In this HHH video entitled Praxeology: The Austrian Method
http://mises.org/media/4347/Praxeology-The-Austrian-Method
It has problem at the gate. Praxeology is a science, not a method.
"As in a kaleidoscope, the constellation of forces operating in the system as a whole is ever changing." - Ludwig Lachmann
"When A Man Dies A World Goes Out of Existence" - GLS Shackle
It's often used for both. Praxeology is a science, basically analogous to sociology. But, praxeology is also used to describe the <i>a priori</i> deductive method of Mises. I agree that the latter needs to be called something else to distinguish, but as long as people understand the difference when listening to Hoppe, I don't really see it as an <i>error</i>.
This is basically what I was trying to get at. Obviously people know what this means, but is this something that should be said in such a way?
Vive la Insurrection:
This is due to the Rothbardian interpretation of praxeology as distinct from the Misesian conception of praxeology.
Historically, Rothbardians considered praxeology as "the method of Austrian Economics" and not as a general science of all forms of human action.
Hence Rothbard's widely circulated article: "Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics."
Economics proper (what Mises referred to as economics in the narrow sense, or catallactics) is the study of market phenomena. Rothbard considered praxeology as the specific method that Austrian Economists employ in their study of market phenomena.
When Rothbard turned to the question of acts of violence that one person may direct toward another (acts of aggression, acts of coercion, etc.) he believed that the best method for approaching these kinds of acts was natural law and natural rights philosophy:
"....to elaborate that subset of natural law that develops the concept of natural rights, and that deals with the proper sphere of "politics," i.e., with violence and non-violence as modes of interpersonal relations." (The Ethics of Liberty, p.25)
Thus, in a sense, Rothbard conceives that the "method" of economics (of studying market activity) is praxeology, and the "method" of studying interpersonal acts of violence and aggression is natural law, etc.
And thus, in this view, praxeology is considered virtually synonymous with economics, the study of market phenomena.
Several scholars have noticed the alternative conception of praxeology proposed by Rothbard. Here are a few:
"Mises’s thought is much more subtle than is typical of Rothbard. First of all, praxeology is a discipline, not a method. Rothbard totally obscures this point throughout his methodological writings. To Mises, praxeology is the broader discipline of the human sciences, of which economics represents a mere subset,… " (Boettke, 1988)
"Thus praxeology is the broader category. Economics is one of the subsets of praxeological inquiry. “[T]he praxeological view sees the economic affairs as distinguished solely by the fact that they belong to the larger body of phenomena that have their source in human actions” (Kirzner 1976, p. 148). Yet many Austrians slip into the habit of equating praxeology with economic theory alone. This is understandable as long as Austrians think of economics as the science of human action. However, to do so is an error, since it is praxeology which is the science of human action, not economics. In other words, it would be preferable to define economics in a narrower fashion, one that does not merely equate it with praxeology." (Sechrest, 2004)
"However, such accounts of “praxeology and economics” leave little space for a sphere of content for praxeology to call its own, independent of economics. Rothbard writes that, “With praxeology as the general, formal theory of human action, economics includes the analysis of the action of an isolated individual (Crusoe economics)…” While the proposed distinction appears to be between “general and formal” and greater specificity, this sentence could generate confusion because “Crusoe economics” is a fictional device to explain the most fundamental concepts of praxeology itself—from ends and means to production to time-preference. Rothbard’s comment comes at the end of the chapter called “Fundamentals of Human Action,” which uses Crusoe to explain the most fundamental praxeological concepts. This could leave the impression that “economics,” as represented by “Crusoe economics,” has on day one moved in to occupy all of the identifiable territory in this new land of praxeology, taking as its own any and all content that might otherwise be assigned to a core of praxeology itself—an independent core that could be shared with other possible “branches” or “sub-divisions” besides economics. Unsurprisingly, economics has remained the dominant branch of praxeology decades later, and only a few writers have speculated on what other branches might be. (Graff, 2011)
The Rothbardian conception is that praxeology and economics (catallactics, the study of market phenomena) are virtually identical. The Misesian conception is that praxeology is a general science that studies the various forms of human action.
The four broad classes of action are:
1. Physical action: acts of the individual in which the individual interacts with physical nature, including his own body.
2. Interpersonal action: acts of the individual in which the individual interacts with an other actor
3. Mental action: acts such as thinking, deliberating, reasoning, imagining, etc., in which the actor acts with regard to his own mind.
