anyone out there familiar with daniel dennetts views, on determinism and free will?
im just beginning to familiarise myself with his outlook, and it seems very agreeable to me.
I wondered whether any austrians have considered how this philosophy impacts the austrian,
whether they are compatible, etc.
a quick search on mises.org turns up some papers by Tibor Machan, and a couple others, who i think take a contrary stance attacking dennetts views, and being happy to do so.
im thinking of devoting some time to try to show how the two are compatible. but i dont want to waste my time, e.g. if the majority of people who have thought about it would agree with my intuition that they are compatible already. If not, and the austrian concensus is that they arent, (i.e. more austrians than not agree with machan), then it might be worth me having a go. I might come out a big failure but it seems to me that a defense of dennett could be mounted. and could even be a boon to austrianism.
any thoughts?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
What is Dennett's view? There is a variety of positions within the Austrian School on free will, although I think a lot of Austrians tend towards the free will view.
The discovery of deterministic chaos makes the whole determinism/free will debate moot. Even if everything is deterministic, there is no way to tell.
The fallacies of intellectual communism, a compilation - On the nature of power
What is 'deterministic chaos' exactly?
I'd disagree here, one point I make in just about every philosophy paper I write is that scientific discoveries do not come complete with their own interpretation, and therefore they cannot determine your philosophy. In my reading of Dennett, albeit limited, I found nothing to suggest that he's in the least compatible with the Austrian school. Mises writes about the difference between human sciences and other sciences being that man acts, as far as I can tell, Dennett is trying to deny that man acts in any way different from the sense in which plants act. By the way, if any philosopher tells me that the self is an illusion, I run, but first I check to make sure my wallet is still in place.
Stranger: The discovery of deterministic chaos makes the whole determinism/free will debate moot. Even if everything is deterministic, there is no way to tell.
I'm not sure what Dennett's ideas are.
I don't believe in free will. It is possible in some circumstances to reliably predict what people will do. For example, if you struck a policeman the outcome would be predictable. We lack a practical theory accurately prediciting peoples' behavior under every possible scenario; but that simply suggests ignorance, rather than a need for spiritual or metaphysical concepts. There is also no practical theory for predicting where the next bubble will appear in a pot of boiling water, but there is nothing spooky or wierd going on. It's just that some phenomena are too complex to make practical predictions about.
For me "determinism" means we have the ability to predict something. "indeterminism" is an arrogant appeal to Chance, as if Chance is a some kind of real actor that can do something, instead of simply admitting our ignorance about a process.
And "free will" is a vacuous term, plagued with paradoxes. I guess the closest I can come to understanding it, is that a super-intelligent outside observer might be able to predict my actions 100%, but me being oblivious to such knowledge, my will appears to be unconstrained.
But I can still accept praxeology as a viable basis for economics.
Inquisitor:What is 'deterministic chaos' exactly?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rule_30
Your example is correct, I can predict what a policeman will do if I were to hit him. But there's no imperative - I'm predicting based on what I assume about his personality and so on. He could choose to do otherwise. You define "determinism" as the ability to predict, but there are two forms of prediction. One is based on some knowledge of a causative factor, and one isn't. The two are different, and the meaning of "prediction" is different in the two cases. Your view of "indeterminism" seems based on a dichotomy - either things are determined, or they are random. Certainly determinists accept this dichotomy, but not everyone does. What else can there be but determinism or chance? Well, human action, for one.
If you believe that human behavior is mechanistically determined, just how can you accept the notion of action which is at the basis of praxeology? Not only must you deny "man acts" but more directly, you have no reason to accept that man chooses his most highly valued end for a given means, ex ante. After all, the reason for his behavior is physically determined, right?
>Your view of "indeterminism" seems based on a dichotomy - either things are determined, or they are random.
Scientifically it's impossible to know the true nature of things. The dichotomy is that you either have a model with experimentally-proven predictive power, or you have no such model.
You can say that something behaves "randomly", or is caused by "Chance"; however, because randomness is the absence of a prediction, it is inherently untestable and therefore not a model at all. This doesn't rule out statistical predictions. For example, predicting that a flipped coin lands heads up 50% of the time over many trials, is a testable conjecture and it happens to be true (Casinos profit on this kind of knowledge). Saying the next coin flip result will be "random", is an untestable conjecture.
I would define human action as simply humans acting and not a concept competing with ideas like determinism or Chance. To say that a human behaves according to human action is a tautology.
>If you believe that human behavior is mechanistically determined
I do believe that; but I have no general model for predicting human action, and therefore it's just an unprovable opinion. I also believe that any such model is too complex for us to comprehend and calculate currently.
> just how can you accept the notion of action which is at the basis of praxeology?
