it from a thief (whether wittingly or unwittingly is immaterial here). Now, if we can identify and find the victim or his heir, then it is clear that Jones’s title to the watch is totally invalid, and that it must promptly revert to its true and legitimate owner. Thus, if Jones inherited or purchased the watch from a man who stole it from Smith, and if Smith or the heir to his estate can be found, then the title to the watch properly reverts immediately back to Smith or his descendants, without compensation to the existing possessor of the criminally derived “title.”[7] Thus, if a current title to property is criminal in origin, and the victim or his heir can be found, then the title should immediately revert to the latter.
Suppose, however, that condition (a) is not fulfilled: in short, that we know that Jones’s title is criminal, but that we cannot now find the victim or his current heir. Who now is the legitimate and moral property owner? The answer to this question now depends on whether or not Jones himself is the criminal, whether Jones is the man who stole the watch. If Jones was the thief, then it is quite clear that he cannot be allowed to keep it, for the criminal cannot be allowed to keep the reward of his crime; and he loses the watch, and probably suffers other punishments besides.[8] In that case, who gets the watch? Applying our libertarian theory of property, the watch is now—after Jones has been apprehended-in a state of no-ownership, and it must therefore become the legitimate property of the first person to “homestead” it—to take it and use it, and therefore, to have converted it from an unused, no-ownership state to a useful, owned state. The first person who does so then becomes its legitimate, moral, and just owner.
But suppose that Jones is not the criminal, not the man who stole the watch, but that he had inherited or had innocently purchased it from the thief. And suppose, of course, that neither the victim nor his heirs can be found. In that case, the disappearance of the victim means that the stolen property comes properly into a state of no-ownership. But we have seen that any good in a state of no-ownership, with no legitimate owner of its title, reverts as legitimate property to the first person to come along and use it, to appropriate this now unowned resource for human use. But this “first” person is clearly Jones, who has been using it all along. Therefore, we conclude that even though the property was originally stolen, that if the victim or his heirs cannot be found, and if the current possessor was not the actual criminal who stole the property, then title to that property belongs properly, justly, and ethically to its current possessor.
But there is far more before and after this portion, and it is even better when read in context. So I highly suggest reading the entire chapter.
jodiphour: Of course, someone will argue that violence requires infringement of property rights, so taking property from a thief is not violent. And that is a valid point too and may solve the conundrum.
Of course, someone will argue that violence requires infringement of property rights, so taking property from a thief is not violent. And that is a valid point too and may solve the conundrum.
That is not the typical understanding of the word violence. Violence is physical force. If you take the property from the thief through force, you have used violence against him.
This is different from aggression, which is the initiation of violence or the threat thereof. Taking the property from the thief is not aggressive (within proportion), so it is in line with the NAP.
Violence can be used to create just ownership.
There is a proper role for the use or threat of violence. The fact that - a priori - we desire the minimization of violence does not flow from violence being in some cosmic sense "immoral" but, rather, from the simple fact that it is impoverishing. Hence, the minimization of violence is not an end-in-itself. Rather, prosperity (individual human flourishing) is the end desired and the minimization of violence is one of the logical preconditions to achieving this. This is why we're not pacifists.
Clayton -
All I'm saying is that there is a difference in the actual unfolding of reality, and how we percieve reality. And how we percieve reality is not necessarily unjust because of our imperfections.
Ideally just ownership would be tied to the actual unfolding of reality, but for practical reasons it isn't, it is tied to our perception of reality. So there are two types of just ownership, the one that is tied to actual reality which is independent of our perceptions (except in that our perceptions influence the unfolding of reality) is the actual just ownership. But even with our imperfections, we require justice to exist in a percievable way. So in evaluating situations of loss or theft, we must be able to have justice. This means using our imperfect perception of reality to determine who is the just owner. If that determination doesn't match up with actual reality, that doesn't make it unjust as long as the judges are acting in accordance with the NAP. This simply means that you can lose and gain just ownership because of aggression (except the intial aggressor can not gain).
