Does subjective perception of morality/ethics precede the function of NAP and thus negate the uniform importance of property rights, putting into question the legitimacy of NAP as a social institution?
Stated another way, "If ethics and morality precede property rights in human perception and subjectivism reigns as the window of perception, can the Non-Aggression Principle still retain justification?"
COPIED FROM ANOTHER THREAD (involving slave labor and the morality of buying goods with the knowledge of coercion since some said it was off topic.) Contains a few edits.
My point is that libertarians apply 'subjectivism' to anything and everything. You might call it a fact. Yes, it is a fact in a real world economic sense. However, one cannot have any intellectual discourse when libertarians just say "oh, subjectivism. case closed" in every instance of social inquiry.
Morality? "Subjectivism."
Justice? "Subjectivism. Duh, idiot"
Market? "Subjectivism. Whatever, fuck you!"
Good v. Bad; Right v Wrong? "Subjectivism."
Rationality? "Subjectivism."
{Inset normative inquiry} "Subjectivism. Your premise is flawed."
It is starting to me to be a less and less applicable answer to social inquiry. (cultural, not necessarily economic)
I also fail to recognize how libertarians can just say "subjectivism" and think that this is the answer that people are wanting elaborated upon. People should just know any question they pose on these borads will draw out "subjectivism" as a response to everything. It is a cop out because it fails to ever reveal anything deeper about culture (cultural norms). But, I suppose the whole concept of culture (or cultural importance) is negated with the claim of subjectivism (read: subjective perception), huh?
This is why I don't like nihilists as well. They are moral-less and have the potential for infinite selfishness and evil in my mind (not the the two go hand in hand, but the potential for both is extremified under their moniker). Why bother with logic and reason and emotion if they are a priori and/or subjective?
It was said by a poster on this board that:
There is no objectively justifying human action.
Except owning property, huh?
...implies "subjective perception" as the base justification for (any old) human action.
That same poster said, regarding the subjective ontological perception of the world, that:
I think we can get consistent answers, however, which actually reveal valuable truth, if we start with reality.
The "reality" that property rights is the only legitimate perspective of ethics or morality so as to justify the broad application of subjectivism?
The same poster:
Morals are subjective, so we shouldn't pretend anything else just to have a fun debate.
No one is saying that that is not a true statment.
But, in society, people abide by morals other than their own from time to time. "Why?" would be an illegitimate or irrelevant question with 'subjective morality and ethics' applied everywhere. Ultimately it leads one to think that social ethics (a term for when people abide by morals other than their own from time to time) are relativistic; i.e., not subjective. Which means that people's worth or value of property rights will vary from person to person (whether this is in their interest or not) and also implies that ethics and morals precede property rights in people's action sequence (decision making process). Even though the ends of the action sequence may be based around the acquisition or disacqusition of property itself.
I am wondering if NAP can be justified in light of this.
Again, the poster:
I don't see what's wrong with being infinitely selfish.
But, some parts of society does. Why? Jealousy? Religion? Perception? Historical evolution (ha)? Morality?
Subjectivism (more specifically, relativism, and more poignantly, nihilism) broadly applied to ethics and/or morality, but not necessarily property rights, will yield the rejection of "'natural law' and reason."
So, the abstractions of philosophy are meritless in inquiry if subjectivism is applied broadly. Everyone, then, is basically a philosopher of life/action/ethics/epistemology/logic if this is the case. There must be limits to the use of subjectivism. Especially for libertarian social/political theory/philosophy.
Also, subjectivism (and nihilism, relativism) will allow for the rejection of a priori knowledge, of which all logic is.
The short of it is that, libertarians need to apply subjectivism carefully.
This reminded me of this recent thread: http://mises.org/Community/forums/p/30021/479386.aspx#479386
I understand, and mostly, if not wholly (I'll need to ponder it further to be sure) agree with what you're saying. I think the issue that will arise is the definition of the NAP. I think, but could be making a wrong assumption, that most believe that since the initiation of force is immoral, that they can justify using force against the initiator. However, since "justice is subjective," to the person onthe receiving end o the "justice," it can look like revenge, and thus, a new initiation of force. I'm not sure if what I'm trying to get at is at all clear...
Property rights (and natural rights) can be maintained when a different interpretation of the implications of the NAP is followed. That is, the initiation of force is never justified, and the only force that MAY be justified is defense in the face of aggression. So, for example, if someone is actively engaging you in an attempt to kill you, you MAY be justified in using force to stop the aggressor. However, once he has stopped, whether he succeeded in murdering you or not, yfreedom anyone else is justified in attempting to restrict his freedom, be it with jail or any other sentence. To do so would be viewed as a new initiation of force, and obviously, unjustified according to the NAP.