4. Catallactic action: actions based on monetary calculation.
Catallactics, according to Mises, is the study of those actions which are conducted based on monetary calculation.
In Misesian praxeology, interpersonal actions are the subject matter of a separate branch of praxeology.
In the Rothbardian conception, interpersonal actions are the subject matter of normative ethics; praxeology applies only, or primarily, to economics.
Hoppe, as a Rothbardian, generally follows Rothbard in his conceptions.
It is also important to realize that Hoppe's concept of action is very close to the concept of physical action above (#1).
"Acting is a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality"
(Economic Science and the Austrian Method, p.70)
Thus, Rothbard's conception of praxeology is narrow and he equates praxeology with economics. Hoppe, following Rothbard in his general conceptions, holds a narrow conception of action, and conceives action as mainly physical action.
By contrast, Mises's conception of praxeology is wider (it is the study of all actions of the individual, not a circumscribed subset of actions), and Mises's conception of action is more universal (it is the study of all goal-directed activity---including such actions as thinking, lying, etc.---regardless whether a physical body is guided in physical reality).
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Adam,
Do you think you could draw a diagram showing the relationship between the definitions of praxeology, economics, catallactics, etc? Maybe one for the Misesian conception and one for the Rothbardian? And another diagram of the relationship between the classes of action to illustrate what Rothbard and Hoppe miss out? I'm having trouble fitting it all together.
Rothbard says in MES what you describe as Mises' position:
"What is the relationship between praxeology and economic analysis? Economics is a subdivision of praxeology—so far the only fully elaborated subdivision. With praxeology as the general, formal theory of human action, economics includes the analysis of the action of an isolated individual (Crusoe economics) and, especially elaborate, the analysis of interpersonal exchange (catallactics). The rest of praxeology is an unexplored area. Attempts have been made to formulate a logical theory of war and violent action, and violence in the form of government has been treated by political philosophy and by praxeology in tracing the effects of violent intervention in the free market. A theory of games has been elaborated, and interesting beginnings have been made in a logical analysis of voting."
Here he is clear that he sees praxeology as a discipline, not a method, even if in other places (later in his life?) he writes as if it were a method. I think when Rothbard says praxeology is the method of economics, he could charitably be interpreted as meaning that economics has the same method as praxeology, i.e. axiomatic-deductivism, or apriorism, as opposed to empiricism, which would be the same as Mises' view.
Adam Knott:When Rothbard turned to the question of acts of violence that one person may direct toward another (acts of aggression, acts of coercion, etc.) he believed that the best method for approaching these kinds of acts was natural law and natural rights philosophy: "....to elaborate that subset of natural law that develops the concept of natural rights, and that deals with the proper sphere of "politics," i.e., with violence and non-violence as modes of interpersonal relations." (The Ethics of Liberty, p.25) Thus, in a sense, Rothbard conceives that the "method" of economics (of studying market activity) is praxeology, and the "method" of studying interpersonal acts of violence and aggression is natural law, etc.
I don't think this is a fair interpretation. TEOL is his political philosophy book. Natural rights philosophy was one mode of analysis, but Rothbard had two. Power and Market is him "using praxeology" (i.e. deducing things from the concept of action) to study violence. Power and Market is the praxeological "theory of war and violent actions" that he alluded to in the quote from MES above.
The four broad classes of action are: 1. Physical action: acts of the individual in which the individual interacts with physical nature, including his own body. 2. Interpersonal action: acts of the individual in which the individual interacts with an other actor 3. Mental action: acts such as thinking, deliberating, reasoning, imagining, etc., in which the actor acts with regard to his own mind. 4. Catallactic action: actions based on monetary calculation.
These classes overlap. All physical actions require a prior mental action. Catallactic actions are always interpersonal actions and both (and arguably mental actions too) are necessarily physical actions.
I'm not quite sure how this categorisation relates to the first part of your post. Are you suggesting that praxeology is a discipline with subsets corresponding to each of these classes of actions?
Government Explained 2: The Special Piece of Paper
Law without Government
Hi Graham
Thank you for taking the time to reply and comment.
For the diagram showing the relationship between the definitions of praxeology, economics, and catallactics, in the Misesian conception:
Praxeology: The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration, of exact laws of human action.
Economics (catallactics): The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration of exact laws of human action, specifically with regard to market phenomena.
In other words, the the discovery of exact laws of man's actions on the market or man's conduct with regard to the market.
