I didn't self-identify with that label at all. I perceived you as placing that label on me, given that I disagree with the Rothbardian position on "voluntary slavery". However, that disagreement to me in no way constitutes "pro-slavery", as I don't see myself advocating slavery in the slightest.
I'm sorry but I don't understand your first question. I don't see how someone being aware of the actual content of a contract means that the contract conveys intent. Furthermore, I don't see this notion of a contract being a conveyance of intent to be the same as the Rothbardian notion of a contract being a transfer of one or more titles.
Malachi:[Well] it could mean anything since semantics are relative.
I'm sorry but I can't tell whether this is a sarcastic comment or not. Could you please clarify?
Malachi:But my point is that if B telegraphs his intent to obey A and agrees to penalties for disobedience, then B has conveyed intent. But B literally cannot convey intent for all of the future, because human cognition is continuously changing.
I think what B has done there is more than conveying intent. I think he's literally alienated his right to not be whipped by A if he disobeys A. Conversely, one could say he's given A the right to whip him if he disobeys him.
Malachi:If I recall correctly, you consider rights to be a social construct, meaning they are intersubjective conventions that have no existence outside of human thoughts.
Yes, you recall correctly.
Malachi:This being the case, the contract can only convey an idea of socially acceptable behaviors between A and B. So youre an arbitrator, and must settle the dispute between the (formerly voluntary) slave and the owner. Who has a stronger claim to the right of physical access to B's body? The guy with the 3 year old piece of paper, or the person who actually has control of the body, and literally cannot give it up?
B possessed that right originally and then gave it to A, so it now belongs to A. Hence A has the stronger claim. The fact that it's B's nerves that transmit impulses to B's muscles makes no difference.
Consider an situation where the access rights concern a house instead of a person. So I make a contract with you whereby I give you the right to enter and exit my house as you please for the next year. Six months later, I decide to change my mind. Would you still say you're allowed to enter and exit my house as you please for six more months? Why or why not?
Malachi:I guess [it's] as meaningful as a comic book, or tom clancy novel, or any other fiction. What meaning could it have? This piece of paper gives someone powers of someone else's physical determination?
I didn't say the contract gives A powers of B's physical determination. As I said before, the contract isn't about ability, it's about legitimacy.
Malachi:My basis for declaring it to be "not very meaningful" is the lack of intent. There was no real correspondence between the meaning of the words on the paper and the mind of B. He may as well have signed a newspaper article.
I'm sorry but I have no idea what you mean by this. I don't see why a contract must convey intent.
Malachi:[Surely] you agree that the physical piece of paper doesnt actually convey rights, merely describe and record an understanding between two or more parties. Without that understanding, the contract is null, it doesnt represent what a contract is intended to represent. The future is uncertain, so its literally impossible for B to understand what is necessary to convey those future rights indefinitely.
How/why can't a contract actually convey rights? Even Rothbard thought contracts convey rights, just certain kinds of rights (namely property titles). I also don't see how the rights under consideration have to be conveyed constantly, as seems to be implied by your last sentence. Otherwise, your last sentence seems to contain a non sequitur - it doesn't follow from the future being uncertain that it's impossible to understand something.
Malachi:[Here] being the crux of the issue. We have different opinions of law. I agree that contractual slavery is legal in some jurisprudential perspectives. I maintain that such a thing is illegal from a libertarian position, because you cannot punish a conscious human body without punishing a human consciousness. Indeed, that would be the point. Enforcement of a slavery contract constitutes aggressive violence. Why? Because the will is inalienable.
What do you mean by "punish"? What do you mean by "enforcement of a slavery contract"?
Malachi:that would make contracts agreements of a sort, correct? Meaning they are socially meaningful, as they refer to what humans will permit and forbid to other humans, right? That would make the intent of the parties to the contracts significant to the interpretation of the contract, right? If I contract with you, conveying the right to pick tomatoes from my garden, it follows that I conveyed my intent to permit you to pick tomatoes from my garden, correct?
As I see it, it means that anything you do to prevent me from picking tomatoes from your garden is now illegitimate. You're nevertheless free to no longer permit me to do so later on.
Malachi:[I base it on the] premises are the NAP and the indivisibility of the self. Humans cannot be divided into consciousness and body, so that the body can be punished without the consciousness being aggressed upon. The conciousness can waive rights, but not permanently, as the future is uncertain, and that includes future states of mind. There is no actual way to escape this. ["Slavers" [sic]] say it doesnt matter, the conciousness knew what it was signing up for. ["Anti-slavers" [sic]] say that the future is uncertain, so they de facto could not have known exactly what they signed up for, and if the state of mind changes (say, consent is withdrawn) then the contract no longer represents an agreement between two minds. There is no agreement to be subject to violence, so the initiation of violence is aggression. I can see you all just pounding away at your keyboards, "WELL THEN IF I SELL A CAR AND CHANGE MY MIND I CAN STEAL IT BACK AND KEEP THE MONEY HURR DURR" [sic] obviously cars are alienable property, you can be separated from the car. Stealing it back constitutes a crime against property. You cannot be separated from the corpus, there is no "stealing it back," control of the property was never transferred. You might owe damages (just like breaking out of an employment contract before it expires) but you do not owe obedience. Kind of like if you "sell" your car by receiving payment, but never transferring posession or title, you might owe damages, even more than the cost of a new car, but you didnt consent to being carjacked and curbstomped. If they take posession of the car without violence and do title work, then you have no leg to stand on. Thats why I say this discussion can be revisited when we have the technology to alienate the will.
I can see you all just pounding away at your keyboards, "WELL THEN IF I SELL A CAR AND CHANGE MY MIND I CAN STEAL IT BACK AND KEEP THE MONEY HURR DURR" [sic] obviously cars are alienable property, you can be separated from the car. Stealing it back constitutes a crime against property. You cannot be separated from the corpus, there is no "stealing it back," control of the property was never transferred. You might owe damages (just like breaking out of an employment contract before it expires) but you do not owe obedience. Kind of like if you "sell" your car by receiving payment, but never transferring posession or title, you might owe damages, even more than the cost of a new car, but you didnt consent to being carjacked and curbstomped. If they take posession of the car without violence and do title work, then you have no leg to stand on. Thats why I say this discussion can be revisited when we have the technology to alienate the will.
I think including expressions like "HURR DURR" in your posts is clearly mockery. I don't see any need for it, and I would appreciate it if you would stop. You don't see me mocking you, do you?
Now with all due respect, I think you're barking up the wrong tree here. It's not at all about transferring one's will to another. That's impossible (at least for the time being). Hence obedience can't be enforced in the same sense as a transfer of property can be enforced. Rather, it involves whether it's legitimate for one person to hurt another (i.e. whether he has the right to hurt him). If it is, then that means any retaliation by the latter against the former is illegitimate. This in no way constitutes "enforcing obedience" unless one equivocates over the word "enforce". Nor does it constitute "selling one's body" - as you correctly note, doing so requires alienating one's body, which is also impossible (at least for now). But I don't think either alienating the will or alienating the body is relevant here at all. It's simply about who is allowed to do what to whom.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Malachi:[Given] the existence of other forum members in this thread, its hard for me to see how you perceived that. Challenging my ideas is different than advocating the inverse of them. However, ignoring arguments against slavery while asserting that a slavery contract could legally justify the nonconsensual torture of individual actually does resemble a kind of advocacy. However I dont consider you "pro-slavery" and I apologize for the misunderstanding.
I accept your apology. What I meant by "advocate" was "proclaim something as good and encourage it".
Malachi:Human action is purposeful, how exactly is one supposed to agree to transfer social permissions and obligations without intending to do so? Is the pattern of ink on the paper really that powerful, or do we pay attention to the meanings of words and sentences because they correspond with thoughts and ideas? I'm probably not a rothbardian, btw.
I think the contract embodies the transfer/assignment itself - it's not an agreement to transfer/assign one or more things. So by signing the contract, one is considered to actually make the transfer/assignment.
Rather, it involves whether it's legitimate for one person to hurt another (i.e. whether he has the right to hurt him).
But I don't think either alienating the will or alienating the body is relevant here at all. It's simply about who is allowed to do what to whom.
Autolykos:Regardless of principles, mutualists certainly don't seem to like high levels of wealth inequality.
So you don't consider the right to use something (generally or in a particular (set of) way(s)) to be something that one can give to someone else? Why not?
Well, if we say labor is inalienable (which mutualism says), renting of means of production is illegitimate because it would constitute theft by considering someone else's labor one's own. Renting of other products some mutualist consider ok, some mutualist consider that all rent is illegitimate because it is unearned income, and because rent is a contradiction between de facto abandonment, and de jure continued property; between ius ad rem (possession) and ius in re (property), and that possessions is more important then property being that "possession is a fact, and property is a theory".
There is another point of view, that says that renting is not ok because it is a product of the lack of (economic) freedom, namely- one would never rent from someone something he needs (maybe some people would rent in rare cases when they want, not need, to) in a free economy- because in free economy, with free banking, interest would fall near zero, and no one would rent stuff he needs when he could easily borrow money and buy it.
Who do you think should decide who has usufruct over a given area of land?
Or how do you think usufruct rights in land should be distributed?
No need for it to be distributed. What you occupy-and-use without employing anyone, you have usufruct over that land.
it seems that Proudhon considered land to be the property of the "community". Do you agree with this?
If so, how do you define "community"? What do you think distinguishes one "community" from another?