Of course, this view may be preferred to be used only on the subject of moral philosophy, as opposed to market philosophy. Obviously people may not be happy that a burglar could steal your television when your not home, and then not be punished. According to this other view of the NAP, the only way to get around this would be to implement a state. It could be a voluntary state. Yet, only if people consent that force is justified in certain circumstances could the robbed be assured of the return of their property.
Essentially, the state (even a voluntary one) hands out justice in a more human-based time-preference, and thus serves to displace God, who hands out the proper, objective justice though not necessarily on a human-based but a "cosmic" time-preference.
Again, I reiterate that this is merely an opinion, and one on such an interesting topic that I'll need to consider this at further length to find more about my position, but this is my initial reaction and initial thoughts.
The only one worth following is the one who leads... not the one who pulls; for it is not the direction that condemns the puller, it is the rope that he holds.
Very interested in contributing here. Also very tired and nappy time. I look forward to responding.
Aristophanes,
All concepts about morality and justice are inherently subjective. That is, they are concepts that rely upon the perspective of a subject. The NAP is not objectively right. That I recognize this does not mean that i consider other people's opinion to be equally right. All it means is that I am not objectively right. I consider people who do not hold the NAP as a moral prinicple to be wrong. But they are not objectively wrong. They are wrong in my opinion. Obviously, they would consider that I am wrong too, but in their opinion.
Invoking subjectivism just means recognizing that values require a subject to do the valuing. No subject, no values. There may be some subjectivists that believe that all values are equally right, but I don't think there are many (if any) on this board. There is a world of difference between recognizing that values require subjects and believing that someone you disagree with is right (!).
Describing my moral position would take quite a bit of time, as well as arguing against moral subjectivism, so I will try to get to the fundamental issue here. Everything which isn't a object is subjective to some degree. This includes language, morality, the economy, and everything else which wouldn't exist without human consciousness. Saying something is subjective is practically redundant, in that so many very important things are subjective, to some degree. One shouldn't just say something is subjective, one should talk about how subjective something is, as in the case of morality where what people believe plays a big part but not entirely. When it comes to morality it isn't as extremely subjective as the context used in talking about the market. There are better moral theories and there are inferior moral theories, moral theories which better correspond to reality than others. In talking of morality one should try to find the moral theory that best works with reality.
All concepts about morality and justice are inherently subjective. That is, they are concepts that rely upon the perspective of a subject. The NAP is not objectively right. That I recognize this does not mean that i consider other people's opinion to be equally right. All it means is that I am not objectively right. I consider people who do not hold the NAP as a moral prinicple to be wrong. But they are not objectively wrong. They are wrong in my opinion. Obviously, they would consider that I am wrong too, but in their opinion. Invoking subjectivism just means recognizing that values require a subject to do the valuing. No subject, no values. There may be some subjectivists that believe that all values are equally right, but I don't think there are many (if any) on this board. There is a world of difference between recognizing that values require subjects and believing that someone you disagree with is right (!).
But, you do not see how this perspective limits social dialogue? There are cultural/social norms that do exist. You miss the point of the post. Subjectivism is almost an excuse so as to not accept anything other than your mindset about whatever is in question. You state that you do think that other people are wrong. So, if they reciprocate that feeling, but you do agree to compromise, then you have demonstrated a social norm that exists inbetween your perception and theirs.
When two individual subjective perspectives that hold different value about a particual thing (object concept, w/e), and reach a compromise then there is an objective perspective that can be reached when the parties involved agree to it. Subjectivism turns into social (objective) relativism under these circumstances.
All concepts about morality and justice are inherently subjective.
Also, no this is not correct. The concepts must be agreed to in order to be even considered by two parties. If you say existential and I say analytical, the concepts are not subjective, as the concepts are not the same, it is only the persepective of the concepts that is subjective (and this is only so once an agreement on the definition of said concepts is agreed upon). The fact that we can all talk about morality and ethics shows the concept to be objective (i.e. virtuous behavior), but our perspectives on the conecpts will differ due to subjective perception and normative belief.