Here is Mises:
Economics is mainly concerned with the analysis of the determination of money prices of goods and services exchanged on the market. (HA-234)
The scope of praxeology, the general theory of human action, can be precisely defined and circumscribed. The specifically economic problems, the problems of economic action in the narrower sense, can only by and large be disengaged from the comprehensive body of praxeological theory. (HA-234)
Considerations of expediency and traditional convention make us declare that the field of catallactics or of economics in the narrower sense is the analysis of the market phenomena. This is tantamount to the statement: Catallactics is the analysis of those actions which are conducted on the basis of monetary calculation. (HA-234)
Thus, Mises clearly conceives that as an economist, he is studying only a circumscribed realm of action. He knows that there are other actions that are not the subject matter of economics as economics. Praxeology is the general science of human action, economics studies man's actions on the market, a specific class of actions.
As I mentioned in the previous post, we can conceive of at least four broad classes of actions:
Physical actions, interpersonal actions, mental actions, and catallactic actions, Economics is primarily concerned with catallactic actions. That leaves three other classes of actions to which three other branches of praxeology might correspond. Mathematics and geometry could be considered forms or types (early forms and rudimentary types) of exact sciences of physical action. I don't claim that mathematics and geometry are, self-consciously, branches of praxeology.
Interpersonal actions are those actions directed by one actor toward another. (helping someone, harming someone, conversing with someone, coercing someone, etc.)
Mental actions are actions directed toward our own mind. (for example, one's attempt to think something through)
Thus, there are conceivable branches of praxeology corresponding to these two broad classes of action. In libertarian social theory, interpersonal actions are generally considered the subject matter of normative ethics. Of course, praxeology is not a normative discipline, and so in praxeology, interpersonal actions are studied with regard to regularity, constant/invariant relations, typical relationships, i.e., exact laws.
Regarding mental actions, this is the realm of action (of intentional activity) that was once the province of "descriptive psychology" but which is now considered a branch of natural or experimental science.
*******
Regarding how, exactly, Rothbard conceived the relationship between the various realms of human conduct, I would leave that up to Rothbardian scholars to explain. From my point of view, there was a time when Rothbard was more a student of Mises. This is when MES was written, and much of MES follows a Misesian view of things. Later in his life, when Rothbard more strongly developed and asserted his own view of things, this is when his conception of praxeology as largely synonymous with economics became more apparent.
But you can see the seeds of his conception even in the passage from MES you provided above:
"...and violence in the form of government has been treated by political philosophy and by praxeology in tracing the effects of violent intervention in the free market..."
The view of things described here is one where violence, as a mode or form of conduct, is considered in relation to its effect on the market.
What is missing in this conception is the question whether there are any regular occurences or consequences that must occur, generally, when an actor employs violence? In the above conception, the idea is to trace the effects of violent intervention in the market, after which economic laws become operant, and we can then say, "violent intervention in the market ( action X), must cause effect Y".
There is no conception of a praxeological analysis of violence and its necessary effects generally, when violence is employed as a means by an actor generally, regardless whether such violence has an effect on the market or not. That is the oversight.
When Rothbard and Hoppe turn to interpersonal realations, they automatically switch to normative theorizing.
The Ethics of Liberty is a book about violence and non-violence used as means of interpersonal relations. In this book Rothbard explicitly distances himself from the value-free, praxeological approach. Either he did not believe interpersonal relations (the traditional realm of ethics and morals) were an appropriate subject matter of praxeology, or, he did not know how to extend praxeology past its historical association with economics. Maybe it was some of both. The fact is that the realm of interpersonal action is treated by Rothbared and Hoppe, but only treated by them with normative theory, not by praxeology.
(if you are asserting that in Power and Market Rothbard extends praxeology to study violent actions generally, and as such, this would be a great topic for a seperate thread)
"Are you suggesting that praxeology is a discipline with subsets corresponding to each of these classes of actions?"
Yes, definitely.
"All physical actions require a prior mental action." (action 2 is preceded by action 1)
Whether true or not, an interpretation of a squence of actions would be a matter of thymology not praxeology. Praxeology is concerned with the formal structure of action as such. (concerned with those things that action 1 and action 2 must have in common)
"Catallactic actions are always interpersonal actions"
Perhaps in the objective sense, but not in the subjective sense. If I purchase something from a vending machine, this could count as an action that could be based on monetary calculation, but it is not interpersonal action in the strict sense. I need not act toward another actor (toward another consciousness) to make a vending machine purchase.