In other words, the NAP defines justice, not reality. Reality is not necessarily just.
jodiphour: I'm not sure this is inline with Rothbard. This means that Native Americans are still the just owners of certain pieces of land.
I'm not sure this is inline with Rothbard. This means that Native Americans are still the just owners of certain pieces of land.
No, this is not at all what it means. Look, I don't really want to keep going in circles about this. There are not specific Native Americans making claims about specific plots of land. They are making general claims about general areas. As I said (and you didn't quote this section for some reason):
gotlucky: Well, there may be Native Americans who are just owners, except that they can only be just owners if specific people make claims to specific plots of land. Otherwise, their claims are akin to saying, "My entire family was mugged the other night in NYC. Someone, somewhere in NYC has my wallet. I want all NYC muggers to return all stolen wallets to my family." That just doesn't fly. They don't have claims to everyone else's wallet. They have a claim to their own wallet. When the wallet cannot be traced to the owner, that is another way of saying that no one is claiming to own the wallet. Anyone other than the thief can rightfully own the wallet. But should the man whose wallet was stolen find and reclaim the wallet, then his wishes should be honored.
Well, there may be Native Americans who are just owners, except that they can only be just owners if specific people make claims to specific plots of land. Otherwise, their claims are akin to saying, "My entire family was mugged the other night in NYC. Someone, somewhere in NYC has my wallet. I want all NYC muggers to return all stolen wallets to my family." That just doesn't fly. They don't have claims to everyone else's wallet. They have a claim to their own wallet.
When the wallet cannot be traced to the owner, that is another way of saying that no one is claiming to own the wallet. Anyone other than the thief can rightfully own the wallet. But should the man whose wallet was stolen find and reclaim the wallet, then his wishes should be honored.
These are not legitimate claims.
jodiphour: In my opinion, absolute just ownership doesn't require the action of making a claim, nor the ability to prove a claim if it were made. I was taking your comment "claim of ownership" to mean the act of making a claim, such as a verbal statement. Maybe you just meant being the owner is equivalent to having a claim of ownership, e.g. title (not necessarily a State-legal one), property rights, etc. Ownership requires a claim. Period. If you do not claim to own your stuff, then it's not your stuff. There is no other way. If you do not claim that your car is your car, then it is not your car. Claim of ownership is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of ownership. When you abandon property, it can be acceptable to abandon it implicitly, such as when you leave your trash on the side of the road for pickup. But claims to ownership are a little a different. No one can know that you are claiming to own something unless you demonstrate to them that you are claiming to own it. It is not enough to just pick berries from a bush, you have to demonstrate it. Typically, this is done by fencing it in, or putting up a sign. Sometimes you have to tell them. If you are a mute or speak a different language, then you must make some sort of gesture. But no one can know that you are claiming the bush as your property if you do not make some sort of claim. People are not psychic. jodiphour: Not as I have defined it. The original picker of the blueberry plant would own it without making a claim if the picking was a regular and somewhat frequent event. This constitutes continued use of the object, which makes it property in my opinion. However, if multiple people are picking from the plant regularly, then they collectively own it. This is just my opinion, I'm not deriving this from Rothbard or NAP. In my opinion, Native Americans own the land that they use regularly even though they do not have a concept of land-ownership. Otherwise, we must conclude that non-libertarians are not stolen from when they are taxed. You have completely missed the point of my story. The point is that the first user did not claim to own the plant. The point is that he did not care to claim it as his property, so it is not his property. He is letting other people claim it as their own. I am not trying to make an analogous scenario to the Native Americans. I am merely demonstrating that a claim to ownership is a necessary condition of ownership. jodiphour: Ok, this is fine. I can accept that the NAP doesn't require this. But still there is a distinction between lost and stolen. With loss, the finder can be just owner, with stolen