What is property?

Identity theory: Mental states really do exist. Propositional attitudes can be linked to certain brain states.

EM: Mental states do not exist. They are completely illusory. Propositional attitudes cannot be linked to brain states. 

Apply Leibniz's law of the indiscernability of identicals. Ergo, identity theory is not equivalent to EM, since IT possesses properties that EM does not and vice-versa.

They are both obviously types of materialism, but my response was to the claim that 'Identity theory = eliminative materialism'. This claim is false. If the writer didn't mean it, then he should have been clearer.

Identity theory: Mental states really do exist. Propositional attitudes can be linked to certain brain states.

EM: Mental states do not exist. They are completely illusory. Propositional attitudes cannot be linked to brain states. 

Apply Leibniz's law of the indiscernability of identicals. Ergo, identity theory is not equivalent to EM, since IT possesses properties that EM does not and vice-versa.

They are both obviously types of materialism, but my response was to the claim that 'Identity theory = eliminative materialism'. This claim is false. If the writer didn't mean it, then he should have been clearer.

IT:

1. mental states exist

2. physical states exist

3. mental states are identical to physical states

This can be taken in one of three ways:

(a) M and P are different names for or aspects of a third kind of thing

(b) M is a name for certain kinds of Ps

(c) P is a name for certain kinds of Ms

I take them to mean (b).

Consider if I say:

A exists

B exists

A = B

So then A and B are the same thing: what what thing? Either A, or B, or something else.

I think people misunderstand the "inseparability of will" concept. It is a statement that you actually control the body. Meaning that when someone orders you to act, you still have to execute the necessary nervous system action. You can choose not to obey.

We could easily imagine a surgical procedure and/or device that connects to the brain which severs an individuals control of the legs and arms and thus the individual becomes and observer while another remote controls the body. Would it be legal to sign a contract and submit to such a device? What if that contract clearly indicated that there is no option to cnacel the contract for any reason? And that violence can and will be done to the body regardless..

Minarchist:

because if you change your mind and want to leave then we have to coerce you into staying

To what does "you" refer in this sentence? To my body? My body is not my property anymore, it is the master's. It is not aggression for the master to use violence against his own property. To my will? How can one use violence against the will? Is that like punching ghosts?

Are we going to have to play this stupid game again? you cannot alienate the will. It is aggression for the owner to use violence against the body/will that you already acknowledged are inseperable. Youre trolling, get off gramma's computer and wash the fleas out of your hair

Consider if I say:

A exists

B exists

A = B

So then A and B are the same thing: what what thing? Either A, or B, or something else.

Of course. But EMers deny A completely, so there is nothing for it to be identical with, in contrast to ITers. So there is a substantive difference. ITers think mental states really are real, since all mental states are brain states, but not all brain states are mental states. This is why ITers don't just 'do away' with mental states. For them, the quantifier doesn't work both ways.

Of course. But EMers deny A completely, so there is nothing for it to be identical with, in contrast to ITers. So there is a substantive difference. ITers think mental states really are real, since all mental states are brain states, but not all brain states are mental states. This is why ITers don't just 'do away' with mental states. For them, the quantifier doesn't work both ways.

Yes, I understand your point. But I'd say the difference between the two is semantic only.

@Malachai

Your argument:

1. The will and body cannot be physically seperated

2. Therefore the body cannot be sold without the will

3. The will cannot be sold

4. Therefore the body cannot be sold

1-2 is a non sequitur. The fact that the will and body cannot be physically seperated, means that the body cannot be sold without the will, WHY?

Ive always thought that, if you can deny x's use, then it is your property.

I'll repeat this, since it didn't sink in:

If you can own a car without having the ability to will it into motion, then you can own a human body without the ability to will it into motion.

"Control" is not a requirement for ownership.

Minarchist:

The underlined passage is a problem. Suppose I homestead a piece of land. I spend years improving it and living on it. I decide to sell it to a man living 3000 miles away, while I am still living on it. Who has the "best link" to this property? I do, obviously. Yet I don't own it anymore, the man I sold it to owns it.

Firstly, "best link" is a matter of opinion. When you have relinquished ownership of land and traded it to another, you have demonstrated that you consider the other person to have the best link.  But you cannot relinquish ownership over your body. Unfortunately, I addressed this in the post that is pending moderation, so my full response is in limbo...

Minarchist:

So the special link between myself and my body cannot be broken voluntarily by myself, the owner of my body, but it can be broken if I commit aggression. This distinction seems both arbitrary and intuitively unjust. What's the reasoning behind this?

The NAP. Estoppel. But with "voluntary" slavery, the slave does not aggress against his master by disobeying, so the master acts wrongfully when he uses violence against the slave.

 

---

 

The point is that libertarianism is based off of the NAP, which in turn is an specific application of the golden rule to law. Another name for the golden rule is the ethic of reciprocity. This is why the title-transfer theory of contracts is so important to libertarianism. If you insult me, and I insult you, there is reciprocity. But if I assault you or damage your property, I have gone beyond reciprocity (this is also why the theory of proportionality is so important to libertarianism).

And we can explain libertarian theory of property and homesteading too. If you don't take my apple, I won't take your apple. If you claim this unowned apple tree, I won't violate it if you respect my claim for this other unowned apple tree. So we can see the origin of homesteading as a foundation for property rights. And we can see how estoppel works too. If you don't respect my claim to own the apple tree, well then I won't respect your claim to your apple tree, and you cannot complain, as you have demostrated that you do not respect other's claims to their property. There has been reciprocity.

So how does title-transfer theory apply in these cases? Well, I relinquish ownership of my apple tree. You can now claim it as your own. This is what Kinsella is talking about (I sort of went into this in my limbo post, but vive has told me that he can't find it, so I may end up having to rewrite it or something). Kinsella is saying that you abandon (relinquish) ownership of your property, and now it is unowned, and someone else can claim it. This is what happens in an exchange. You relinquish ownership over something, and in an exchange, it is under the condition that the person you are exchanging with (or gifting to) has the legitimate claim to the unowned property. 

