What does it mean to be an objectivist (the wikipedia definition is very very confusing, and example of how an objectivist would think might help me out)?
After reading For a new liberty (im halfway through), i kinda want to study human action ( i say kinda since im not sure if i should read more about the economics itself, or more political oriented works, but at the same time i think learning the philosophy/methodology is very important to understanding), and the austrian's methodology and things similar to this kind of stuff.
What books would you guys reccommend starting off, if not books then lectures/youtube vids?
“Since people are concerned that ‘X’ will not be provided, ‘X’ will naturally be provided by those who are concerned by its absence.""The sweetest of minds can harbor the harshest of men.”
http://voluntaryistreader.wordpress.org
I'd go straight to the source and read Rand. She is an intelligent and often evocative author. The Fountainhead, The Virtue of Selfishness and Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal are all worth reading, as is Atlas Shrugged.
For Objectivist theory generally, I'd read David Kelley and his Logical Structure of Objectivism. Roderick Long has an interesting book on Rand but it's very, very difficult to get hold of and is very pricy. Reisman also writes from a Randian perspective and he is, I think, one of the most impressive Austrian thinkers.
On ethics, I'd go for Hoppe, John Harsanyi, Nozick, David Schmidtz (Elements of Justice), Anthony de Jasay, Jan Narveson, Stephan Kinsella (his estoppel approach) and David Friedman, as they have varying approaches which you can learn from. For more advanced reading on Rand's ethics and a formulation of an Aristotelian ethical system of natural rights, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas den Uyl are worth the effort.
On epistemology, again Hoppe and Mises. They're insightful and very well read. Roderick Long's work on Wittgenstein and generally most of the stuff he writes is of interest, as is the case with David Gordon, Leland Yeager, Henry Veatch (very good Aristotelian author), Geoffrey Alan Plauche, Daniel Sanchez and Barry Smith, and this site's own Adam Knott. George Selgin has a great article on comprehending the praxeological method. Hollis and Nell (Rational Economic Man), Laurence Bonjour (In Defense of Pure Reason) and Brand Blanshard are also valuable reads. Generally speaking you'd benefit from reading Daniel Dennet and Thomas Nagel. I don't agree with a lot of what they say, but they make you think. Most of the features I mentioned feature on the Mises website.
Needless to say, you should read Kant, Aristotle and Hume, and perhaps Plato. All philosophy revolves around them to some degree or other. You could probably add Nietzsche to that list. Quine and Popper are very influential and you could profit from reading them if only to understand some very popular philosophical currents.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Are austrian economists objectivists? Or it doesnt really matter?
I disagree with relativism, but i do not think that everything is absolute either (for if everything was relativie, then wouldnt that make it absolutist in the first place, therefore negating relativism?). One mans trash can be one mans treasure, and 4 will always be greater number than 3, what is the difference between absolutism and objectivism?
Nope, they're mostly not Objectivist nor is Objectivism related much to Austrianism other than the act that Rand admired Mises. I think Objectivism is still worth educating oneself on, as it is based on an Aristotelian thought system and often approaches philosophical issues from a fresh perspective. Avoid the hardcore Peikoff type Randroids though. Peikoff himself has work I'd consider reading but without falling into that line of cultism.
Objectivism is not a relativist system of thought, no. Objectivism is a complete system of thought, encompassing epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics etc. Absolutism as you put it tends to be narrowed down to an epistemological position. I now wonder if you're using the term "objectivist" (to be contrasted with a variety of subjectivist positions in different disciplines of philosophy) in its common philosophical usage or to refer to Ayn Rand's brand of it.
what is the difference between absolutism and objectivism?
This is the thrust of what it means to be in a cult. Your perspective mixed with some kind of (perceived) objective morality (that you hold, but others do not) is what creates religions and states.
Rothbard used to be great friends with Ayn Rand, and then she went ahead and insulted his wife. I'm sure there was more to it, but that seemed to be the straw that broke the camel's back. Walter Block also knew Rand personally, and he seems to hold her in high regard.
But this is just coincidence. There is nothing about Austrian Economics that would cause its economists to be objectivists. In fact, most probably are not, seeing as many Austrian economists are anarchists, and that is directly at odds with objectivism.
Objectivism is Rand's philosophy. Subjectivism is just realizing that values are subject and not objecive. Your clothes do not have an objective price. A burger is not objectively better than cereal. 4 is greater than 3, and that is not subjective. It does not depend upon a subject. Values require a subject to do the valuing.
Actually I'd say cults are pretty subjectivist based on the fact that they rely upon the authority of some individual (or super-individual) and a core of elites that interprets its word. This isn't objective in any sense of the word.
Hmm, still confused ill look on mises website for some articles.
What does it mean when you say that objectivism is a cult?
All it is is a group of people who think theyre right?
Wouldnt any school of X subject be a cult also?
Well it depends on how you are using the term. "Objectivism" tends to refer to the view that some thing out there (e.g. the truth, ethical values etc.) is objective i.e. independent of the mind.You can be committed to one type of objectivism without being committed to the other.
This is not the same as Ayn Rand's Objectivism, which does take the objectivist position on a number of these questions but is its own thought system altogether. I think you need to focus your thoughts a little and try decide what it is you are trying to learn.
So there is objectivism, then theres ayns rand's flavor of objectivist thought?
The reason why Objectivism and Austrianism are so close but have little overlap is because while they end up at the same libertarian policy prescriptions they do so through practically opposite ways, the first through the application of hard moral principles of how rational man should act while Austrianism is value-free and arrives at its conclusion through the assumption of radical subjectivism and the assumption that all actions are inherently of equal merit. While there is nothing that is explicitly contradictory here (except insofar as Austrianism contradicts any ethical system).
The reason why Objectivism is often labeled as a cult is because those who adhere to the philosophy tend to live by the word of Rand alone, focusing little on other points of view and deeming anyone who does not agree with them as religious and illogical. Furthermore the way the organization acted while Rand herself was alive was rather cultish, as you'll read if you look into Rothbard's writings on the subject.
As for your OP I don't understand if you're asking for advice on whether to look into Objectivism or further Austrianism or something else. Can you rephrase the question?
Ill rephrase:
Which books can I read to gain a better understanding of austrian philosophy and methodology?
The objectivism part was something on my mind that i wanted to know about- didnt really want to read a book indepth just wanted to understand better.
Still the books I recommended. I'd also pick up Veatch's Two Logics.
I agree with Jon in his book recommendations.
But depending on how you want to approach the subject, I might suggest certain works as higher priority and others as lesser priority.
For me, the Economics was the entry point, but my primary interest has always been the deeper systemic application of knowledge in general. In my youth, when I started to ask which party I embraced, I went to look at Political Philosophy. I embraced libertarian themes, and that lead to the economics of the Austrian School. I also found Objectivism as so many do.
But as I continued to dig, the desire systematically order and interconnect the various fields and views of the world such that "everything had its place" led me to continue to ask lots of questions and I ended up reading a lot of philosophy stuff, and thinking about many of the confusing questions of philosophy. Objectivism in many ways helped me understand the battleground, in particular the subjective/objective dualism. Which I came to embrace as the the dual reams of the is/ought problem. She embraced objective reality as preeminent over subjective reality. I agreed. So does Austrian Economics. However, her philosophy is predicated on collapsing the dualism into objectivism only. Mises however disagreed.
My disconnect there, is that rationality arises from the subjective nature of man. I didn't understand how that mattered until I read The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science. Everything fell into place for me in that book. Mises in that book embraced man's subjective experience as the only experience of man. That all of the fundamental tools we examine in epistemology are givens from which we construct an objective interpretation of reality itself. But it doesn't remove the subjective nature of the action man engages in, and in this way gives rise to the normative disciplines. The normative disciplines are inside the box, and cannot be divorced from value judgment. There may be general correlations, in terms of the social and personal side effects inside the human mind and in our social spheres that would be viewed as harmful and damaging, but he considered the ends at which a man aimed to be givens. In order to make her system work Rand embraced an Objective ideal, the survival of man. That is however a subjective value. That was the point Mises wouldn't cross (ends as givens) and I embrace his courage and agree with him.