I see no problem with accepting man's ability to value things subjectively and ordinally. A deterministic model explaining it wouldn't take the ability away.
baxter:I would define human action as simply humans acting and not a concept competing with ideas like determinism or Chance. To say that a human behaves according to human action is a tautology.
I meant human action as Mises understands it. My point, which you left out in your snips, was that a deterministic view of how people act removes Mises' proof of his definition of human action: that men choose their highest valued uses for the means available, ex ante. If our actions are reducible to the behavior of the physical components of our brain, I don't see why this should be the case.
if you brain is a system which by design (evolutionary etc.) both sets goals, and generates for itself fluctuating ordered rankings of preference, then i would think it is easy to see how this could be completely determined by the inputs to the brain system and the given brain condition at the moment we consider it. and also it would lead an investigator of human action, such as mises, to see the brain choose their highest valued uses for the means available, ex ante.
compatible.
furthermore to suggest the mind is somehow not completely determined by the physical brain, but owes anything to something spiritual or unnatural is to reduce the credibility of the suggester....
I recall Mises as saying on the topic that for man all that matters is that from his point of view, as opposed to that of some omniscient God for instance, that he chooses.
nirgrahamUK: if you brain is a system which by design (evolutionary etc.) both sets goals, and generates for itself fluctuating ordered rankings of preference, then i would think it is easy to see how this could be completely determined by the inputs to the brain system and the given brain condition at the moment we consider it. and also it would lead an investigator of human action, such as mises, to see the brain choose their highest valued uses for the means available, ex ante.
Then you can only defend it as an accidental fact, not a priori. Certainly things could have come out another way.
nirgrahamUK:furthermore to suggest the mind is somehow not completely determined by the physical brain, but owes anything to something spiritual or unnatural is to reduce the credibility of the suggester....
This isn't an argument, it's an ad hominen and a presumptious one. Until the last 100 years no one would have thought to doubt that thinking is not material, now you simply assert that all is physical and insult anyone who disagrees. Regardless, I will choose to end it here (or you can regard it as my being determined to end it here) and say that we will not convince one another (maybe we're hardwired to have our opinions.) From your point of view, why would you ever argue the point anyway?
For the other poster, I'm not sure how Mises' statement helps you. Any discussion that we have is accessible to any person, and so the idea of predetermination does affect the acting person too.
JAlanKatz, you should read the first paragraph in the "Theory and History" Introduction : http://www.mises.org/Books/theoryhistory.pdf.
Here, Mises does not reject determinism outright, but rather just says it's not practical at this time:
"Man—up to now [cannot] bridge the gulf that he sees yawning between mind and matter ... science—at least for the time being—
must adopt a dualistic approach, less as a philosophical explanation than as a methodological device."
My favorite line so far is this one
"ignorance splits the realm of knowledge into two.. nature.. and human thought and action
I tend to think that Mises got more right than most philosophers. However, I have the right to disagree with him, and I would here. Mises also thought that conscription is acceptable under some circumstances, and wasn't an anarchist. I'd also note that he's not defending determinism here either, but just claiming that his points hold regardless of which way you go on that question. That doesn't commit him to determinism. I'd also argue that his arguments related to human action don't work if we start with determinism, whether he would agree or not.
baxter: JAlanKatz, you should read the first paragraph in the "Theory and History" Introduction : http://www.mises.org/Books/theoryhistory.pdf. Here, Mises does not reject determinism outright, but rather just says it's not practical at this time: "Man—up to now [cannot] bridge the gulf that he sees yawning between mind and matter ... science—at least for the time being— must adopt a dualistic approach, less as a philosophical explanation than as a methodological device." My favorite line so far is this one "ignorance splits the realm of knowledge into two.. nature.. and human thought and action
I'm not familiar with Daniel Dennett, but in my opinion Austrianism must suppose free will. The action axiom itself requires free will. An action requires means and ends, and therefore implies intent, otherwise it is simply a mechanistic, knee-jerk response. Intent presupposes free will and choice. Now of course you could argue that all thoughts and ideas and therefore all intents are simply electrical responses in the brain that result from a given set of chemical compounds, and that these responses, given a sufficently large super-brain, are completely predictable. But since we don't know this to be the case, and since no such super-brain exists, I must assume free will.
JAlanKatz:I tend to think that Mises got more right than most philosophers. However, I have the right to disagree with him, and I would here. Mises also thought that conscription is acceptable under some circumstances, and wasn't an anarchist. I'd also note that he's not defending determinism here either, but just claiming that his points hold regardless of which way you go on that question. That doesn't commit him to determinism. I'd also argue that his arguments related to human action don't work if we start with determinism, whether he would agree or not.
My point in quoting Mises was not to insist that he was right or that he defended determinism (he didn't; from what I understand he was more of a compatibilist.) It was just to show exactly what you stated, that his arguments hold either way. Determined or not we always face choice, whether it is an illusion or not.