You can go out into the world and exclaim, "I relinquish ownership over this apple tree! Anyone can come along and claim it as their property. This is in line with the ethic of reciprocity. You have said that you will respect anyone else's claim over the apple tree.

But you cannot relinquish ownership over your body. You cannot go out into the world and exclaim, "I relinquish ownership over my body!" What happens next? Can anyone just come along and claim your body as theirs? What if they do? Is this in line with the ethic of reciprocity? What happens when you don't care to respect his claim of ownership over your body? What is the reciprocation to this? You have done nothing to him. You are merely saying that you do not respect this aspect of "ownership".

If I don't respect your apple tree, then you won't respect mine. If I don't respect your claim to own my body, then you won't respect my claim to own yours. This is the ethic of reciprocity, the golden rule. The NAP is the golden rule applied specifically to law. It is what libertarianism is based on. There is no way that "voluntary" slavery can be compatible with libertarianism.

---

Sorry if this is so rambly, as I have not had to explain it in this manner before. For those of you who have read my posts, you have probably noticed that I talk about the golden rule a lot. As you can all see, libertarian principles (e.g. NAP, homesteading, estoppel) all are derived from the ethic of reciprocity, the golden rule. I have not had to explain it in this way before, so I have usually relied upon Rothbard's arguments, but I think the one I just made may make more sense. I did not go back and edit it, so it may seem a little unordered (it is). I'll get better at it with time.

Firstly, "best link" is a matter of opinion. When you have relinquished ownership of land and traded it to another, you have demonstrated that you consider the other person to have the best link. But you cannot relinquish ownership over your body. Unfortunately, I addressed this in the post that is pending moderation, so my full response is in limbo...

I'll wait for your full response, as I'm not sure I follow your reasoning here.

The NAP. Estoppel. But with "voluntary" slavery, the slave does not aggress against his master by disobeying, so the master acts wrongfully when he uses violence against the slave.

The underlined part is only true if the master does not own the body of the slave: i.e. if he does own it, then he is not acting wrongfully, he's just doing what he pleases with his own property.

So how does title-transfer theory apply in these cases? Well, I relinquish ownership of my apple tree. You can now claim it as your own. This is what Kinsella is talking about (I sort of went into this in my limbo post, but vive has told me that he can't find it, so I may end up having to rewrite it or something). Kinsella is saying that you abandon (relinquish) ownership of your property, and now it is unowned, and someone else can claim it. This is what happens in an exchange.

You say an exchange occurs when property is abandoned by A, becomes unowned, and is then homesteaded by B.

I say an exchange occurs when property is transferred from A to B: with no intervening abandonment, lack of ownership, and then homesteading.

Does the difference between these two concepts of exchange manifest in physical reality? No, the exchange of a car, house, tomato, etc can be imagined your way or my way. In other words, it is a legal fiction. And it makes no difference whatsoever in any case of property exchange EXCEPT for the body, and only if you assume that the body cannot be abandoned.

Kinsella's concept of exchange strikes me as tailor-built to justify his argument against voluntary slavery (VS), as that is the only instance in which it has different implications from the usual concept of exchange (whereby there is no abandonment intervening between A's owning the thing and B's owning the thing). I'd be curious if any other libertarian thinkers use this concept of exchange? And other than the desire to disprove the validity of VS contracts, is there any reason to adopt K.'s concept rather than my own?

A general comment: I feel like this entire debate over VS has suffered from an overly mechanistic view of property rights and property exchanges. Remember that it has nothing to do with physical-spatial relationships. The seller and buyer aren't proteins locking into receptors. They are people. Property is an idea. If I own property, and I say "now you own it" (and you agree) then you own it - poof! As if by magic. There are no physical laws in operation. Whereas, I feel like this idea that abandonment is necessarily involved in exchange is like imagining I must physically drop the property, walk away from it, and let you pick it up or something like that.

You can go out into the world and exclaim, "I relinquish ownership over this apple tree! Anyone can come along and claim it as their property. This is in line with the ethic of reciprocity. You have said that you will respect anyone else's claim over the apple tree...You cannot go out into the world and exclaim, "I relinquish ownership over my body!" What happens next? Can anyone just come along and claim your body as theirs?

Yes, like the apple tree.

What if they do?

Then it is their property, like the apple tree.

What happens when you don't care to respect his claim of ownership over your body?

He might use violence against his property: i.e. my body.

You have done nothing to him.

Makes no difference, as he's not doing anything to me either: he's doing something to his property (my body), which used to be my property.

You are merely saying that you do not respect this aspect of "ownership". If I don't respect your apple tree, then you won't respect mine. If I don't respect your claim to own my body, then you won't respect my claim to own yours. This is the ethic of reciprocity, the golden rule.

The whole point is that it isn't "your body" anymore (i.e. not in terms of ownership, though it's still yours biologically of course). By doing whatever he does with his property ("your body"), he is not violating your property rights.

@gotlucky

Re the idea that abandonment is necessary for property exchange, I'll add this:

Abandonment was originally very literal. I own a farm in the wilds of Kentucky in 1769. I move West. Two years later, Fred finds the farm. It's obviously been abandoned. He moves in, fixes it up, lives there. He's homesteaded it, it's now his property.

...And now, I mean this in an entirely non-snarky way, but don't you think it's a bit of a stretch to say that an analogous process occurs when I fork over a buck to the cashier at Unimart? Doesn't that strike you as artificial, unnecessary to explain what's going on: conceptual baggage, so to speak?

John James:

The whole point is nothing you say (i.e. promise) prevents you from simply deciding to not do what you are ordered.  So then what.

Then you're still someone's property, because you sold yourself. It the same as if sell you a product of my labor, I take the money, and then I change my mind and take that product back. That's theft, because you payed for the products. The same is with my body- you bought it, and you can do whatever you want it, if anyone takes it away from you- that's theft.