The reason there's so much overlap in practice was that she rigorously articulated logical ethics of a man who seeks to not just survive but thrive. She embraced an Aristotelian view of reality and therefore employed Logic in describing the necessary side-effects of various political and ethical positions on the man himself and on society as a whole. Praxeology must therefore give similar if not identical conclusions. The difference simply being Rand stated them as absolute objective truth, instead of what they actually are is if then ethical propositions which a man then decides to embrace or discard based on his own desires.
So, if in the end, you are looking for a way to bind the various scientific or rational fields of man, into a coherent whole, be they physical or social sciences or philosophical disciplines, that book The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science(Mises) is the key. Theory and History(also Mises) is one others recommend and I'm reading it now.
If you're primarily interested in the economic content, then Human Action is the book. You will still get a fair amount of the epistemological underpinnings in the early chapters.
Hoppe is also very good on the Epistemological aspects of Praxeology.
Michael M:Rand embraced survival (qua man) as an ideal while explaining that until one makes that very same choice no values are possible at all. She identified the fact that the most fundamental alternative faced by all living entities is to pursue life or not (life/death, existence/non-existence, etc.) Only volitional living entities who choose to pursue life require values in order to achieve it. Consequently, the if/then proposition of Objectivist ethics is, "if you choose life, then values are necessary and life is the standard of their measure" -- both an if/then proposition and an absolute truth. Once one embraces that goal and grasps that one's only means to achieve it is by the application of reason to action in production and trade, and grasps also that force is the only threat to one's freedom to so apply it, Rand's politics of absolute freedom from initiated force is inescapable.
By this reasoning, an attempt failed or not to kill oneself, of to sacrifice oneself, would be to reject value. I think we're conjoining two different contexts. Praxeology defines value as arising out of action. Value, in a thing (an object), arises out of the worthiness of the object toward a specific end. You are implying that in order to seek any end one must at a minimum have chosen to live. The fact that there is an exception, the end of suicide, implies that there's a significant logical hole in the "seeking of life" as the prerequisite of having values. There are other exceptions. I prefer a looser supposition, that choice in and of itself, the fact that man acts purposefully is the source of the entire realm of normative phenomena, as the normative concept assumes intention. To say what normative ethics a man SHOULD have, when others are possible (though they may in fact be self-destructive by his own standard) is the application of intentionality to the system that intentioinality arises from. It's either an infinite regression, OR the objective realm gives rise to the subjective realm and then objectively "judges" the actions that arise from action. In the second case then one cannot go back to the objective realm to find objective roots for the subjective choice, but must instead look in the opposite direction and give objective analysis of outcomes for a specific subjective choice.
Values in the context you mean them might be the specific axioms, maxims, rules by which one chooses actions that are "good" or "bad", and that these rules, as we know from experience, are not entirely based on consequences. They can in fact preclude actions that may be more efficient, because one determines by his own "values" that the action has some inherent property that makes them not just "bad" but "Bad" in a broader sense.
I believe that the objective destination of action is the proper place to determine whether or not the outcome of that action constitutes a "good" outcome. And that values in the ethical sense are a convenient shorthand that aid in the selection of potential actions especially as the risks (uncertain theory or limited data) increase. The fact that ethical values tend to converge in specific ways is not an outcome of objective reality as origin, but of objective reality as destination. I don't fault any of the logic that inhabits her Objectivist Ethics, I simply argue that this is objective of the second order not the first order (origin of the subjective nature of man) and thus since what a man's ultimate ends are exists in the subjective realm, his choices are his own.
Michael M: The if/then propositions "which a man then decides to embrace or discard based on his owdn desires" are the subject of the descriptive science of economics so comprehensively well defined by Mises. But it is only the normative science of ethics that can evaluate those subjective (personal) choices as valid or invalid in reference to man's nature and reality.
David B: Value, in a thing (an object), arises out of the worthiness of the object toward a specific end. You are implying that in order to seek any end one must at a minimum have chosen to live.
David B: I prefer a looser supposition, that choice in and of itself, the fact that man acts purposefully is the source of the entire realm of normative phenomena, as the normative concept assumes intention.
David B: To say what normative ethics a man SHOULD have, when others are possible (though they may in fact be self-destructive by his own standard) is the application of intentionality to the system that intentioinality arises from.
David B: I simply argue that this is objective of the second order not the first order (origin of the subjective nature of man) and thus since what a man's ultimate ends are exists in the subjective realm, his choices are his own.
David B: Her final destination was "I want to remain alive."
David B: Good and Bad are in the mind, not in the survival instinct of the man. The survival instinct is in the man. But that is only one of the factors by which a man may evaluate the actions he chooses to take.
kelvin_silva:Which books can I read to gain a better understanding of austrian philosophy and methodology?
Luckily someone already did the work for you and distilled it all in an excellent magnum opus: Human Action. Strap on and enjoy the intellectual ride of your life.
Michael M: No, I am saying that since life v death is the most fundamental alternative, that there is no intention or end one can choose that does not already imply the prior choice of one or the other. The choice to die does not reject value, it rejects life and thereby obviates value. One need not be conscious of making the choice. It is already implicit in a child's responses to pleasure and pain.
No, I am saying that since life v death is the most fundamental alternative, that there is no intention or end one can choose that does not already imply the prior choice of one or the other. The choice to die does not reject value, it rejects life and thereby obviates value. One need not be conscious of making the choice. It is already implicit in a child's responses to pleasure and pain.
This is not true. As David B made clear, the most fundamental alternative that man faces is which means will result in his desired ends. While it is true that you cannot be both alive and dead simultaneously, most people do not consider their choices with life and death in mind, whether or not you consider it to be implied. If I am facing a choice of whether to eat a McIntosh or a Granny Smith apple, I am not deciding between life and death. I am choosing which apple will result in my desired end, which for most of the time is what tastes better. Only in subsistence living do we really choose between life and death.
Choosing has everything to do with satisfaction and choosing between pleasure and pain. Do I choose pleasure now with the result of pain later, or vice versa? There are many thoughts and choices we can all face, but very few of them are a life and death dichotomy. To assume that because I have chosen to eat either of the apples means that I have also chosen to live is beside the point. For all we know, I could choose to eat 600 calories a day in some desire to shed weight really fast. Should I continue long enough, I would probably die from malnourishment. But anorexics do not choose to die. They do not believe that their unhealthy body weight is in fact unhealthy and likely to kill them. Sure, you might say that their choices are good/bad right/wrong, but that is beside the point. The point is that they are not making a choice between life and death. They are making a choice between healthy body weight and unhealthy body weight, and they don't even see it in that sphere either.
Furthermore, there is nothing that we can really learn from this life/death dichotomy. We can learn a lot from praxeology (economics comes to mind), but praxeology is the science of action, which has nothing to do with a life/death dichotomy, and it has everything to do with man's chosen means to reach his desired end, which is satisfaction.
Regarding the rest of your post, it seems that you are confused about objective and subjective. Reality does not establish man's values. Values are not objective. Values require subjects. They exist only within the mind of a subject. As David B pointed out:
David B: The mistake she made, in my opinion, is the equivalent of thinking that cute is in the baby, and not in the mind of the parent. That funny is in the thing said and not in the mind of the joke teller and the joke hearer, that sweet is in the cake or pie, and not in the brain itself. Good and Bad are in the mind, not in the survival instinct of the man.
The mistake she made, in my opinion, is the equivalent of thinking that cute is in the baby, and not in the mind of the parent. That funny is in the thing said and not in the mind of the joke teller and the joke hearer, that sweet is in the cake or pie, and not in the brain itself. Good and Bad are in the mind, not in the survival instinct of the man.
While it is true that anyone who is alive prefers life to death, this does not make it some sort of objective value. All we can say from this is that people are alive prefer life to death for themselves. The subject in question values life more than death. That is all. It is not that life is somehow objectively good. This is gibberish. It's like saying to the people in New Orleans that Katrina was angry with them. Hurrican Katrina is an object, not a subject. Though we have named it, this does not make it a subject. This demonstrates confusion about what subjects and objects even are. And for all Rand's criticisms of witch doctors, she pulled the same thing they did; she personified a concept that has no personality or mind. Ayn Rand was a very intelligent woman, but unfortunately she tried to subjectify objects. Ironic.
