So, I put together a fairly explicit criticism of Stefan Molyneux's essay *On Objective Morality* (Proving Libertarian Morality, Reclaiming the High Ground). Please take the time to read both Stefan and my thoughts on the subject. The point of logic being normative is that one cannot draw "objective" inferences in varied (and subjective) circumstances. Morality comes way down the road from epistemology and logic. It is impossible to empirically verify logic's inference rules. ___________________________________________________________ I don't disagree with the goals of Molyneux in demystifying the state. However, his claims that morality is objective lie here, _"We must start from the beginning, build logically and reject any irrational or non-empirical substitutes for the truth"_ and can be proven to be fallacious. "Non-empirical" means a priori. He needs us to think that logic is objective, which it is not. Logical proofs cannot justify themselves as it requires the inference rule _being used_ to also be _simultaneously_ a premise in the proof. This is circular and therefore a fallacy. But, this is what SM is doing (among other things). SM: "Physical laws describe the behaviour of matter, but do not contain a single prescription." Duh...but it is not to be expected that physical laws will provide any prescriptions... Right here, SM does himself in, "Thus it cannot be said that moral rules exist in material reality..." Then how can they be objective? Objective reality can be proven through observations (astronomy, math, chemistry, etc.) If something does exist, but dones't exist in material reality, it can only exist in the mind. "Subjecting moral theories to the scientific method will provide the same benefits that subjecting physical theories to the scientific method did." FA Hayek destroys this concept in "The counter revolution of Science." It is called "scientism"; the idea that one can apply the scientific method to anything outside of the natural sciences in itself is an incorrect pattern of thought and as SM says, 'morals don't exist in material reality'...so, where do they exist? In an _individuals mind._ For, if they _do exist_ but not in material reality, the only other place they can exists is in our thoughts. SM goes on to say that "preferred behaviour" exists in an axiomatic form. This may be true, but it in no way implies that _everyone_ sees _circumstances_ the same way (especially moral circumstances). As I pointed out, Logic is normative (a priori), i.e., it is subjective and circumstantial. "to argue otherwise would require proof that consciousness is not composed of matter, and is not organic – an impossibility, since it has mass, energy, and life." But, he provides no proof that _consciousness_ has mass, energy, or life. He simply states it as if it is a fact. Where is my consciousness? If it has mass, then should be able to locate its position in time/space. But, if it is in my brain...then the simple fact that _my_ circumstances for judgment are different than _anyone_ and _everyone_ else's means that is cannot be objective. (Or, rather, it means that SM is using "preferable behaviour" in a sense of eating, sex (procreation for existence), and sleep. None of which are directly related to objective judgmental circumstance in terms of MORALITY. Look at Israel and Palestine, if you don't think people can view "preferable behavior" in different terms...) "if he is alive to argue, he has followed preferred behaviours such as breathing, eating and drinking." See? Those aren't "moral" circumstances. They are, in Kant's terminology, "necessary" circumstances. "All living organisms require preferred behaviour to live." This premise is under scrutiny in my book as he has, so far in his essay, mentioned morality only indirectly. "First of all, we must remember that morality is optional." Well, wait a second. Everything to this point has argued for the objectivity of morality. But, if it is a choice, then it cannot be objective...The validity of 2+2=4 is not a choice, it is objective. Objective reality is proven through empirical evidence, math, physics, etc.; the scientific method. "The fact that compliance with moral rules is optional has confused many thinkers into believing that because morality is optional, it is subjective." Ha, he preempts any criticism by calling us "confused"; this is ad hominem and a red herring. "Applying moral theories is optional, but that does not mean that moral theories are subjective." haha. By admitting that they are "theories" he admits that there are more than one system of belief in them. How many scientific _methods_ are there?; Note they are methods not theories. "The scientific method is optional, but it is not subjective. Applying biological classifications is optional, but biology is not subjective." I'm going to point back to FA Hayek's criticism of "scientism" for this one. He is mistakenly using scientism to justify his analogy of morals to the scientific method; a peculiar abstraction to twist as he does. "I can choose not to eat, but I cannot choose to live without eating." I'd like to point out that EVERY one of his examples so far have been biological comparisons to something that is not biological. His use of "preferred behaviour," literally, is limited to this "To be valid, any moral theory must also pass the criteria of logical consistency. Since the behaviour of matter is logical, consistent and predictable, all theories involving matter – either organic or inorganic – must be also be logical, consistent and predictable. The theory of relativity cannot argue that the speed of light is both constant and not constant at the same time, or that it is 186,000 miles per second, five fathoms in depth and also green in colour!" Again, here he uses the _assumption_ that consciousness is material...Logical proofs can use assumption, but they must use particulars (Universal Instantiation followed by Existential Generalization along with whatever inference rules are required). And again he uses a scientistic analogy... "Biology includes three forms of ‘randomness,’ which are environment, genetic