Malachi:labors can be sold, the corpus is inalienable.
Labor is inalienable, too. Just as only I can control my body, only I can control my labor, and thus- no one has the right to consider my labor his own.
When someone mows your lawn, they get paid, then they leave. If they re-enter your yard to "reclaim their labor" (at which point we realize that you are WRONG and their labor can be alienated)
Thet's not alienating one's labor. Employment is alienation of one's labor, providing a service isn't.
if I sell you an automobile that belongs to Autolykos, and he attempts to regain posession of said auto, and you resort to violence to prevent this, you have used aggressive violence.
I don't see what this false analogy has to do with anything.
If I sell you something, then later I change my mind and take it back, thats theft, and the force you use to stop me is a reaction to theft, not aggression.
Whether that something is my car or my body doesn't change the fact that the force you use is reaction to theft, not aggression.
Saying that slavery by selling oneself is illegitimate because enforcing a sale like that is aggressive is invalid, because enforcing any sale is reactive, not aggressive.
Saying that slavery by selling oneself is illegitimate because the body is unalieanalbe can be valid (and I do accept that), but in order to be consistent one must accept that if the body is unalieanble, so is labor, which means that not only slavery, but also employment is illegitimate.
@ Papirius
You appear to believe that employment is invalid in that your labor is your own, that employment somehow claims that the labor isn't your own, yet at the same time believing that providing a service is legitimate. A employer, upon hiring the employee, has the employee sign a contract whether explicitly and implicitly, that the employee will be paid for his labor. This means that the employer has never claimed that the employee's labor is his own, for if the employer genuinely believed that then he wouldn't pay the employee at all, after all why would you pay someone for something that is your own?
You appear to believe that employment is invalid in that your labor is your own, that employment somehow claims that the labor isn't your own, yet at the same time believing that providing a service is legitimate.
Yes.
A employer, upon hiring the employee, has the employee sign a contract whether explicitly and implicitly, that the employee will be paid for his labor.
The slaveowner, upon buying the slave, can have the slave sign a contract wherer explicitly and implicitly, that the slave will be paid for his body (by having his, or his family's debt payed off, or money given to his family, or whatever).
This means that the employer has never claimed that the employee's labor is his own
Actually it does. When I do a service for you, I get money from you for the service in which I have put my labor into. But when I'm an employee of someone's and do a service for you, I don't get the money for the service in which I have put my labor into, my employer gets the money from you, and then he gives me a part of that money. The difference is very clear, when I do a service I get the full product of my labor, when I do a service as an employee, you don't give me money for my service, you give my boss the money, and I don't get the full product of my labor.
So your problem with it is that you don't get paid enough for your labor? Other things would need to be taken into consideration, like marketing (Which the employer must handle), the risk of the product not selling (Which the employer must bare, while the employee doesn't need to worry about if the product sells or not, since the employee will be paid regardless), and the fact that the employee is using the equipment of the employer in order to make the product. If you still see employment as a problem why not start your own business? You might still think it unfair, it isn't something that is unavoidable, in that the person chose the unfair arrangement from the beginning.
Edit:
Comparing employment and slavery might seem appropriate at times. Consider that some people would rather prefer slavery. (BDSM for example.)
So your problem with it is that you don't get paid enough for your labor?
No. The problem is I don't get paid for my labor, my boss get paid for my work, and then the boss gives me a small conpensation for me alienating my labor.
Other things would need to be taken into consideration, like marketing (Which the employer must handle)
No, there is no such a "must", other workers can handle that.
the risk of the product not selling (Which the employer must bare, while the employee doesn't need to worry about if the product sells or not, since the employee will be paid regardless)
I don't know i what world you live in, hundreds of thousands of people do not get payed for their work because the firm eg. goes bankrupt, I personally am a worker, troughout my working life, I have more then a year of unpayed labor, a few months not being a consequence of firm's bankruptcy (which the owner/employer doesn't even notice, he doesn't have to sell his villas or cars to pay the firm's debts and unpayed wages, whereas I had to sell my car so could buy food) but purely a product of employers blackmailing me by the fact that I have no alternative job. But that's basically irrelevant, it's an externality.
and the fact that the employee is using the equipment of the employer in order to make the product.
Which is based on the theory of private property which alows rent, and which I reject as illegitimate.
If you still see employment as a problem why not start your own business?
Because there is no real competition in crony capitalism.
You might still think it unfair, it isn't something that is unavoidable, in that the person chose the unfair arrangement from the beginning.
Just like the slave might think it unfair, but it wasn't unavoidable, he didn't have to plegde himself agaist a loan, he could have had started a business, bla bla bla.
Comparing employment and slavery might seem appropriate at times. Consider that some people would rather prefer slavery.
It's irrelevant what people prefer, but what is legitimate.
Malachi:[It's] not sarcasm. The contract could literally mean anything, the only measure of what it means is what people think it means. If we sign a contract that specifies that you are permitted to pick tomatoes from my garden, so its in writing for everyone to see, and then I refuse to let you inside my fence, saying "I only conveyed the right to pick tomatoes frm my garden, I never said I intended to allow you to exercise that right" then I have committed fraud.
Okay, fair enough. I just wasn't sure.
Malachi:I [don't] consider that right [the right of B to not be whipped by A if he disobeys A] to be alienable. Since there are no objective rights for us to look at to see who is right, I guess we will have to agree to disagree. But if you think that such a contract is legal, I dont see why you would object to being considered "pro-slavery."
Well the way I see it, I'm "pro-slavery" in the same sense that I'm "pro-drug-addiction". In the latter case, I think it should be legal for people to use drugs, and even become addicted to drugs, but that doesn't mean that I think they're good things to do or that I'm going to encourage people to do them.
Anyways, why don't you consider that right to be alienable?
Malachi:[No], I dont think I would be allowed to enter and exit your house after you changed your mind and said you no longer intended to permit me ingress and egress of your domicile. This is because the piece of paper no longer represents a meeting of the minds. I might seek damages, however.
Why would you be entitled to damages? If the contract just represented a meeting of the minds, and that meeting of the minds no longer exists, then you haven't been deprived of anything, have you? And if you haven't been deprived of anything, then you're not entitled to any damages.
Malachi:I consider the initiation of violence on a nonconsenting nonaggressor to be illegitimate, so a piece of paper isnt going to change that, even if that nonaggressor was foolish enough to "sell" "his" "body." [The] person who attempted to buy nontransferable goods would be entitled to damages, but not entitled to commit assault.
See above about entitlement to damages in this case. Otherwise, do you see legitimacy as requiring consent? Why or why not?
Malachi:["Punish" and "enforcement of a slavery contract" mean to me] the things that "masters" typically do to their human chattel when they get uppity, I consider it assault, battery, torture, and abuse. In descriptive terms, physical contact with a nonconsenting individual, typically with the intent of modifying that person's behavior.
Keep in mind that using "enforcement" in that way contradicts the use of it in the context of a contract that involves title transfer. In the latter case, "enforcement" means forcibly obtaining what one is entitled to by the contract. At the very least, I think we both agree that obedience can't be enforced in this way, and any contract which claims otherwise is null and void.
Malachi:[Is] it illegitimate merely because I said or wrote something, or is it illegitimate because I meant something when I said/wrote it?
If I understand you correctly, then I'd say it's illegitimate because you meant something when you said/wrote it.
Malachi:I'm sorry to have offended you[.]
It's okay, as long as you don't engage in mockery from here on out.
Malachi:I agree, and that [whether a person can have the right to hurt another] is central to our dispute. I believe that consent to being hurt or injured must be intentional and can be withdrawn. Hurting (nonaggressive) people without their consent is wrong, in a descriptive sense, as in I wouldnt want to live somewhere that was seen as legitimate.
I think two even more fundamental issues here are 1) whether rights can be broken down into smaller component rights, and 2) which rights are considered to be alienable. I've recently come to take a broad approach with both: I think rights are basically infinitely divisible, and I think all rights are alienable.
Malachi:In that case I apologize if I misattributed arguments to you.
No problem.
Papirius:I think almost everyone doesn't like [high levels of wealth inequality]..
Why do you think that?
Papirius:Well, if we say labor is inalienable (which mutualism says), renting of means of production is illegitimate because it would constitute theft by considering someone else's labor one's own. Renting of other products some mutualist consider ok, some mutualist consider that all rent is illegitimate because it is unearned income, and because rent is a contradiction between de facto abandonment, and de jure continued property; between ius ad rem (possession) and ius in re (property), and that possessions is more important then property being that "possession is a fact, and property is a theory".
I take it that by "labor" you mean something like "the bodily actions that undertaken to produce something"? In that case, labor is indeed inalienable, because actions are inalienable. However, I don't think that has anything necessarily to do with whether rent is considered to be legitimate. As I see it, there's also the question of prior ownership of the things that a person uses in his labor. While a person's bodily actions are inalienable from him, he may not own the things he undertakes those actions on. Either way, were it not for those things, he wouldn't be able to undertake those actions in the first place.
What do you think constitute abandonment? Do you think there's an objective way to determine that? Also, I don't think it's a question of possession per se - if it was, then there'd be no talk about theft, vandalism, etc. Those things involve legitimacy. So the question to me is about legitimate possession, which is at least part of what I think makes up property/ownership. Finally, the notion that fact is more important than theory is itself a theory.