We could possibly start a new thread on some of these issues if you wanted to. In the original post, Vive la Insurrection seems to have independently recognized the alternate conception of praxeology that Rothbard and Hoppe have employed, and my main point was to affirm what he/she had recognized and provide some supporting quotes and background information. In the interpersonal realm of human conduct, the concern of Rothbard and Hoppe has been to try to lend theoretical support to libertarian norms of ethical conduct. Their approach to interpersonal relations has been normative, not analytic (analytic in the value-free sense of the term). The conception wherein praxeology is seen as a method of economics (a method of approaching market phenomena) compliments the viewpoint that sees normative ethics as a method of approaching interpersonal relations.
Mises was an opponent of objective and normative ethics and he believed that interpersonal and political relations were a field to be studied by praxeology. That's why he repeats over and over that economics is but a part or branch, the best elaborated part or branch of praxeology.
For Rothbard, interpersonal relations are treated by natural law, for Hoppe, interpersonal relations are treated by the argumentation ethics. Both of these are normative disciplines. For them, praxeology is "the method" of economics.
For Mises, interpersonal relations are treated by praxeology, the value-free general science of human action.
Adam Knott:For the diagram showing the relationship between the definitions of praxeology, economics, and catallactics, in the Misesian conception: Praxeology: The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration, of exact laws of human action. Economics (catallactics): The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration of exact laws of human action, specifically with regard to market phenomena. In other words, the the discovery of exact laws of man's actions on the market or man's conduct with regard to the market. Here is Mises: Economics is mainly concerned with the analysis of the determination of money prices of goods and services exchanged on the market. (HA-234) The scope of praxeology, the general theory of human action, can be precisely defined and circumscribed. The specifically economic problems, the problems of economic action in the narrower sense, can only by and large be disengaged from the comprehensive body of praxeological theory. (HA-234) Considerations of expediency and traditional convention make us declare that the field of catallactics or of economics in the narrower sense is the analysis of the market phenomena. This is tantamount to the statement: Catallactics is the analysis of those actions which are conducted on the basis of monetary calculation. (HA-234) Thus, Mises clearly conceives that as an economist, he is studying only a circumscribed realm of action. He knows that there are other actions that are not the subject matter of economics as economics. Praxeology is the general science of human action, economics studies man's actions on the market, a specific class of actions.
Because of the parts I've bolded above, your Misesian definition of economics above must mean "economics proper" or "economics in the narrower sense". So what is "economics in the broader sense"? Is that equal to praxeology, or is it still a subset?
Rothbard said in MES that economics is 'Crusoe economics' + catallactics. Is Crusoe economics something that Mises would consider outside of "economics proper" but inside of "economics in the broader sense"?
Rothbard also said that catallactics is the study of interpersonal actions, not the stricter Mises class of "actions which are conducted on the basis of economic calculation". So how would Mises categorise interpersonal actions that are NOT based on economic calculation - and what kinds of actions are these?
As I mentioned in the previous post, we can conceive of at least four broad classes of actions: Physical actions, interpersonal actions, mental actions, and catallactic actions, Economics is primarily concerned with catallactic actions. That leaves three other classes of actions to which three other branches of praxeology might correspond.
Physical actions, interpersonal actions, mental actions, and catallactic actions, Economics is primarily concerned with catallactic actions. That leaves three other classes of actions to which three other branches of praxeology might correspond.
I really don't get how this could be the case. Suppose you and I exchange an apple for an orange. This is certainly a physical action, and it's certainly an interpersonal action, and it certainly required prior mental action by us both. It could be an action "based on monetary calculation" but I'm not sure. Would that only be the case if either apples or oranges happened to be the money in society? It seems like the difference is not really important enough to be categorised as a whole different class of action and analysed within a whole different subset of praxeology.
I can't see how it's useful to think of each class of action as representing a different subset of praxeology, when most (all?) actions fall within more than one of your classes.
Mathematics and geometry could be considered forms or types (early forms and rudimentary types) of exact sciences of physical action. I don't claim that mathematics and geometry are, self-consciously, branches of praxeology.
But mathematics and geometry have nothing to do with action at all. Where's the purposefulness in those disciplines?
Game theory, on the other hand, seems to require purposefulness... would you consider game theory a branch or subset of praxeology?