mutation and free will." He writes as if "free will" is definitely a thing. There is a lot of question put into this in philosophical circles. "If I say that gravity affects matter, it must affect all matter." Mind is not matter. He must have hidden premises (or tacit premises) if this is the case. "Furthermore, any moral theory based on non-universal or self-contradictory principles is demonstrably false." For instance, using scientistic arguments and some kind of objective logic (which is demonstrated to be normative due to circumstances.) *My point* is that there aren't any objective standards that can be _universally accepted_ due to people's ability to reason (rationication is done through logic) is based on a priori inference rules and subjective circumstances. I agree with his morality, but not the notion that it is objective. He says people need to eat, right? Eating is "preferable behaviour" so let's say that in Uganda a child is starving and the only way to acquire food is to kill the person who has stolen it all from his village. How can we say that someone violating property rights and preventing "necessary" behavior cannot be killed if the _objective consequence_ is the death of the innocent child? His "objectivity” raises marauders to the level of Mother Teresa. I’d also urge you to read Sartre’s “Existentialism and Human Emotion” for an exposition of moral relativism. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. F.A. Hayek, The Counter Revolution of Science Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy
Thompson, "What Achilles Should have said to the Toroise"
Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing How and Knowing That" Papers on the a priori nature of logic: http://www.illc.uva.nl/Research/Reports/MoL-2007-21.text.pdf http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4545244?uid=3739664&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21101166650537 http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/rules/papers/RailtonAPriori.pdf
You can also read J. F. Thompson's "What Achilles Should Have Said to the Tortoise" (May require a two page story by Lewis Carroll for clarification, "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_the_Tortoise_Said_to_Achilles" They deal with infinte regress, but also the difficulty (if not paradox) in proving an inference rule using that same inference rule.
Please forgive the spelling and grammatical errors, I was up all night and typed this at about 730am.
Math is a subset of logic, so the claim that math is objective while logic is not is contradictory.
faber est suae quisque fortunae
@Aristophanes
I wanted to look at this paragraph more in depth:
Stefan 'Confused Man' Molyneux: The fact that compliance with moral rules is optional has confused many thinkers into believing that because morality is optional, it is subjective. Nothing could be further from the truth! Living organisms are part of material reality, and material reality is rational and objective. Applying moral theories is optional, but that does not mean that moral theories are subjective. The scientific method is optional, but it is not subjective. Applying biological classifications is optional, but biology is not subjective. Choices are optional; consequences are not. I can choose not to eat, but I cannot choose to live without eating. I can choose to behead someone, but I cannot choose whether or not they can live without a head. Morality is thus optional, but the effects of moral choices are measurable and objective. There is no subjectivity involved whatsoever.
The fact that compliance with moral rules is optional has confused many thinkers into believing that because morality is optional, it is subjective. Nothing could be further from the truth! Living organisms are part of material reality, and material reality is rational and objective. Applying moral theories is optional, but that does not mean that moral theories are subjective. The scientific method is optional, but it is not subjective. Applying biological classifications is optional, but biology is not subjective. Choices are optional; consequences are not. I can choose not to eat, but I cannot choose to live without eating. I can choose to behead someone, but I cannot choose whether or not they can live without a head. Morality is thus optional, but the effects of moral choices are measurable and objective. There is no subjectivity involved whatsoever.
First, in the emphasised sentence, Molyneux is either plain wrong or equivocating. Biological classifications are subjective. You can classify living things into whatever categories you want. But the question is, are your classifications useful? Do they reveal any knowledge to you? We could classify bats as birds and not mammals, or dolphins as fish and not mammals. But is that useful?
We could make the classifications based on whatever attributes we want. Bats fly and pigeons fly, and we could make classifications based on the attribute "flying". But modern biologists see a greater use with different criteria. They can make more sense of the world classifying living things according to a different set of attributes.
So, if Molyneux is saying that classification is objective, then he's just plain wrong. But notice how he said that biological classification is optional, but biology is not? Is he equivocating here? Substituting biological classification for the entire science of biology?
Furthermore, Molyneux is one of those people who does not understand the simple difference between a subject and an object. Morality is a set a values, and values are something that require a subject to do the valuing. Anyway, he is also confused on the consequences of choices. If you shoot someone, there are consequences to this action. The death of the person you shot is one of these possible consequences. Identifying this consequence does not suddenly make the act of killing right or wrong. All you have done is identify that there are physical consequences to shooting people. Whether or not it was right or wrong is entirely within the minds of people. This is why it is subjective.