It might sound nonsensical, I see it sounds so to you, it sounds so to me, too, but you cannot say it is in contradiction to self-ownership or non-aggression, because it's not. It might be wrong because of some reason, but that ain't one of them. If I'm the owner of my body, I can do whatever I want it- destroy it or sell it, and I'm not aggressing against anyone in doing either.

Basically you're alleging that one can surrender control of (i.e. alienate) something that is inalienable from him...control over his own will and person.  You cannot "sell" (that is, transfer ownership of) your will because you cannot alienate yourself from it.

You're selling you body, not your will, and also, if you can't sell your body, then you shouldn't be able to sell your labor, because labor is also something that can be exclusively under the control of oneself, making employment illegitimate.

Of course you can be physically forced or coerced into obedience, but by definition this means this is obviously not voluntary on your part.  This is when it becomes "slavery"

Slavery which one has agreed too (by selling oneself). Just like I can agree to be beaten or killed by someone in the present, I can agree to being beaten or killed by someone at any point he choses to.

 

The fact that the will and body cannot be physically seperated, means that the body cannot be sold without the will, WHY?

because the enforcement of such a contract woukd constitute aggressive violence, as I said above. Please learn to pay attention.

The body cannot be sold because only I can control my body, but also, only I can control my labor, yet employment (selling of one's labor) is legitimate, is it?

It might sound nonsensical, I see it sounds so to you, it sounds so to me, too, but you cannot say it is in contradiction to self-ownership or non-aggression, because it's not. It might be wrong because of some reason, but that ain't one of them. If I'm the owner of my body, I can do whatever I want it- destroy it or sell it, and I'm not aggressing against anyone in doing either.

it constitutes aggression against the occupant of the body. You admit that your position is nonsensical, perhaps thats a clue?

You're selling you body, not your will

They cannot be separated therefore ownership rights over the body cannot be exercised without affecting the consciousness.

if you can't sell your body, then you shouldn't be able to sell your labor, because labor is also something that can be exclusively under the control of oneself, making employment illegitimate.

nonsense. People sell labor every day, there is no libertarian objection to this. Please explain your position.

Slavery which one has agreed too (by selling oneself).

and when/if the slave changes his or her mind, what then? Enforcement of the contract constitutes aggression against a person, this is obviously unacceptable from a libertarian perspective.

How is an employment contract enforced?

They cannot be separated therefore ownership rights over the body cannot be exercised without affecting the consciousness.

Yet ownership rights over one's labor can be separated?

People sell labor every day, there is no libertarian objection to this

People sold themselfes into slavery every day, it happend for centuries, some still do, google debt bongade.

Please explain your position.

You say that slavery is illegitimate because ownership over one's own body is unalienable because only I can control my body. But also, only I can control my labor, and thus ownership over my own labor should be unalienable, too, making employment illegitimate.

and when/if the slave changes his or her mind, what then?

When selling oneself into slavery you waive your right to change your mind, and give your owner the right to own you body even if you change your mind on a later point.

How is an employment contract enforced?

How is a contract of buying/selling a product enforced? By force. If you say that it's not aggressive force because if was a reaction to theft- because the guy bought the product of another, and it's his; one can also say that the force used to enforce the slave contract also is not aggressive, because it is a reaction to theft- because guy bought the body of another, and it's his.

.

The point:

If you say that slavery by selling oneself is illegitimate because self-ownership is unalienable, and it is unalienable because people can control only their own bodies, it follows that ownership over one's own labor is also unalienable, because people can control only their own labor, thus making employment illegitimate.

If you say that slavery by selling oneself is illegitimate because force must to be used if the seller would change his mind and take back what he sold, then it follows that selling any product is illegitimate, because in those cases, too, force must be used if the seller would change his mind and take back what he sold.

At the risk of derailing the derailing, I'd like to respond to the OP.

Papirius:

Another one is the pure Lockean theory of property, the one that liberals hold on to, which is similar, but different in the detail of property right not being absolute but being bellow the (positive) right to life.

IIRC, Locke didn't consider the right to life to be a positive right. So I don't see how this is the pure Lockean theory of property. Also, I don't see how the Lockean-Rothbardian theory of property considers property right to be absolute. It simply considers the (negative) right to life to equate to a property right in oneself.

Papirius:

Another is the [Rousseauian]-Proudhonian theory of property. Land ownership is illegitimate [according] to it, because land is not a product of labor; employment, rent, interest are viewed as illegitimate for the same reason.

Interestingly enough, individual land ownership isn't required for high levels of wealth inequality to arise in a pre-industrial economy. All that's required is individuals having alienable usufruct rights over parts of the commonly owned land.

Papirius:

All have their arguments. I don't see the libertarian concept of property being sequitur to the self-ownership axiom.

Self-ownership to me means that the actions of an individual are legitimate, so long as they don't interfere with the legitimate actions of others. If an individual takes possession of something that no one has taken possession of before, that action is therefore legitimate. If an individual later consents to someone else taking possession of it, that action is also legitimate.

Papirius:

While giving those stuff a glance, I saw an interesting point- that Rothbard was not a voluntaryist. If it's consensual, it's doesn't mean it's ok, concretly, slavery by selling oneself is not valid, no matter the consent. I agree with that. But Proudhon argued that just as it is illegitimate to sell oneself, it is illegitimate to rent oneself, and just as "You can only give away your property, not yourself." (as it says in the Private Property's Philosopher article) you can only sell your property, not your labor (which is, as opposed to it's products, a part of yourself). So, two conflicting theories of property stand.

I understand "usufruct" to mean "ownership of the products of one's use of something". So usufruct is a relation between a person and a thing. The question then is, does a worker necessarily have usufruct over the tools and other equipment he works with? My answer is no. Does he even necessarily have absolute rights in the mere use of those things? Again, my answer is no. If he's only been given specific rights in the mere use of those things, who reserves the rest? My answer is the person who gave him those specific rights. One must assert that a worker necessarily has usufruct over what he works with as an additional premise.

Autolykos:

IIRC, Locke didn't consider the right to life to be a positive right.