Regarding how, exactly, Rothbard conceived the relationship between the various realms of human conduct, I would leave that up to Rothbardian scholars to explain. From my point of view, there was a time when Rothbard was more a student of Mises. This is when MES was written, and much of MES follows a Misesian view of things. Later in his life, when Rothbard more strongly developed and asserted his own view of things, this is when his conception of praxeology as largely synonymous with economics became more apparent. But you can see the seeds of his conception even in the passage from MES you provided above: "...and violence in the form of government has been treated by political philosophy and by praxeology in tracing the effects of violent intervention in the free market..." The view of things described here is one where violence, as a mode or form of conduct, is considered in relation to its effect on the market. What is missing in this conception is the question whether there are any regular occurences or consequences that must occur, generally, when an actor employs violence? In the above conception, the idea is to trace the effects of violent intervention in the market, after which economic laws become operant, and we can then say, "violent intervention in the market ( action X), must cause effect Y". There is no conception of a praxeological analysis of violence and its necessary effects generally, when violence is employed as a means by an actor generally, regardless whether such violence has an effect on the market or not. That is the oversight.
That's interesting. What kind of action would have no effect on the market? Give me an example.
When Rothbard and Hoppe turn to interpersonal realations, they automatically switch to normative theorizing. The Ethics of Liberty is a book about violence and non-violence used as means of interpersonal relations. In this book Rothbard explicitly distances himself from the value-free, praxeological approach. Either he did not believe interpersonal relations (the traditional realm of ethics and morals) were an appropriate subject matter of praxeology, or, he did not know how to extend praxeology past its historical association with economics. Maybe it was some of both. The fact is that the realm of interpersonal action is treated by Rothbared and Hoppe, but only treated by them with normative theory, not by praxeology. (if you are asserting that in Power and Market Rothbard extends praxeology to study violent actions generally, and as such, this would be a great topic for a seperate thread)
I am asserting that Rothbard was both a political philosopher and a praxeologist. TEOL is him analysing violence as a political philosopher. P&M is him analysing violence as a praxeologist. I think we can set aside TEOL because that is Rothbard using a different mode of analysis, for better or worse.
I don't know if P&M could be said to cover "violent actions generally" because I can't think of any violent actions that don't also come under "violent actions that affect the market".
"All physical actions require a prior mental action." (action 2 is preceded by action 1) Whether true or not, an interpretation of a squence of actions would be a matter of thymology not praxeology. Praxeology is concerned with the formal structure of action as such. (concerned with those things that action 1 and action 2 must have in common)
Possibly, but I would class my statement that all physical actions require a prior mental action as an exact law and so a praxeological statement. "I act therefore I think", you might say. It is implied by the action axiom that humans think: we think when we choose a goal, and we think when we choose a means to achieve the goal.
"Catallactic actions are always interpersonal actions" Perhaps in the objective sense, but not in the subjective sense. If I purchase something from a vending machine, this could count as an action that could be based on monetary calculation, but it is not interpersonal action in the strict sense. I need not act toward another actor (toward another consciousness) to make a vending machine purchase.
I don't know what you mean. Buying from a vending machine you are making an interpersonal exchange with the owner of the goods inside the vending machine. I don't see what difference it makes that you don't meet face-to-face with the person you are exchanging with.
We could possibly start a new thread on some of these issues if you wanted to. In the original post, Vive la Insurrection seems to have independently recognized the alternate conception of praxeology that Rothbard and Hoppe have employed, and my main point was to affirm what he/she had recognized and provide some supporting quotes and background information.
I appreciate that. I don't see the need to start a new thread. We are on topic here.
Yes, economics in the wider sense is praxeology. Economics in the narrower sense is the study of market phenomena.
The traditional and historical definition of economics is the narrow definition:
"There have never been any doubts and uncertainties about the scope of economic science. Ever since people have been eager for a systematic study of economics or political economy, all have agreed that it is the task of this branch of knowledge to investigate the market phenomena, that is, the determination of the mutual exchange ratios of the goods and services negotiated on markets, their origin in human action and their effects upon later action." (Human Action)
Regarding Crusoe economics, I would rather not get involved in trying to untangle Rothbard's conceptions or trying to translate Rothbard's conceptions into Mises's conceptions. This will probably cause more confusion than necessary. If you read the first two hundred pages of Human Action, Mises doesn't rely much on the Crusoe construct.
*****
In general, I think the part you're not seeing is the difference between an "objective" description of events and the description of an event from the point of view of the individual actor. Misesian praxeology is concerned with the latter and not the former.
Objectivity (the notion of objectivity) is arrived at by taking a description of events, and omitting reference to a describer and/or his act of description.
In subjective analysis, there is no act of description without reference to an actor who describes; there is no act of observation without reference to an actor who observes, there is no act of envisioning without reference to an actor who envisions, etc...