Maybe here is a better way of putting it. It's not like Hitler went around saying, "Golly gee, murder is objectively wrong, but I am going to choose the option of murdering Jews and other undersireables. I am glad that my actions have consequences, or else I might not have ordered the imprisonment and murder of these undesireables." In what way does this line of thinking make sense? Hitler didn't say to himself that he was surely acting wrongly. HE WAS SURE HE WAS RIGHT!
The only universally preferable statement I think we can make is that no one wants to be aggressed against. Isn't it true by definition? Because if you wanted it, it wasn't aggression. But so what can we get from this? Just because we can say that no individual wants to be aggressed against doesn't mean we get to say that the NAP is objectively right.
So all people don't want to be aggressed against. So what? This isn't going to stop criminals from aggressing against their victims. It's not even going to stop people from having legitimate disputes about property lines. At best you can refer to the golden rule, that since you wouldn't want to be aggressed against, you shouldn't do it to others. But so what? I might subscribe to that rule, but what about all the people who think that if you are rich (by their definition!), then you ought to have your money stolen from you at gunpoint so as to give it to another?
They don't care about universal ethics. They are not operating under the assumption that universal ethics are good. They have an entirely different worldview.
/end rant
This isn't in direct response to the OP... just that there is lots of heat and not a lot of light on this subject so throwing some light.
David Gordon's critique of Molyneux's ethical ideas.
There are at least four levels of connotation at work in moral-value language:
The objective/subjective distinction should not be confused with value-free/value-laden distinction.
Naturalistic fallacy: Assuming that because something is natural it is, therefore, moral or vice-versa
Moralistic fallacy: Assuming that because something is moral it is, therefore, natural or vice-versa
Clayton -
Aristophanes:The point of logic being normative is that one cannot draw "objective" inferences in varied (and subjective) circumstances. Morality comes way down the road from epistemology and logic. It is impossible to empirically verify logic's inference rules.
Take the laws of thought, for instance - the law of identity ("A = A"), the law of non-contradiction ("A =/= ~A"), and the law of the excluded middle ("A | ~A"). They seem intuitively obvious to us. Why? Because our innate perception of the external world is based upon them. That sounds like some strong empirical verification, if you ask me. However, it's impossible to prove the (logical) validity of the laws of thought. Why? Because they're required for logic in the first place. Trying to prove (or disprove) the validity of logic is like a horse trying to pull a cart that's in front of it.
Aristophanes:"Non-empirical" means a priori. He needs us to think that logic is objective, which it is not. Logical proofs cannot justify themselves as it requires the inference rule _being used_ to also be _simultaneously_ a premise in the proof. This is circular and therefore a fallacy. But, this is what SM is doing (among other things).
Logic is objective in the sense that the a given statement will necessarily evaluate to "true" or "false" ("1" or "0", "consistent" or "inconsistent", etc.) within the context of one or more other statements (the premises). That is, the rules of logic don't change based on a person's mood or other subjective factors. In other words, logic won't evaluate a certain statement a certain way just because you want it to, any more than gravity won't make you fall off a cliff just because you don't want it to.
Aristophanes:SM: "Physical laws describe the behaviour of matter, but do not contain a single prescription." Duh...but it is not to be expected that physical laws will provide any prescriptions... Right here, SM does himself in, "Thus it cannot be said that moral rules exist in material reality..." Then how can they be objective? Objective reality can be proven through observations (astronomy, math, chemistry, etc.) If something does exist, but dones't exist in material reality, it can only exist in the mind.
First off, what do you mean by "proven" here? If you mean "deduce logical validity or invalidity", then empirical observations don't prove anything beyond themselves (which is tautological). In deductive reasoning, the set of premises under consideration is always closed - but in inductive reasoning, the set of premises under consideration is always open. That is, inductive reasoning always allows for new premises to come into play. Empirical observation and experiment is inductive, not deductive, reasoning, because there can always be more observations to make and experiments to perform.
Second, the mind is a part of material reality. That's why I prefer to use the term "external reality" to refer to reality outside of the mind.
Aristophanes:"Subjecting moral theories to the scientific method will provide the same benefits that subjecting physical theories to the scientific method did." FA Hayek destroys this concept in "The counter revolution of Science." It is called "scientism"; the idea that one can apply the scientific method to anything outside of the natural sciences in itself is an incorrect pattern of thought and as SM says, 'morals don't exist in material reality'...so, where do they exist? In an _individuals mind._ For, if they _do exist_ but not in material reality, the only other place they can exists is in our thoughts.