And therefore no Man could ever have a just Power over the Life of another, by Right of property in Land or Possessions; since 'twould always be a Sin in any Man of Estate, to let his Brother perish for want of affording him Relief out of his Plenty. As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise; and a Man can no more justly make use of another's necessity, to force him to become his Vassal, by with-holding that Relief, God requires him to afford to the wants of his Brother, than he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to his Obedience, and with a Dagger at his Throat offer him Death or Slavery.

So according to Locke, the right to life is a positive one, and murder by commission and by omission are both murder.

In that sense ine Lockean theory property is not absolute, whereas the in Rothbardian it is.

Interestingly enough, individual land ownership isn't required for high levels of wealth inequality to arise in a pre-industrial economy. All that's required is individuals having alienable usufruct rights over parts of the commonly owned land.

None of these theories of property are consequentialist, so consequences like wealth inequality are not really relevant here.'

The question then is, does a worker necessarily have usufruct over the tools and other equipment he works with? My answer is no.

Whereas mutualism argues that all rent is illegitimate because property is primarily a product of labor, and by renting you take products of someone else's labor without really giving anything in exchange, because you haven't stopped considering the rented item as yourown.

Malachi:

[Because] people change with the passage of time and so a contract, which conveys intent, cannot declare someone's intent for all of time. So the inalienability of the will has a direct bearing on your control, and therefore potential ownership, of the body. Do you not see a problem with owning someone else's body? Like they might one day change their mind and decide to leave?

Does a slavery contract have to convey intent? I don't think it has to. It can simply establish that A now has the right to e.g. whip B if B disobeys A. Notice that B's will has in no way been alienated under this contract. The contract is about A's rights with respect to B. Also notice that B no longer has to consent to be whipped, as he alienated his right to not be whipped by A if he disobeys A.

I think the whole notion of one person literally controlling the will of another is just a mindgame that's promoted to inculcate greater obedience.

Papirius:

And therefore no Man could ever have a just Power over the Life of another, by Right of property in Land or Possessions; since 'twould always be a Sin in any Man of Estate, to let his Brother perish for want of affording him Relief out of his Plenty. As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise; and a Man can no more justly make use of another's necessity, to force him to become his Vassal, by with-holding that Relief, God requires him to afford to the wants of his Brother, than he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to his Obedience, and with a Dagger at his Throat offer him Death or Slavery.

Could you please provide a source (preferably a link) for this quote?

Papirius:

So according to Locke, the right to life is a positive one, and murder by commission and by omission are both murder.

In that sense ine Lockean theory property is not absolute, whereas the in Rothbardian it is.

Assuming the quote is valid, then you're right. I stand corrected.

Papirius:

None of these theories of property are consequentialist, so consequences like wealth inequality are not really relevant here.

My understanding is that Proudhon (if not also Rousseau) advocated the theory of property that he did in order to reduce (if not eliminate) wealth inequality. Am I mistaken here?

Papirius:

Whereas mutualism argues that all rent is illegitimate because property is primarily a product of labor, and by renting you take products of someone else's labor without really giving anything in exchange, because you haven't stopped considering the rented item as [your own].

I think there is an exchange in a rental agreement, namely an exchange of rights for money.

Do you think a worker necessarily has usufruct over the tools and other equipment he works with? Why or why not?

@Minarchist

Here is my response that finally got approved. After rereading it, the best way for me to explain Kinsella's point:

In a title-transfer, one person relinquishes ownership of some property so that another specific person may claim ownership. So I do consider both your example to be analogous, with the one exception being that there is an intent by the first owner in a transfer to relinquish ownership so that another specific person may claim it, whereas in abandonment, the owner relinquishes ownership so that any person may claim it.

I like Kinsella's explanation, but I think that mine is better. I'm going to try to explain it again in a more ordered fashion.

---

Libertarians take the NAP to be the founding principle of libertarianism. The non-aggression principle is the golden rule, the ethic of reciprocity, applied to law. Libertarians also take the concept of homesteading to be a very important principle, but it is often taken as a premise separate from the NAP. What I am going to show is that this is not the case. I am also going to show how three other essential principles to libertarianism are derived from the ethic of reciprocity.

When the golden rule is applied to the realm of law, the result is the NAP. It is the negative form of the golden rule, "Do not aggress against others", and another way of stating it would be, "If you respect me and my property, then I will respect you and your property". The realm of law is tied to disputes that would otherwise turn to violence. If you and I have a dispute as to what movie to watch at the theater, this is not in the realm of law, as this would not turn to violence. But if one of us were to aggress against the other, this is in the realm of law, and now we apply the NAP to the situation. So libertarians do find the golden rule to be very important, but at the same time, libertarians are more concerned with its applications to law than to human interaction in general. But we do talk about its application to human interaction in general. People who lie and break promises soon find that other people choose not to associate with them. Shunning is a powerful tool.

So it is quite easy to see how we derive the libertarian principle of proportionality. Whether we take Rothbard's principle of double reciprocation, "two teeth for a tooth", or if we just stick to equal reciprocation, we can see that some sense of proportion is embedded in libertarianism. And this is precisely because of reciprocation.

The theory of estoppel can be derived from the golden rule, even though its origins are not libertarian, but then again, neither is the golden rule. Essentially, with estoppel, one cannot claim something contrary to what has been established as truth by his own actions. There is more to it, but this is the most important part to libertarianism. So, if I hit you, I would be estopped if I were to say that one ought not hit another. You would be able to hit me back. Estoppel is a legal principle that allows for reciprocation.

The libertarian theory of just property is derived from the golden rule. Property and ownership are legal terms and ideas. They require people to agree to them. So, if I agree to not violate your property, you agree to not violate mine. This applies to our homes, food, clothes, etc. It applies to first use. You make a claim to own this unowned apple tree, and I make a claim to own this unowned blueberry plant. We agree to respect our claims. This is how we also derive homesteading from the golden rule.