Michael M: David B: Value, in a thing (an object), arises out of the worthiness of the object toward a specific end. You are implying that in order to seek any end one must at a minimum have chosen to live. No, I am saying that since life v death is the most fundamental alternative, that there is no intention or end one can choose that does not already imply the prior choice of one or the other. The choice to die does not reject value, it rejects life and thereby obviates value. One need not be conscious of making the choice. It is already implicit in a child's responses to pleasure and pain. David B: I prefer a looser supposition, that choice in and of itself, the fact that man acts purposefully is the source of the entire realm of normative phenomena, as the normative concept assumes intention. No, it is not the action of choosing per se but rather which alternative is chosen that gives rise to the need for a normative system. We might be saying the same thing here indirectly. But let me unpack, choosing is not an action. The action demonstrates the choice. For any specific act, there are always alternative options, if there was no alternative action, it was not a choice, it was not normative, it was a given. To act is to choose, to act is to prefer. Value is the term we give to the choosing of one action and discarding another action. The action chosen has a higher subjective value than the action discarded. Value as a measurement of some quantity or magnitude of a phenomena in reality is not the same thing, as the abstract praxeological value category. It has no measurement in the arithmetic sense. There is only one sense in which it can be measured and that's by the mathematical terms "greater than" and "less than". The series of actions that a person takes over time presents to us the contents of a virtual stack of ends, and the current action demonstrates the action currently most highly valued. What I don't think is getting through is that every word that has any sense of preference, or value, or judgment between two things (even if the second thing is not stated but simply implied) is predicated on the teleological nature of man. I don't know how to make this point any more clearly. My point is the choosing nature of man is the source of the normative stance. I'll follow up below, on the next part of that very point. Michael M: David B: To say what normative ethics a man SHOULD have, when others are possible (though they may in fact be self-destructive by his own standard) is the application of intentionality to the system that intentioinality arises from. Intentionality has nothing to do with what normative ethics a man should have. That is established by man's nature. Life in this context means maximization of the potential of that nature. And each action one opts for will either contribute to (the good) or detract from (the bad) that. First point in this paragraph, "Intentionality has nothing to do wit what normative ethics a man should have." We disagree here in that I believe intention arises in the mean, and that this is the source of "any concept of should". The universe does not contain "should" apart from the mind of man. But you point at man's nature. So here we go. Let me point at a thing in reality. A chair. What is the nature of a chair? Your first thought of course is to sit in it... but that's the purpose of it. Unless that's what you mean by the "nature". In this context, the purpose of the chair is not in the chair, it's in the human mind, it's in the epistemological layer, not in objective reality. I could just as easily objectify it as firewood. Now in this case, I'm choosing to use a different set of mental categories that represent attributes of the "thing in reality that I see as a chair/firewood". But this is not, nor has it ever been the way I view the term objective reality. Perhaps that's the disconnect. But even so, to objectify a thing, in that sense requires an observer, again it requires the intentional stance. For in this case to objectify something is to see it as that object which is necessarily the embracing of a thing from a specific point of view. Other features or attributes or qualities of that "thing in reality" are ignored, discarded, or unseen. Michael M: David B: I simply argue that this is objective of the second order not the first order (origin of the subjective nature of man) and thus since what a man's ultimate ends are exists in the subjective realm, his choices are his own. That man is volitional and makes his own choices is not relevant to whether or not those choices are objective or subjective, nor is it relevant to whether or not Rand's or anyone else's identifications of the process are accurate. We all make our own choices and for the consequences to contribute to life, they all have to meet the same standards established by the nature of reality. This is our disconnect, you're going to need to define what you mean by subjective and objective. To me they are "point of view" one subjective is from inside the mind of man, and the other is they imagined but real world outside. The only other way I could interpret it is as the category by which the subjective man is apprehending the target thing in reality. Making it an "object". But then I'll point at the category and say, why is that the category. What it means to be a man and what my nature is are then the "Category" by which I apprehend myself. Michael M: David B: Her final destination was "I want to remain alive." No, it was "I want to live" in the fullest sense of the word, a multitude of layers away from merely sustaining physical existence. That's a goal, what makes it right? Because I can just get along without dying. If her argument is that I'm less than a man, then that denies the fact that everything in reality (including us) can be used by man toward any end he chooses to attain, as long as it's applicable. It doesn't require figuring out how to maximize all of my potential as a man. I like that as a goal, but we all take shortcuts in order to do whatever it is we choose to do. In fact, ethical propositions are just that type of shortcut, as are emotions. Emotions are instinctual and are hard to directly bring under control, ethical propositions are more directly manageable, but will be constructed internally regardless of your active participation or not. Michael M: David B: Good and Bad are in the mind, not in the survival instinct of the man. The survival instinct is in the man. But that is only one of the factors by which a man may evaluate the actions he chooses to take. What one thinks at any given time that Good and Bad are is in one's mind, where one identifies and evaluates reality. What Good and Bad really are is established by the nature of what reality is. What the former ought to be is consistent with the latter. And since man is volitional, there are no instincts, survival or otherwise, to provide that consistency for him. He must discover it and act accordingly. Again, I put choice in there, because that's what is, everytime I see must, ought, nature, etc. I see frame of reference and choice. That's the reality. That certain goals and ethics may lead to "better" results presumes the results desired. That a man will have an goal or end is a given, which of the myriad goals a man might seek is not a Given. I don't know how much farther around the circle we can go. I did this before with Rand's work, and didn't see how she could (or thought that she did) escape the epistemological, teleological, praxeological box that man's consciousness or self, his knowledge and choice, are confined to. | Post Points: 5
Michael M: David B: To say what normative ethics a man SHOULD have, when others are possible (though they may in fact be self-destructive by his own standard) is the application of intentionality to the system that intentioinality arises from. Intentionality has nothing to do with what normative ethics a man should have. That is established by man's nature. Life in this context means maximization of the potential of that nature. And each action one opts for will either contribute to (the good) or detract from (the bad) that.
Michael M: David B: I simply argue that this is objective of the second order not the first order (origin of the subjective nature of man) and thus since what a man's ultimate ends are exists in the subjective realm, his choices are his own. That man is volitional and makes his own choices is not relevant to whether or not those choices are objective or subjective, nor is it relevant to whether or not Rand's or anyone else's identifications of the process are accurate. We all make our own choices and for the consequences to contribute to life, they all have to meet the same standards established by the nature of reality.
Michael M: David B: Her final destination was "I want to remain alive." No, it was "I want to live" in the fullest sense of the word, a multitude of layers away from merely sustaining physical existence.
Michael M: David B: Good and Bad are in the mind, not in the survival instinct of the man. The survival instinct is in the man. But that is only one of the factors by which a man may evaluate the actions he chooses to take. What one thinks at any given time that Good and Bad are is in one's mind, where one identifies and evaluates reality. What Good and Bad really are is established by the nature of what reality is. What the former ought to be is consistent with the latter. And since man is volitional, there are no instincts, survival or otherwise, to provide that consistency for him. He must discover it and act accordingly.
gotlucky:the most fundamental alternative that man faces is which means will result in his desired ends.
No. Your analysis is short-range and concrete bound. The choice to pursue life that gives rise to the need to have values is long-range. Having short-range desires and/or ends is the pursuit of life in the long-range, i.e. the fundamental choice is already made. The short-range choice between two apples is just one result of one's long-range commitment to maximize life, in this case by seeking pleasurable nutrition.
The relationship between one's choices and the life/death alternative is seldom a conscious one in those terms. It consists of no more than grasping that one's short range choices have longer range consequences and acting accordingly. Children and a lot of adults who have no capacity to grasp this alternative in this context nevertheless exercise this principle every day of their lives.
gotlucky:But anorexics do not choose to die. They do not believe that their unhealthy body weight is in fact unhealthy and likely to kill them. Sure, you might say that their choices are good/bad right/wrong, but that is beside the point. The point is that they are not making a choice between life and death.
This is not beside the point, it is a different point in a different context entirely. The first question in this matter was not what values are right or wrong. The first question was why do we need to have values in the first place. The answer to that question was that we only need them if our long-range goal is life; and we need them because evaluation is a deliberative and time-consuming action, while life is a sequence of complex and spontaneous choices. Therefore we need a code of abstract principles (values) to guide our spontaneous emotional responses to every instant of our lives.
Only after answering that question does the second question arise: what kinds of actions will contribute to life, and what kinds will detract? Implicit in the question itself is that life is the standard for making that distinction. One can only judge the choice to be anorexic to be an error because it can be objectively demonstrated to detract from the pursuit of life in the long-run, and that judgement can only be in relevant to one who has chosen at the fundamental level, consciously or implicitly, life over death.