The original argument was over the morality of purchasing goods from slave labor with the knowledge that it is coming from slave labor. This post is a collection of thoughts concerning public perception of the situation and why some will disagree. There are some who will say that it is immoral to purchase the goods because it is providing "demand" for goods produced by those means which will further the condition and possibly make it larger and hence worse. Others say it is moral on the grounds that by contributing to increased revenue the slave owner may pass the profits along to the workers conditions increasing their living standards and possibly removing the "slave" from the labor. Both arguments are based off of property rights, but my question is, "Do people really predicate morality and ethics solely on perception of property?" Is property the sole basis for morality and the epitome of virtue? I think the answer is, "no." Both arguments take into account the physical condition of the slave when deciding on the morality of the purchase, which leads me to believe that ethics/morality are decisions that precede the simple property arguments. Because the answer was never, "Yes, I want the product," (which most people actually think and is the "absolutist Ayn Rand selfishness" response), I think property is not always (it is not necessarily) the be all end all. In a practical sense, the question of slave labor is asking whether or not much of globalized trade is ethical. Is it ethical to buy clothes or electronics that you know are produced by slave labor? After all, you do do it.
† I define 'slave labor' as including fingerless children in Mongolia and Indonesia, etc. that stitch clothes, mine ore, and weld electronics for $.50 a week as well as 'literal forced labor' in the North Korean sense.
people are genuinely happier when they engage in moral behavior.
Again, if we are asking the question of whether or not "it is ethical to buy goods knowingly produced through slave labor," then your statement means that...people who buy the goods think it is not only moral, but that they are happy because they did or that in decling the purchase they are happier because it is immoral to do so (since property is the initial instigator of the scenario).
I just had a Euthyphro moment.
Aristophanes: But, you do not see how this perspective limits social dialogue?
But, you do not see how this perspective limits social dialogue?
There is nothing inherent in recognizing subjectivism that limits dialogue. If someone says, "It's all subjective, so that's that", then yes, that limits social dialogue. But this is not what I do, though there may be others who do this. I recognize that morals are subjective, but this in no way means that I am not going to continue the discussion. I'm constantly referencing the NAP/reciprocity in my posts.
Aristophanes: There are cultural/social norms that do exist.
There are cultural/social norms that do exist.
Norms are a funny thing. They are simultaneously objective and intersubjective,and they exist abstractly. But that does not suddenly change the fact that morals are subjective.
Aristophanes: You miss the point of the post. Subjectivism is almost an excuse so as to not accept anything other than your mindset about whatever is in question. You state that you do think that other people are wrong. So, if they reciprocate that feeling, but you do agree to compromise, then you have demonstrated a social norm that exists inbetween your perception and theirs.
You miss the point of the post. Subjectivism is almost an excuse so as to not accept anything other than your mindset about whatever is in question. You state that you do think that other people are wrong. So, if they reciprocate that feeling, but you do agree to compromise, then you have demonstrated a social norm that exists inbetween your perception and theirs.
Values are subjective. There is nothing wrong with pointing this out in a debate about morality. If two people disagree about their underlying principles regarding morality, then the only purpose of debate is either to understood your own principles better, or to try to reach out to other people so that they might accept and adopt your principles.
Aristophanes: When two individual subjective perspectives that hold different value about a particual thing (object concept, w/e), and reach a compromise then there is an objective perspective that can be reached when the parties involved agree to it. Subjectivism turns into social (objective) relativism under these circumstances.
Strictly speaking, they have an intersubjective understanding. The concept they agree to can be objective in the sense that it is an object, but the values they agree to are an intersubjective experience.
Aristophanes: Also, no this is not correct. The concepts must be agreed to in order to be even considered by two parties. If you say existential and I say analytical, the concepts are not subjective, as the concepts are not the same, it is only the persepective of the concepts that is subjective (and this is only so once an agreement on the definition of said concepts is agreed upon). The fact that we can all talk about morality and ethics shows the concept to be objective (i.e. virtuous behavior), but our perspectives on the conecpts will differ due to subjective perception and normative belief.
Firstly, you are right in that the concepts themselves can be talked about as objects. But when two or more subjects share the same perspective, they are having an intersubjective understanding. "Seven" does not objectively mean "7" (and neither does "7"!). Whatever sound we use to mean "7" is an intersubjective understanding. But the concept "7" is objective.
The concept of "right" can be talked about objectively in the sense that it is an object. But what is right is subjective. Whether aggression is right or wrong depends upon a subject having a value. So we cannot objectively say that the NAP is right or wrong.
Aristophanes: Both arguments are based off of property rights, but my question is, "Do people really predicate morality and ethics solely on perception of property?" Is property the sole basis for morality and the epitome of virtue? I think the answer is, "no." Both arguments take into account the physical condition of the slave when deciding on the morality of the purchase, which leads me to believe that ethics/morality are decisions that precede the simple property arguments. Because the answer was never, "Yes, I want the product," (which most people actually think and is the "absolutist Ayn Rand selfishness" response), I think property is not always (it is not necessarily) the be all end all.