And we can see how the title-transfer theory of contracts is derived from the golden rule. Title is a legal term regarding the rights over property. To go with our previous example, you have title to your apple tree, and I have title to my blueberry plant. So, if we were to exchange our property, what we are really exchanging is our title to these properties, as you may not necessarily dig up your apple tree when you give it to me. You are giving me the title, the rights, to the apple tree. Rothbard insisted upon title-transfer instead of honoring contracts for the sake of honoring contracts. When you give me title to your apple tree, you are saying that you will respect the apple tree as my property. If you break from this, what you are saying is that you do not respect the apple tree as my property. Reciprocation would be that I do not respect a similar claim of yours over property.

But some libertarians, such as Rothbard and Kinsella, make an exception regarding the body. They have different reasons, but they both say that title to the body is the one exception to the rule of title-transfer theory of contracts. One way or the other, the title is inalienable, even if you want it to be. So now that we have looked at how reciprocity applies to all these other main principles of libertarianism, let's look at how reciprocity applies to the body.

First, let us examine this statement: If I don't respect your house, then you won't respect mine. This is reciprocation. You make a claim to your house, and I make a claim to mine. If I violate your claim, equal reciprocation would mean that you could violate mine. But how does this apply to a voluntary slave contract? A voluntary slave contract would state something along the lines of, "I agree to be your slave, even if I disagree with this at a later date." So what happens when I decide later that I don't want to be a slave anymore? I cease to respect your claim to own my body. So let's apply reciprocity: If I don't respect your claim to own my body, then you won't respect my claim to own yours.

Let's look at it one more time. I give you a car. Later, I decide that I don't like this so much, so I violate this gift and take the car back. If we follow reciprocity, we see that if I don't respect your claim to own your car, then you won't respect a similar claim I make. That is reciprocity. So, if I don't respect your claim to own my body, then you won't respect my claim to own your body. This is reciprocity. Even if we were to use Rothbard's standard of double reciprocation, it doesn't change the principle of the matter. To reciprocate with the claims would be that we each do not respect the other's claim over our respective bodies.

I believe this is why it is so intuitive for most libertarians to be against "voluntary" slavery. The others want to respect contracts for the sake of contracts. But even if we were to apply reciprocity to that, we can see that in the end we must be against "voluntary" slavery, as if I don't respect a contract stating you own me, then you won't respect a contract stating I own you. This is reciprocal. It does not mean that any other contract need to be called into question.

And Kinsella has pointed out that honoring a "voluntary" slave contract because it is a contract is question begging - assuming it is a valid contract because it is a valid contract. We must look at why contracts are considered valid, and they are valid only in that people respect them. And why do people respect them? Because of an expectation of reciprocity. But the only reciprocation in a "voluntary" slave contract is: If I don't respect your claim to own my body, then you won't respect my claim to own yours.

Reciprocity is the heart of libertarianism. When we look at all of the main principles of libertarianism, we see that they all come from reciprocity. This is why "voluntary" slavery is incompatible with libertarianism. Enforcing a "voluntary" slave contract is not reciprocal. It is aggression. It violates the NAP.

Yet ownership rights over one's labor can be separated?

I offer you $20 in exchange for the performance of a task, mowing my lawn. You mow my lawn. I give you $20. What is your objection to this transaction? Please be specific.

People sold themselfes into slavery every day, it happend for centuries, some still do, google debt bongade.

and as libertarians, we consider the enforcement of such contracts to be unethical. What is your objection to this? No one denies the existence of slavery, we are saying that it is unjustifiable. People get robbed everyday, google it, I guess that means there are no libertarian arguments against rapine :eye roll:

You say that slavery is illegitimate because ownership over one's own body is unalienable because only I can control my body. But also, only I can control my labor, and thus ownership over my own labor should be unalienable, too, making employment illegitimate.

actually, I say that the enforcement of a slavery contract is unjustifiable because it constitutes aggressive violence. Please explain how that same argument applies to an employment contract. Quoting myself here: "People sell labor every day, there is no libertarian objection to this." this isnt to say that no one objects to employment, marxists do. But are you a marxist?

When selling oneself into slavery you waive your right to change your mind, and give your owner the right to own you body even if you change your mind on a later point.

that right cannot be waived because the will is inalienable. See above.

How is a contract of buying/selling a product enforced? By force. If you say that it's not aggressive force because if was a reaction to theft- because the guy bought the product of another, and it's his; one can also say that the force used to enforce the slave contract also is not aggressive, because it is a reaction to theft- because guy bought the body of another, and it's his.

I suspect you are trolling because you failed to answer my question. We were discussing employment. How is an employment contract enforced? Please answer so that I can explain to you in detail how your argument fails to demonstrate what you think it does.

If you say that slavery by selling oneself is illegitimate because self-ownership is unalienable, and it is unalienable because people can control only their own bodies, it follows that ownership over one's own labor is also unalienable, because people can control only their own labor, thus making employment illegitimate.

except, thats not what I said. I said that enforcement of a slavery contract constitutes an unjustifiable act, therefore slavery is unjustifiable. In order to attempt to apply this argument to employment, you have to distort it beyond its original meaning, which is (apparently) why you feel the need to set up this strawman.

If you say that slavery by selling oneself is illegitimate because force must to be used if the seller would change his mind and take back what he sold, then it follows that selling any product is illegitimate, because in those cases, too, force must be used if the seller would change his mind and take back what he sold.

Aggressive violence is the key, not force. Reread the thread.

Does a slavery contract have to convey intent? I don't think it has to. It can simply establish that A now has the right to e.g. whip B if B disobeys A. Notice that B's will has in no way been alienated under this contract. The contract is about A's rights with respect to B. Also notice that B no longer has to consent to be whipped, as he alienated his right to not be whipped by A if he disobeys A.

what exactly would a contract like that mean? If B signed a contract giving A the right to beat him, but he didnt intend to permit A to beat him, I would call that a fraudulent contract because it's not meaningful. If A could beat B, sans contract, A wouldnt need the contract (hopefully we agree on this), he could just start whuppin on him. B has to consent to the whipping. This doesnt require a contract, it requires actual consent. Consent can be given verbally, its just a message conveying a state of mind, or B's will in this matter. Obviously B might change his mind, and withdraw consent. You cant tell me that he cant withdraw consent, because consent isnt a social fiction, it is a description of a state of will. Consent could be withdrawn halfway through the beating. If the paper contract doesnt convey intent, then what does it convey?