"For it is obvious that an action has only one subjective meaning: that of the actor himself. It is X who gives subjective meaning to his action, and the only subjective meanings being given by F and S in this situation are the subjective meanings they are giving their own actions, namely, their actions of observing X." (Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World)
The "method" of praxeology is methodological individualism or what may be called "individual subject analysis" in which all phenomena are conceived from the point of view of the individual actor, and no activity is depicted without an actor who performs that activity.
When I make a distinction between several various actions, this refers to the nature of the action or the content of the action as the actor himself sees it at the time of his action.
"The explanation of an action must have the same content as was in the person's head when he performed the action or when he reasoned toward his intention to perform the action." (Searl, Minds, Brains and Science)
I'm not referring to the point of view of an observer Y, who watches actor X performing various tasks, and I'm not referring to a later action of X (action 2) wherein X appraises or considers some previous action he performed (action 1). I'm referring to the action X performs, as X understands it, at the time he performs it.
I believe what you want to talk about is the objective point of view. I the observer watch actor X put money in the vending machine. I the observer watch actor Y take money out of the vending machine. Now, I omit reference to my acts of observation. This leaves:
Actor X put money in the vending machine, actor Y took money out of the vending machine. (an objective event)
You want to ask: how does praxeology deal with this event, a description of events from the point of view of an observer in which reference to the observer and his act of observation is omitted.
I want to deal only with what was in the mind of the actor himself (his intention or purpose) at the time he performed the action.
I want to deal with subjective data not objective data.
I think this is the difference.
Adam
("It is important to remember that the so-called "data," from which we set out in this sort of analysis, are....all facts given to the person in question, the things as they are known to (or believed by) him to exist, and not, strictly speaking, objective facts. It is only because of this that the propositions we deduce are necessarily a priori valid and that we preserve the consistency of the argument." Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge")
Thanks for the response Adam. One follow up question
While I tend to agree that Austrianism is linked to some Aristotelian/Scholastic framework, even in Mises tried reframe it in a neo-Kantian framework, isn't this a peculiarly Mengarian outlook?
That is to say, if one is looking broadly at the debates and splits that could be allowed within an Austrian framework as a whole, is exact laws an appropriate generic definition/ broad scope outlook for the definition of praxeology?
Vive la insurrection
I tend to believe that libertarian ethics theories are linked to an Aristotelian/Scholastic framework, but I would debate that Austrian economics and praxeology are tied to Aristotle. Here are some passages from Menger and Mises on the source of economic and praxeological laws:
Menger:
"There is one rule of cognition for the investigation of theoretical truths which as far as possible is verified beyond doubt not only by experience, but simply by our laws of thinking."
"...or, what is in essence the same thing, that strictly typical phenomena of a definite kind must always, and, indeed in consideration of our laws of thinking, simply of necessity, be followed by strictly typical phenomena of just as definite and different a type."
"This rule holds true not only of the nature of phenomena, but also of their measure, and experience not only offers us no exception to it, but such a thing simply seems inconceivable to the critical mind."
"[Science]...does to be sure, and indeed on the basis of the rules of cognition characterized by us above, arrive at laws of phenomena which are not only absolute, but according to our laws of thinking simply cannot be thought of in any other way but as absolute. That is, it arrives at exact laws, the so-called "laws of nature" of phenomena."
(Book 1, Chapter 4, Investigation Into the Method of the Social Sciences)
Compare to Mises:
"But the characteristic feature of a priori knowledge is that we cannot think of the truth of its negation or of something that would be at variance with it. What the a priori expresses is necessarily implied in all our thinking and acting."
"If we qualify a concept or a proposition as a priori, we want to say: first, that the negation of what it asserts is unthinkable for the human mind and appears to it as nonsense; secondly, that this a priori concept or proposition is necessarily implied in our mental approach to all the problems concerned, i.e., in our thinking and acting concerning these problems."
(The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science)
The core of Mises's praxeology and Menger's theoretical exact science is independent of an analysis in terms of Aristotle versus Kant.
Both Menger and Mises are focused on regularities in the social world, specifically with "exact" or "necessary" regularities or relationships, and both attribute these exact regularities to the structure of our thinking or mind.
Exact laws are definitely not peculiar to Menger; they are the essence of Mises's praxeology:
"Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict with apodictic certainty the outcome (B) of various modes of action (A)."