Both arguments are based off of property rights, but my question is, "Do people really predicate morality and ethics solely on perception of property?" Is property the sole basis for morality and the epitome of virtue?
I think the answer is, "no." Both arguments take into account the physical condition of the slave when deciding on the morality of the purchase, which leads me to believe that ethics/morality are decisions that precede the simple property arguments. Because the answer was never, "Yes, I want the product," (which most people actually think and is the "absolutist Ayn Rand selfishness" response), I think property is not always (it is not necessarily) the be all end all.
I do not think that property is the basis for morality except for very few people. Libertarianism itself does not take property as the sole basis for morality, as the basis of morality for libertarianism is the NAP. If you want a sole basis of morality, see Clayton's posts about Epicurus. That which is pleasurable is good, and that which is painful is bad. Time preferences are still relevant to Epicurean ethics, as it is not a hedonist ethic. That's about as close to a universal basis as one can get.
Libertarianism itself does not take property as the sole basis for morality, as the basis of morality for libertarianism is the NAP.
Aha!
This is what I am trying to point out. If ethics and morality precede 'respect for property' then you cannot justify the NAP on anything but a (possibly common) subjective whim†. But if 'respect for property' is placed before ethical/moral judgment, then the NAP is easily justified on a shared ground of ownership of the body (and the externalities it creates; bodily and mental needs/wants). This places property, or respect for property, as the epitome of virtue.
In the sense that this comes to action, consumption of the good produced with slave labor is moral.
But, if you place the treatment of the slave's over the slave owner's "ownership" of the slave, refusing to buy the good, then you are making a moral decision first, as it doesn't concern your property and doesn't quite "respect" the slaveowners 'property.
That which is pleasurable is good, and that which is painful is bad.
This seems like it will lead to the aforementioned "Ayn Rand ultra selfish consumption and acquisition of property is the epitome of virtue" reasoning. Or the Bacchan reasoning. It is pleasurable to consume the good. It is painful to want. The slave's situation has no bearing on you.
___
† You use the term "intersubjective" where I used the term "objective relativism," but they are the same.
Aristophanes: If ethics and morality precede 'respect for property' then you cannot justify the NAP on anything but a (possibly common) subjective whim†.
If ethics and morality precede 'respect for property' then you cannot justify the NAP on anything but a (possibly common) subjective whim†.
The NAP (golden rule/ethic of reciprocity) precedes property. It is the basis for property. The negative form that libertarians prefer is, "Do not aggress against others and their rightful property." In the positive form and in first person, I think the basis for property is much clearer, "Respect me and what is mine, and I'll respect you and what's yours." From this ethic, we get property.
Aristophanes: But if 'respect for property' is placed before ethical/moral judgment, then the NAP is easily justified on a shared ground of ownership of the body (and the externalities it creates; bodily and mental needs/wants). This places property, or respect for property, as the epitome of virtue.
But if 'respect for property' is placed before ethical/moral judgment, then the NAP is easily justified on a shared ground of ownership of the body (and the externalities it creates; bodily and mental needs/wants). This places property, or respect for property, as the epitome of virtue.
There is de facto property, and there is rightful property. Property originates from the ethic of reciprocity, but if someone or some group has sufficient power, then who owns what is placed at the whim of this powerful group. But property is a result of reciprocity.
Aristophanes: In the sense that this comes to action, consumption of the good produced with slave labor is moral. If you place the ownership of the slave's own body over the slave owner's "ownership" of the slave, then you are making a moral decision first, as it doesn't concern your property.
In the sense that this comes to action, consumption of the good produced with slave labor is moral. If you place the ownership of the slave's own body over the slave owner's "ownership" of the slave, then you are making a moral decision first, as it doesn't concern your property.
To be honest, I am not sure I follow what you are saying here.
Aristophanes: This seems like it will lead to the aforementioned "Ayn Rand ultra selfish consumption and acquisition of property is the epitome of virtue" reasoning. Or the Bacchan reasoning. It is pleasurable to consume the good. It is painful to want. The slave's situation has no bearing on you.
I know very little about Epicurus and his philosophy, so I cannot speak to this with any kind of accuracy. Clayton is very familiar with Epicurus, so if he reads this thread, maybe he'll be able to shed some light on this.
The NAP (golden rule/ethic of reciprocity) precedes property. It is the basis for property.
If subjective perception is the inherent condition of man, then property isn't a necessary framework for ethical/moral dilemmas. This means that, in a intersubjective or objective relativistic societal condition, property may be placed lower on the preference scale than some moral or ethical standards. This also means that the NAP is not universally justifiable (as it is when preoperty rights are assumed), it is just another social contract.