B no longer has to consent to be whipped, as he alienated his right to not be whipped by A if he disobeys A.

I dont think that right is alienable.

Question for the pro-slavery crowd: suppose I trick someone into signing a slavery contract, giving me title to her body. Is this contract enforceable? Why or why not?

Autolykos:

Could you please provide a source (preferably a link) for this quote?

http://www.johnlocke.net/Two-Treatises-of-Government-1.html §. 42.

My understanding is that Proudhon (if not also Rousseau) advocated the theory of property that he did in order to reduce (if not eliminate) wealth inequality. Am I mistaken here?

I don't think so, I think that their theory is deontological with talk about consequentialism, but even if they personally were consequentialists, we're talknig about principle here, not consequences.

I think there is an exchange in a rental agreement, namely an exchange of rights for money

I disagree. The rentier takes something without giving anything, he gaines wealth without labor, and as Proudhon said- any wealth gained without labor was stolen from those who labored to create that wealth.

Do you think a worker necessarily has usufruct over the tools and other equipment he works with? Why or why not?

I think that usufruct should be applied only on land, and only usufruct, IMO- land cannot legitimately be property; also, everything that is a product of someone's labor should be property, and only property, no usufruct should apply.

gotlucky:

So, if I don't respect your claim to own my body, then you won't respect my claim to own your body.

Which is irrelevant, because two people cannot themselves into slavery to each other.

Reciprocity is the heart of libertarianism.

I thought it was prorperty rights. Everyone has property over his own body, his labor, and the products of his labor until he relinquishes them, or "tranfers the title".

It is aggression. It violates the NAP.

If you say that slavery by selling oneself is illegitimate because force must to be used if the seller changes his mind and take back what he sold, then it follows that selling any product is illegitimate, because in those cases, too, force must be used if the seller would change his mind and take back what he sold.

Malachi:

I offer you $20 in exchange for the performance of a task, mowing my lawn. You mow my lawn. I give you $20. What is your objection to this transaction? Please be specific.

Mowing the lawn for someone is a service, I have no objections to that.

that right cannot be waived because the will is inalienable.

I repeat- if you are going to uphold ownership over one's body as unalienable, in order to be consistent, you have to uphold ownership over one's own labor as unalienable, too.

Aggressive violence is the key, not force.

I don't see how one is aggressive, and the other is not. If the seller sell something and then later changes his mind and takes back what he sold, he's commiting theft, no matter if that what has been sold is his car or his body.

This is a very important topic, one which I will respond to more thoroughly later, but at the moment I'll add 2 cents. Why is it that this discussion turned into another "Can someone sell theirself into slavery?", discussions? Why is such a question even worth the time being spent on it?

When someone uses the word own, it carries with it certain baggage, in that it brings to mind what most people consider 'own' to mean. Ownership means that you have complete and just control over something, you can do whatever you want with it, if you so desire. Self-ownership has always perplexed me, not because I don't understand it, but because it's on the level of Stefan Molyneux's "universally preferable behavior". We all know that no behavior is universally preferable, there is always a exception, meaning it can't be universal. The words "universal" and "preferable behavior" should never be put together. Ownership implies being able to sell something, being able to sell something is just a part of ownership, so why is it that people call it self-ownership? If you can't sell yourself into slavery then you don't actually have ownership, if you had ownership you should be able to do whatever it is you feel like with it, including selling it. Now don't get me wrong, I'm not saying that people don't have control over themselves, people clearly do, using the word ownership to describe that relationship just doesn't make sense. Does there even need to be a word for the relationship of you having control over your body?

So maybe we could say that there are then five theories of property.

(Lockean- ) Rothbardian

(Lockean- Rothbardian- ) Blockean

pure Lockean

(Rousseauan- ) Proudhonian

(Rousseauan- ) Georgist

Malachi:

[What] exactly would a contract like that mean?

I think it would mean exactly what it says - that B has given A the right to whip B if B disobeys A. What else do you think it could mean?

Malachi:

If B signed a contract giving A the right to beat him, but he didnt intend to permit A to beat him, I would call that a fraudulent contract because it's not meaningful.

I think it certainly is meaningful. What basis do you have for thinking it isn't? (I'm not saying there can be none - I'm just wondering.)

Malachi:

If A could beat B, sans contract, A wouldnt need the contract (hopefully we agree on this), he could just start whuppin on him. B has to consent to the whipping.

A contract doesn't stipulate physical ability per se - it stipulates the legitimacy (between/among the parties involved) of exercising certain physical abilities. In order to whip B, A doesn't need a contract, strictly speaking. What the contract does is stipulate that B has given A the right to do so.

Malachi:

This doesnt require a contract, it requires actual consent. Consent can be given verbally, its just a message conveying a state of mind, or B's will in this matter. Obviously B might change his mind, and withdraw consent. You cant tell me that he cant withdraw consent, because consent isnt a social fiction, it is a description of a state of will. Consent could be withdrawn halfway through the beating. If the paper contract doesnt convey intent, then what does it convey?

I'm certainly not saying that B can't withdraw consent. I'm saying that, once B has alienated his right to not be whipped by A if he disobeys A, whether he consents to such at any time thereafter isn't legally relevant. At the very least, it doesn't have to be legally relevant.

I consider contracts to convey assignment(s) of right. This includes transfer of title, but is hardly limited to it.

Malachi:

I dont think that right [the right of B to not be whipped by A if he disobeys A] is alienable.

Why not? Are you treating that as a premise or as a conclusion? If the latter, what do you derive it from?

Malachi:

Question for the pro-slavery [sic] crowd: suppose I trick someone into signing a slavery contract, giving me title to her body. Is this contract enforceable? Why or why not?