another change of hands is required and aggression was initiated. I think the latter is a bit more complicated a situation in that there are more variables to deal with. This gives rise to all sorts of new questions too: So the NAP just requires the finder to give it back if the loser can prove the claim? Why would the finder believe the loser's claim, what if they do not agree on what constitutes proof? In the end it is just a case of SOL. In my opinion, the loser is still the just owner and not the finder. This is why I distinguish between #1 and #2. It's not about whether or not the loser believes the finder. If the finder can prove that it is his property, he may acquire it using force if need be. In libertopia, the law allows for this (whether the law is common law or customary law, otherwise it wouldn't be libertopia). If the finder cannot prove it is his property, then he is SOL. If he cannot prove it, then the rest of society has no way to know if his claims are true or false. Tell me, should we be punishing alleged criminals on the mere say-so of plaintiffs? There is a reason why libertarians support the standard beyond a reasonable doubt. jodiphour: This is why I am distinguishing between just ownership and the ability to prove it. There are just owners and legal owners. jodiphour: ??? This is my point!!! Even if the absolute just owner cannot prove ownership, they are still the just owner. I am making a fundamental change to Rothbard's position. They are only the just owner so long as the make a claim. As far as I'm aware, I don't know of any specific Native Americans making claims to specific plots of land, such as Joe Indian claiming 1 Main Street, Los Angeles CA to be his rightful property as the decendant of the original just owner. Without this, they cannot even be rightful owners. jodiphour: Yes, Rothbard is correct that if the just owner cannot be found, then the new non-thief owner is the just owner. However, my claim is that this is a practical just ownership. It is conditional ont he continual non-finding of the original just owner. Because 10 years down the road, if the original just owner turns up and can prove the claim, the practical just owner loses ownership. This by definition is not absolute just ownership. Absolute just ownership would mean that it is not possible for someone to make a true claim (one representing the actual unfolding of history). Of course one might succesfully make a false claim to aggress against someone's just ownership, but that does not destroy the absolute just ownership; it can only create a succession of practical just ownerships. We cannot say it is unjust for the subsequent non-thief parties to be owners. But we can claim that they are not the just owners as well... this is why I think a ddistinction is necessary. If the just owner cannot be found, then the new non-thief owner is the just owner. But if the original just owner does find his property and make a claim, then the status of just owner reverts to him. The new owner is no longer a just owner. There cannot be more than one just owner at a time, with the only exception being just joint ownership. jodiphour: Yes, this is what I said. But still, you have no choice but to recognize the difference between human knowledge of realityand actual objective reality. In Libertopia, the Law is the NAP, but this is not enough to always determine perfect absolute justice. Following the NAP does not give humans perfect knowledge, and therfore errors is making legitimate claims will occur. Of course, if you condition Libertopia on every citizen following the NAP perfectly (no aggression exists), then all ownership will exactly be type #1 (with some assumptions on history). Even with no aggression, there are still going to be disputes about property rights. Law cannot be reasoned out perfectly a priori. Certainly there are general principles that we can reason out, but the details of specific disputes cannot be known a priori. Not all ownership would be this ideal just ownership that we fantasize about. Just ownership is an ideal that we strive for. It can never be reached perfectly. The idea is that in libertopia, legal ownership and just ownership would almost always align, with few exceptions. This is unlike statist societies where the state does not care for just ownership (after all, state's can only exist through violating just ownership). LibertyHQ and its awesome forum. | Post Points: 20
In my opinion, absolute just ownership doesn't require the action of making a claim, nor the ability to prove a claim if it were made. I was taking your comment "claim of ownership" to mean the act of making a claim, such as a verbal statement. Maybe you just meant being the owner is equivalent to having a claim of ownership, e.g. title (not necessarily a State-legal one), property rights, etc.