I am trying to do two things, (1) see whether or not "knowingly purchasing goods produced from a slave labor is moral" with all of the above contraints...
There are some who will say that it is immoral to purchase the goods because it is providing "demand" for goods produced by those means which will further the condition and possibly make it larger and hence worse. Others say it is moral on the grounds that by contributing to increased revenue the slave owner may pass the profits along to the workers conditions increasing their living standards and possibly removing the "slave" from the labor.
... and (2) trying to figure out if the NAP can be universally agreed to without property rights as a prerequisite.
Aristophanes:Does subjective perception of morality/ethics precede the function of NAP and thus negate the uniform importance of property rights, putting into question the legitimacy of NAP as a social institution? Stated another way, "If ethics and morality precede property rights in human perception and subjectivism reigns as the window of perception, can the Non-Aggression Principle still retain justification?"
As I see it, the whole notion of property rights depends upon the notion of rights in general, which to me is the same thing as the notion of actions being considered legitimate. Note that I use the word "considered" deliberately, because legitimacy is a value judgement imputed to things (actions, states of affairs, etc.). Because it's a value judgement, legitimacy is also necessarily subjective. Keep in mind that by "subjective" I mean "exists entirely within the mind".
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Since my last post was ignored, I'm curious, are any of you Idealists? I ask because many of you continue talking about the subjectivity of things but fail to distinguish the degrees of subjectivity. Do you believe that everything is subjective in the most absolute sense of the word? (Or more simply, do you all believe that there is no degrees of subjectivity, that there is simply subjectivity and that is it?)
The following is an unsound argument:
1. Ethics are subjective
2. Therefore, people should not make ethical claims.
The conclusion doesn't follow from the premise, and "people should not make ethical claims" is self-contradictory.
The following is another unsound argument:
2. Therefore, people cannot make ethical claims
Once again, the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. Also, people do in fact make ethical claims, therefore "people cannot make ethical claims" is false.
My point here is to distinguish between the idea that ethics are subjective (which is true) and the idea that, therefore, we have to give up on ethics (which is nonsense). Libertarians hold the former idea, but not the latter.
Also, be careful to distinguish between ethical subjectivism, and subjectivism in general. Libertarians believe that there is no truth-value attached to ethical claims, but they do believe in an objective reality (or at least they recognize that belief in objective reality, whether justified or not, is a necessary precondition for any kind of society), and that claims about that reality have truth-values.
@OP: You're confusing moral sentiments - which are just a kind of taste/preference, like preferring sun to rain, that is, subjective - with social mores, which are objective, though fuzzy around the edges. More here and here.
Clayton -
I will be addressing your post in reverse order:
Aristophanes: ... and (2) trying to figure out if the NAP can be universally agreed to without property rights as a prerequisite.
That's my point. It precedes property. Property has two origins:
1) Golden Rule: Respect me and what's mine, and I'll respect you and what's yours. This is good for the vast majority of any population. Most people do not engage in criminal acts.
2) Law: People have disputes, and they settle it through argumentation. Sometimes this ends with violence, but it assigns property rights for all disputes. Law is necessary for the small minority of the population that are criminals, and it is also necessary for when two or more people cannot agree to what belongs to whom.
The golden rule is already almost universal. It never will be, as there will always be at least a criminal element. But property is not a prerequisite for the NAP, it is derived from the NAP.
Aristophanes: I am trying to do two things, (1) see whether or not "knowingly purchasing goods produced from a slave labor is moral" with all of the above contraints...
This is why I linked to Rothbard's article, Living in a State-Run World, in the other thread. Twice. These two sections are probably the most relevant, though I consider the whole article to be useful. The first:
There is nothing wrong, and everything rational, then, about accepting the matrix in one's daily life. What's wrong is working to aggravate, to add to, the statist matrix. To give an example from my own career. For many years I taught at a "private" university (although I would not be surprised to find that more than half its income came from the government). The university has long teetered on the edge of bankruptcy, and years ago it tried to correct that condition by getting itself "statized" through merging with the State University of New York system, in those halcyon days rolling in dough. For a while, it looked as if this merger would occur, and there was a great deal of pressure on every member of the faculty to show up in Albany and lobby for merger into the State system. This I refused to do, since I believed it to be immoral to agitate to add to the statism around me. Does that mean that all libertarians can cheerfully work for the government, apart from not lobbying for statism, and forget about conscience in this area? Certainly not. For here it is vital to distinguish between two kinds of State activities: (a) those actions that would be perfectly legitimate if performed by private firms on the market; and (b) those actions that are per se immoral and criminal, and that would be illicit in a libertarian society. The latter must not be performed by libertarians in any circumstances. Thus, a libertarian must not be: a concentration camp director or guard; an official of the IRS; an official of the Selective Service System; or a controller or regulator of society or the economy.