No value can be judged valid or invalid, rational or irrational, outside of the context of a particular choice from the fundamental alternative.
Note that the choice of death over life does not necessitate values. To exercise that choice, one needs only to not think and act. Even in changing one's choice to live to a choice to die (suicide) does not involve any values. One's choices of when and how to end one's life are still choices about the quality of one's life right up to the point of its extinction. Death is not a value. It is the absence of values.
I'm not sure of how much I want to continue this discussion. It is incredible how effectively Randian Objectivism renders an intelligent mind useless. Any and all choice made by man is demonstrating a preference of one thing over another. Man acts in order to satisfy his wants. Rand smoked cigarettes because of the fire in the mind nonsense, yet she looked down upon marijuana smokers. Whatever. She had her biases and she tried to rationalize them. If anything, cigarettes represent death while marijuana represents life. After all, we can have medical marijuana, but I have yet to hear any doctor prescribe medical tobacco.
The fact of the matter is that people choose one thing over another because they value that thing more than the other. If someone chooses to eat pie instead of salad, they are demonstrating their preference for pie over salad at that moment. Trying to sneak in "pleasurable life" or whatever after the fact still does not save this silly life/death dichotomy. After all, there are people who actually prefer simple living and renounce worldly goods. There aren't many of them, as most people prefer to have material wealth, but there are people who value the opposite. What is pleasurable to one person may not be pleasurable to another.
One's choices of when and how to end one's life are still choices about the quality of one's life right up to the point of its extinction. Death is not a value. It is the absence of values.
This is pseudo-intellectualism. A man who sacrifices his life to save his wife is not lacking values. He values his wife's life more than his own. He is not saying that he does not value anything. It is unbelievable how useless this life/death dichotomy is. And what's more, whenever you try to explain your useless dichotomy, you try to explain it in terms of pleasure. Well, hello, guess what ataraxia and human action are all about. In order for you to justify this dichotomy, you have to in some way reference Misean action. Cut out the excess garbage and go with the premise that is not only true but actually useful in understanding the world.
Please, "death is not a value". What nonsense. This is just more of imbuing objects with values. It's the kind of nonlogic that Marx had regarding his Labor Theory of Value. Yup, that's right. Rand's logic is the same as Marx's. You heard it here first, folks. If someone values death, then he values death. Maybe he is a murderer who values death for his victim. Maybe he is a man who values his wife's or child's life more than his own. Maybe he is a firefighter who values saving a trapped victim more than his own life. But this life/death dichotomy allows for no such understanding of these actions. I don't really care to hear your explanation, as it will just be more of the same. You have a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between subjects and objects and also of Misean action.
Feel free to have the last word. If you introduce some new concept, perhaps I'll respond. But if it's just more of the same, then I doubt I will be bothered to continue this discussion. There really isn't much to say to someone who cannot recognize the difference between a subject and object.
Michael M:No. Your analysis is short-range and concrete bound. The choice to pursue life that gives rise to the need to have values is long-range. Having short-range desires and/or ends is the pursuit of life in the long-range, i.e. the fundamental choice is already made. The short-range choice between two apples is just one result of one's long-range commitment to maximize life, in this case by seeking pleasurable nutrition.
By that reasoning, we've all already chosen death, as all life ultimately comes to an end.
You also seem to be using an unusual definition of "choose". Most people's definition of "choose" implies consciousness, but yours does not. Why is that?
Finally, I'll note that Rand considered survival to necessarily precede "thriving" (i.e. utility/value-maximization). That doesn't actually follow, however. None of us chooses to become alive, but we can choose to become dead. Praxeology doesn't consider that to be a contradiction, but Objectivist ethics does.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Michael M:Note that the choice of death over life does not necessitate values. To exercise that choice, one needs only to not think and act. Even in changing one's choice to live to a choice to die (suicide) does not involve any values. One's choices of when and how to end one's life are still choices about the quality of one's life right up to the point of its extinction. Death is not a value. It is the absence of values.
That directly contradicts Rand's definition of "value". From "The Objectivist Ethics":
Ayn Rand:“Value” is that which one acts to gain and/or keep.
Given that definition, death certainly can be a value, because one can act to gain death.
gotlucky: It is incredible how effectively Randian Objectivism renders an intelligent mind useless.
Autolykos: By that reasoning, we've all already chosen death, as all life ultimately comes to an end.
Autolykos: Most people's definition of "choose" implies consciousness, but yours does not. Why is that?
Autolykos:Finally, I'll note that Rand considered survival to necessarily precede "thriving" (i.e. utility/value-maximization). That doesn't actually follow, however. None of us chooses to become alive, but we can choose to become dead. Praxeology doesn't consider that to be a contradiction, but Objectivist ethics does.
Michael M: gotlucky: It is incredible how effectively Randian Objectivism renders an intelligent mind useless. I apologize for any role my adopted philosophy played in rendering your mind useless. I assure you it is only temporary, and I am sorry you are not going to comment further after the effects wear off, as, per the absence of pertinent content in this post, they clearly haven't yet. You are merely describing various ways men value, none of which is contrary to anything I have said. And by the way, did you know that never in the recorded history of the digital universe has anyone been able to pre-announce his departure from a forum or blog and subsequently resist the urge to come back and post at least one more time to the same thread he left?
Hey, ignore him, focus on me.
Explain what you mean by objective, and explain how objective facts arise out of reality. Next, i want to understand what you mean by "nature of man" and where you think it comes from.
I'm going to try to add additional structure to what I mean when I use the terms I do, and I want to understand the terms you are meaning when you use them. So, I'm providing this detail for you to explain the things you mean by the terms above.
I assume this structure <Reality(Metaphysics)> -> <Human Mind(Epistemology)> -> <Subjective Value(Ethics)> -> <Subjective Social Norms(Politics)>
In addition I assume that Teleology implies Praxeology and that both sit at the root of the Human Mind, they cannot arise independent from each other, they are in the mind, they are of the mind, but the Mind itself sits on them and is subject to them. Meaning that any concrete conscious thought was produced with them already present and implicit in the knowledge itself.
Knowledge can be Objective only in the sense that it makes observations of facts, or deduces facts about or rules that interpret or relations between specific Real Phenomena produced in Reality. However, the knowledge itself is not the reality itself, it is a phenomena in reality.
Objective when a man says it can mean two things. 1) it says something about his knowledge, meaning that the category as defined is relevant and matches real phenomena in reality. The word 'lie' is then an objective category. I can define it and know that it is possible in reality and I can also verify that it has happened in reality. Whether or not a specific statement is a lie is not so easily determined.
The other sense in which a man can use the term Objective (and I tend to mean it in both of these ways) is to speak of Objective Reality. By this I mean what reality actually in spite of but not necessarily in contrast to what I think of it.
And so, one is taking the reality apart from my observation and asking is this thing actually a "real thing" apart from my mind. So, is Time in Reality? No, but change is and it has regular features. Time is the term I use to refer to regularity of change. The second part is to look at my word 'time' instead and ask if it refers to something objective in reality, but what I mean when I say time isn't regular change it's this mental abstract thing that is going by. So my category doesn't exactly refer to change specifically.
So 'Time' is an objective thing, but it really isn't in reality. What I'm seeing is an intepretation of something else that is happening in reality. I believe most if not all words are this very thing. In other words we bind our categories to part of the reality, by necessity, and in doing so leave out others.
Ethics arises from inside the mind, not from outside. There is no way in which to place any features of Ethics outside of Action and Purpose (Praxeology and Teleology). And because of that I can Objectively Look At Ethics, because ethics is a thing produced by specific features of the mind, therefore it is real, a product of reality. But in arising inside the Epistemological layer, it can't add anything to that which arises before it, or which gives rise to it. So, Purposefulness and Actionability (nice words huh?) were produced from evolution in a nascent form in animals, they played an active and in fact accelerating role in producing higher and higher levels of intelligence, eventually resulting in the human mind, which can produce and use knowledge.
Purposefulness and Actionability requires some mechanism in the brain for goal selection and action initiation prior to the rise of Conscious interference. However, that does not mean that there was an Ethical system before hand. But it would constitute a hard-wired instinctual ethic system. With the introduction of knowledge into the process, man knows self and man knows things, but this knowing is simply a tool for goal selection and action initiation.