(Human Action)(A and B added)
Mises doesn't use the term "exact laws" but prefers the term "a priori". But both terms refer to the same thing.
If we consider the proposition: "In walking toward a location (phenomenon A) an actor always walks away from a different location (phenomenon B)."
Menger would refer to this situation as an exact law, Mises would refer to it as an a priori proposition. Hayek would maintain that it is a tautological transformation which is necessarily true because it is merely a transformation of the assumption from which we start.
The name one gives to this circumstance isn't essential. What is essential is that phenomenon B occurs every time phenomenon A occurs.
Economic or praxeological laws are Mises's ultimate aim:
"Mises suggested that I explore the changing views about individual behavior which economists had, since the time of Adam Smith, adopted in order for them to grasp the possibility of a science of economics. Given the apparent unpredictability of individual behavior it is intuitively difficult to account for the economic regularities which seem to occur. It was necessary to somehow "understand" individual behavior in a way consistent with the possibility of "scientific laws."
(Kirzner, in his article "Human Action, Freedom, and Economic Science," recalling Mises's suggestion for a topic for his, Kirzner's, dissertation)
Here is part of page 2 of Human Action:
"In the course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man must adjust his actions if he wishes to succeed. It is futile to approach social facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point of view of quite arbitrary standards and subjective judgments of value. One must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature."
Thus, the science that Menger and Mises envision is primarily concerned with regularities in social phenomena, and specifically with those regularities for which no exception is possible, or seems possible. We can call these regularities exact laws, scientific laws, economic laws, praxeological laws, etc... They are the essence of Austrian economics and praxeology.
However, exact laws need not be the primary focus of every discipline within a broader Austrian framework. In Mises's conception, the compliment or counterpart to praxeology is thymology. Essentially, thymology means the non-universal or non-necessary aspects of action. For example, considering a proposition such as "if taxes are increased (phenomenon A), businessmen will hire less employees (phenomenon B)." It refers to specific content (businessmen and taxes as opposed to actors and objects of action generally) and it asserts a regularity which is "inexact" (the relationship between A and B may not hold in every single instance). This proposition also refers to a sequence of seperate actions (as opposed asserting a relationship between an action A and its necessary accompaniment B)
When we treat specific content, assert inexact or "empirical' regularities, or depict a sequence of separate actions, we leave praxeology proper, but we do not necessarily leave a broader Austrian framework. In other words, a broad Austrian framework might include, besides praxeology, both historical and predictive disciplines (forecasting). But these are by definition "inexact" disciplines.
Adam Knott:I tend to believe that libertarian ethics theories are linked to an Aristotelian/Scholastic framework, but I would debate that Austrian economics and praxeology are tied to Aristotle.
Interesting. I'm fairly convinced by Barry Smith's analysis of the Austrian tradition as an Aristotelian one. I know Mises believed that praxeological truths were such because of laws of logic our mind imposed on the world, but I have a hard time accepting that Menger held that view as well. Besides the historical connection of the broader Austrian tradition (Brentano school) to Aristotle and the scholastics, you have Menger saying things like:
"Theoretical economics has the task of investigating the general essence and the general connection of economic phenomena, not of analysing economic concepts and of drawing the conclusions resulting from this analysis. The phenomena, or certain aspects of them, and not their linguistic image, the concepts, are the object of theoretical research in the field of economy." (Investigations)
Also, in the quotes you give of Menger, its clear that he doesn't believe economic phenomena are solely a product of our minds imposing logic on the world, because he talks about the nature of phenomena separate from our cognition of them. When Menger says that we could not concieve of the exact laws as being other than absolute, it isn't because they are products of laws of thought, but because they are laws of reality -- a squarly Aristotelian attitude.
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
mikachusetts
I'm aware of the interpretation of Austrian economics that seeks to establish that it derives from Aristotle. I would argue that what is essential about Austrian economics is independent of an analysis in terms of Aristotle and Kant.