There is nothing wrong, and everything rational, then, about accepting the matrix in one's daily life. What's wrong is working to aggravate, to add to, the statist matrix. To give an example from my own career. For many years I taught at a "private" university (although I would not be surprised to find that more than half its income came from the government). The university has long teetered on the edge of bankruptcy, and years ago it tried to correct that condition by getting itself "statized" through merging with the State University of New York system, in those halcyon days rolling in dough. For a while, it looked as if this merger would occur, and there was a great deal of pressure on every member of the faculty to show up in Albany and lobby for merger into the State system. This I refused to do, since I believed it to be immoral to agitate to add to the statism around me.
Does that mean that all libertarians can cheerfully work for the government, apart from not lobbying for statism, and forget about conscience in this area? Certainly not. For here it is vital to distinguish between two kinds of State activities: (a) those actions that would be perfectly legitimate if performed by private firms on the market; and (b) those actions that are per se immoral and criminal, and that would be illicit in a libertarian society. The latter must not be performed by libertarians in any circumstances. Thus, a libertarian must not be: a concentration camp director or guard; an official of the IRS; an official of the Selective Service System; or a controller or regulator of society or the economy.
The second:
Take, for example, the Soviet Union, where the government has, in effect, nationalized all occupations, and where there are no, or virtually no, private employers. Are we to condemn all Russians whatsoever as "criminals" because they are government employees? Is it the only moral act of every Russian to commit suicide? But that would be idiotic. Surely there are no moral systems that require people to be martyrs.
And don't forget that Murray Rothbard lived in a rent-controlled apartment. Was that moral? He thought it was fine so long as he did not seek to make the situation worse for his landlord. Rothbard did not make the rules, and he is actively against the current rules.
So, someone can say that it is immoral to buy products made by slave labor, but this is just an arbitrary distinction between 100% slavery and 99% slavery. If someone feels that way, so be it. But it's a personal decision separate from the NAP, in my opinion.
Aristophanes: If subjective perception is the inherent condition of man, then property isn't a necessary framework for ethical/moral dilemmas. This means that, in a intersubjective or objective relativistic societal condition, property may be placed lower on the preference scale than some moral or ethical standards. This also means that the NAP is not universally justifiable (as it is when preoperty rights are assumed), it is just another social contract.
Well, you can call it a social contract if you like, but the term "social contract" really has nothing to do with the NAP/golden rule, and everything to do with legitimizing the state. The fact of the matter is, that so long as you live in society, you are at the mercy of society (the collection of individuals that make up society). The goal of libertarianism is to decentralize this as much as possible, so as to reduce the amount of injustice in society. That and the fact that the state is injust by its very existence.
So, then is it moral to add demand to the slave produced goods? "I'm against slave labor, but they sure do make a good widget! I'll have another because that is a fair price."
Adding demand for slave labor is making the situation worse.
The fact of the matter is, that so long as you live in society, you are at the mercy of society (the collection of individuals that make up society).
So, there is subjective perception, but it doesn't matter because there are other people that can interfere with your perception due to the collectivization of their own?
e goal of libertarianism is to decentralize this as much as possible, so as to reduce the amount of injustice in society. That and the fact that the state is injust by its very existence.
Okay. Leaving aside the state. I think it is hard to moralize slave labor with the Burkean conservatism that you just described (either it is moral and there is no question of its exististence or it is immoral and exists.
No where in the thread was I blaming the state for conservatism. In fact, I was trying to think of a society without a state at all that had slave labor...
It looks like "no" to the elimination of property rights still allowing for uniform universal application of the NAP.
Aristophanes: So, then is it moral to add demand to the slave produced goods? "I'm against slave labor, but they sure do make a good widget! I'll have another because that is a fair price." Adding demand for slave labor is making the situation worse.
I may have misrepresented Rothbard's view, as what he meant was that you could not add to it through aggression. Merely renting a rent-controlled apartment is not aggression. Going to the government in order to make your landlord comply with these rules would be.
Aristophanes: So, there is subjective perception, but it doesn't matter because there are other people that can interfere with your perception due to the collectivization of their own?
I'm not sure what you are getting at here. The law of a decentralized anarchist society may very well not be perfectly in line with the NAP, as people are fallible. I suspect that for the most part, the law would be very close to the NAP and would get closer over time. But in the end, in any type of society, the individual is subject to the decisions of whoever has more power than he. The more decentralized a society, the less power any one individual has over another. Marxists take this is an end in itself, but their philosophy is flawed beyond measure.