First of all, I don't see any need for mockery. I'm not mocking you, am I?

Now then, if you trick someone into signing any contract, that means the person wasn't aware of the actual content of the contract, so it can be said that she didn't actually agree to it. The contract would then be null and void IMO.

Papirius:

http://www.johnlocke.net/Two-Treatises-of-Government-1.html §. 42.

Thanks for that.

Papirius:

I don't think so, I think that their theory is deontological with talk about consequentialism, but even if they personally were consequentialists, we're talknig about principle here, not consequences.

Consequentialist ethics itself is a form of deontological ethics - it just has different premises from those traditionally attributed to the latter. In any case, my point was simply to show that individual ownership of land isn't necessary for high levels of wealth inequality to appear. Regardless of principles, mutualists certainly don't seem to like high levels of wealth inequality.

Papirius:

I disagree. The rentier takes something without giving anything, he [gains] wealth without labor, and as Proudhon said- any wealth gained without labor was stolen from those who labored to create that wealth.

So you don't consider the right to use something (generally or in a particular (set of) way(s)) to be something that one can give to someone else? Why not?

Papirius:

I think that usufruct should be applied only on land, and only usufruct, IMO- land cannot legitimately be property; also, everything that is a product of someone's labor should be property, and only property, no usufruct should apply.

Who do you think should decide who has usufruct over a given area of land? Or how do you think usufruct rights in land should be distributed?

Based on that link you gave me in another thread (thanks, BTW), it seems that Proudhon considered land to be the property of the "community". Do you agree with this? If so, how do you define "community"? What do you think distinguishes one "community" from another?

I've read it, I just don't agree with it. Also, I have written in that threat.

Rothbard, and a lot of guys here by following him, talk about some imaginary slavery contracts which have "cancelable by lack of consent of the slave" clauses and call that voluntary slavery, but by the fact of having such clause it is not slavery. Whereas, as I said, slavery by selling oneself has existed throughout history. People knew that by selling themselves into slavery they give up their right to life, liberty, property and the right to cancel the slavery contract, and they agreed to those conditions in exanchge for whatever the slaveowner agreed to. Such slavery can become involuntary on a metaphysical level, but not on the legal one, because by selling oneself into slavery one has waived his right to cancel and get out of the contract.

What if in that time libertarians would come to power, how would they justify taking slaves from the slave-owner that got them when they voluntarily sold themselves to him? The slave-to-be knew what slavery is, he agreed to it, the slaveowner payed the slave's family, or whoever he needed to give money to according to the slave contract- and what would happen? Would libertarians take the slave from him and explain how that was an illegitimate contract? Whould they give him his money back?

If anyone has the right to do what he wants unless he violates NAP, I don't see how could it be contradictional with selling oneself into slavery.

So it is questionable whether slavery by selling oneself is inconsistant with libertarianism, and if it is accepted as such, there arises the question if employment is inconsistant with libertarianism, too..

If the contract was a voluntary contract then that would be valid and it then could not be considered to be slavery because it is a voluntary agreement. When it comes to no escape clauses which is essentially what would make a contract resemble slavery. It could be argued that the contract is not valid because the person that accepted the contract to be owned by someone else would be considered not in their right mind. The contract would have been signed by someone who would be considered incapacitated. This is the same argument that you would have if you are kidnapped and forced to sign a contract for example. The "slave" person would just need to take the contract to an arbitrator who would void the contract.

A contract would also not include unless specified violence or physical restrictions. The semantics of the contract would realy matter. If the slave owner in the contract tried to force the person to do something through violence and it was not specified explicitly in the contract, then the slave owner would be liable for any actions they take.

Autolykos:

Malachi:

Question for the pro-slavery [sic] crowd: suppose I trick someone into signing a slavery contract, giving me title to her body. Is this contract enforceable? Why or why not?

First of all, I don't see any need for mockery. I'm not mocking you, am I?

Now then, if you trick someone into signing any contract, that means the person wasn't aware of the actual content of the contract, so it can be said that she didn't actually agree to it. The contract would then be null and void IMO.

I dont consider that to be mockery. Furthermore, I didnt address you by name, nor was this a reply to any of your posts, so you appear to have implicitly self-identified with the label "pro-slavery." all that aside, if a contract doesnt convey intent, then why must someone be aware of the actual content in order for it to be valid? What correspondence is necessary between an individual's mental state (including knowledge) and the meaning of the words on the paper, and what is the significance of the signature act? If someone signs a contract without conveying intent, in what sense can they be said to have "agreed" to the arrangement?

thank you for answering the question, however, I will admit that it wasnt directed at you specifically. I do want to know what besides intent is conveyed by a contract and how this distinction is meaningful.

I repeat- if you are going to uphold ownership over one's body as unalienable, in order to be consistent, you have to uphold ownership over one's own labor as unalienable, too.

you need to do more than repeat it. You need to support it. I could just as easily make argument by assertion against slavery, however that would be pointless. labors can be sold, the corpus is inalienable. When someone mows your lawn, they get paid, then they leave. If they re-enter your yard to "reclaim their labor" (at which point we realize that you are WRONG and their labor can be alienated) then they are trespassing, and this can actually be prevented without violence at all, and certainly without aggressive violence. If the occupant of a body that has been sold decides to take his body back, there are only two solutions: appeasement, where the prior "owner" lets them go; and coercion, where aggressive violence is used to obtain cooperation. Why cant we just prevent the person from reappropriating the body? Because the conscious apparatus is inalienable. Ergo title to the body cannot be transferred in a libertarian legal system because that title transfer is unenforceable.

I don't see how one is aggressive, and the other is not. If the seller sell something and then later changes his mind and takes back what he sold, he's commiting theft, no matter if that what has been sold is his car or his body.

if I sell you an automobile that belongs to Autolykos, and he attempts to regain posession of said auto, and you resort to violence to prevent this, you have used aggressive violence. That is because I cannot sell someone else's property, the sale was illegitimate. Likewise if I try to transfer an inalienable title, and you, believing that you posess title, use violence to retain posession, that constitutes aggressive violence.