jodiphour: Not as I have defined it. The original picker of the blueberry plant would own it without making a claim if the picking was a regular and somewhat frequent event. This constitutes continued use of the object, which makes it property in my opinion. However, if multiple people are picking from the plant regularly, then they collectively own it. This is just my opinion, I'm not deriving this from Rothbard or NAP. In my opinion, Native Americans own the land that they use regularly even though they do not have a concept of land-ownership. Otherwise, we must conclude that non-libertarians are not stolen from when they are taxed.
jodiphour: Ok, this is fine. I can accept that the NAP doesn't require this. But still there is a distinction between lost and stolen. With loss, the finder can be just owner, with stolen another change of hands is required and aggression was initiated. I think the latter is a bit more complicated a situation in that there are more variables to deal with. This gives rise to all sorts of new questions too: So the NAP just requires the finder to give it back if the loser can prove the claim? Why would the finder believe the loser's claim, what if they do not agree on what constitutes proof? In the end it is just a case of SOL. In my opinion, the loser is still the just owner and not the finder. This is why I distinguish between #1 and #2.
jodiphour: This is why I am distinguishing between just ownership and the ability to prove it.
jodiphour: ??? This is my point!!! Even if the absolute just owner cannot prove ownership, they are still the just owner. I am making a fundamental change to Rothbard's position.
jodiphour: Yes, Rothbard is correct that if the just owner cannot be found, then the new non-thief owner is the just owner. However, my claim is that this is a practical just ownership. It is conditional ont he continual non-finding of the original just owner. Because 10 years down the road, if the original just owner turns up and can prove the claim, the practical just owner loses ownership. This by definition is not absolute just ownership. Absolute just ownership would mean that it is not possible for someone to make a true claim (one representing the actual unfolding of history). Of course one might succesfully make a false claim to aggress against someone's just ownership, but that does not destroy the absolute just ownership; it can only create a succession of practical just ownerships. We cannot say it is unjust for the subsequent non-thief parties to be owners. But we can claim that they are not the just owners as well... this is why I think a ddistinction is necessary.
jodiphour: Yes, this is what I said. But still, you have no choice but to recognize the difference between human knowledge of realityand actual objective reality. In Libertopia, the Law is the NAP, but this is not enough to always determine perfect absolute justice. Following the NAP does not give humans perfect knowledge, and therfore errors is making legitimate claims will occur. Of course, if you condition Libertopia on every citizen following the NAP perfectly (no aggression exists), then all ownership will exactly be type #1 (with some assumptions on history).
Yes, this is what I said. But still, you have no choice but to recognize the difference between human knowledge of realityand actual objective reality.
In Libertopia, the Law is the NAP, but this is not enough to always determine perfect absolute justice. Following the NAP does not give humans perfect knowledge, and therfore errors is making legitimate claims will occur. Of course, if you condition Libertopia on every citizen following the NAP perfectly (no aggression exists), then all ownership will exactly be type #1 (with some assumptions on history).
Even with no aggression, there are still going to be disputes about property rights. Law cannot be reasoned out perfectly a priori. Certainly there are general principles that we can reason out, but the details of specific disputes cannot be known a priori. Not all ownership would be this ideal just ownership that we fantasize about. Just ownership is an ideal that we strive for. It can never be reached perfectly. The idea is that in libertopia, legal ownership and just ownership would almost always align, with few exceptions. This is unlike statist societies where the state does not care for just ownership (after all, state's can only exist through violating just ownership).
jodiphour: Ideally just ownership would be tied to the actual unfolding of reality, but for practical reasons it isn't, it is tied to our perception of reality. So there are two types of just ownership, the one that is tied to actual reality which is independent of our perceptions (except in that our perceptions influence the unfolding of reality) is the actual just ownership. But even with our imperfections, we require justice to exist in a percievable way. So in evaluating situations of loss or theft, we must be able to have justice. This means using our imperfect perception of reality to determine who is the just owner. If that determination doesn't match up with actual reality, that doesn't make it unjust as long as the judges are acting in accordance with the NAP. This simply means that you can lose and gain just ownership because of aggression (except the intial aggressor can not gain).