The point is, that in a decentralized society, injustice is minimized.
Aristophanes: Okay. Leaving aside the state. I think it is hard to moralize slave labor with the Burkean conservatism that you just described (either it is moral and there is no question of its exististence or it is immoral and exists. No where in the thread was I blaming the state for conservatism. In fact, I was trying to think of a society without a state at all that had slave labor...
I don't consider slave labor to be moral. I consider it to be immoral. My point is that it seems entirely arbitrary to condemn a man for buying a product made from 100% slave labor, while saying it is moral to buy products made from 99% slave labor or 50% slave labor.
Aristophanes: It looks like "no" to the elimination of property rights still allowing for uniform universal application of the NAP.
I'm not sure I follow. Could you rephrase?
My point is that it seems entirely arbitrary to condemn a man for buying a product made from 100% slave labor, while saying it is moral to buy products made from 99% slave labor or 50% slave labor.
I tried to define slave labor and account for those kinds of contingencies...
I'm not trying to draw distinctions. Any forced labor or labor through duress (extortion, intimidation, etc.) is slavery in my scenario.
Aristophanes: It looks like "no" to the elimination of property rights still allowing for uniform universal application of the NAP. I'm not sure I follow. Could you rephrase?
"Property rights" seems to indicate that there is a certain set of "rules" that extend from one another that can be applied uniformly and universally and from which a uniform and universal ethical/moral conduct can be deduced, the NAP. Which means that property rights can lead to a uniform ethical code.
It looks like we cannot place property rights after ethics/morals in society and still develop a uniform universal ethical/moral code. But neither of the two result in the scenarios I would think.
Paradox(?): In a stateless society, if ethics (NAP) are placed before property then the buyer could do many things as his morals will vary. But, he cannot buy the good with the reasoning that it is within the 'property realm' alone because if he did then 'property rights' would be placed before ethics.
But, the same buyer could place property rights before ethics and buy the good since he is not aggressing, but he cannot not buy the good out of respect for the slave's property rights as this is a moral decision and hence would mean that his decision is made not on the purchase of goods (property), but on the treatment of the laborer (a moral decision).
=/
Aristophanes: I tried to define slave labor and account for those kinds of contingencies...
Aristophanes: † I define 'slave labor' as including fingerless children in Mongolia and Indonesia, etc. that stitch clothes, mine ore, and weld electronics for $.50 a week as well as 'literal forced labor' in the North Korean sense.
Aristophanes: I'm not trying to draw distinctions. Any forced labor or labor through duress (extortion, intimidation, etc.) is slavery in my scenario.
Your examples of fingerless children that stitch clothes and mine ore are not necessarily working involuntarily. But then you define slavery essentially as involuntary servitude. So it's a little hard to tell exactly which definition you are going with. But even if we go with the involuntary servitude, my point still stands:
gotlucky: My point is that it seems entirely arbitrary to condemn a man for buying a product made from 100% slave labor, while saying it is moral to buy products made from 99% slave labor or 50% slave labor.
Take Rothbard's example of when an industry has been nationalized. Are mailmen immoral? They are employed by a group that gets its income from aggression. Rothbard says no, that so long as the position would exist in a free society, it is okay.
Now, what about the consumers of the USPS? Anybody who uses the USPS to deliver mail is guilty of supporting a group that gets its revenue almost entirely by aggression. Should everyone just stop using the USPS? Maybe ideally, but who else can they use?
The only difference I see is one of degree, not of kind. That, in America, we are not 100% slaves, but something like 40-60%. Should America have boycotted the USSR? Was it moral to buy any products from there? Was it immoral? Does it matter if someone is 99% slave versus 100%?
That said, I understand and share people's distate for buying products of slave labor. But making a distinction between 50%, 99%, and 100% slavery is just arbitrary.
Aristophanes: "Property rights" seems to indicate that there is a certain set of "rules" that extend from one another that can be applied uniformly and universally and from which a uniform and universal ethical/moral conduct can be deduced, the NAP. Which means that property rights can lead to a uniform ethical code. It looks like we cannot place property rights after ethics/morals in society and still develop a uniform universal ethical/moral code. But neither of the two result in the scenarios I would think.
You seem confused about where property rights come from. They can only originate through something like the ethic of reciprocity or law (e.g. statutory or customary law). And even though they *can* originate through the golden rule, eventually there is conflict, and law must outline the exact details of property rights.