I think it would mean exactly what it says - that B has given A the right to whip B if B disobeys A. What else do you think it could mean?

well it could mean anything since semantics are relative. But my point is that if B telegraphs his intent to obey A and agrees to penalties for disobedience, then B has conveyed intent. But B literally cannot convey intent for all of the future, because human cognition is continuously changing. If I recall correctly, you consider rights to be a social construct, meaning they are intersubjective conventions that have no existence outside of human thoughts. This being the case, the contract can only convey an idea of socially acceptable behaviors between A and B. So youre an arbitrator, and must settle the dispute between the (formerly voluntary) slave and the owner. Who has a stronger claim to the right of physical access to B's body? The guy with the 3 year old piece of paper, or the person who actually has control of the body, and literally cannot give it up?

I think it certainly is meaningful. What basis do you have for thinking it isn't? (I'm not saying there can be none - I'm just wondering.)

I guess its as meaningful as a comic book, or tom clancy novel, or any other fiction. What meaning could it have? This piece of paper gives someone powers of someone else's physical determination? My basis for declaring it to be "not very meaningful" is the lack of intent. There was no real correspondence between the meaning of the words on the paper and the mind of B. He may as well have signed a newspaper article.

A contract doesn't stipulate physical ability per se - it stipulates the legitimacy (between/among the parties involved) of exercising certain physical abilities. In order to whip B, A doesn't need a contract, strictly speaking. What the contract does is stipulate that B has given A the right to do so.

surely you agree that the physical piece of paper doesnt actually convey rights, merely describe and record an understanding between two or more parties. Without that understanding, the contract is null, it doesnt represent what a contract is intended to represent. The future is uncertain, so its literally impossible for B to understand what is necessary to convey those future rights indefinitely.

I'm certainly not saying that B can't withdraw consent. I'm saying that, once B has alienated his right to not be whipped by A if he disobeys A, whether he consents to such at any time thereafter isn't legally relevant.

here being the crux of the issue. We have different opinions of law. I agree that contractual slavery is legal in some jurisprudential perspectives. I maintain that such a thing is illegal from a libertarian position, because you cannot punish a conscious human body without punishing a human consciousness. Indeed, that would be the point. Enforcement of a slavery contract constitutes aggressive violence. Why? Because the will is inalienable.

I consider contracts to convey assignment(s) of right. This includes transfer of title, but is hardly limited to it.

that would make contracts agreements of a sort, correct? Meaning they are socially meaningful, as they refer to what humans will permit and forbid to other humans, right? That would make the intent of the parties to the contracts significant to the interpretation of the contract, right? If I contract with you, conveying the right to pick tomatoes from my garden, it follows that I conveyed my intent to permit you to pick tomatoes from my garden, correct?

Why not? Are you treating that as a premise or as a conclusion? If the latter, what do you derive it from?

the premises are the NAP and the indivisibility of the self. Humans cannot be divided into consciousness and body, so that the body can be punished without the consciousness being aggressed upon. The conciousness can waive rights, but not permanently, as the future is uncertain, and that includes future states of mind. There is no actual way to escape this. "slavers" say it doesnt matter, the conciousness knew what it was signing up for. "anti-slavers" say that the future is uncertain, so they de facto could not have known exactly what they signed up for, and if the state of mind changes (say, consent is withdrawn) then the contract no longer represents an agreement between two minds. There is no agreement to be subject to violence, so the initiation of violence is aggression.

I can see you all just pounding away at your keyboards, "WELL THEN IF I SELL A CAR AND CHANGE MY MIND I CAN STEAL IT BACK AND KEEP THE MONEY HURR DURR" obviously cars are alienable property, you can be separated from the car. Stealing it back constitutes a crime against property. You cannot be separated from the corpus, there is no "stealing it back," control of the property was never transferred. You might owe damages (just like breaking out of an employment contract before it expires) but you do not owe obedience. Kind of like if you "sell" your car by receiving payment, but never transferring posession or title, you might owe damages, even more than the cost of a new car, but you didnt consent to being carjacked and curbstomped. If they take posession of the car without violence and do title work, then you have no leg to stand on. Thats why I say this discussion can be revisited when we have the technology to alienate the will.

Malachi:

I dont consider that to be mockery. Furthermore, I didnt address you by name, nor was this a reply to any of your posts, so you appear to have implicitly self-identified with the label "pro-slavery."

I didn't self-identify with that label at all. I perceived you as placing that label on me, given that I disagree with the Rothbardian position on "voluntary slavery". However, that disagreement to me in no way constitutes "pro-slavery", as I don't see myself advocating slavery in the slightest.

Malachi:

[All] that aside, if a contract doesnt convey intent, then why must someone be aware of the actual content in order for it to be valid? What correspondence is necessary between an individual's mental state (including knowledge) and the meaning of the words on the paper, and what is the significance of the signature act? If someone signs a contract without conveying intent, in what sense can they be said to have "agreed" to the arrangement?

I'm sorry but I don't understand your first question. I don't see how someone being aware of the actual content of a contract means that the contract conveys intent. Furthermore, I don't see this notion of a contract being a conveyance of intent to be the same as the Rothbardian notion of a contract being a transfer of one or more titles.

Malachi:

[Thank] you for answering the question, however, I will admit that it wasnt directed at you specifically. I do want to know what besides intent is conveyed by a contract and how this distinction is meaningful.

As I see it, a contract is an assignment of rights between/among two or more parties.

Voluntary contracts would allow for assisted suicides and in some extreme cases people would sign up for strange and violent acts that might require a contract. There are such instances today where people sign contracts that specify they can be subjected to all sorts of strange punishment. If the person wants to get out of such a contract they can go to arbitration and try to void the contract. In some cases the result may mean that the "slave owner" is awarded compensation from the "slave" due to breaking the contract. But any semantics like, what about if you hire a hitman and you change your mind at the last minute and so on would be handled by arbitration.