Subjecting moral theories to the scientific method requires that moral categories like "right" and "wrong" be observable. How can they be so, if morals don't exist in the reality outside of our minds? The only observations that one can make about them are observations about himself.
From what I've read of Molyneux, I think he might be confusing "scientific method" with "logical analysis". Those are not at all the same thing.
Aristophanes:"to argue otherwise would require proof that consciousness is not composed of matter, and is not organic – an impossibility, since it has mass, energy, and life." But, he provides no proof that _consciousness_ has mass, energy, or life. He simply states it as if it is a fact. Where is my consciousness? If it has mass, then should be able to locate its position in time/space. But, if it is in my brain...then the simple fact that _my_ circumstances for judgment are different than _anyone_ and _everyone_ else's means that is cannot be objective. (Or, rather, it means that SM is using "preferable behaviour" in a sense of eating, sex (procreation for existence), and sleep. None of which are directly related to objective judgmental circumstance in terms of MORALITY. Look at Israel and Palestine, if you don't think people can view "preferable behavior" in different terms...)
I think it's useful to provide the full sentence containing that quoted passage: "Any living mind, of course, is an organic part of the physical world, and so must be subject to both physical laws and has followed preferred behaviours – to argue otherwise would require proof that consciousness is not composed of matter, and is not organic – an impossibility, since it has mass, energy, and life."
Aristophanes:"if he is alive to argue, he has followed preferred behaviours such as breathing, eating and drinking." See? Those aren't "moral" circumstances. They are, in Kant's terminology, "necessary" circumstances.
See? Those aren't "moral" circumstances. They are, in Kant's terminology, "necessary" circumstances.
Molyneux here is actually going down the same road as Rand and Rothbard went before him. His argument for objective morality is really no different from theirs. It's basically the notion that maximization of value/utility/satisfaction/etc. necessarily depends on staying alive. But if a person kills himself, then he clearly preferred dying over staying alive. But that means that staying alive isn't necessary for one to maximize his own value/utility/satisfaction/etc. Interestingly enough, this is closer to the original Aristotelian concept of ethics than Rand and Rothbard would have us believe.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Clayton:Naturalistic fallacy: Assuming that because something is natural it is, therefore, moral or vice-versa Moralistic fallacy: Assuming that because something is moral it is, therefore, natural or vice-versa
I'll just note that these also reflect the two sides of the is-ought problem.
Autolykos: Take the laws of thought, for instance - the law of identity ("A = A"), the law of non-contradiction ("A =/= ~A"), and the law of the excluded middle ("A | ~A"). They seem intuitively obvious to us. Why? Because our innate perception of the external world is based upon them. That sounds like some strong empirical verification, if you ask me. However, it's impossible to prove the (logical) validity of the laws of thought. Why? Because they're required for logic in the first place. Trying to prove (or disprove) the validity of logic is like a horse trying to pull a cart that's in front of it.
Have you read the following quote by Avicenna?
Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned.
Fun stuff!
Hehehe. I believe I have seen that quote before. It's very apt.
To ignore the laws of thought means to ignore all distinction. If one ignores all distinction, then one literally cannot say anything or even think anything. However, our nervous systems are predicated on various forms of distinction even at the most basic levels. For example, most types of retinal ganglion cells have what's called "center-surround antagonism". What that means is that they respond when there's one level of light in the center of their receptive field and a different level of light in the remainder. Either the former is higher than the latter (in which case they're called "on-center" cells) or vice-versa (in which case they're called "off-center" cells). So really, in order to ignore all distinction, the entire nervous system has to shut down.
If one ignores all distinction, then one literally cannot say anything or even think anything.
QFT.
Math is a subset of logic
This cannot be proven. Does logic prove math or does math prove logic? It is also a highly contested concept. Check out Professor Sutherland from Univ. of Chicago, he talks a lot about it.
That is, the rules of logic don't change based on a person's mood or other subjective factors.
I just woke up and need some time to shower and collect my thoughts, but the first paper I posted covers this (read chapters 1 and 9). There are different logical systems (predicate, sentential, etc.)
EDIT:
One system of formal logic, classical first order logic, was privileged to give the rules for rationally justified inferences, and to classify some argument patterns as fallacies. Educating a person in rational thinking was synonymous to teaching that person how to reason in classical logic. This attitude dates back to the founding fathers of logic. In fact, one of Frege’s arguments against psychologism, the reduction of logical norms to empirical laws of thinking, was precisely that such a psychological view of norms makes it impossible to arbitrate between good and bad reasoning.