Prior to this knowledge, the function of the brain, worked based only to the extent that it propogated that specific instance of life. That did not make it the right brain, or the right hard-wiring. It made it the one that worked. Surviving was not the goal. Surviving was the result, and procreation was the gateway through which it had to pass. Procreation doesn't "care", the species doesn't "care" and the animal doesn't "want" in the sense that man "wants", when he describes it.
Man with knowledge takes ownership of his goals, interferes with the hard-wiring. For his goals to be right, is tautological. His goals/ends are his goals/ends. That makes them right. What the universe has to say is, nice goal, here's the result.
So, having said what I have, when you said, "You are merely describing various ways men value, none of which is contrary to anything I have said." I'm at a loss. I feel that all I've just provided is an expansion of what we've been saying, which you say is not contrary to anything you've said. But I thnk it is. "The nature of man" is in the idea of man. The idea of man is in the head of man. But by necessity saying the word man, is to acknowledge some features and discard others. Each and every choice of a man, will be consistent with a variety of goals all of which by definition (praxeology) are given ends. There's no right end or wrong end they are given.
Now you are going to rightly say that if reality judges your end to cause death or decay of the self, then that's the "judgment" of reality. But to connect that with purpose, is to imply purpose is in the underlying Reality before Mind, and I don't know where that is, if it is. Man did not arrive in the state he is with a nature from Reality as a choice, or a goal, it's an outcome (IS). But to say that's the way Ought becomes IS, is to confuse ought.
Yes we have 'oughts', 'Oughts' are. But that's not the same as saying the the Right Ought is X. Right is in Ought.
Hmmm.... I would simply say that Objectivist Ethics are fantastic. And using logic (because it's the only tool) is the only way to come up with ethical standards by which one judges ones actions, but the Ultimage Good that forms the then part of an if/then ethical proposition, IS NOT a GIVEN from the underlying reality.
To jump to "The Purpose of Man is to Live in the Fullest Sense of the Word..." I'll do my own reflection. Oddly, I like that statement as a primary Given. However, what I like most is that I get to define what that means to me. And quite frankly, if that's what Ayn Rand meant, the sentence is sterile and cannot provide Ethical Propositions which are binding and universal in the common colloquial sense.
Autolykos: Given that definition (“Value” is that which one acts to gain and/or keep), death certainly can be a value, because one can act to gain death.
David B, "Explain what you mean by objective, and explain how objective facts arise out of reality." In a metaphysical context it is the recognition that existence is independent of one's consciousness that is the faculty with which one grasps it and grasps it as distinct from oneself, i.e. per the law of identity, that A is A, B is B, A cannot be both A and B at the same time in the same manner. In an epistemological context, it recognizes that by nature your means to grasp and deal with reality involves a specific process of mentally isolating existents into groups based on certain similarities that separate them from everything else and holding that group as a concept with which one can identify and deal with any of the group so long as they fall within the range of similarity. Rand defines similarity as "the relationship between two or more existents which possess the same characteristic(s), but in different measure or degree" (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 97-98) That which is derived from, formulated from, and traceable to sensory perception logically with logic (logic is non-contradictory identification) by that process is "objective". ------ "Next, i want to understand what you mean by 'nature of man' and where you think it comes from." The nature of man is the identity of what man is, in principle. It refers only to the essential characteristics abstracted from the infinite concrete instances of man, i.e. those characteristics that are common to and unique to all men who are, were, or ever will be. The facts of what man is and his specific means by which he perpetuates and maximizes his existence are the facts on which any derivation of human ends and means must be based and derived from. ------ "I assume this structure <Reality(Metaphysics)> -> <Human Mind(Epistemology)> -> <Subjective Value(Ethics)> -> <Subjective Social Norms(Politics)>" Metaphysics is about the nature of existence — what is everything anyhow? Epistemology is about the nature of consciousness — how do we know that? Ethics is about a man's necessary relationship with reality in an individual context Politics is about a man's necessary relationship with other men in a social context (in order to sustain his ethical relationship) ------ "Knowledge can be Objective only in the sense that it makes observations of facts, or deduces facts about or rules that interpret or relations between specific Real Phenomena produced in Reality. However, the knowledge itself is not the reality itself, it is a phenomena in reality." Yes. Knowledge is a mental entity. Reality is 'out there', knowledge is 'in here'. ------ "Objective when a man says it can mean two things. 1) it says something about his knowledge, meaning that the category as defined is relevant and matches real phenomena in reality. The word 'lie' is then an objective category. I can define it and know that it is possible in reality and I can also verify that it has happened in reality. Whether or not a specific statement is a lie is not so easily determined. The other sense in which a man can use the term Objective (and I tend to mean it in both of these ways) is to speak of Objective Reality. By this I mean what reality actually in spite of but not necessarily in contrast to what I think of it." Yes ... more or less ... I think the first of these replies explained this too. ----- "And so, one is taking the reality apart from my observation and asking is this thing actually a "real thing" apart from my mind. So, is Time in Reality? No, but change is and it has regular features. Time is the term I use to refer to regularity of change. The second part is to look at my word 'time' instead and ask if it refers to something objective in reality, but what I mean when I say time isn't regular change it's this mental abstract thing that is going by. So my category doesn't exactly refer to change specifically. So 'Time' is an objective thing, but it really isn't in reality. What I'm seeing is an intepretation of something else that is happening in reality. I believe most if not all words are this very thing. In other words we bind our categories to part of the reality, by necessity, and in doing so leave out others." Time is an abstraction—a measurement of motion—an identification of a relationship between two or more entities. That kind of measurement/relationship can serve to identify or explain other phenomena that have some relationship to it. ------ "So, having said what I have, when you said, "You are merely describing various ways men value, none of which is contrary to anything I have said." I'm at a loss." Don't make too much of that. I was merely pointing out that we were discussing why the concept of "value" could only exist in the context of the fundamental choice to pursue life. Autolykos was countering with mere descriptions of several different ways/situations in which men value and choose. ------ "Now you are going to rightly say that if reality judges your end to cause death or decay of the self, then that's the "judgment" of reality." Yes, reality is the ultimate arbiter of what is right or wrong. Our task is to discover what is right and act accordingly.
----- "... using logic (because it's the only tool) is the only way to come up with ethical standards by which one judges ones actions, but the Ultimate Good that forms the then part of an if/then ethical proposition, IS NOT a GIVEN from the underlying reality." Nutrition for the body and rationality for the mind are ultimate goods that are established as such by reality, specifically man's nature. But there are multitudinous varieties of concrete instances of each.
Malachi: Nearly every sentence of your post, including the quote by Ayn Rand, can be factually disputed. Rather than do that, I will simply observe that introducing artificial semantic restrictions to preserve an archaic worldview is, dare I say, irrational. It means your theory doesnt match reality so you mask the discrepancy with language.
We see you are skilled at characterizations. How are you at showing that they actually apply?
Michael M: David B, "Explain what you mean by objective, and explain how objective facts arise out of reality." In a metaphysical context it is the recognition that existence is independent of one's consciousness that is the faculty with which one grasps it and grasps it as distinct from oneself, i.e. per the law of identity, that A is A, B is B, A cannot be both A and B at the same time in the same manner.
David B, "Explain what you mean by objective, and explain how objective facts arise out of reality." In a metaphysical context it is the recognition that existence is independent of one's consciousness that is the faculty with which one grasps it and grasps it as distinct from oneself, i.e. per the law of identity, that A is A, B is B, A cannot be both A and B at the same time in the same manner.
And here is the difference, the law of identity in respect to man's interaction with reality is in the mind, not in reality. I do NOT mean that the thing in reality isn't what it is, which is also a form of A is A. But our mental A is A, is a subset or a formalization of aspects of the objective A is A in reality. It's very easy to conflate the two, and think they are the same thing, and I believe this is what Rand does.
In other words, reality has no concept of star, it has existents to which we attribute the term star. However, if a star reaches a certain mass, we consider it to be a black hole, but reality doesn't. It is what it is, A is A. We may say that Star1 and Star2 are both A's, but reality sees Star1 as A and Star2 as B, and they are not of the "same class". The "nature of a star" is in the mind, not in reality.