We have property rights now, and our situation is not uniform and universal. In fact, it's just the opposite. If we take property rights as the foundation by itself, then we should be equally satisfied with either a statist or anarchist society. After all, there would be property rights.
But, we do not want just any society, we want one based off of the NAP. The NAP must precede property rights, not only because it leads to them in the first place, but because without the NAP, we would have no way to measure the justness of a society.
Aristophanes: Paradox(?): In a stateless society, if ethics (NAP) are placed before property then the buyer could do many things as his morals will vary. But, he cannot buy the good with the reasoning that it is within the 'property realm' alone because if he did then 'property rights' would be placed before ethics. But, the same buyer could place property rights before ethics and buy the good since he is not aggressing, but he cannot not buy the good out of respect for the slave's property rights as this is a moral decision and hence would mean that his decision is made not on the purchase of goods (property), but on the treatment of the laborer (a moral decision).
Well, I think this is what Murray Rothbard was getting at, that when you are in a statist matrix, the aggressive rules are not your fault. So long as you are not complicit in the aggression, you are not acting hypocritcally. In other words, Rothbard renting a rent-controlled apartment is not hypocritical. Now, depending upon one's point of view, it could be right or it could be wrong. But at least it's not hypocrisy.
Aristophanes: =/
=\
Take Rothbard's example of when an industry has been nationalized. Are mailmen immoral? They are employed by a group that gets its income from aggression. Rothbard says no, that so long as the position would exist in a free society, it is okay. Now, what about the consumers of the USPS? Anybody who uses the USPS to deliver mail is guilty of supporting a group that gets its revenue almost entirely by aggression. Should everyone just stop using the USPS? Maybe ideally, but who else can they use? The only difference I see is one of degree, not of kind. That, in America, we are not 100% slaves, but something like 40-60%. Should America have boycotted the USSR? Was it moral to buy any products from there? Was it immoral? Does it matter if someone is 99% slave versus 100%? That said, I understand and share people's distate for buying products of slave labor. But making a distinction between 50%, 99%, and 100% slavery is just arbitrary.
You don't see how you are making, by yor own words, arbitrary distinctions? You constantly have to refer to the state which I try to make not a part of the hypothetical. And your mention of current times is a distinction between the hypothetical duress that I am concerning with this.
We have property rights now, and our situation is not uniform and universal.
Again, because we have a state .. I know this. I don't need help elaborating on it...
But, we do not want just any society, we want one based off of the NAP.
Okay.
The NAP must precede property rights, not only because it leads to them in the first place, but because without the NAP, we would have no way to measure the justness of a society.[
But, if subjectivism reigns, then you cannot justify a uniform ethical code. Admission of property rights as having priority over ethics is what creates the uniform standard so that everyone (theoretically) could agree to something. This is what I am trying to point out. You cannot just keep saying "Subjectivism, subjectivism, NAP first." It lacks justification for "why" the ethic of reciprocity is legitimate.
Aristophanes: You don't see how you are making, by yor own words, arbitrary distinctions? You constantly have to refer to the state which I try to make not a part of the hypothetical. And your mention of current times is a distinction between the hypothetical duress that I am concerning with this.
My point is that we are all making arbitrary distinctions. What difference does it make if you buy a good that was produced under a system of 50% slavery or 100%? It's a difference of degree, not kind. Any distinction is arbitrary.
Aristophanes: Again, because we have a state .. I know this. I don't need help elaborating on it...
Then I have no idea what your point was, as it sounded like you were saying:
But maybe this is not what you were talking about.
Aristophanes: But, if subjectivism reigns, then you cannot justify a uniform ethical code. Admission of property rights as having priority over ethics is what creates the uniform standard so that everyone (theoretically) could agree to something. This is what I am trying to point out. You cannot just keep saying "Subjectivism, subjectivism, NAP first." It lacks justification for "why" the ethic of reciprocity is legitimate.
Good luck with your uniform ethical code. Last I checked, every single criminal objects to the dominant ethical code in any given area. You cannot convince a Marxist that the NAP and property are just if they fundamentally oppose property. You cannot convince the mafia that their actions are wrong if they just don't care about your sense of right and wrong. You cannot convince Michael Savage that imperialism is wrong.
Don't waste your time with people who view the world differently than you at a fundamental level. The vast majority of people recognize the value and justness of the golden rule to some extent, some more than others. Appeal to the people who have underlying similarities in their worldview and try to show them how their lives would be improved economically in a decentralized nation. Show people the moral double standard that is the state, and teach people economics so that they can understand that a centralized economy makes everyone poorer.
People can make the leap after that to anarchism. But you can never have a universal ethical code.