Oh yes it does make it unjust. If you witness the murder of a loved one, and you know who did it, but you cannot prove it in a court of law, that does not mean that if the rest of society says you can't prove it that the murderer didn't do it. It just means that you can't prove it, and that if you take action against the murderer, you are taking matters into your own hands without the blessing of society.
The murderer is the murderer. Punishing him is just. But if you can't prove it was him to the rest of society, then you are acting alone and will accept the consequences of what you have done. Your actions will be just, but you cannot expect anyone else to see it that way. If you are punished for your actions, this will be unjust. But no one else will see it that way as you could never prove that your actions were just.
That illustrates that "Native Americans" do have an idea concerning property in land, different from people of Europid descent, just as I mentioned previously. This of course also begs the question: Who has got the RIGHT idea concerning property?
What I also find funny is the common assumption that only whites got their property via violence or "taking it away from someone". Except that there usually is no evidence for this whatsoever, what about the question, if landed property the "Natives" claim, had been taken away from someone else previously?
Gotlucky, Do you think I should debate Clayton further on this?
Torsten: That illustrates that "Native Americans" do have an idea concerning property in land, different from people of Europid descent, just as I mentioned previously. This of course also begs the question: Who has got the RIGHT idea concerning property?
Well I don't know how different their conception was. Certainly not all nations had the same conception, as some were nomadic and some were not. The Iroquois had longhouses, which even though they were communal, they were fixed to specific plots of land. Certainly decendants of the Iroquois could make claims to those plots, but the problem is that they are not claiming the plots where the longhouses were located. And certainly after all this time, it is probably impossible to prove where the longhouses were located specifically.
Torsten: What I also find funny is the common assumption that only whites got their property via violence or "taking it away from someone". Except that there usually is no evidence for this whatsoever, what about the question, if landed property the "Natives" claim, had been taken away from someone else previously?
So, if I understand you correctly, what you are saying is that a murdering thief does not have a rightful claim to the property he has acquired unjustly, and that anybody else has a more rightful claim than him? And that examples of murdering thieves would be war? So territory and property acquired through war is unjust and anybody else has a more rightful claim?
Well, that would seem to make it harder for Clayton to prove the settlers necessarily were wrong, because they may have acquired land from unjust owners. But, and this is a huge but, the burden of proof is not on Clayton to prove that the settlers stole justly owned land, the burden of proof is on you to prove that the settlers stole unjustly owned land. Because without evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the current owners are the rightful owners.
But, I do agree that the statement "The settlers necessarily stole just land from the Native Americans" would be a false statement, as certainly some of the land acquired by the settlers had been unjustly owned by some of the Native Americans, but the question is which land was unjustly owned. And I'm too lazy to go ahead and reread what Clayton wrote to see what his claims were exactly. Certainly some settlers acquired some land unjustly, and the same can be said of the Native Americans. This is one of the reasons we need specific people to make claims about specific plots of land.
Torsten: Gotlucky, Do you think I should debate Clayton further on this?
Perhaps. It seems like Clayton is making a more generalized statement than he should be. Like I said, we know that some settlers (colonial America or actual America) acquired some land unjustly (Trail of Tears anyone?). But certainly not all settlers did this. So without more details, we can't really make generalized comments about what most settlers did or believed. However, Clayton's point that settlers knew that Native Americans had conceptions about property rights and pretended they didn't when they violated them does seem a little weird. After all, Native Americans and colonists/Americans (or French when they were there too) traded. So, Clayton is certainly right when he says that colonists/Americans/whoever knew that Native Americans had ideas about property rights because they demonstrated this with the very act of trading with them. But I have no idea if these very same people all of a sudden pretended they didn't when some of them acquired land through theft and murder. I would need evidence for that.
Torsten: This of course also begs the question: Who has got the RIGHT idea concerning property?