Michael M: In an epistemological context, it recognizes that by nature your means to grasp and deal with reality involves a specific process of mentally isolating existents into groups based on certain similarities that separate them from everything else and holding that group as a concept with which one can identify and deal with any of the group so long as they fall within the range of similarity. Rand defines similarity as "the relationship between two or more existents which possess the same characteristic(s), but in different measure or degree" (Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 97-98) That which is derived from, formulated from, and traceable to sensory perception logically with logic (logic is non-contradictory identification) by that process is "objective". ------ "Next, i want to understand what you mean by 'nature of man' and where you think it comes from." The nature of man is the identity of what man is, in principle. It refers only to the essential characteristics abstracted from the infinite concrete instances of man, i.e. those characteristics that are common to and unique to all men who are, were, or ever will be. The facts of what man is and his specific means by which he perpetuates and maximizes his existence are the facts on which any derivation of human ends and means must be based and derived from.
That which is derived from, formulated from, and traceable to sensory perception logically with logic (logic is non-contradictory identification) by that process is "objective". ------ "Next, i want to understand what you mean by 'nature of man' and where you think it comes from." The nature of man is the identity of what man is, in principle. It refers only to the essential characteristics abstracted from the infinite concrete instances of man, i.e. those characteristics that are common to and unique to all men who are, were, or ever will be. The facts of what man is and his specific means by which he perpetuates and maximizes his existence are the facts on which any derivation of human ends and means must be based and derived from.
Here's what I consider to be the mistake of Objectivist Ethics, and it's the way the "Nature of Man" is inserted back into reality, instead of left inside the mind as an abstraction and therefore a subjective interpretation of the instance, thought the content may reflect objectively true observations.
By saying "essential characteristics" subjective or selective observation of features is chosen. In other words, there's no reason not to have carved off a slightly different set of features, or adding an additional criterion for subsetting humanity. For example, I may add, "And possesses a uterus." Well doesn't this imply procreation and some level of ethical obligation to replicate? After all the proper use of a uterus is to grow an egg into a human being.
You may think that saying this is silly, but I'll add why. We organize knowledge into hierarchies of abstract concepts. In the instance of life, we organize a "tree of life" (both class and instance, or genotype/phenotype). Now if I take out and abstract the nature of life, either the instance serves the longer term goals of the genotype or it doesn't. If we choose to say at that one aspect of the "nature of life" is to propogate itself, then we say it's "Good for instances of life, to pursue that goal to the fullest possible extent." I don't mean to "screw everything". My point is that I could add additional sub-goals, which could be logically shown to support this goal, and call these as goods also.
So, back to hierarchies of knowledge. Let's take a horse specifically, it is an instance of life, and it has organs for procreation. It has additional senses, and a specific set of additional organs that each enable certain functions. Each organ then should operate "to the fullest extent of it's purpose". But does the horseness (the nature of the horse as horse) add new proper ends, to the ones that existed when one simply considered it as an instance of life? Can the old ends be overridden by the ends of the more specific category? Either way you answer this question you end up with a problem in terms of describing the nature of Man. Here's why.
If I say no, the more specific nature can't a more generic nature, then we must do the things that all life does to the fullest extent, and we must do the things that all mammals do, to the fullest extent, and we must do the things that all primates do, etc. All the way down to the level of "David B", because in the end, by this way of thinking, "David B" has a nature to that can ADD new ultimate ends to the equation.
By this way of thinking, the organs that I have that pursue life (since the brain is one) must be used to their fullest possible extent, which of the functions of my body should be raised above or subjugated to the other? In this case, there is no "reason" for "reason" to have primacy over eating, sleeping, defecating, or procreating. All vital important functions that are in the "nature of living organism" which should be lived to the fullest. Even more directly, doesn't the social nature of man, ALSO add additional ethical obligations? Shouldn't the society also have a say in my ultimate ends? Doesn't the nature of a society have it's own nature? Should that more specific aggregate have a say in the ends that I pursue?
If however, we answer that question YES, then things look different. "Can the hierarchically more specific nature, override ultimate ends from a more generic nature?" That was the question, if I say yes, then the most specific nature would be "David B". Anda I therefore, rightly reject any limitations as ethical givens or ultimate truths about my nature.
I'm not rejecting any of her "goods" as "bads". I'm not even ambivalent to them, I'm human and want good things (by my own estimation). I embrace her concept that Reality is preeminent over consciousness, I embrace the "good" of human logic, and it's rightful place as the ultimate tool that I have available to me with which to pursue the happiness I must necessarily seek.
But at the same time, I accept responsibility for both determining what is "Good" for me AND what constitutes a "Good" way for me to achieve these ends. Her system of philosophy says out of one side of the mouth that the genius man is the pinnacle of reality, and he should selfishly pursue his own greatness, and then out of the other side of the mouth says, and that greatness is "X" and if you don't do "X" then you aren't Great. That second statement directly conflicts with the first statement.
Was Mother Theresa great? By her own estimation and by the estimation of many others. Abraham Lincoln? Hitler? Napoleon? George Washington?
Can't the same be said for each of them? And there will be people who disagree. In the end, the answer to that question will be one for the man himself to determine for himself, and when he dies...
Michael M: ------ "I assume this structure <Reality(Metaphysics)> -> <Human Mind(Epistemology)> -> <Subjective Value(Ethics)> -> <Subjective Social Norms(Politics)>" Metaphysics is about the nature of existence — what is everything anyhow? Epistemology is about the nature of consciousness — how do we know that? Ethics is about a man's necessary relationship with reality in an individual context Politics is about a man's necessary relationship with other men in a social context (in order to sustain his ethical relationship) ------ "Knowledge can be Objective only in the sense that it makes observations of facts, or deduces facts about or rules that interpret or relations between specific Real Phenomena produced in Reality. However, the knowledge itself is not the reality itself, it is a phenomena in reality." Yes. Knowledge is a mental entity. Reality is 'out there', knowledge is 'in here'. ------ "Objective when a man says it can mean two things. 1) it says something about his knowledge, meaning that the category as defined is relevant and matches real phenomena in reality. The word 'lie' is then an objective category. I can define it and know that it is possible in reality and I can also verify that it has happened in reality. Whether or not a specific statement is a lie is not so easily determined. The other sense in which a man can use the term Objective (and I tend to mean it in both of these ways) is to speak of Objective Reality. By this I mean what reality actually in spite of but not necessarily in contrast to what I think of it." Yes ... more or less ... I think the first of these replies explained this too. ----- "And so, one is taking the reality apart from my observation and asking is this thing actually a "real thing" apart from my mind. So, is Time in Reality? No, but change is and it has regular features. Time is the term I use to refer to regularity of change. The second part is to look at my word 'time' instead and ask if it refers to something objective in reality, but what I mean when I say time isn't regular change it's this mental abstract thing that is going by. So my category doesn't exactly refer to change specifically. So 'Time' is an objective thing, but it really isn't in reality. What I'm seeing is an intepretation of something else that is happening in reality. I believe most if not all words are this very thing. In other words we bind our categories to part of the reality, by necessity, and in doing so leave out others." Time is an abstraction—a measurement of motion—an identification of a relationship between two or more entities. That kind of measurement/relationship can serve to identify or explain other phenomena that have some relationship to it. ------ "So, having said what I have, when you said, "You are merely describing various ways men value, none of which is contrary to anything I have said." I'm at a loss." Don't make too much of that. I was merely pointing out that we were discussing why the concept of "value" could only exist in the context of the fundamental choice to pursue life. Autolykos was countering with mere descriptions of several different ways/situations in which men value and choose. "Now you are going to rightly say that if reality judges your end to cause death or decay of the self, then that's the "judgment" of reality." Yes, reality is the ultimate arbiter of what is right or wrong. Our task is to discover what is right and act accordingly.