Logical rules are universal norms. As several of the above quotations have shown, it is customary to assume that logic is fundamental to all other sciences. It is the supreme court to which differences of opinion can be referred. The universality of logic means that there can be only one (maximal) set of valid inferences, hence also that there is an absolute distinction between fallacious and non-fallacious inferences. Many people believe that a logic worth its name must have this universal character. If logic is not universal, it cannot be used to resolve disputes, for instance because the validity of inferences becomes itself a topic of argument, thus leading to a regress. A common justification of the universality of classical logic runs as follows. As will be seen in a moment, logical laws are considered to be valid by virtue of their form. This means that they are schematic, with variables for non-logical content. Since these variables can be replaced with arbitrary content, logic is content-independent and hence universally applicable.
Interestingly, this is one area where many psychologists would agree with Copi: to explain reasoning in classical logic one cannot use this logic itself; various heuristics are necessary, for instance, those described by Johnson-Laird’s ‘mental models’ theory. Briefly, Johnson-Laird’s theory can be viewed as opposing the theory of ‘mental logic’ which holds that logical reasoning proceeds by and large by application of natural deduction rules, and so remains within what classical logic has to offer. Johnson-Laird believes that people do not reason by applying rules but instead by constructing models of the situation described by the premises. This procedure is heuristic, however, because it may be beyond human capacities to construct all models corresponding to a given set of premises, and hence arguments may be declared valid which in fact are invalid.
...alternative views of rationality have come to the fore, both from within and without logic. To start with the latter, it has for example been observed that real-life reasoning is mostly concerned with decision under uncertainty, and that therefore classical logic fails on two counts: it does not deal with actions, and it cannot handle uncertainty. New standards of rationality have been proposed, for instance inductive reasoning in the form of probability theory. Within logic itself one has seen the development of various logics for applications in artificial intelligence, and equally importantly a sustained critique of classical logic by various forms of constructivism. To give just one example of the latter, Prawitz has criticised the classical notion of validity given above as being a definition of validity instead of a consequence of validity. He argues that the Bolzano definition is useless for practice, where one would want to infer the truth of a conclusion of a valid argument from the truth of the premises, without having the capacity to survey all concrete instances of the particular argument form. Prawitz argues for the need of a notion of validity with lower epistemic requirements. The definition of validity that Prawitz proposes entails the Bolzano – Tarski criterion of validity without being epistemically equivalent to it, since validity is defined independently of truth. The question raised by these developments is obviously that of justification; for instance, if the formal character of logic confers universality upon it, how is it possible that other logics exist and even find applications in places where classical logic fails?
The question raised by these developments is obviously that of justification; for instance, if the formal character of logic confers universality upon it, how is it possible that other logics exist and even find applications in places where classical logic fails?
Normativity thus presents a Janus-face to us. On the one hand, logical laws are inescapable and a priori, on the other hand, they are revisable. Their inescapability they have in common with earlier conceptions of logical laws. Here, however, it simply means that one is bound to reason according to some set of logical laws, namely the logical laws constituting the interpretation that one constructs. But unlike traditional conceptions of logic, one must conceive of logical laws as revisable. The reason for this is that the assignment of a logical form always serves a purpose, namely, extraction of information that is deemed relevant to the task at hand (Chapter 2). Whenever the logical form is judged to be useless or at least not sufficiently effective for that purpose, it is liable to be changed. For example, one could adopt a closed world understanding of a reasoning task, to be replaced later by a classical understanding (Chapter 8). Such shifts are very likely to occur in one’s attempt to solve a reasoning task. However, they should not be seen as instances of irrational behavior. Indeed there is no external norm to dictate a particular interpretation, when in principle more than one can be constructed.
Aristophanes:I just woke up and need some time to shower and collect my thoughts, but the first paper I posted covers this (read chapters 1 and 9). There are different logical systems (predicate, sentential, etc.)
By "logic" I was referring to classical first-order logic. Sorry if that wasn't clear. But surely you agree that the rules of any particular logical system don't change based on a person's mood or other subjective factors. If a person decides to alter the set of rules under which he's evaluating statements, then he's technically deciding to use a different system altogether. The rules themselves don't change just because he's no longer using them.
I've been wondering something quite relevant: has Molyneux released his response to Gordon's second article? There was Gordon's attack, Molyneux's response, then Gordon's response, but has Molyneux responded again, yet?
A Critique Of Molyneuvian Ethics (‘universally preferable behavior’)