In the last few days, David Gordon wrote a review of Molyneux's book, Molyneux responded, and then Gordon responded. This can all be found posted or linked in Mises Daily Articles.
What I've gathered from the back and forth between Molyneux and Gordon is that M.'s book is trying to set out ethical rules which everyone could adhere to simultaneously. In other words, ethics which are universalizable without contradiction. For example, "though shalt rape" is not such a rule, because for one to rape, another must resist rape (if he/she doesn't resist, then by definition it isn't rape), and so one person following the rule necessarily means that another person must not follow the rule. Note universalizable.
It's easy to see how this kind of thinking leads to libertarian ethics, as the NAP is universalizable.
Here's my question/criticism: how do you go from "these rules are universally applicable at the same time" to "these rules are objectively true?"
It is true that "thou shalt rape" cannot be universally adopted at the same time, but how does that demonstrate that "thou shalt not rape" is an objectively valid ethical claim (or the inverse)?
Suppose A wants to rape B. B says, "but you know that "thou shalt rape" is not a universally applicable ethical rule?" And A says, "so what? What do I care if other's can't adopt this rule at the same time I do? Why shouldn't I rape?"
...if M.'s point was to show that only libertarian ethics (the ethics of non-aggression) are truly universalizable, then that is an excellent point worth making. If he wanted to show that those ethics are objectively valid, then he failed - and I know this even without reading what he wrote. Objective ethics are impossible in principle.
For example, "though shalt rape" is not such a rule, because for one to rape, another must resist rape (if he/she doesn't resist, then by definition it isn't rape), and so one person following the rule necessarily means that another person must not follow the rule. Note universalizable.
Gordon notes in his article that this need not be the case because the rape victim can be asleep or unconscious, eliminating the need for one individual to actively resist another's unwelcome sexual advances.
I don't believe that you can, or at least I've never seen it done. The is-ought problem applies to Molyneux's argument just as it does to any purportedly objective system of morals.
I suppose it depends on whether you consider "not giving consent" as equivalent to "resisting." If so, then sleep is not a special case. If not, well then lock your bedroom door! : )
Is appears at the Metaphysical layer, Ought appears at the Epistemological layer, and the Epistemological layer is an emergent system that arises out of the Metaphysical layer. Having intentionality (human action for example) gives rise to should/shouldn't, the normative. The results of such judgments(the ought) play out and are themselves judged by reality (the is). I think attempting to bridge that gap is an artifact of a desire for power. Which in the end is what we all want. I want my ends to be reached with certainty, instead of the uncertainty I actually encounter in action.
Molyneux strikes me as a person obsessed with a need to order and understand his world in a way that rejects the fundamental uncertainty the human mind must embrace about it's existence. By this I mean the fact that the mind is limited in scope and power, and that no rules devised or constructed will be sufficiently perfect to achieve a perfect apprehension of how reality works. Nor will we ever have sufficient data (even if we have the rules figured out) to model the future with sufficient precision to attain certainty of prediction beyond a very short timescale.
For example, one can make truth statements about lying as a behavior and the feedback effects that are likely to occur, but one cannot make universal claims about whether or not that behavior should or should not be used. I'll damn sure lie to a man with a gun pointed at my head, if it will keep him from shooting me... I think it's more helpful to understand the impact of lying as a phenomena, and then have individuals make their own decisions about how and when to use or not use it. Even more importantly, I think my description is how we see human beings apply ethics in practice on a daily basis in choosing means and ends. "Thou shalt not lie" is an emergent maxim, based on the general observation that dishonesty tends to be self-destructive, as it endangers ones social relationships. That doesn't put "Thou shalt not lie" as a truth statement at the metaphysical level, nor do I see how it could be possible, as it arises as an emergent property of the human mind.
I stated this in another thread but I'll summarize again. I haven't gone in depth with UPB in a long time but as I recall my fundamental problem with it was always that it assumed that the performance of an action somehow implies that all others should do it, which is clearly not the case. When I drink water I imply that I believe that I should, in that instant and under those exact circumstances, drink water, nothing more, nothing less. There is no such thing as universally preferable behavior.
For example, "though shalt rape" is not such a rule, because for one to rape, another must resist rape (if he/she doesn't resist, then by definition it isn't rape)
I'm sure there's plenty more to comment on, in the article, it's comments, and here. But that just caught me eye right away.
EDIT: Also Gordon is a complete jackass, constantly implying that anyone who thinks Gordon is an idiot is therefore a "Molyneux admirer".
+1 Neodoxy's post.
Rothbard, Hoppe and Molyneux all perform that trick of substitution.
Humans as thinking beings operate in the means-ends framework, which is subjective and contextual. If a prisoner is speaking to another prisoner, he is not working under the premise that his fellow prisoner has full libertarian control over his body, nor does he regarding himself. What's happening is that he thinks speaking to the other one serves as a means to his ends, such as not feeling so lonely; for which neither need to be in much control of their bodies.
More at:
A Critique Of Rothbardian Ethics ('natural rights')
http://nielsio.tumblr.com/post/16528520459/a-critique-of-hoppean-ethics-argumentation-ethics
http://nielsio.tumblr.com/post/17076476518/a-critique-of-molyneuvian-ethics-universally
There has been a fun article written that describes a mental condition called "Narcissism" and a characteristic called "splitting", and how it impressively fits with Molyneux's personality. http://www.fdrliberated.com/stefan-molyneux-the-splitting-question/ His idea that there is some objective source for morality always got on my nerves, just like when humanists show pictures of flowers and mountain tops and say, "Life is awesome, all we have to do is love one another! Weeeeee." Oh please. His binary mind is shallow and vapid and ew. Extra ew. Human interactions are far more complicated than a "four step plan to morality".
Molyneux is brilliantly manipulative, he's a legend in that regard, for better or worse. Studying people is incredibly interesting to me so I've listened to many hours of many prominent public figures, Molyneux among them. I have found endless material to disagree with, but if I ever decide to attack his content logically I pray it isn't as weak as what I'm seeing from the likes of Gordon or FDR Liberated.
That said, I give Molyneux loads of credit for his ability to pass mind-blowing ideas to me, whether they are actually his own or not (you don't reform the mafia from the inside, morals are propaganda to limit competition for power, everything about human farming, etc etc etc).