Papirius:There is another point of view, that says that renting is not ok because it is a product of the lack of (economic) freedom, namely- one would never rent from someone something he needs (maybe some people would rent in rare cases when they want, not need, to) in a free economy- because in free economy, with free banking, interest would fall near zero, and no one would rent stuff he needs when he could easily borrow money and buy it.
How do you think a free economy and free banking necessarily lead to interest falling near zero? Also, isn't borrowing a form of renting, namely renting of money?
Papirius:You homestead a piece of land and you have usufruct rights until you abandon it. No need to deciede anything.
Okay. That's different from what Proudhon says in that link you gave me, though. Again, what do you think constitutes abandonment?
Papirius:No need for it to be distributed. What you occupy-and-use without employing anyone, you have usufruct over that land.
What do you think constitutes occupation and use? For example, I own a house that's nearly 2,000 square feet "under air" (i.e. discounting the garage, porch(es), etc.). But at any given time, I occupy only a fraction of that square footage - if I occupy any of it at all. So I'm not sure whether you'd say I actually have usufruct over my entire house.
Papirius:I don't think it really matters so much whether we call it communal or unowned. Altough it does matter to Georgists.
Well, given what you describe above, it seems you don't see a need for a "community" to ultimately decide who gets which parts of the land. I'll just note again that this seems to disagree with Proudhon. That's fine by me though.
Papirius:Haven't really thought about that term ["community"] in a general way..
I'd appreciate it if you did so and got back to me.
Papirius: Which is irrelevant, because two people cannot themselves into slavery to each other.
Which is irrelevant, because two people cannot themselves into slavery to each other.
No, you are missing the point. The ethic of reciprocity is about reciprocal justice. It is based on retribution, not restitution. The vast majority of people would prefer restitution over retribution if possible, but the theory of justice (in terms of reciprocity) is based on retribution.
The NAP is the ethic of reciprocity but applied to the realm of law. "Do not aggress against others or their rightful property", or "Respect me and what is mine, and I will respect you and what's yours". If A doesn't respect B's home, then B won't respect A's home. If A burns down B's home, then B burns down A's home. If A does not respect the "voluntary" slave contracts of B, then B won't respect the "voluntary" slave contracts of A.
Whether or not A claims to own B is irrelevant. What is relevant is the reciprocal aspect of it. Most people would rather restitution than retribution, but (libertarian) justice is based on (either equal or double) retribution. You threaten the criminal with (equal or double) retribution, and you get him to pay restitution. Most people would prefer this. If a criminal burns down your house and all your possessions, would you rather see his house and possessions burned, or would you rather that he pay to restore your house and possessions? I imagine most people would choose the latter, but you threaten the criminal with retribution in order to receive restitution.
And now it is time to look at Clayton's claims about the origin of law, and how it might look in a decentralized society. Essentially, the parties to a dispute go to court in order to settle their dispute without further violence. If A murders B, the only reason A agrees to go to court with B's family is to avoid further violence. Very few murderers would go to court and then agree to their own execution. A murderer goes to court in order to pay off his victim's family.
So, what happens with a man who violates his "voluntary" slave contract? Well, he and his owner have a dispute. There are some options: the owner can drop the issue, the slave can agree to go back to being a slave, they can fight it out, or they can go to court. We are not interested in the first two options. Now, if they fight it out, the slave may end up winning and killing his master. The slave has more incentive to fight it out than the master, as the slave is fighting for his freedom. The master is fighting for what he considers a piece of property. He has more to lose.
So let's say they go to court. Well, the slave is never going to agree to becoming a slave again, as the whole point of going to court is so that he may not be a slave. So, whatever deal they come up with, we can be sure that the slave will be freed, even if he pays some sort of penalty.
Papirius: I thought it was prorperty rights. Everyone has property over his own body, his labor, and the products of his labor until he relinquishes them, or "tranfers the title".
I thought it was prorperty rights. Everyone has property over his own body, his labor, and the products of his labor until he relinquishes them, or "tranfers the title".
I really don't know what to make of this. You quoted the end of my post, so presumably you read the whole thing. So if you read the whole thing, you would see that the libertarian concept of property is derived from reciprocity. "Respect me and what is mine, and I'll respect you and what's yours." That is the positive form. The negative form is the NAP: "Do not aggress against others or their rightful property."
So, I guess all I can say to your response is, "Reread my post."
Papirius: If you say that slavery by selling oneself is illegitimate because force must to be used if the seller changes his mind and take back what he sold, then it follows that selling any product is illegitimate, because in those cases, too, force must be used if the seller would change his mind and take back what he sold.
If you say that slavery by selling oneself is illegitimate because force must to be used if the seller changes his mind and take back what he sold, then it follows that selling any product is illegitimate, because in those cases, too, force must be used if the seller would change his mind and take back what he sold.
Then it's a good thing that this is not my argument.
I'll respond by topics, quoting some people in the process.
"Voluntary" Slavery
First off, I think voluntary slavery is only a good term to facilitate the understanding of the possibility of a person wanting to act as a slave of someone else. In that case, said person would act just like a slave, but wouldn't be a slave, because slavery by definition is involuntary.
I do think that, given todays technology, the will is inalienable. This is a point that even the people advocating the legitimacy of voluntary slavery (Autolykos, Minarchist and Papirius) agree on, as I could perceive from their posts. The fact that the will is inalienable is easily empirically verifieable, so I won't even try to prove it. Now, let's imagine that Bob would like to be Alice's slave (I copied these names from Clayton, I hope he don't mind ;D ). So Alice creates a contract that stipulates that Bob will be her slave, forever, and Bob signs. I say this is not compatible with libertarianism, but not because the will is inalienable. As the guys I mentioned above pointed out, the fact that the will is inalienable doesn't impede Alice to remain control over Bob's body, even without his consent. The reason why voluntary slavery cannot be enforced through contract in a libertarian society, in my opinion, is because the moment Bob withdraw consent this violates the NAP. Simple as that. The moment that Bob stops consenting being a slave, Alice is now agressing against Bob's will. Is important to mention here that the will and the body are aspects of the same being. The will doesn't exist without the body, and the body without the will is either dead or in a vegetative state, both useless for being enslaved. So Alice would be agressing against Bob when he stops consenting, thus violating the very base of libertarianism, and even a contract could not violate the NAP in a free society. "But I want to be Alice's slave!", says Bob, furiously. Well, Bob can still be Alice's slave without signing a contract. He can be her slave for 50 years, but at the end of this 50 years, if Bob changes his mind, he can walk away as a free man, or he can continue to be her slave for one year more, until he dies, or whatever.
Again, no such contract in a libertarian society could be enforceable, not because the will is inalienable, but because it would violate the NAP, in the case the slave changes his mind.
Another argument that I have is that, obviously, humans are entirely different subjects than other objects. It starts here, see? Subjects and objects. I'll quote Minarchist:
I'll repeat this, since it didn't sink in: If you can own a car without having the ability to will it into motion, then you can own a human body without the ability to will it into motion. "Control" is not a requirement for ownership.
If you can own a car without having the ability to will it into motion, then you can own a human body without the ability to will it into motion.
"Control" is not a requirement for ownership.
The question is, can a car will itself into motion?
A car is entirely different from a living human being. Even inanimate objects are handled differently than others in the market, when it comes to the act of trade. Can you mortgage a bag of chips? No, even if you want to. But the majority of people who buy a house have to mortgage it. It is only natural then that a living human body, being a unique kind of property, is treated differently than other kinds of property. In the libertarian case, it is untradable due to the NAP.
In short: bag of chips=!car=!house=!body
Employment as ilegitimate
This one is to respond these quotes from Papirius:
Mowing the lawn for someone is a service, I have no objections to that.
and
When I do a service for you, I get money from you for the service in which I have put my labor into. But when I'm an employee of someone's and do a service for you, I don't get the money for the service in which I have put my labor into, my employer gets the money from you, and then he gives me a part of that money. The difference is very clear, when I do a service I get the full product of my labor, when I do a service as an employee, you don't give me money for my service, you give my boss the money, and I don't get the full product of my labor.
To begin with, being an employee is a voluntary action, so (in a libertarian society) it's legitimate. You can quit whenever you want to. But I want to analise this case a little further, so let's ignore the voluntarity of this action for the time being.
Mowing lawn is a service. Working for an employer is, too, a service. The real problem you are raising is when you mow lawn for someone you get the total money for the labor you've done. When you work for someone, you only recieve a part of it. In other words, the problem here is the amount of money. Now, consider these two cases:
1-Bob mows Alice's lawn with her manual, half-working lawn mower.
2-Bob mows Alice's lawn with her automatic lawn mower (those that look like a tractor).
The service provided is the same in both cases. The output is the same, the lawn is mowed. But in the first case, Bob is likely to earn more money than in the second case. Why is that? Does Alice in the second case is not paying the "total money" that Bob's labor is worth? No, it is because the means of production used were different. That leads me to this point: wage is directly correlated with the means of production, and with supply and demand. There's nothing written in a stone about what is the "total money" worth of this and that labor. It all depends on the factors I highlighted above, in other words, it all depends on market prices. Moreover, if Bob brought his own lawn mower to mow Alice's lawn, he would be paid more than in the examples above, because the means of production in the example above were Bob's labor (the reason why he is being paid. This is important to remember) and Alice's lawn mower. If Bob brought the lawn mower the means of production would be his own labor and lawn mower, thus, his reward would be higher.
To sum it all up, employment is voluntary. Just as "voluntary" slavery, employment would be legitimate in a libertarian society. But, just like anyone is free to quit his job if he wants, a voluntary slave could quit his enslavement if he wants.
You're awesome.
first of all, if someone can waive their legal status, as in becoming an outlaw, it stands to reason that they can be subject to conditions of slavery with no legal remedy. Prohibitions on slavery would have to be of the type of law as community ordinances, laws that predate an individuals residence in the community and are enforced based on their willingness to continue living there, meaning they require the consent of the governed.
secondly, alienable property is alienable because the subordinate claimholders can be physically separated from it. An attempt to gain unauthorized control would require aggression against property. But the will cannot be separated, so the previous claimholder cannot relinquish his physical control, meaning no aggression is required to re-establish physical control. Indeed, physical control never left that person's hands. In order to deny this person's claim we have to remove his legal standing, in effect refuse to recognize his existence. Well, the legal system was created to settle disputes without violence, by legally sanctioning slavery we have abandoned that goal in two ways. First, by refusing to recognize claims put forth by a supposed slave, we have forced that slave to choose between abandonment of his claim and violent pursuit of it. Secondly, we have turned our faces from the violence imposed by the owner upon the slave, since he "isnt a legal person" it doesnt really count. One wonders why we even have courts if we are going to allow one human being to legally beat another into submission.
in a vacuum, you may be right that rights are infinitely partitionable and always alienable, but that might lead to more disputes and even more violent disputes, that are more difficult to resolve. If I understand you correctly, and rights exist because we say they do because we want to live in a world where rights exist, then infinitely divisible/always alienable rights would lead to more violence and less wealth, at least in the near term (Imo).
I have avoided any statement as to the reification of contracts or our disagreement about their nature because I havent formed my response yet.
Labor is inalienable, too. Just as only I can control my body, only I can control my labor
Before continuing with the voluntary slavery discussion, I want to reply to the OP.
What is property?
Property is any thing (in the broadest sense of the term: res) which is owned.
What does it mean to own a thing?
To own a thing is to have the exclusive right to use that thing, and in any way, and at any time, that one pleases.
What kinds of things can be owned?
A thing can be owned if it is impossible for more than one person to use it at the same time. This applies to all physical things.
What about mental things (thoughts)?
Well, for it to be possible to have the right to use a thought, it must be possible to use a thought. What could it mean to "use" a thought? What can one do with a thought? Everything one can do with a thought falls under the name "having (i.e. thinking) the thought." To use a thought is simply to have it. So, if I sell you my thought, I sell you the right to have my thought.
We can consider thoughts in two ways.
(a) If two people have the same thought, we can say that one thought exists, which both people are having. In this case, an infinite number of people can have the same thought at the same time without any conflict, and thus thoughts cannot be property.
(b) If two people have "the same" thought, we can say that two thoughts exist; as even if they are perfect duplicates, they are distinct simply in virtue of the fact that two distinct people are having them. This I think is a better ontology (as the other ontology necessarily gives thoughts existence independently of anyone thinking them, which is absurd). What are its implications on the question of whether or not thoughts can be property?
I sell you the right to have my thought.
Since "my thought" is defined as "the thought I have," it is impossible for you to have it. If you have "my thought" you are having your thought. Any thought you have is your thought. This is not a technological problem: even if there were a device which allowed my thoughts to be "beamed" into your mind, "my thought" would still be your thought because you're the one having it.
Since only the thinker can have his thoughts, it is impossible for a dispute to arise over who will have his thoughts. Hence there is no need to assign property rights over his thoughts, as the only function of property rights is to prevent and/or resolve disputes over the use of things.
Thus, we see that a contract whereby I sell you my thought (i.e. the right to have my thought) is a contract whereby I sell you nothing, as no such right exists.
However, earlier we made this rule: "A thing can be owned if it is impossible for more than one person to use it at the same time." It is impossible for more than one person to use a thought at the same time - but we know from the argument above that thoughts cannot be property. Hence I propose this modification of our rule.
A thing can be owned if it is impossible for more than one person to use it at the same time, but possible for A to use it at time T and B to use it at time T+1.
Thoughts cannot be used by more than one person at one time, but nor can they be used first by A and then by B: i.e. they can only be used by the person having them, the thinker. They cannot be used by anyone else subsequently.
Note that all physical things do meet the requirements of the new rule.
Malachi:[I consider the right of B to not be hurt by A if he disobeys A] for a variety of reasons, likely stemming from difficulties with enforcement and my distaste at slavery, not mention my belief in human rights and my general opposition to violence. I'm going to try to address this in paragraph form, now that I have thought about it some, which means I'll be abandoning the quote/response format. Please let me know if you feel like I have missed something.
Will do. In the meantime, I'd like to take a look at the phrase "enforcing a contract". To me it means "exercising one's contractual rights, by force if necessary". What does it mean to you?
Just so you know, I share your distaste with slavery, but just because I find it distasteful doesn't mean I think it should be illegal. There are many other things that I find distasteful, such as drug addiction, foot fetishes, and black licorice, but I don't think those things should be illegal for that reason (if for any reason).
Malachi:[First] of all, if someone can waive their legal status, as in becoming an outlaw, it stands to reason that they can be subject to conditions of slavery with no legal remedy. Prohibitions on slavery would have to be of the type of law as community ordinances, laws that predate an individuals residence in the community and are enforced based on their willingness to continue living there, meaning they require the consent of the governed.
You bring up a good point about outlaws, in having alienated all of their rights, being subjectable to slavery without legal remedy. On the one hand, that also means they can be killed outright without legal remedy. On the other hand, I think that makes outlawry even more of a deterrent.
What are these "communities" you speak of? If an individual purchases land within a "community", does he then own it, or does the "community" somehow still own it (maybe without telling him)?
Malachi:[Secondly,] alienable property is alienable because the subordinate claimholders can be physically separated from it. An attempt to gain unauthorized control would require aggression against property. But the will cannot be separated, so the previous claimholder cannot relinquish his physical control, meaning no aggression is required to re-establish physical control. Indeed, physical control never left that person's hands. In order to deny this person's claim we have to remove his legal standing, in effect refuse to recognize his existence. Well, the legal system was created to settle disputes without violence, by legally sanctioning slavery we have abandoned that goal in two ways. First, by refusing to recognize claims put forth by a supposed slave, we have forced that slave to choose between abandonment of his claim and violent pursuit of it. Secondly, we have turned our faces from the violence imposed by the owner upon the slave, since he "isnt a legal person" it doesnt really count. One wonders why we even have courts if we are going to allow one human being to legally beat another into submission.
With all due respect, I think you're once again barking up the wrong tree with this. I have not asserted that the body is somehow alienable, and I don't believe that to be the case (at least not yet). As I see it, B alienating his right to not be hurt by A if he disobeys A (for example) in no way involves B alienating his body. He's simply alienating a right that he's considered to possess. His physical control of his body is irrelevant IMHO.
At this point, and in all honesty, I don't think legal systems originally arose to settle disputes without violence. I think they originally arose simply to settle disputes. Another way of putting this is that they arose to determine whose actions - past, present, and/or future - are to be considered legitimate. Note that this includes violent actions. I think the historical trend away from violent resolutions of disputes is a separate issue, one driven more by economic considerations (i.e. violence is more economically destructive than non-violence).
Finally, I think you're making quite a hasty generalization - to the point of setting up and attacking a strawman - by saying "[one] wonders why we even have courts if we are going to allow one human being to legally beat another into submission". You make it sound as though that sort of thing would be allowed all the time. I don't see how that follows at all from anything I've said.
Malachi:[In] a vacuum, you may be right that rights are infinitely partitionable and always alienable, but that might lead to more disputes and even more violent disputes, that are more difficult to resolve. If I understand you correctly, and rights exist because we say they do because we want to live in a world where rights exist, then infinitely divisible/always alienable rights would lead to more violence and less wealth, at least in the near term (Imo).
On what basis do you make this conclusion?
Malachi:I have avoided any statement as to the reification of contracts or our disagreement about their nature because I havent formed my response yet.
That's fine. I don't see how I'm reifying contracts, however.
@Michel
So Alice creates a contract that stipulates that Bob will be her slave, forever, and Bob signs. I say this is not compatible with libertarianism, but not because the will is inalienable. As the guys I mentioned above pointed out, the fact that the will is inalienable doesn't impede Alice to remain control over Bob's body, even without his consent. The reason why voluntary slavery cannot be enforced through contract in a libertarian society, in my opinion, is because the moment Bob withdraw consent this violates the NAP. Simple as that. The moment that Bob stops consenting being a slave, Alice is now agressing against Bob's will.
Aggression is defined as a violation of property rights.
The will is not property.
Thus it is impossible for Alice to aggress against Bob's will: in the same way that it would be impossible for her to aggress against Bob's opinions, attitudes, ideas, memories, soul, etc.
You quoted me saying:
If you can own a car without having the ability to will it into motion, then you can own a human body without the ability to will it into motion. "Control" is not a requirement for ownership.
You responded:
No, but a horse can. Substitute horse for car.
I'd like to take a look at the phrase "enforcing a contract". To me it means "exercising one's contractual rights, by force if necessary". What does it mean to you?
@Autolykos
As I see it, B alienating his right to not be hurt by A if he disobeys A (for example) in no way involves B alienating his body. He's simply alienating a right that he's considered to possess.
Would you agree with me that ownership = exclusive right to use?
If so, then isn't B's "right to not be hurt by A" just a part of B's ownership over his own body? That is, if B has an exclusive right to his body, then any harm which A does to B's body (to which B does not consent) is a property rights violation. One could say that the following rights follow from B's ownership over his own body:
B's right to not be hurt by A
B's right to not be hurt by C
B's right to not be hurt by D
....etc
You could specify every single way in which B's property rights in his own body could conceivably be violated and call that a right.
Is there some important implication of your claim that the VS contract trades a right in general rather than property right in particular?
What kind of (libertarian-recognized) right is there which is not a property right?
@Minarchist
Aggression is defined as a violation of property rights. The will is not property. Thus it is impossible for Alice to aggress against Bob's will: in the same way that it would be impossible for her to aggress against Bob's opinions, attitudes, ideas, memories, soul, etc.
But, you see, the will is part of the body. A human being is not just the body. I mean, he is, but he is a living body. If a human is not exercising his will, as I stated above, he is either dead or on a vegetative state.
That leads me to a thought. If Bob agrees to be Alice's slave by contract, he is giving himself completely to her. I mean, the two parts that make him a living being, the body and the will. The body is clearly material property, but the will itself is not, as you said. So he is giving property and non property in the same package to Alice. Since the will cannot be taken out of the body, and since contracts can only be over property titles, I guess that's why you can't have a voluntary slavery contract. You can only have contracts over "full" properties, not a mix of property and non property like a human being is. I'll make an analogy; let's say I capture a man on the street and lock him in a cage inside my house that is virtually impossible to open or break (this is impossible of course, but lets pretend for the sake of the analogy). Then I sell my house to you. Did the man became your property? In the analogy above, of course, the house is the body and the man caged is the will. I don't know if that's a good analogy, but that's what I could think about now. EDIT: [Thinking about it, I don't think that this is a perfect analogy because the caged man can't control de house, but I think that this makes the case against voluntary slavery stronger, rather than weaker.] What do you think?
Of course, that leads me to animals, and animals are an exception to this rule. Why? Well, I am not completely sure why, but I have so guesses (and there are topics and articles about that, like this and this (I didn't read them yet)). One thought that I have is: humans evolved eating meat, for example, and this is a natural process, and nature just is.
So we arrive at this:
You quoted me saying: If you can own a car without having the ability to will it into motion, then you can own a human body without the ability to will it into motion. "Control" is not a requirement for ownership. You responded: The question is, can a car will itself into motion? No, but a horse can. Substitute horse for car.
True. As I said above, humans and the rest of the animals are different from several reasons, but my argument was "if a car could will itself into motion", and a horse clearly can. I take that back.
@gotlucky
And Kinsella has pointed out that honoring a "voluntary" slave contract because it is a contract is question begging - assuming it is a valid contract because it is a valid contract.
I'm not suggesting that we honor the contract because it's a contract. I'm suggesting that we honor the property rights which the contract assigns: i.e. the master's ownership over the slave's body. It's a valid contract because it involves a voluntary exchange of property.
Enforcing a "voluntary" slave contract is not reciprocal. It is aggression. It violates the NAP.
Could you define what a (non)reciprocal contract is?
We must look at why contracts are considered valid, and they are valid only in that people respect them. And why do people respect them? Because of an expectation of reciprocity. But the only reciprocation in a "voluntary" slave contract is: If I don't respect your claim to own my body, then you won't respect my claim to own yours.
This doesn't make sense to me on several levels:
1) The underlined passage reads like you think the "If I...then you..." statement is somehow insufficient, like there's not "enough" reciprocity. Huh?
2) What does it mean for reciprocity to be "in" a VS contract? A contract is a transfer of title, period. I don't see how a contract transferring title can be insufficiently reciprocal (whatever that means), and therefore invalid.
3) Reciprocity, to my mind, is not "in" a contract: the principle of reciprocity is what (we hope) governs what happens in the event that one party ignores the property rights of the other (with or without any contract being involved: e.g. reciprocity also governs torts, as you know).
4) The "if I...then you..." statement you made sounds perfectly good to me, what's the problem? How is that deficient in some way, as you imply?
You can only have contracts over "full" properties, not a mix of property and non property like a human being is. Of course, that leads me to animals, and animals are an exception to this rule
You can only have contracts over "full" properties, not a mix of property and non property like a human being is.
Of course, that leads me to animals, and animals are an exception to this rule
Yes, if you go by the "no mixes" rule, then no animals can be owned, which is obviously an absurd conclusion. Hence, the rule is no good.
Minarchist:Would you agree with me that ownership = exclusive right to use?
I'm not sure. It seems to me that, by that definition, a person doesn't own a house if someone's renting it from him. This is why I think the "all rights are property rights" notion has caused confusion. Many people think the term "property" implies absolute ownership.
Minarchist:If so, then isn't B's "right to not be hurt by A" just a part of B's ownership over his own body? That is, if B has an exclusive right to his body, then any harm which A does to B's body (to which B does not consent) is a property rights violation. One could say that the following rights follow from B's ownership over his own body: B's right to not be hurt by A B's right to not be hurt by C B's right to not be hurt by D ....etc You could specify every single way in which B's property rights in his own body could conceivably be violated and call that a right.
If B alienates his right to not be hurt by A if he disobeys A, then there's no property-rights violation against B if he later disobeys A and A subsequently hurts him. One must presume that rights in one's body are inalienable.
Basically the idea is that, if you alienate a right to someone else, then you can't legitimately take it back whenever you want, because it no longer belongs to you. The person you alienated it to has to give it back to you.
Minarchist:Is there some important implication of your claim that the VS contract trades a right in general rather than property right in particular? What kind of (libertarian-recognized) right is there which is not a property right?
See the first part of this response. Otherwise, I think the key is that, since rights concern actions, and actions involve one or more physical objects, then rights are always over one or more physical objects. That doesn't mean any/all of those objects are absolute owned, however.
Malachi:that definition seems satisfactory to me.
Okay. So going with that definition, it's impossible to literally enforce obedience, because a person can't exercise his will directly against another person's will.
Malachi:a community is a society or culture confined to a specific geographic region that defines and enforces certain norms. A libertarian community wouldnt try to sneak anything in one someone without them knowing it, but they might prohibit certain behaviors/activities such as slavery or domestic violence or polyamory. A legal fiction such as a municipality is the most formal type of community, these are basically city-states under a hegemony. Other communitities like in rural appalachia are less formal but they do the same things, like enforce norms.
If a person owns land within such a community, and let's say he's practicing polyamory on his land, do you think the community can legitimately kick him off of his own land? If so, then how is that different from the state? If not, then how can the community actually prohibit such an activity within its territory?
Malachi:ok, I see what you are saying here
Okay good.
Malachi:this may be a historical consideration that has little bearing to me because I, personally, consider dispute resolution to be a means of reducing viokence and increasing cooperation in a social system. Perhaps I cannot get outside myself to see why else we would want to settle disputes without violence, except that our aim is to settle disputes without violence.
Well, like I said, violence is simply more economically destructive than non-violence. Take the ultimate expression of violence among humans - warfare. Even the winning side in a war loses overall in economic terms.
Malachi:because if people can sign away rights that the lack of would preclude their seeking of legal remedy, then they will seek violent remedy, whereas if those rights couldnt be legally signed away they could seek legal remedy. And we both agree that violence tends to destroy wealth.
Not only would their remedy be violent, it would be aggressive, as they're trying to exercise rights that they're no longer considered to possess. This is why I think that it would probably be very rare for people to willingly put themselves into conditions of indefinite servitude, if it would happen at all (in spite of it being legal to do so).
To try to answer the OP's original question, property is a behavior. It is a way that an animal behaves with regard to other animals or objects in the world. Furthermore, anything can be considerred property (someone or something can act like they own something) so long as they have the ability to enforce it.
For example, we are all owned by the government because at a whim, they can force or compel us to do anything, even die.
Whether you agree that IP SHOULD exist or not, IP is real property not neccesarily in any objective sense, but simply because there stands an army ready to enforce it.
Minarchist: I'm not suggesting that we honor the contract because it's a contract. I'm suggesting that we honor the property rights which the contract assigns: i.e. the master's ownership over the slave's body. It's a valid contract because it involves a voluntary exchange of property.
There may be a voluntary exchange at first, but the question is whether or not this is still compatible with the NAP and reciprocity. We cannot assume that it is compatible just because there was an exchange.
Minarchist: Could you define what a (non)reciprocal contract is?
The point I'm making about reciprocity is that it is the foundation of (NAP) libertarianism. If I poke out your eye, reciprocal justice is that you poke mine out. Of course, most people would prefer restitution over retribution in most cases, but reciprocal and retributive justice is the foundation for restitution.
Anyway, if I poke out your eye, reciprocal justice is that you poke mine out. If I don't respect your claim to your house, reciprocal justice is that you don't respect my claim in the same way. For example, if I burn your house down, reciprocal justice is that you burn mine down.
When we apply reciprocal justice to "voluntary" slave contracts, we have, "If I don't respect your claim to own me, reciprocal justice is that you don't respect my own to own you." But, as Papirius has pointed out, I'm not claiming to own you, you are the only one claiming to own someone. "Voluntary" slave contracts cannot be enforced in the way we have been talking about in these threads, which is forcing the slave to go back to the owner, as this is not reciprocal justice. It is jumping straight to restitution, which is not reciprocal justice.
Minarchist: 1) The underlined passage reads like you think the "If I...then you..." statement is somehow insufficient, like there's not "enough" reciprocity. Huh?
Minarchist: 2) What does it mean for reciprocity to be "in" a VS contract? A contract is a transfer of title, period. I don't see how a contract transferring title can be insufficiently reciprocal (whatever that means), and therefore invalid.
The non-aggression axiom is the lynchpin of the philosophy of libertarianism. It states, simply, that it shall be legal for anyone to do anything he wants, provided only that he not initiate (or threaten) violence against the person or legitimately owned property of another. [Emphasis added]
The non-aggression axiom is the lynchpin of the philosophy of libertarianism. It states, simply, that it shall be legal for anyone to do anything he wants, provided only that he not initiate (or threaten) violence against the person or legitimately owned property of another.
Minarchist: 3) Reciprocity, to my mind, is not "in" a contract: the principle of reciprocity is what (we hope) governs what happens in the event that one party ignores the property rights of the other (with or without any contract being involved: e.g. reciprocity also governs torts, as you know).
Minarchist: 4) The "if I...then you..." statement you made sounds perfectly good to me, what's the problem? How is that deficient in some way, as you imply?
Bump. This thread was on a roll for a while...
I agree that its impossible to enforce obedience, obedience can only be coerced or voluntarily performed.
I agree that violence destroys wealth, while catallacty creates it. This is why I believe that nonviolent dispute resolution was invented.
Not only would their remedy be violent, it would be aggressive, as they're trying to exercise rights that they're no longer considered to possess.
it took me a while to respond, because I was thinking. Now I think I am an egalitarian before I am a propertarian.
Two degrees of ownership:
To have unlimited ownership of X is to have the exclusive right to use X in any way one pleases.
To have limited ownership of X is to have the exclusive right to use X in certain ways only.
Suppose that A "owns" a house, but B rents that house from A.
A and B both have only limited ownership, with the limits for each of them defined by the rental agreement. B's ownership in the house may be limited either temporally (as, for example, in the case of a lease with a fixed expiration-date), or in some other respect (as, for example, with rules preventing B from changing the appearance of the exterior of the house).
If B alienates his right to not be hurt by A if he disobeys A, then there's no property-rights violation against B if he later disobeys A and A subsequently hurts him.
Agreed. To put this in the language of property rights, either:
(1) B gives to A limited ownership over B's body; in other words, A has acquired the exclusive right to use B's body in a particular way (as opposed to: in any way he pleases). In what way is A entitled to use B's body? In the way you described: i.e. if B disobeys A, then A may inflict harm on B's body. That is the only right which A has acquired: the right to use B's body within these limits.
(2) B gives A unlimited ownership over B's body; in other words, A has acquired the exclusive right to use B's body in any way he pleases. If this has occurred, A may still inflict harm on B's body if B disobeys, but he may also inflict harm on B at any time he likes, or do anything else to/with B's body that he pleases - hence his right to use B's body is unlimited.
Agreed.
since rights concern actions, and actions involve one or more physical objects, then rights are always over one or more physical objects. That doesn't mean any/all of those objects are absolute owned, however.
Certainly.
If a VS contract affects an exchange of property, such that B acquires ownership over the body of A, and if we agree that a property owner has the right to do as he pleases with his property, then it necessarily follows that B can do whatever he likes with A's body. I assume we are in agreement that a property owner can do whatever he likes with his own property? So our only disagreement is about whether or not a VS contract affects an exchange of property such that A's body becomes B's property.
If you argue that no such exchange was affected through the VS contract, that A's body did not become B's property, because the enforcement of the contract requires aggression, you are simply begging the question: i.e. enforcement of the contract only requires aggression if you already assume that A's body is not B's property (as, if it were, nothing B does to A's body could be aggression), but it is that very assumption which you are trying to prove. It is a circular argument.
A VS slavery contract is invalid because its enforcement would require aggression.
And that which its enforcement requires (for example, B whipping A's body) is aggression because the VS contract was invalid.
...circular.
"Voluntary" slave contracts cannot be enforced in the way we have been talking about in these threads, which is forcing the slave to go back to the owner, as this is not reciprocal justice.
The slave runs away from the master i.e. the slave steals the master's property). The master has the right to retake his own property (the slave). This as of yet has nothing to do with the doctrine of reciprocation. The master's right to retake his slave derives from the fundamental right of property owners to exclude others from the use of their property. It is his slave, the slave running away did not change that. This is only the first tooth in Rothbard's "two teeth for a tooth" dictum. At the point where the master retakes possession of the slave, he has only taken one tooth: i.e. retaken his rightful property. He is yet to take the second tooth, and the second tooth is where the doctrine of reciprocation enters into the equation.
And that doctrine states that the victim has the right to violates the property rights of the aggressor to the same extent that the aggressor violates the property rights of the victim. To take this literally, would mean that the master has the right to steal a slave belonging to the slave (which is what the slave did to the master: i.e. steal his slave). Assuming the slave has no slaves of his own, this is impossible - but so what? If you steal my car, I take the first tooth by retaking my car. But suppose you don't have a car: well then I cannot literally violate your property rights to the extent you violated mine, I can't take your car because you don't have one, I can't take the second tooth. So what happens? We look for an equivalence. That is, we look for some piece of property of yours which is equivalent in value to my car, and I have the right to appropriate that.
So the master has taken the first tooth (retaken the slave), and now has the right to take a second tooth: i.e. take from the slave a piece of property equivalent to a slave. Presumably the slave has no property at all, in which case the master must resort (like any other victim of a tort) to enslaving the tortfeasor to work off the debt (say, market value for a slave). Obviously, the tortfeasor is already the slave of the master, and so the master cannot very well enslave him again. But, again, so what? That's tough luck for the master. He is entitled to take compensation, but if it is impossible to do so, oh well. There are other cases where this might occur. If you steal my car, and then die without heirs or property, I can take the first tooth (retake my car), but I have no possible way of extracting the second tooth from you: ah well, tough luck for me.
It is jumping straight to restitution, which is not reciprocal justice
But reciprocation is not always possible, and in many many cases other than voluntary slavery. Again, if you steal my car, and you have no car, then strict reciprocation is impossible. Does it follow that I have no right to anything? No, of course not. If I cannot violate your property rights in exactly the same way as you violated mine, then I am entitled to violate your property rights in some roughly equivalent fashion.
Re contracts in general:
There are not contract rights and property rights. There are just property rights. Contracts are just indications that transfers of property have occurred..
A and B make an agreement (whether verbally, implicitly, or by contract makes no difference except when it comes to proving something in the event of a dispute) whereby A will transfer ownership of $100 to B if B transfers ownership of a bike to A, and B will transfer ownership of the bike to A if A transfers to B ownership of the $100. Each transfer of property is conditional on the other. Suppose A gives B the $100, but B fails to give A the bike. What happens? Firstly, talking about "enforcing the contract" is confusing. You aren't really enforcing the contract, you are simply enforcing property rights. Since A giving the $100 to B was conditional on B giving the bike to A, and since B did not give the bike to A, then the $100 (though in B's possession) is still A's property. In other words, what has happened as a result of B failing to meet his obligation is that no transfer of property has taken place. Neither A nor B has any new rights/obligations through the contract, they simply have the property rights they started out with. the attempt to reassign property rights through the contract failed, because the conditions for the exchange were not met. So A has the right to his $100. If B possesses that $100, A has the right to take in back from him, by force if necessary. If B were to resist, then he would be guilty of theft, and A would gain additional rights as the victim of that very tort. But supposing B gives A back the money without delay, then no tort has been committed, no aggression has occurred, all that happened was that an exchange of property was attempted but failed.
Now, let's take you insult example.
Suppose we make an agreement where I promise not to insult you and you promise not to insult me. That alone is nothing but a set of promises, no property has changed hands. However, we could achieve the desired result if we changed the nature of the agreement. Suppose we agree that I will pay you $1000 today, and you will pay me $10k if/when you insult me at any time in the future. Now an exchange of property has taken place. You have become the new owner of $1000 right now, and I will become the owner of $10k of yours if/when the condition we established for that transfer of ownership is met. So what happens if you do insult me a few years after we made this property exchange? Well, now the $10k of your property becomes my property. I demand it from you, maybe you hand it over. If you don't, I have the right to take it from you (it is my property) by force if necessary. And if you withhold it from me, you are guilty of theft.
If a VS contract affects an exchange of property, such that B acquires ownership over the body of A, and if we agree that a property owner has the right to do as he pleases with his property, then it necessarily follows that B can do whatever he likes with A's body. I assume we are in agreement that a property owner can do whatever he likes with his own property? So our only disagreement is about whether or not a VS contract affects an exchange of property such that A's body becomes B's property. If you argue that no such exchange was affected through the VS contract, that A's body did not become B's property, because the enforcement of the contract requires aggression, you are simply begging the question: i.e. enforcement of the contract only requires aggression if you already assume that A's body is not B's property (as, if it were, nothing B does to A's body could be aggression), but it is that very assumption which you are trying to prove. It is a circular argument. A VS slavery contract is invalid because its enforcement would require aggression. And that which its enforcement requires (for example, B whipping A's body) is aggression because the VS contract was invalid. ...circular.
I'll explain it differently, as most of our points have totally missed the main issue. In my previous post, I pointed to the various definitions of the NAP, all of which include prohibiting agression to the person as well as to rightful property. Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that A legitimately sold his body to B, if B uses violence against A, he is initiating violence against A. This does not change just because we are using the phrase "A is B's rightful property". B is still initiating the use of violence against A's person.
And to make it really clear, let's pretend that A follows B's instructions to the letter, so we cannot even claim that A is somehow denying B his property by taking a nap when he is not allowed to. He always follows B's instructions exactly. So, when B hits A, he is most definitely initiating violence against A's person. After all, it's not like A took a break when not allowed and "stole" B's property.
Now let's make it less clear. B orders A to shovel snow, and A refuses and just stands in place. What can B do? Can B torture or execute A? Well, this defies proportionality competely. Remember the bubblegum thief? The shopkeeper can't just shoot the thief, as the aggression done by the shopkeeper would greatly dwarf the aggression done by the bubblegum thief. So, in the case of slave owner B coercing A, if he uses more aggression than A, then he is the aggressor.
But this is totally silly in terms of slavery. Suddenly there must be all these rules that the slave owner must follow regarding his property. Furthermore, what level of violence would B be allowed before he would be aggressing against A? If A refuses to work, virtually any amount of violence against him would be aggression. In the case of the bubblegum thief, the shopkeeper can use just enough coercion to keep the thief there and return the property. In other words, he can lock the door, stand in front of the door, basically just prevent the bubblegum thief from leaving. Maybe he can physically restrain the bubblegum thief in order to get his property back.
In short, even if we assumed that a person could be another's rightful property, using violence against the person would still constitute aggression and thus violate the NAP.
Retaking the slave is aggression in the same way that shooting the bubblegum thief is aggression. Beating the bubblegum thief is aggression too. So is stabbing him, kicking him, slapping him, etc. What the shopkeeper can do is prevent the thief from leaving the premises. He can wait the thief out. If the thief tries to force his way out, the shopkeeper can respond with appropriate force. The important thing is that the bubblegum thief has aggressed so little against the shopkeeper that virtually any violence against the thief would constitute aggression. Unless, of course, the thief starts using violence against the shopkeeper or the property in the store.
Using any amount of force against the slave in order to reclaim him, that is aggression.
Regarding equivalence, I agree with you. If there is an exact equivalence, we must go with that, but otherwise we must go with something similar. But just because we say the words "A is a slave of B" does not mean that somehow B may now initiate violence against A's person whenever he wants. Aggression is aggression.
And this is where the history of the NAP is quite useful. In my previous post, I mentioned the wikipedia article on the NAP. I have never edited that article, and what's interesting to note is that the NAP can be traced the golden rule. So I am not the only person making this connection. Anyway, one of the most interesting things you will note about the golden rule is that it is always about respecting someone's person. Maybe someone had previously added in property as well. Maybe. From what I've seen, the only people who have added in property were people like Rothbard, Block, and Rand.
There has always been an importance on the person more than property, and while that does not mean that you must also place a similar importance, I should remind you that most people typically consider violence to the person to be worse than violence to external property. Nevermind the fact that external property cannot exist without respecting individuals in the first place.
Feel free to respond, but I'm not sure I will, as I don't have much else to say. We have mostly been just repeating things we have said for a while. Obviously, you don't consider beating or executing a slave to be aggression, and your reasons thus far have been because the slave is the rightful property of the slave owner. But this completely neglects the first and most important part of the NAP/golden rule: Don't aggress against someone's person. Life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe. Interestingly, in the wiki article on Eye for an eye:
Social hierarchy and reciprocal justice In Exodus 21, as in the Code of Hammurabi, the concept of reciprocal justice was only meant to apply to social equals. In Ex 21:23-25 lies the statement of reciprocal justice "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe" and then following it an example of a different law. If a slave-owner blinds the eye or knocks out the tooth of a slave, the slave is freed but the owner does not pay any other consequence. However, in Leviticus, the reciprocal justice is meant to apply across social boundaries. The "eye for eye" principle is directly followed by the proclamation "You are to have one law for the alien and the citizen." (Lev 24:19-22) This shows a much more meaningful principle for social justice, in that the marginalized in society were given the same rights under the social structure. In this context, the reciprocal justice in an ideal functioning setting, according to Michael Coogan, "to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands and exacting disproportionate vengeance for offenses committed against them."
In Exodus 21, as in the Code of Hammurabi, the concept of reciprocal justice was only meant to apply to social equals. In Ex 21:23-25 lies the statement of reciprocal justice "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe" and then following it an example of a different law. If a slave-owner blinds the eye or knocks out the tooth of a slave, the slave is freed but the owner does not pay any other consequence.
However, in Leviticus, the reciprocal justice is meant to apply across social boundaries. The "eye for eye" principle is directly followed by the proclamation "You are to have one law for the alien and the citizen." (Lev 24:19-22) This shows a much more meaningful principle for social justice, in that the marginalized in society were given the same rights under the social structure. In this context, the reciprocal justice in an ideal functioning setting, according to Michael Coogan, "to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands and exacting disproportionate vengeance for offenses committed against them."
Note that if the slave owner seriously injures his slave, the slave goes free. Just because historically the golden rule has been interpreted this way doesn't make it right. But I hope you pause to consider that the emphasis has always been on injuries to the person first, before any consideration of damage to external property.
Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that A legitimately sold his body to B, if B uses violence against A, he is initiating violence against A.
I'm trying to understand what you mean here.
As you accepted for the sake of argument the premise that A's body is the property of B, you cannot be claiming that B's violence against A is aggression because it is a violation of A's property rights in his own body: you admit he has none. You can only be saying that B's violence against A is aggression because the has literally initiated violence, i.e. A did not use violence against the person of B, but B used violence against the person of A. But if we extrapolate from this concept of aggression that you have put forth, unacceptable results follow.
For example, suppose you stole my car in the middle of the night, and did not use violence against my person. I discover what you did, and use violence against your person to retrieve my stolen property. I have literally initiated violence (used violence against you when you did not use violence against me), and so by you reasoning, I am an aggressor. The flaw is this analysis is that it ignores the question of whether or not I had a right to initiate violence. And I did have such a right, because the car is my property, and as its owner I have a right to forcibly exclude others from its unauthorized use: that is the very essence of what it means to own property.
Aggression is not the "initiation of violence" in the sense you mean. Aggression is the violation of property rights.
There are two possibilities here:
On the one hand, A may have obligated himself to performing certain services for B, but he is not a chattel slave. In this case, B can only justly use violence against A in order to compel A to perform those services. More precisely, B is has limited and conditional ownership in A's body. B has the right to use A's body, but only to make it perform the service in question, and only on the condition that A fails to perform that service at the time or in the manner that he agreed he would.
On the other hand, A may have sold himself to B (i.e. B has unlimited and unconditional ownership over A's body), in which case B is within his rights as owner of A's body to do whatever he pleases with it, and the question of whether or not A is obeying B is irrelevant.
B orders A to shovel snow, and A refuses and just stands in place. What can B do?
See above.
Well, this defies proportionality competely. Remember the bubblegum thief? The shopkeeper can't just shoot the thief, as the aggression done by the shopkeeper would greatly dwarf the aggression done by the bubblegum thief.
If A's body is the property of B, then nothing B might do to A's body is a tort. Whatever B does is just B exercising his property rights.
Or if B has only limited and conditional ownership in A's body (A has obligated himself to perform some service for B), then B is within his rights to use force against A, but only so much as is necessary to compel A to perform the service. Again, B is simply exercising his property rights, no tort is involved as of yet. Now, you could argue that if A resists B's attempt to use his body to perform the service (i.e. force him to perform the service), then A is violating B's property rights, and that is a tort. But this is a separate issue. Whatever rights B may acquire as a consequence of this tort committed by A are something over and above B's right to exercise his property right in A's body in the first place.
Retaking the slave is aggression in the same way that shooting the bubblegum thief is aggression
The victim of the bubblegum thief first has the right to retrieve his stolen property, by force if necessary. This is the first tooth. He then has a right to proportional retribution: taking something equivalent to the bubblegum from the thief. This is the second tooth.
The master first has the right to retrieve his stolen property. This is the first tooth. He then has a right to proportional retribution: taking something from the thief equivalent to the stolen slave. This is the second tooth.
The victim of the tort may use whatever amount of force is necessary to retrieve the first tooth, no proportionality is operative here. If when the victim of the bubblegum thief comes to get back his stolen bubblegum, the thief puts up a violence resistance, the victim can use any amount of violence necessary to win the contest, up to and including killing the thief if that's the only way to retrieve his stolen property. This is just because it's entirely up to the thief. The same with, for example, trespassing. I do not have a right to kill you because you trespassed. But I do have a right to remove you from my property by force: what amount of force is required to do that is entirely up to you. The same with a master retrieving his stolen slave.
Proportionality comes into play only with respect to the second tooth. The victim acquires new property equivalent to that of which he was deprived by the tortfeasor. Put another way, proportionality concerns the exchange of property caused by a tort, proportionality does not limit how much force any any property owner can use to exclude others from using his property (remove a trespasser, retake possession of stolen property, etc).
I should remind you that most people typically consider violence to the person to be worse than violence to external property.
Libertarians are not against violence. We are against aggression. Violence toward the person is not necessarily aggression toward the person.
Obviously, you don't consider beating or executing a slave to be aggression, and your reasons thus far have been because the slave is the rightful property of the slave owner. But this completely neglects the first and most important part of the NAP/golden rule: Don't aggress against someone's person
See above,
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I am not talking about A's "property rights in his own body". I am talking about actual violence or the threat thereof to his actual body. Note how the NAP, whether it is Rothbard, Block, or one of its golden rule incarnations, is about the person, not the property in the person. It is not, "Thou shalt not aggress against a person's property rights in himself or his external just property". It is, "Do not aggress against a person or his just property". You can read my previous posts for how Rothbard and Block actually put it, but they never say "property in the person" when they state the NAP.
So, when B beats A, there is a contradiction. On the one hand, A is his rightful property, so he may do what he wishes, but on the other hand, in order to beat A, he must aggress against A's person. It is a contradiction. The only way around this is for you to start redefining the NAP. But then it's not the NAP, at least not one that I am familiar with.
Let's look at the bubblegum example one more time before looking at this one. In the case of the bubblegum thief, bubblegum can fit in his pocket. Now, the thing is, you are entitled to retrieve your just property, but they problem is that you cannot aggress against other people in order to do this, even if it is the thief. This does not mean that you cannot use force/coercion/violence against the thief, it just means that you must use proportionate force. The problem is that the thief has done very little to you, so it is very easy to go beyond proportion.
So, like I said before, you can always wait the thief out. After all, you can legitimately block him from leaving. And he has to sleep eventually. When he collapses from exhaustion, take the bubblegum out of his pocket. Now, I can almost guarantee you that the thief will return the damn bubblegum long before this, as being trapped in the store for hours really isn't worth the trouble.
Now, I might be willing to say that you could tackle and restrain the thief in order to regain your property. I am slightly hesitant, only because it is very easy for people to start saying that they can just beat up someone. But, if the shopkeeper could tackle the thief and restrain him without much damage to the bubblegum thief, then I could get behind this.
Now let's look at the car thief. Well, you may retrieve your car from the thief, I agree with that. But what can you do in order to do this? Can you burn his house down? That does not seem to be proportionate. Can you break his garage door down? Well, that seems to be far more proportionate to what he has done to you. And there is the added bonus that it is directly related to the purpose of regaining the stolen car. But what about violence to the thief's person? Well, I only agree to the amount necessary to regaining the bubblegum. The problem is defining "necessary".
In the case of the bubblegum thief, you could just shoot him and be done with it. But I don't agree that this would be necessary, unless the thief has escalated the situation to deadly force. And I see it as the same way in the example of the car thief. If you have broken down his garage door and gotten into your car, what do you do if he is standing in front of the car so as to prevent you from leaving? Well, if he isn't threatening you (e.g. pointing a gun at you), then you probably shouldn't be able to drive over him. That does not seem proportionate. You could probably get out of the car and shove him aside, and then get back in and drive off. But what if he has a knife? Sure, while you are in the car it isn't a problem, but if you were to get out of the car, it becomes a very real problem. Well, in this case I'd say you could drive over him, and then even sue him for damages to the car.
But look, all of this is just becoming speculation as to what is necessary, what is proportionate, etc. It is all very interesting, but it is rather silly. The fact of the matter is that we don't really know what is proportionate or necessary for most disputes. We can have general rules that guide us. But in the end, the people involved in the dispute are the ones who must settle it. There is a difference between what we might consider to be proper libertarian law and what might actually occur in a decentralized system of law. One person might say that violence is never an option, and another might say that shooting thieves is legitimate. But in the end, third party opinions matter very little in a decentralized system of law.
Back to the topic at hand. The problem is, even if you could say that the slave owner may retrieve his slave with the minimum violence/force/coercion necessary, the problem is that at the same time he must also aggress against the slave. It is a contradiction. You cannot wish it away by saying that so long as the slave is legitimately owned, the owner can never actually aggress against his slave's person. It's pretty obvious that it is aggression. After all, the slave owner must initiate violence against the slave's body. Not his "property right in his body". His actual body. His living, breathing body.
Well feel free to define aggression however you want. But if we are going to talk about aggression in the context of the NAP, then we really ought to go by the definition of aggression that is stated in the NAP. In a previous post, I actually quoted both Rothbard and Block, and those are the two most common understandings of the NAP. I will quote them one more time.
First, Block:
Second, Rothbard:
WE MAY DEFINE ANYONE who aggresses against the person or other produced property of another as a criminal. A criminal is anyone who initiates violence against another man and his property: anyone who uses the coercive “political means” for the acquisition of goods and services. [Emphasis added]
Both Rothbard and Block define aggression as "the initiation of violence (or the threat thereof) against another man and/or his property". They do not define it as "violating property rights". Now, Rothbard and Block reached different conclusions on occassion (VS for instance), but they both define initiating violence against another person as aggression. Neither mention property in the person for the purpose of the NAP.
This can only be true if you do not use the NAP as your premise. After all, we are not talking about whether or not beating a "rightfully" owned slave is a tort. As long as you take the standard definition of the NAP as your premise, you will have a contradiction if you beat your "rightfully" owned slave (against his will).
Well, I disagree with that. You may only use the amount of violence necessary and no more. If the thief escalates the situation to Mortal Kombat (FINISH HIM), then you may kill the thief. But just because the thief runs faster than you and can run circles around you until you puke does not give you the right to execute him. Now, sure, this might mean that you go without your property, but just because you might go without your bubblegum doesn't give you the right to execute people.
This is true, but it is not really what I am getting at. The point is that if a thief beats you and takes your wallet, we typically think that the crime of beating you up is somehow worse than the crime of stealing your wallet. Or, if a thief steals your bubblegum, that you beating him up is actually worse than what he has done to you. This tends to be the case most of the time. There may be some outliers, but I never claimed it was 100% true all the time.
Well, insert the NAP definition of aggression, and you get, "Thou shalt not initiate violence or the threat thereof against someone's person."
Again, that violence against the body is agression is not axiomatic. Violence against the body is aggression only if it is a violation of property rights.
So, when B beats A, there is a contradiction. On the one hand, A is his rightful property, so he may do what he wishes, but on the other hand, in order to beat A, he must aggress against A's person.
No, he must use violence against A's person. Violence is not necessarily aggression. If you disagree, then explain why self-defense is not aggression, and why killing a murderer is not aggression, as both of them involve violence?
This does not mean that you cannot use force/coercion/violence against the thief, it just means that you must use proportionate force. The problem is that the thief has done very little to you, so it is very easy to go beyond proportion.
No, you do not have to use proportional force. You may use whatever amount of force is necessary to retrieve your stolen property. I repeat, whatever amount of force is necessary, and what is necessary is determined by the thief himself (will he give it up or will he fight for it). Proportionality has nothing to do with retrieving stolen property, or otherwise exercising property rights. Proportionality only concerns retribution. That is, the victim may violate the property rights of the tortfeasor the same extent that his own property right were violated by the tortfeasor.
Now let's look at the car thief. Well, you may retrieve your car from the thief, I agree with that. But what can you do in order to do this? Can you burn his house down? That does not seem to be proportionate.
Again, proportionality has nothing to do with it, as we are not talking about retribution.
Well, I only agree to the amount necessary to regaining the bubblegum. The problem is defining "necessary".
I don't really see it as a problem. Consider something analogous:
If I point a gun to your head, and pull the trigger, am I the cause of your death? Or is the bullet the cause of your death, or is the man who gave me the gun the cause of your death? A common standard for determining who is the cause is the following: an action is considered the cause of an event if and only if the action was a necessary condition for that event to occur, and if the actor knew or reasonably should have known that it would in fact cause that event.
What does it mean that he "reasonably should have known"? How do we define reasonable? It's normative, pure and simple. It's up to the people making the decision, the arbitrator or the judge. There's no cleat way, nor any need, to try to define "reasonable" a priori - the same with "necessary." The judge will decide whether or not the use of force in question seemed excessive, or only what was necessary.
Of course there's another analogy to self-defense.
The problem is, even if you could say that the slave owner may retrieve his slave with the minimum violence/force/coercion necessary, the problem is that at the same time he must also aggress against the slave.
A master can no more aggress against his slave than can the owner of a horse aggress against his horse. The situation of a master retaking his slave is quite different from the case of someone retrieving a stolen car, as in the latter case, the person must be careful of not unnecessarily violating the rights of the thief, but in the former case, there is no other person at all - as with recovering a horse.
It's pretty obvious that it is aggression.
I fail to see how that's so obvious.
After all, the slave owner must initiate violence against the slave's body. Not his "property right in his body". His actual body. His living, breathing body.
Violence is only aggression if it is a violation of property rights.
Appeal to authority fallacy.
First, Block: The non-aggression axiom is the lynchpin of the philosophy of libertarianism. It states, simply, that it shall be legal for anyone to do anything he wants, provided only that he not initiate (or threaten) violence against the person or legitimately owned property of another. [Emphasis added]
Block views the body ("person" in the statement above) as property like any other. Block shares my view, or I share his, on voluntary slavery.
https://mises.org/journals/jls/17_2/17_2_3.pdf
And so it follows, "thou shalt not kill a murderer, since to do so involves an initiation of violence."
And I mean,
violence against the...body. Not his "property right in his body". His actual body. His living, breathing body.
So why is it that killing a murderer (or taking violent retribution of any kind) is just? Could it be...because whether violence is just or not depends entirely on whether or not it involves a violation of property rights?
As a general point, I would also say that the NAP is not the basis of libertarian ethics. The concept of property is the basis of libertarian ethics, and is presupposed by the NAP. It makes no sense to talk about aggression prior to a concept of property.