Torsten: What I also find funny is the common assumption that only whites got their property via violence or "taking it away from someone".
gotlucky: Oh yes it does make it unjust. If you witness the murder of a loved one...
gotlucky: If the just owner cannot be found, then the new non-thief owner is the just owner.
gotlucky: If he cannot prove it, then the rest of society has no way to know if his claims are true or false.
gotlucky: Well I don't know how different their conception was. Certainly not all nations had the same conception, as some were nomadic and some were not. The Iroquois had longhouses, which even though they were communal, they were fixed to specific plots of land. Certainly decendants of the Iroquois could make claims to those plots, but the problem is that they are not claiming the plots where the longhouses were located. And certainly after all this time, it is probably impossible to prove where the longhouses were located specifically.
But if they know what land they own, and it is true historically (that it is the specific plot of land they traditionally occupied and used), then they are absolutely justified in taking it back by force. However, they are not practically justified in doing so... they will probably end up dead if they attempt it.
jodiphour: gotlucky: Well I don't know how different their conception was. Certainly not all nations had the same conception, as some were nomadic and some were not. The Iroquois had longhouses, which even though they were communal, they were fixed to specific plots of land. Certainly decendants of the Iroquois could make claims to those plots, but the problem is that they are not claiming the plots where the longhouses were located. And certainly after all this time, it is probably impossible to prove where the longhouses were located specifically. But if they know what land they own, and it is true historically (that it is the specific plot of land they traditionally occupied and used), then they are absolutely justified in taking it back by force. However, they are not practically justified in doing so... they will probably end up dead if they attempt it.
I'm part Iroquois by blood (Seneca). I couldn't trace any specific lineage back to full blooded indians. Couldn't know what parcels they owned if I did. Couldn't know the limits or boundaries of such a claim. Any claim would be a collective claim of all relatives of those people. Of which there are a truly great many now as ordinary americans. It's really not worth pursuing.
We can't say that no valid claims exist because we do not know about them. And if there are valid claims, then it is justified to take the property back by force. If the claim is truly valid, then there is no burden of proof for the retaking by force to be justified. But it is definitely not legally justified to take the property back by force.
But this presents an interesting conundrum... what if the rightful heir of the victim is also the heir of the thief? Wow... I didn't think of that!
It's really not worth pursuing.
I think this is the case for the vast majority of people in your situation.
That said, I think there is great value in really trying to get hold of the magnitude of the crime not so we can self-flagellate with pointless, misguided guilt but so that we can all the more clearly identify the evil of the State. The settlers didn't steal the land by virtue of their whiteness, they stole it by virtue of the enabling and backing of the US government and Anglo-European money interests. The great-great-...-grandchildren of the very same political Elites who held power at that time are still in power today and it is toward these living, breathing heirs of the colonial plunder of the planet to which our moral condemnation is directed.
Even if there is nothing they can do to right the wrongs that were committed hundreds of years ago, there are a lot of wrongs being committed today which could be righted and, most importantly of all, there is no reason the heirs of this colonial/imperial legacy should be permitted to continue this domination into the future. Moral clarity on this issue is extremely difficult as the very people who we should be criticizing employ all the means at their disposal to befuddle public opinion and discussion on this issue. The problem is insidious but I hope that the LvMI, the Internet, and the "global political awakening" driven in part by cell phones, the Internet, etc. may be building a critical mass to once and for all break the back of this system of blatant exploitation.
Well said clayton. My perspective is probably different from everyone else's here, but I'll present it anyway...
It's human nature that needs to change... that is the only way to break the back of the State... as long as humans have the tendency to exploit, exploitation will occur. The State is not the only avenue of exploitation. It's the tenency to exploit that is the root problem. It's like guns. Guns aren't the problem, it's the tendency of people to use them irresponsibly that is.