------ "I assume this structure <Reality(Metaphysics)> -> <Human Mind(Epistemology)> -> <Subjective Value(Ethics)> -> <Subjective Social Norms(Politics)>" Metaphysics is about the nature of existence — what is everything anyhow? Epistemology is about the nature of consciousness — how do we know that? Ethics is about a man's necessary relationship with reality in an individual context Politics is about a man's necessary relationship with other men in a social context (in order to sustain his ethical relationship) ------ "Knowledge can be Objective only in the sense that it makes observations of facts, or deduces facts about or rules that interpret or relations between specific Real Phenomena produced in Reality. However, the knowledge itself is not the reality itself, it is a phenomena in reality." Yes. Knowledge is a mental entity. Reality is 'out there', knowledge is 'in here'. ------ "Objective when a man says it can mean two things. 1) it says something about his knowledge, meaning that the category as defined is relevant and matches real phenomena in reality. The word 'lie' is then an objective category. I can define it and know that it is possible in reality and I can also verify that it has happened in reality. Whether or not a specific statement is a lie is not so easily determined. The other sense in which a man can use the term Objective (and I tend to mean it in both of these ways) is to speak of Objective Reality. By this I mean what reality actually in spite of but not necessarily in contrast to what I think of it." Yes ... more or less ... I think the first of these replies explained this too. ----- "And so, one is taking the reality apart from my observation and asking is this thing actually a "real thing" apart from my mind. So, is Time in Reality? No, but change is and it has regular features. Time is the term I use to refer to regularity of change. The second part is to look at my word 'time' instead and ask if it refers to something objective in reality, but what I mean when I say time isn't regular change it's this mental abstract thing that is going by. So my category doesn't exactly refer to change specifically. So 'Time' is an objective thing, but it really isn't in reality. What I'm seeing is an intepretation of something else that is happening in reality. I believe most if not all words are this very thing. In other words we bind our categories to part of the reality, by necessity, and in doing so leave out others." Time is an abstraction—a measurement of motion—an identification of a relationship between two or more entities. That kind of measurement/relationship can serve to identify or explain other phenomena that have some relationship to it. ------ "So, having said what I have, when you said, "You are merely describing various ways men value, none of which is contrary to anything I have said." I'm at a loss." Don't make too much of that. I was merely pointing out that we were discussing why the concept of "value" could only exist in the context of the fundamental choice to pursue life. Autolykos was countering with mere descriptions of several different ways/situations in which men value and choose.
"Now you are going to rightly say that if reality judges your end to cause death or decay of the self, then that's the "judgment" of reality." Yes, reality is the ultimate arbiter of what is right or wrong. Our task is to discover what is right and act accordingly.
No, reality is the ultimate consequence generator. It produces the consequences of our actions. It has no concept of good or bad for the consequences. We interpret the results along two axes. One matches what I expected, or doesn't match what I expected. This is the Truth axis. It is the only judgment that reality makes on my knowledge. The second matches result is good for me or bad for me. This is the Good axis. That's inside the mind. This is reality's feedback to my desires. After the fact reflection on whether or not the result was subjectively good for me.
She gives us a ton of good logical analysis of specific ethical forms, and a good basis for forming and choosing specific large scale ends. But it's the reflection from consequence and logical analysis of such things (which cannot be avoided, the mind must do it) by which a man regulates his own ethics.
Michael M: ----- "... using logic (because it's the only tool) is the only way to come up with ethical standards by which one judges ones actions, but the Ultimate Good that forms the then part of an if/then ethical proposition, IS NOT a GIVEN from the underlying reality." Nutrition for the body and rationality for the mind are ultimate goods that are established as such by reality, specifically man's nature. But there are multitudinous varieties of concrete instances of each.
And remembering my previous arguments, procreation is good for the sex organs (going down the hierarchy) and for the human race (going up the hierarchy), and maybe good for me if I want kids (or additional farm labor...) and while my mind is a feature of my instance of "thing in reality", I see no reason one can't embrace those specific natures also. Again, those are natures as a man sees them.
Again, I end up supporting 90% of what she says in Objectivist Ethics, but I reject "judgment" of a man, by another man, for his failure to somehow meet an external standard that is "Right" because of his "Nature". Is man heterosexual? I can explain why heterosexuality must be the dominant orientation, but I don't think that says anything about what is right.
This seems to me to be an atheistic reshaping of "<insert religion like Christianity>" statements like, "It's not natural, it's not how God made you."
@Michael M
I want to make a brief very specific criticism of the idea of things having "Natures" that are given by reality.
The entire evolutionary process, by it's nature (joke), obviate natures in a very specific way.
Speciation, by which man came into existence, necessitates variation. This allows new capabilities, organs, cell types, new proteins, new shapes to existing features, etc. to arise.
In other words, there are two ways to resolve speciation, one is to say, well because it has this new distinct feature it has a nature that is slightly different from the nature of the parent.
The other way is to say, it's nice that you're slightly different in this unique way, but the nature of X of which you and your parent are both instances, is Y, and therefore even though your new feature allows behavior Z also, any conflict between Y and Z necessitates preferrint Y.
Well, this is the state of man, even though each instance is not a different species. If I have a body that's built for swimming, does that mean I should swim? etc., etc.
Looking back at Rand's history, it makes sense that she would think of men in this abstract fashion, put the man in the role his abilities say is his ideal role.
That logic is the logic of Communist allocation of labor. The beauty of free societies is in it's fostering of individual growth and exploration, specifically in ways not previously seen or expected. It is in these unexpected vectors, that the beneficial Black Swans of human advancement are created.
Do you see the disconnect?
reality has no concept of star, it has existents to which we attribute the term star. However, if a star reaches a certain mass, we consider it to be a black hole, but reality doesn't. It is what it is, A is A. We may say that Star1 and Star2 are both A's, but reality sees Star1 as A and Star2 as B, and they are not of the "same class". The "nature of a star" is in the mind, not in reality.
Very good. This concept can not be stated enough, in any manner of communication possible - be it drawing a picture, miming an action, or beating the crap ot of someone / usless subvedrsive idiot with a spoon who refuses to call a spoon a spoon for purley pragmatic reasons of calling a spoon a spoon "for our purposes"
"As in a kaleidoscope, the constellation of forces operating in the system as a whole is ever changing." - Ludwig Lachmann
"When A Man Dies A World Goes Out of Existence" - GLS Shackle
@David B
"I want to make a brief very specific criticism of the idea of things having "Natures" that are given by reality. The entire evolutionary process, by it's nature (joke), obviate natures in a very specific way. Speciation, by which man came into existence, necessitates variation. This allows new capabilities, organs, cell types, new proteins, new shapes to existing features, etc. to arise." I see the disconnect. It is between you and abstract concepts. As Rand explains, concepts such as the nature of man are integrations into a unit of universal similarities among all of a group of existents with the particular measurements of those mentally omitted. Thus one can comprehend with the integration of all objects that are flat surfaces for holding objects above terra firma all tables that are, were, or ever will be, whatever different concrete measurements (shape, color, number of legs, etc.) they would have that are not significant to the task of grasping and retaining a potentially infinite number of a kind of entity in one's head with a single symbolizing word: "table." The universal similarities among all men are things like being a living entity with the twin capacities of volition and reason, aka "a rational animal." When and if evolution produces such an entity that is not volitional or not rational, that entity will not be a human being, it will be something else. The fundamental nature of something is by definition universal to all the entities subsumed under the concept. The variations you refer to are concrete differences, none of which contradict the essential nature of man. The shape of one's body is not a defining characteristic of whether or not one is a human being. It has no bearing on one's volitional or conceptual capacity. "Looking back at Rand's history, it makes sense that she would think of men in this abstract fashion, put the man in the role his abilities say is his ideal role." Nothing could be further from the truth. Rand's concept of man is utterly neutral—nothing predetermined, no instincts, no inherited ideas or knowledge, tabula rasa. It is time you read about Objectivism beyond her novels. I would suggest "Objectivism:The Philosophy of Ayn Rand", by Leonard Peikoff. It is a summary of the entire philosophy in hierarchical order, and Peikoff is a master at explaining complex philosophical ideas in clear, concise, and easily understandable text.
Michael M: @David B "I want to make a brief very specific criticism of the idea of things having "Natures" that are given by reality. The entire evolutionary process, by it's nature (joke), obviate natures in a very specific way. Speciation, by which man came into existence, necessitates variation. This allows new capabilities, organs, cell types, new proteins, new shapes to existing features, etc. to arise." I see the disconnect. It is between you and abstract concepts. As Rand explains, concepts such as the nature of man are integrations into a unit of universal similarities among all of a group of existents with the particular measurements of those mentally omitted. Thus one can comprehend with the integration of all objects that are flat surfaces for holding objects above terra firma all tables that are, were, or ever will be, whatever different concrete measurements (shape, color, number of legs, etc.) they would have that are not significant to the task of grasping and retaining a potentially infinite number of a kind of entity in one's head with a single symbolizing word: "table."