In the quote you provide, Menger argues that economics investigates the general essence and the general connection of economic phenomena. He argues that economics is not about analyzing economic concepts and drawing conclusions from that analysis. Let's take this passage from Hayek:
From the fact that whenever we interpret human action as in any sense purposive or meaningful, whether we do so in ordinary life or for the purposes of the social sciences, we have to define both the objects of human activity and the different kinds of actions themselves, not in physical terms but in terms of the opinions or intentions of the acting persons, there follow some very important consequences; namely, nothing less than that we can, from the concepts of the objects, analytically conclude something about what the actions will be. If we define an object in terms of a person’s attitude toward it, it follows, of course, that the definition of the object implies a statement about the attitude of the person toward the thing. When we say that a person possesses food or money, or that he utters a word, we imply that he knows that the first can be eaten, that the second can be used to buy something with, and that the third can be understood—and perhaps many other things. ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")(emphasis added)
Here Hayek is proposing what Menger is arguing against. The argument against considering praxeology as conceptual analysis alone does not depend or rely on Aristotle, but is independent of Aristotle. I could easily make the same argument to Hayek that Menger is making toward the thinkers he has in mind. I could argue that when we realize that walking toward a location entails walking away from a different location, we did not arrive at this information via conceptual analysis, but by some other way. In arguing against the conception of economics as conceptual analysis, this does not commit me to Aristotelian ontology or any philosopher's conceptions of Aristotelian ontology.
Also, if a writer uses the word "essence" this does not tie or connect that writer to Aristotle.
"The starting point of praxeology is not a choice of axioms and a decision about methods of procedure, but reflection about the essence of action." (Mises)
"All that is needed for the deduction of all praxeological theorems is knowledge of the essence of human action." (Mises)
In these passages Mises is not committing himself to any kind of Aristotelian ontology by his use of the term essence.
What is essential about Austrian economics or praxeology is that it proposes a necessary relationship between an action A, and some result of or accompaniment to that action, B. This is what Hayek does in the passage above, and so in this sense he is practicing praxeology and Austrian economics. Menger may conceive the nature and source of social necessity differently, and Mises still differently.
The essential aspect is the attempt to provide a theory or rationale for social necessity. It is not essential that the rationale be an Aristotelian one or a Kantian one.
Also, I believe that the position of those who try to explain the regularity of social phenomena with reference to the human mind is more subtle than the position you portray.
1. "...our mind imposed on the world..."
2. "...our minds imposing logic on the world..."
3. "...products of laws of thought..."
In your portrayal (1&2), there is an assumed objective world on the one hand, and a mind separate from that world on the other hand. This separate mind takes the objectively existing material and reconfigures it, imposing it's own structure on what was previously an independently and objectively existing substance or world.
(In #3, the conception is kind of reversed. In this conception, the mind or structure of thought "produces" something separate from the mind or the structure of thought, hence "product of thought.")
This way of thinking about things presupposes and assumes an objective world or objective substance separate from and independent of any consciousness.
The presupposition of an objective real world independent of any consciousness is essentially the beginning postulate or axiom of the philosophy of objective realism, the philosophy generally preferred by objective ethicists.
The "structure of mind" or "categories of thought" approach is not dependent on the assumption of an objective real world independent of any consciousness. In this approach, one categorizes (classifies) all the various phenomena of experience (of consciousness). This categorization or classification scheme is a formal scheme akin to formal mathematics and geometry. It differs from those in that its object is intentionality as opposed to extended space. Instead of a graph or chart that depicts things in terms of "over here" and "over there" or "higher" and "lower," the formal praxeological scheme depicts the phenomena of consciousness in terms of "means" and "ends" or in terms of "satisfaction" and "dissatisfaction."
The formal scheme is neutral with respect to a supposed objective reality. It neither affirms nor denies the existence of an objective real world.
To the extent the formal scheme categorizes the phenomena of consciousness, then of course it does not categorize those things which are not phenomena of consciousness. This is not identical to a positive assertion that such things do not "exist." It merely means that such things, posited by some to exist, do not enter a formal scheme that categorizes only phenomena of consciousness.
Once again though, for a broad definition of praxeology (and nor just a Misean one) - I think this "exact law" can be contested. Many Austrians seem (particualrly NYU Austrians?) fine using a Weber "ideal type" that goes contrary to what Mises and Menger seemed to be driving at.
Wether or not people like Lavoie, etc are wrong isn't my issue - but the fact that praxeology, in general, seems to have a broader definition.
vive la insurrection
"...praxeology, in general, seems to have a broader definition."
Why not provide some of the other definitions of praxeology as proposed by other thinkers?
Just skim the chapter on "From Mises to Lachmann"
http://library.mises.org/books/George%20A%20Selgin/Praxeology%20and%20Understanding%20An%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Controversy%20in%20Austrian%20Economics.pdf
That's the general idea what I was getting at. Along with the Don Lavoie use of Hermeneutics.
Basically it seems legit to have a Weber - Shutz - Hayek - Shackel - Lachmann line under the science in so much as praxeology isn't a method