Rather than teaching people to criticize the State, we need to teach them to criticise their own individual actions and how they result in harm to others (some of which is through the State, but not all).
jodiphour: Murder of your loved one is not taking your property, it is a different class of crime. In analyzing theft, I am assuming that the property still exists but has undergone a change of possession. The question is about how to understand the concept of ownership.
Murder of your loved one is not taking your property, it is a different class of crime. In analyzing theft, I am assuming that the property still exists but has undergone a change of possession. The question is about how to understand the concept of ownership.
The underlying principle of justice is the same. Murder and theft are both unjust. If the victim (or family of the victim in the case of murder) were to take action against the criminal, so long as they do not exceed the principle of proportionality, their actions are just in accordance with libertarianism and the NAP. If they cannot prove to the rest of society that their actions were just, that does not change the justness of their actions, only what other's opinions may be about their actions.
jodiphour: I am postulating that there is a type of justice beyond the action of humans.
I am postulating that there is a type of justice beyond the action of humans.
There is no sense of justice beyond the actions of humans. Justice requires human actions. It is subjective.
jodiphour: The original just owner is still the absolute just owner, but the new non-thief owner is the practical just owner.
The original just owner is still the absolute just owner, but the new non-thief owner is the practical just owner.
No. For the original just owner to be an owner of the property in question, there must be a claim to the property in question. Otherwise he is just claiming to own some idea or concept of what his property is. If I lose my wallet, I can still call it my wallet, and we all will know what I am talking about. But where is this wallet? What if it gets destroyed? Is it still my wallet? No, it doesn't exist. When I continue to talk of my wallet, I am not talking about it as an actual owned possession, I am talking about the concept of my wallet as my owned possession.
This is what is happening even if the property in question is not destroyed. When Native Americans talk about their stolen land, they are talking about the concept of land that was stolen from them. They are not referring to any actual plot of land that exists. In this case, it is slightly different than the wallet example, as the wallet is still a concrete idea, and not an abstraction. But in the case of land theft, the Native Americans are talking about some abstract land property, and that really doesn't do us any good in determining what they are supposed to be owners of.
jodiphour: (1) Does it mean the finder or judge or somebody else is required to make an attempt to locate the original owner?
(1) Does it mean the finder or judge or somebody else is required to make an attempt to locate the original owner?
I already answered this. Why are you bringing this up again?
jodiphour: (2) Or does in mean the original owner does not exist (e.g. is dead or on another continent, far away beyond the capability of any known reasonable means of finding)?
(2) Or does in mean the original owner does not exist (e.g. is dead or on another continent, far away beyond the capability of any known reasonable means of finding)?
It might mean this in context of some certain scenario. But more generally, what it really means is "the owner cannot be found".
jodiphour: (3) Or maybe it means that we know the property is stolen, but simply do not know who it was stolen from?
(3) Or maybe it means that we know the property is stolen, but simply do not know who it was stolen from?
This is quite rare, as the only way to know if something has been stolen is if there is evidence or a confession, and how exactly are you going to know if some watch on some person's wrist is stolen? Quite rare.
jodiphour: There are still all sorts of logistical questions about how to justly determine the new owner such as: at what point do we does the property actually become unowned?
There are still all sorts of logistical questions about how to justly determine the new owner such as: at what point do we does the property actually become unowned?
The property is unowned when no one makes a claim to own it.
jodiphour: If it is a small material good, such as a watch, does the non-thief possessor of the watch at the time the knowledge of theft comes to light automatically become the new owner?
If it is a small material good, such as a watch, does the non-thief possessor of the watch at the time the knowledge of theft comes to light automatically become the new owner?
Does the new non-thief possessor make a claim to own the watch? If yes, then yes. If no, then no.
jodiphour: If the property is a large plot of land, how do we determine who has homesteaded it? Say two people arrive there simultaneously and start building fences on opposite sides and then meet... who has the rightful homestead claim? Or does the NAP require them to split the land exaclty according to the status of their fences at the time of meeting (if a voluntary agreement cannot be worked out)?
If the property is a large plot of land, how do we determine who has homesteaded it? Say two people arrive there simultaneously and start building fences on opposite sides and then meet... who has the rightful homestead claim? Or does the NAP require them to split the land exaclty according to the status of their fences at the time of meeting (if a voluntary agreement cannot be worked out)?
Fencing in land does not necessarily equal homesteading it. It depends upon the norms of the society. It might be that you can fence in land large enough for you to build a modest house, while you would not be able to fence in miles of land in order to claim a city. Norms are very important.
jodiphour: If the truth is that the property was stolen, then he is absolutely justified in taking it back but is not necessarily practically justified in doing so.
If the truth is that the property was stolen, then he is absolutely justified in taking it back but is not necessarily practically justified in doing so.
Let's stick with the common and well understood terms of justified according to some ethic (such as the NAP) and legally justified. He might be justified according to the NAP but not according to the law. There is no reason to complicate things by throwing in terms that no one else is familiar with.
jodiphour: It can be impractical for the truth to be the standard by which we determine justice, we can usually only be practical, which is not necessarily absolute.
It can be impractical for the truth to be the standard by which we determine justice, we can usually only be practical, which is not necessarily absolute.
Clayton is probably better equipped to deal with this assertion. He's written about this somewhere on the forum.
jodiphour: My opinion is that human application of the NAP to the best of our abilities defines practical justice.
My opinion is that human application of the NAP to the best of our abilities defines practical justice.
You are clearly using the word justice differently from most people. Something is either just or it isn't (according to some ethic, such as the NAP). If there is an unjust outcome in libertopia, the law was not "practically just", it was unjust. Period. The aim is for the law to be as close as possible to the NAP, and that as a result, injustice would be at a minimum. If you want to continue using your idea of "practical justice", you should be aware that you will turn off many people the way Ayn Rand turned off many people in her zealous use of the word "greed". People just don't use the word that way, and if you start saying that unjust outcomes are just, then even if that is not what you really mean, people will just shake their heads.
jodiphour: But if they know what land they own, and it is true historically (that it is the specific plot of land they traditionally occupied and used), then they are absolutely justified in taking it back by force. However, they are not practically justified in doing so... they will probably end up dead if they attempt it.
Again, this can all be simplified by using terms as people commonly understand them. If the Native Americans knew which land they owned (specifically which plots), then they would be justified in accordance with the NAP. However, they would not be justified in accordance with the law of America.
jodiphour: We can't say that no valid claims exist because we do not know about them. And if there are valid claims, then it is justified to take the property back by force. If the claim is truly valid, then there is no burden of proof for the retaking by force to be justified. But it is definitely not legally justified to take the property back by force.
The burden of proof is required for the rest of society. If you know you are justified in whatever actions you are going to take, but you cannot prove it to society, then if you go ahead and take those actions, you are risking punishment from society, however unjust that punishment might be. This is not a failing of libertarian justice, this is a "failing" of reality. Life is not perfect. Shit happens. It sucks.
I am attempting to be "objective" and trying to understand ownership in terms of an objective history of real events (the timeline of actions that have actually occured as opposed to our knowledge of them) which form the basis for determining objective justice which is distinct from what humans think of as justice, and I'm probably failing --- I'll blame subjective language. I'm not claiming that in a given real situation, we can determine what that objective justice is. I'm saying that, given an assumed real history, we can use logic to determine what that objective justice would exact.
Objective just ownership is only dependent upon the existence of the owner, the existence of the property, and the objective application of objective rules based on the NAP. Of course, this has no bearing in subjective reality.
I have many qualms with your last long reply, but will not ask further questions. I am satisfied that I have at least been shown Rothbard's answer. This gives me a better footing to work from.
I'm sure I will come back to it or start another thread with a new question.
I sincerely thank you (and all who replied) for engaging in this for so long! I really learned alot! Cheers!