"I want to make a brief very specific criticism of the idea of things having "Natures" that are given by reality. The entire evolutionary process, by it's nature (joke), obviate natures in a very specific way. Speciation, by which man came into existence, necessitates variation. This allows new capabilities, organs, cell types, new proteins, new shapes to existing features, etc. to arise." I see the disconnect. It is between you and abstract concepts. As Rand explains, concepts such as the nature of man are integrations into a unit of universal similarities among all of a group of existents with the particular measurements of those mentally omitted. Thus one can comprehend with the integration of all objects that are flat surfaces for holding objects above terra firma all tables that are, were, or ever will be, whatever different concrete measurements (shape, color, number of legs, etc.) they would have that are not significant to the task of grasping and retaining a potentially infinite number of a kind of entity in one's head with a single symbolizing word: "table."
See, I think you have a disconnect between you and abstract concepts.
I view concepts (as abstractions) not to be integrations, but disintegrations. Meaning that in identifying universal similarities you are isolating distinct properties of unique existents and categorizing them by the abstraction. You say with the particular measurements ... mentally omitted. You are connecting with the common thread that constitutes the "nature" to which you attach a category. And I'm saying that the omissions are necessarily the blind spot of the category. Explain then to me the relevance of the the real attributes and properties and behaviors that are omitted, when one uses the category of "table". Saying they are irrelevant is nice, but I think this is the crux of our disconnect. I reserve the right to have missed something important, I think of that as healthy skepticism. Reality can blindside you, and this is the purpose of knowledge to reduce risk. Any concept reduces risk in one vector, and overconfidence in the concept increases risk in another vector. When thinking of a table as a table, the risk is incredibly small, so small as to be irrelevant. But it's present everywhere, in all our concepts.
So, regardless of how we get there, I agree with Rand on the logic of her ethical propositions, up to a point. That point is when it crosses the boundary and professes to have identified a universal moral authority over the behavior of man. Skepticism says that it's reality that dictates the consequences of any such maxims, not "the nature of man", and when one turns to abstract statements to affirm specific ethical statements, risk is necessarily reduced on one vector and increased in other vectors, which man may or many not realize.
Michael M: The universal similarities among all men are things like being a living entity with the twin capacities of volition and reason, aka "a rational animal." When and if evolution produces such an entity that is not volitional or not rational, that entity will not be a human being, it will be something else. The fundamental nature of something is by definition universal to all the entities subsumed under the concept.
Again I agree with everything you say, in theory. The question is to which instances of reality do those categories apply. In addition are there other categories which are also relevant?
Michael M:The variations you refer to are concrete differences, none of which contradict the essential nature of man. The shape of one's body is not a defining characteristic of whether or not one is a human being. It has no bearing on one's volitional or conceptual capacity.
Are you sure? I don't think so either, but I reserve judgment on that specific fact. In the area of consciousness and reason, I'm particularly concerned/excited by scientific research and technological advancement in two different directions that are both relevant. Computer Science and AI research and Neuroscience. Both may potentially introduce new phenomena that we must take into account. When they do, it will be interesting.
Michael M:"Looking back at Rand's history, it makes sense that she would think of men in this abstract fashion, put the man in the role his abilities say is his ideal role." Nothing could be further from the truth. Rand's concept of man is utterly neutral—nothing predetermined, no instincts, no inherited ideas or knowledge, tabula rasa. It is time you read about Objectivism beyond her novels. I would suggest "Objectivism:The Philosophy of Ayn Rand", by Leonard Peikoff. It is a summary of the entire philosophy in hierarchical order, and Peikoff is a master at explaining complex philosophical ideas in clear, concise, and easily understandable text.
"Maximizing one's nature in the fullest sense of the word." That's either an abstract statement, that man must insert meaning into in order to fulfill it. In which case, yes it's true for all men. OR it's a concrete statement and Rand has told us what that means. If so, I stand by my statement. In either way, I don't see the point of arguing this directly.
My understanding of Rand's philosophy comes from that book directly. I have not read her fiction, except for Anthem. I have also read Selfishness. Over and above any other, the book by Piekoff is the one I needed to read to feel that I had a firm grasp on what Ayn Rand was saying. It has however been years since I spent any time in it. So, my retention of it's detailed arguments has necessarily faded. Oddly, it's not by her... It was in the Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science that I understood what my disconnect with that teaching was.
In programming we draw a line between abstract/concrete. Abstract is useful in that we can bind together various data types and provide an abstract view that allows us to manipulate seemingly different data in similar ways. It becomes a very powerful tool. Concrete however is where you get stuff done by binding to real phenomena outside of your calculation and manipulation. It's how we create external effects.
Knowledge in the abstract can in fact be absolutely true, the fidelity issue is in applicability to the external reality. Unfortunately, the mind and it's function are a part of the external reality. The one gap I can't seem to break in terms of it being absolutely true and applicable to man, is the acting man view. What I can't seem to put back in in a consistent way, is a consistently true for all men ethics.
The IS part of reality must cover all behaviors and manifestations in reality. To say that a man MUST, means that if he doesn't an IS occurs that SHOULDN'T BE. But my issues with saying a specific SHOULD statement is actually an IS statement is when the SHOULDN'T becomes an IS.
If a "should" becomes and "is", then the "shouldn't" must also be an "isn't", and that's the dissonance not overcome for me. Let me go find some of the specific ethical constructions of Ayn Rand, if we wish to continue this. Otherwise, we're arguing that we agree about the majority of her Ethical System, without agreeing that she bound it as Ultimate Truth.
I'm not seeing a way to converge.
"I view concepts (as abstractions) not to be integrations, but disintegrations. Meaning that in identifying universal similarities you are isolating distinct properties of unique existents and categorizing them by the abstraction. " What you call "categorizing" IS the integration into a concept. "You say with the particular measurements ... mentally omitted. You are connecting with the common thread that constitutes the "nature" to which you attach a category. And I'm saying that the omissions are necessarily the blind spot of the category. Explain then to me the relevance of the the real attributes and properties and behaviors that are omitted, when one uses the category of 'table'." What I am integrating into the concept is the essential characteristics that MAY have any of an (up to) infinite array of possible measurements but MUST have some measurement. The table may consist of any of a wide range of materials, shapes, colors, heights, etc. but it must have one or more of each. We need not clutter our mind with an encyclopedic catalog of all possible forms of tables in order to grasp all tables that are, were, or ever will be. When you present to me an object with the essential characteristics in whatever measure, I will instantly grasp that it is a table and be able to apply all the knowledge about tables I have accumulated in my lifetime to that object. "So, regardless of how we get there, I agree with Rand on the logic of her ethical propositions, up to a point. That point is when it crosses the boundary and professes to have identified a universal moral authority over the behavior of man. Skepticism says that it's reality that dictates the consequences of any such maxims, not "the nature of man",..." You contradict yourself. The only "moral authority over the behavior of man" is reality, and "the nature of man" is the nature (identity) of one instance of reality. On that fact the entirety of Objectivism rests. In order to genuinely agree with Rand on anything at all, you must first grant that to be a fact. You may not then characterize that as crossing the boundary in the way that you appear to have meant it. You often appear to confuse yourself with your own prior assumptions about man. Use a different example, such as: The nature of a Cactus is that it grows in arid soil. The nature of a Lily Pad is that it grows in water. The nature of each is what it IS—including its specific means to survive and thrive. If you plant the Lily Pad in the desert and the Cactus in a swamp, reality will be the authority that will punish you for not doing what you OUGHT to have done, i.e. acted in accordance with the NATURE of each. "The question is to which instances of reality do those categories apply." What do you mean by "categories" ... I do not understand the question. "Knowledge in the abstract can in fact be absolutely true, the fidelity issue is in applicability to the external reality. Unfortunately, the mind and it's function are a part of the external reality. The one gap I can't seem to break in terms of it being absolutely true and applicable to man, is the acting man view. What I can't seem to put back in in a consistent way, is a consistently true for all men ethics." Again, move to another context and then return: A factual IS of man is the need for nutrition. It is an abstract principle that applies universally. There are no men who do not need it. It is a universally valid imperative that in the pursuit of life, man OUGHT to sustain himself with nutrition. There are countless concrete instances of widely differing nutritious foods that can satisfy that imperative. All men do not have to eat the same thing in order to survive and thrive. But they must eat something nutritious. If he doesn't, he will be an isn't. I am glad to hear you are used OPAR as your introduction to Rand ... Maybe our discussion will give you a framework to revisit it, particularly the Epistemology and Ethics chapters. You might also read Ayn Rand's "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology".