I read Gordon's daily here. His dailies are typically top-notch. I was pretty disappointed with this one. I'm not going to pick it apart but I'll explain what disappoints me most. If you look at this quote, Gordon comes close to hitting the mark:
It isn't only that we prefer not to murder innocent children, for example: it really is wrong to do so, in a sense not reducible to people's choices or anything else. (Mises would I think say that the rule against murder, combined with other moral rules, is a means by which we can achieve a society of peace and prosperity, which nearly everyone wants; but that this latter preference is an ultimate judgment of value that is neither true nor false.)
But then he closes with this:
"There are more things in heaven and earth … Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."
The intimation of the entire daily is that the facts of moral realism are embedded into the very structure of the Universe at a level transcending humanity itself. But there is no reason to believe this is actually the case. What we observe is that the conditions for moral facts reside entirely within the human social order. That is, morality is not a question that has anything to do with the Absolute or the Universe as it would appear to an omniscient being.
Rather, moral facts are facts merely about the human social order, about human nature. They are facts about human brains, human bodies and terrestrial biology and our terrestrial environment and the particular facts of our situation in this corner of the cosmos. Is it immoral for Martians to kill Martian children? I have no idea. But I know that it is immoral for humans to kill human children. That's because I know the facts about human beings relevant to human morality but I don't know the facts about Martians relevant to Martian morality.
Gordon's recent tackling of Molyneux's UPB nonsense is commendable and will hopefully spare a lot of young people a lot of needless wandering. But I don't think Gordon's alternative, as presented in this daily, is up to the mark.
Clayton -
I don't get it. Why is it immoral to kill children, in your opinion? And what do you mean by immoral? I.e., what facts about human morality (whatever that is) make it immoral (whatever that is) to murder human children?
@Clayton
moral facts are facts merely about the human social order, about human nature. They are facts about human brains, human bodies and terrestrial biology and our terrestrial environment and the particular facts of our situation in this corner of the cosmos. Is it immoral for Martians to kill Martian children? I have no idea. But I know that it is immoral for humans to kill human children
All you get with this line of reasoning is descriptive ethics, as opposed to prescriptive ethics. That is, you can indeed demonstrate that human beings do in fact hold such and such ethical views. You cannot demonstrate that people should hold such and such ethics views. When people are discussing whether or not some given action is ethically permissible, they typically are not debating whether human beings do in fact find it to be ethically permissible, but rather whether human beings should find it to be ethically permissible. Prescriptive ethics is the problem, not descriptive ethics - which can be settled by conducting a survey.
All you get with this line of reasoning is descriptive ethics, as opposed to prescriptive ethics. That is, you can indeed demonstrate that human beings do in fact hold such and such ethical views. You cannot demonstrate that people should hold such and such ethics views.
But I think we can, as long as we are very clear about what we mean.
Consider the following sentence: "If you want to build an airplane, you should study the physics of aerodynamics." It's a prescription and it is factually true as far as I am concerned. Or, "If you want to build a skyscraper, you should study the physics of statics." Again, this is a prescription and factually true.
Basically, we can make prescriptive statements factually true (or false), by adding a condition to them that specifies the scope in which the prescription applies. All such statements conform to the following schema: "If your end is X, then you should use means Y."
So, we may ask whether there is a conditional which is universally true. That is, does there exist a conditional such that, for any human end, the conditional is always true? I think there is one. "If you want to be happy/satisfied/whatever-you-want-to-call-it, then ...." So, the final end of all human action - satisfaction - is the formal end which resides within every other end, that is, it is the ever-present final end of all human action.
But since this end is purely formal (e.g. the Jesuit neophyte may find satisfaction in self-flagellation, or the masochist in painful sex acts, and so on), it contains no specific moral content. (as of yet) Up to this point, I think what I have presented is perfectly in correspondence with Rothbardian ethics as presented in EoL. But here's where we part ways.
To color in the picture of human morality, Rothbard believes we can apply an a priori methodology (a methodology that Hoppe would later extend with his argumentation ethics) to derive "necessary" principles of human morality. Here, I think that Rothbard goes off the cliff into an is-ought fallacy. But I don't think it's because we can't color in the picture of human morality at all. After all, we all do color that picture in anyway! So, the real question is what we're doing when we engage in moral reasoning? Why does it feel different to say "murder is wrong" than to say "anchovies taste gross"?
On the purely subjectivist theory of morality - that morality has no objective dimension whatseover - morals are preferences and nothing more. I held this view for some time but I think I've charted a way out of it that is intellectually responsible.
Answering all the objections is very tedious so I'll just sketch the idea and leave the objections unaddressed. Basically, the facts of human morality are facts about the relationship between behavior and the attainment of individual satisfaction that are true by virtue of the particular features of human nature (i.e. things like facts of human biology, facts of human psychology, facts of human social behavior, etc.) And when I say "by virtue of the particular features of human nature" I do not mean any kind of a priori principles of human nature such as that you cannot be present and not present at the same time. Rather, I am speaking of empirical facts of human nature, facts that can only be known by observing human beings - how they are made, how they behave, how they interact, and so on.
Because these facts are true by virtue of human nature (a nature which all human beings without exception share), we can drop the "If _________" conditional. For example, "The human body experiences pain when a limb is severed. Hence, if you do not want to experience pain, do not sever your limbs." Because it is true of every human body that severing a limb causes pain and since it is true of everyone that they do not want to experience pain, then we can simply state the moral fact without qualification: "You ought not to sever your limbs." As I said, there are a thousand quibbling objections that I can think of that can be raised to this but, rather than anticipating them all, I'll just answer them as you raise them.
To summarize: the empirical facts of human nature as regards the relationship between behavior and satisfaction can be restated without qualification (just like the formal version above, "If you want satisfaction, then ________"). Being unqualified facts, they are simply true even though they are prescriptive statements.
When people are discussing whether or not some given action is ethically permissible, they typically are not debating whether human beings do in fact find it to be ethically permissible, but rather whether human beings should find it to be ethically permissible. Prescriptive ethics is the problem, not descriptive ethics - which can be settled by conducting a survey.
I'm making a stronger claim than merely that we can engage in descriptive ethics. I'm saying that descriptive ethics say something about attaining satisfaction and that facts regarding the attainment of satisfaction are formally equivalent to prescriptions. Hence, the is-ought bridge can be navigated without falling off into the abyss of mere opinion on the one hand or moral nihilism on the other.
I'll just throw a link to this post for reference.
You're talking about connotation 2. I'm talking about connotation 3. Almost every objection that can be raised against my previous post involves a conflation of two or more conntations of moral language.
For more on what Clayton's talking about see:
Harsanyi, Ethics in terms of hypothetical imperatives
Harsanyi, Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code to Follow and, Indeed, to Follow Any Moral Code at All?
Consider the following sentence: "If you want to build an airplane, you should study the physics of aerodynamics." It's a prescription and it is factually true as far as I am concerned. Or, "If you want to build a skyscraper, you should study the physics of statics." Again, this is a prescription and factually true. Basically, we can make prescriptive statements factually true (or false), by adding a condition to them that specifies the scope in which the prescription applies. All such statements conform to the following schema: "If your end is X, then you should use means Y."
Sure. For every given end, there is a best means which can be prescribed. The problem is that the end itself cannot be prescribed.
So, we may ask whether there is a conditional which is universally true. That is, does there exist a conditional such that, for any human end, the conditional is always true? I think there is one. "If you want to be happy/satisfied/whatever-you-want-to-call-it, then ...." So, the final end of all human action - satisfaction - is the formal end which resides within every other end, that is, it is the ever-present final end of all human action. But since this end is purely formal (e.g. the Jesuit neophyte may find satisfaction in self-flagellation, or the masochist in painful sex acts, and so on), it contains no specific moral content.
But since this end is purely formal (e.g. the Jesuit neophyte may find satisfaction in self-flagellation, or the masochist in painful sex acts, and so on), it contains no specific moral content.
Agreed.
Because these facts are true by virtue of human nature (a nature which all human beings without exception share), we can drop the "If _________" conditional. For example, "The human body experiences pain when a limb is severed. Hence, if you do not want to experience pain, do not sever your limbs." Because it is true of every human body that severing a limb causes pain and since it is true of everyone that they do not want to experience pain, then we can simply state the moral fact without qualification: "You ought not to sever your limbs."
The truth of the moral fact is conditional on the end, regardless of whether that end is universal or not. So, provided your claim is only that the moral fact can be stated unconditionally (as a kind of short-hand), and not that the moral fact itself is unconditionally true, then I have no objection.
I have no objection
Awesome. This goes back to my OP on the distinction between human morality and Martian morality... note that I did not talk about an unqualified morality. Preceding every moral prescription is an "If you are human and desire to achieve satisfaction, then, ..." that can simply be dropped as a shorthand because it is always true as long as we're talking about human beings and not Martians.
Unqualified morality would be the Law of God in the Biblical sense. That is, it is the Absolute Moral Truth as inscribed on the subatomic particles of the Universe Itself. It is moral truth as seen from the point-of-view of an omniscient being, as Mises would put it. To this, I would contend, we have no access. And even if it were truthfully relayed to us in some ancient text, for example, it would be so general - perhaps even unintelligible - as to be useless in making decisions, which is precisely where morality is most needed.
Clayton: Unqualified morality would be the Law of God in the Biblical sense. That is, it is the Absolute Moral Truth as inscribed on the subatomic particles of the Universe Itself. It is moral truth as seen from the point-of-view of an omniscient being, as Mises would put it. To this, I would contend, we have no access. And even if it were truthfully relayed to us in some ancient text, for example, it would be so general - perhaps even unintelligible - as to be useless in making decisions, which is precisely where morality is most needed.
Unless we were given an algorithm of how to use today the set of rules given to us 3000 years ago. Which is precisely what Jewish Oral Torah is, for example. And, possibly, Muslim Shariat law. Also, if the Creator promised to give us subconscious glimpses into His Will when we try to apply the original instructions to our everyday life (I mean, if you believe in the original revelation, why not believe in an ongoing revelation?). In other words, it's not an ancient text, it's an ancient tradition.
I still don't understand your view of morality. As I see it, morality needs to be on the one hand applicable to the individual (you can't make a moral prescriptive statement that addresses the needs or goals of a society, since it is the individuals who make choices) and on the other hand universal (we can't say that a serial killer acts morally, since his actions bring him the greatest satisfaction). What's left then? It seems to me that what's left is precisely the Absolute Moral Truth -- applicable to individuals but regardless of their individual preferences. If adultery is wrong it's wrong for everyone and always.
(Of course, there can be built-in conditions. Lying is wrong, but lying to save someone's life is right, since saving life takes moral priority.)
It also seems to me that libertarian morality is based on the assumption that nothing changes between two people existing in a state of nature and them existing in a society. To see whether something is wrong or not, we have to ask: would it be OK for me to do that to you on a deserted island? For instance, would it be ok for me to steal from you, when there is no society around us? If not, then why is it ok for me to steal from you when there is a society, with the society's help?
But if there is no Absolute Moral Truth, then, indeed, why is it wrong for me to rob you when we are alone on a deserted island if I calculate that it is a greater benefit for me to do that than co-exist with you peacefully? Also, if my actions even in a society are secretive enough, I can get away with doing them without changing the society itself. So, one can say: "people's happiness will be the greatest if they live in a society where children are not killed". But what does this have to do with me personally making a decision whether or not to kill a child secretly? Presumably my actions do not affect the society I live in. Also, while a law against child killing (that benefits the society) could exist on a societal level (applicable to all citizens, enforced by all law agencies of the society), it would still not be a moral law, since it would say nothing as to why I need to keep it at all times and in all circumstances.
I have once heard a joke: If you're stranded on a deserted island with limited food and water in a company of either an atheist or a statist, you should kill them immediately, for your life is in danger. Neither of them can conceive of what is moral or right outside of the society. If they are sufficiently liberated from the traditions of their upbringing, they will reason the justification for killing you very easily.
Moral facts are applicable to everyone and always because everyone is always a human being. In other words, what is constant is not the fact that you exist, but the fact that you are human.
If you look at, say, the moral codes of the major monotheistic religions, you will see that they apply the concepts of "good" and "evil" universally across types of beings - angels, demons, spirits... even animals (e.g. the Serpent in the Garden of Eden). This is where I'm saying they're mistaken. Even if you derive valid, universal moral facts of human behavior, you will not have derived valid, universal moral facts of Martian behavior or angelic behavior.
But this leads right back to the question: what then, are the constant conditions that we are appealing to when revising moral dictums? Is it outcomes (consequentialism/utilitarianism)? Is it duty? Is it something else? Even more importantly, when can we stop? How do we know when we're done making exceptions to our morals? Isn't it always possible that there's just one more exception nobody thought of before?
This is a good way to rebut a lot of majoritarian/collectivist arguments.
But if there is no Absolute Moral Truth, then, indeed, why is it wrong for me to rob you when we are alone on a deserted island if I calculate that it is a greater benefit for me to do that than co-exist with you peacefully?
a) When people actually existed in conditions where this sort of situation was possible, they were a lot more animal-like in their behavior and moral codes. In other words, high population is correlative with the development of "refined" morality.
b) For the purposes of thought-experiment, I think the issue is one of virtue and character. Virtue is something that you cultivate as a form of psychological self-training. It is basically the purposeful inculcation of "general moral guidelines that are almost always right in almost every situation" in order to not be stuck in the situation of having to think your way through each new situation you encounter in life from first principles.
So, I think virtue is the basis of doing "what you ought" even when it does not benefit you in any obvious way, vis-a-vis the alternatives.
c) But this just punts the question down the road... what is virtue? In order to answer this question, I think that we need an active and thriving system of competing law as well as competing religious and philosophical teachings. "Schools" in the sense "Austrian school." Law is in a circular relationship with morality - what is right and wrong turns on what the law finds to be proper, responsible behavior. And what is legal turns on what people have determined to be moral. And both religion and philosophy play a role in organizing solutions to moral and legal problems.
Without this social context, the individual has nothing to found his moral opinions on besides his own prejudices. In other words, there is nothing more than mere opinion to go on. I think where I part ways with the Kantian/Humean tradition is on this point... that the individual can construct a moral foundation on his own, from first principles. He cannot. The individual is dependent on the social order to discover and formulate the vast majority of moral facts on his behalf. This goes back to point a)... a low-population society is devoid of the tools necessary for the discovery of moral truth.
Also, if my actions even in a society are secretive enough, I can get away with doing them without changing the society itself. So, one can say: "people's happiness will be the greatest if they live in a society where children are not killed". But what does this have to do with me personally making a decision whether or not to kill a child secretly? Presumably my actions do not affect the society I live in. Also, while a law against child killing (that benefits the society) could exist on a societal level (applicable to all citizens, enforced by all law agencies of the society), it would still not be a moral law, since it would say nothing as to why I need to keep it at all times and in all circumstances.
I think this has more to do with applications of the law (security, etc.) The question of what the law ought to be is a separate question.
That's just a quote from Hamlet, I wouldn't read too much into it (technically it's a minor misquote).
"As in a kaleidoscope, the constellation of forces operating in the system as a whole is ever changing." - Ludwig Lachmann
"When A Man Dies A World Goes Out of Existence" - GLS Shackle
Clayton: Moral facts are applicable to everyone and always because everyone is always a human being. In other words, what is constant is not the fact that you exist, but the fact that you are human.
But all humans are different. And some are satisfied by things that others would find morally abhorrent and harmful. A rapist is satisfied more by the act of rape than by living in a rape-free society. A slave-trader shipping slaves from Africa doesn't care about society; he is doing what really maximizes his satisfaction (which is not derived from living in a violence-free society). In fact, one could argue that it is within each human being's potential satisfaction to committ (what is traditionally thought of as) immoral acts (for instance, committing petty theft), and we need morality to stop us.
I have never heard of such. In fact, in Judaism, angels don't have the concept of punishment applicable to them; there is an exception in the case of Elijah and one another angel, but both have been humans before they had become angels. In fact, that is why being a human is a greater thing in Judaism than being an angel -- one has freedom of will.
The constant conditions are the demands from our conduct by the source of Absolute Morals. For me, that source is the Creator. I don't know what it is for others. The exceptions themselves are built-in by the Source. There is a hierarchy of demands, etc. I did not mean that we ourselves make exceptions.
Look, there is a concept that different rules apply to different groups of people, but that is because they have different... spiritual anatomy (the best way to describe it) to them. For instance, people who are blind are not expected to read, people who are poor are not expected to give charity. But those are, as I said, built-in conditional brackets. We don't say that it is ridiculous that laws of gravity apply to all objects, yet air baloons fly up.
But this situation can arise nowadays. And a person himself can make it arise. In other words, you're making it sound like my satisfaction from living in a nice society -- to whose "niceness" I contribute by my behavior -- is the greatest motive for all my behavior. But that's not the case:
1) sometimes people value certain things more than living in a nice society (for instance, a serial killer really wants to murder someone in a park; an investor really wants to steal his customers' money -- all regardless of the backlash)
2) sometimes people's individual actions do not have such a strong effect on the society. One killing will not turn the society into that of murderers. So, while the rule "don't murder secretly" is a good prescription on a societal level, I still lack to see the motivation on an individual level (which is where the decisions are made).
b) For the purposes of thought-experiment, I think the issue is one of virtue and character. Virtue is something that you cultivate as a form of psychological self-training. It is basically the purposeful inculcation of "general moral guidelines that are almost always right in almost every situation" in order to not be stuck in the situation of having to think your way through each new situation you encounter in life from first principles. So, I think virtue is the basis of doing "what you ought" even when it does not benefit you in any obvious way, vis-a-vis the alternatives.
But why ought I not kill someone on a deserted island? Am I stupid enough not to see the difference between killing someone in such a situation and killing someone in the middle of a city? If achieving satisfaction is all there is to virtuousness, then I can easily distinguish between different situations.
I would disagree. Living in a secure society is a perfectly legitimate subjective desire. It's like having access to Caesal salads. People like to live in a secure society, where they will not be robbed or murdered. They also want a set of straightforward rules that would allow them to figure out in a case of conflict if robbery or murdered happened. Competition between different law- and protection-producing entities on the market should increase quality of service, just like competition between restaurants increases quality of Caesar salads.
But this has nothing to do with morality. Morality is something that you consider right or wrong when nobody is looking. Law and order are the opposite -- they are services that exist in a society, "in the open", and thus are subject to economic forces.
I agree that the individual cannot discover or construct moral foundation on his own. But I cannot see what social order has to do with moral rules applying to inviduals. Which means:
1) there must be an external source of morality, or:
2) morality is a myth into which we are brainwashed by the society; it's a meme that allows societies to exist, and societies (so to speak) brainwash newborn inviduals into believing into morality; once the bubble is burst, if there is no 1), then there is no morality left for an individual.
No. My joke meant that since statists and atheists conceive of "what's right or wrong" only in the context of a (particular) society, the concepts of right and wrong disappear once they are in a state of nature. So, there is nothing stopping them from murdering someone else if that's what benefits them the most at the moment.
And if you want to define morality this way, that's fine. But I just don't think that most people's view of morality agrees to this picture.
I heard another joke that illustrates this principle. Imagine you travel to 1940s France, and your friends are going to local forest to do Jew-hunting. When you say: "Don't you guys think this is immoral?", they answer: "Oh, it's immoral in your society. But in our society, it's totally fine. We made necessary calculations about societal benefits, and killing all the Jews will maximize everyone else's happiness."
So, to figure out whether they are right and wrong, do you need to sit down and check their calculations? I.e., how do you know they are right or wrong?
Another ad absurdum: I steal a broche from someone in London. Then I cross the Channel and go to Paris. So, while I am in England, I am a thief, while I am in France, I am (maybe) a thief (perhaps depending on whether French and English society are considered one society), but while I am in the middle of the Channel, I am not a thief!
Well, first of all, it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which we are different. Second of all, when we talk about human nature, we are talking about whatever aspects of human nature are, in fact, constants across individuals. Sociopaths - rapists, murders, etc. - are exceptions that prove the rule. There is a significant body of research evidence showing that sociopaths literally do not experience the same feelings of revulsion, regret and guilt that normal people experience when committing heinously immoral acts. So, yeah, of course they get satisfaction out of it... there's "a screw loose" in their head.
Well, we disagree on that. I don't think that view is even intelligible.
But this situation can arise nowadays. And a person himself can make it arise. In other words, you're making it sound like my satisfaction from living in a nice society -- to whose "niceness" I contribute by my behavior -- is the greatest motive for all my behavior. But that's not the case: 1) sometimes people value certain things more than living in a nice society (for instance, a serial killer really wants to murder someone in a park; an investor really wants to steal his customers' money -- all regardless of the backlash) 2) sometimes people's individual actions do not have such a strong effect on the society. One killing will not turn the society into that of murderers. So, while the rule "don't murder secretly" is a good prescription on a societal level, I still lack to see the motivation on an individual level (which is where the decisions are made).
That's not my view at all. I'm saying that the preconditions for nice society are not possible with low population. Of course, there is less need for nicety, as well, so the outcome is felicitous either way.
But why ought I not kill someone on a deserted island? Am I stupid enough not to see the difference between killing someone in such a situation and killing someone in the middle of a city?
In the modern situation, discovery is imminently possible at all times. Have you ever seen a FLIR scope? I think that fundamentally alters the thought-experiment and renders it useless to the point I think you're trying to illustrate. Hence, being abandoned on an island also implies very low population where you have no chance of accidental discovery and can take your secret murder to your grave.
If you're looking for unqualified prohibitions or commands, I think that my approach will not yield them. So what?
Again, we'll have to disagree. Crusoe's morality - alone on the island - is essentially "do what thou wilt" with an asterisk that he ought to avoid doing things that will bring him dissatisfaction but this ought is purely formal. If he wants to eat poisonous, psychedelic mushrooms for one last joyride on his way out of this world and its eternal loneliness, that's his choice. There are no moral duties - except the formal duty to one's own satisfaction - for a man alone on an island. He should do as he sees fit.
1) there must be an external source of morality, or: 2) morality is a myth into which we are brainwashed by the society; it's a meme that allows societies to exist, and societies (so to speak) brainwash newborn inviduals into believing into morality; once the bubble is burst, if there is no 1), then there is no morality left for an individual.
This is a false-dichotomy and a tragic view of morality.
I see nothing to answer in your closing moral questions since they do not in any way represent my moral views.
Clayton, the simple argument that I am making is that moral choices are made by individuals, not societies; hence, moral rules and moral imperatives must be for the individuals, not societies. Action X may be distabilizing to the society if performed by many individuals. Therefore, X may be considered bad for the society, as a societal rule. But what does this have to do with the individual motivation?
If many individuals perform X, it will diminish my satisfaction. But that doesn't mean that if I personally do X once (without anyone finding out), that this will diminish my satisfaction. In fact, the opposite. If I quietly steal a book I really want in a bookstore and not tell anyone, then I have increased my satisfaction by performing an act that, if endorsed by the society at large, would be quite distabilizing.
So, why shouldn't I steal the book (while encouraging the masses not to steal)? What principle on the individual level should prevent me?
FlyingAxe:
You've stated the problem excellently. This is the fundamental problem of libertarian ethics.
The problem must be solved by praxeology in the following general way.
The fundamental thesis of praxeology is that actions have consequences that are apodictically certain: If I do X, then Y must necessarily happen. The theoretical problem is that 1) there are only a limited number of actions, or classes of actions, for which it has been possible to conceive this type of necessity, and 2) as you correctly point out, for there to be an inhibition to a given action, the actor must believe the Y that will happen as a result of his doing to X will happen to him.
This kind of necessity has hitherto been conceived in two kinds of action: physical action and "economic" action.
For example, if a person wants to swim out to sea to get a closer look at a school of dolphins, then the closer he gets to the dolphins X, the farther away he gets from shore Y. Getting farther away from shore is a necessary "consequence" of his action of getting closer to the dolphins, and thus the inhibition to swimming out to sea X, is the necessary consequence Y of leaving the shore. The consequence is necessary, and it happens to the actor who performs the action. This is an example of "physical action."
The law of marginal utility is an example of a law of "economic" action, having to do with the action of obtaining a unit of supply. I'll modify Hoppe's definition of the law which he provides on page 14 of Economic Science and the Austrian Method: "Whenever the supply of a good increases by one additional unit X, ....the value attached to this unit Y must decrease." Of course, in Austrian theory, only actors have supplies, and only actors value. The law of marginal utility expresses that when an actor attains or obtains a unit of supply (action X) there is a necessary "consequence" or "accompaniment" to this action (Y) which is that his valuing of said unit decreases.
The point here is that the significance of the law of marginal utility is to be seen in the way it relates an act X, with a necessary consequence Y which must happen to the actor who performs the act. If an actor doesn't want to experience a decrease in the value of a unit of something (Y), he must, according to the law of marginal utility, abstain from obtaining a unit of that thing (X).
Thus, broadly speaking, science has succeeded, at least to some degree, in discovering necessary laws of human action that are operable in various classes or kinds of action. These laws conceive a necessary relationship between an action performed by an actor X, and some necessary consequence or result that must happen to the actor Y.
The problem for libertarian ethics and libertarian social science, is that no way has been found to demonstrate a necessary consequence of this type that results from actions such as lying, stealing, coercing, etc. We may refer to these actions broadly as "interpersonal" actions; actions that one person directs toward another actor. Thus, your question "So, why shouldn't I steal the book (while encouraging the masses not to steal)? What principle on the individual level should prevent me?" is the fundamental question of libertarian ethics and social science.
What result Y, if any, can be shown to be a necessary consequence of my doing X, when X is an interpersonal action such as stealing, lying, coercing, etc.?
The answer will be of the same general type as shown in the examples above. The result Y of action X will be a necessary consequence of doing X , and will necessarily happen to the person who does X, because Y's happening is necessarily entailed in doing X in some way. The challenge is to find that relationship in interpersonal action as opposed to physical or economic action.
The science charged with finding that relationship is praxeology.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Clayton, the simple argument that I am making is that moral choices are made by individuals, not societies; hence, moral rules and moral imperatives must be for the individuals, not societies.
OK, so far, so good.
Action X may be distabilizing to the society if performed by many individuals. Therefore, X may be considered bad for the society, as a societal rule. But what does this have to do with the individual motivation? If many individuals perform X, it will diminish my satisfaction. But that doesn't mean that if I personally do X once (without anyone finding out), that this will diminish my satisfaction. In fact, the opposite. If I quietly steal a book I really want in a bookstore and not tell anyone, then I have increased my satisfaction by performing an act that, if endorsed by the society at large, would be quite distabilizing.
OK, but the book's owner already has the incentive to stop you from stealing his book (whether through passive security measures or through threats of retaliation, or whatever). No additional incentives need to be added on top of this as some kind of "collective action problem."
1) On the pragmatic/utilitarian level, you shouldn't steal the book because if you get caught, it will be a net loss, not only in material terms (the price of the book versus the cost of restitution), but also in social terms - stigma, lost opportunities, etc. etc. Epicurus makes an interesting argument that the guilty mind is its own punishment as the individual who has done wrong is never able to completely shake the anxiety that he might one day be discovered.
2) On the virtue/character level, you shouldn't steal the book as a matter of principle - even if you're pretty sure you could do it without being caught - because (1) is almost always the case. In other words, it's almost always in your best interest not to steal, so it makes sense to live your life according to the rule "don't steal." This is like saying that it's almost always the case that running your finger along the edge of a piece of paper will result in a papercut so it makes sense to live your life according to the rule, "don't run your finger along the edge of a piece of paper."
For this reason, the wise individual (the individual who takes his own satisfaction/happines seriously) will cultivate the virtue of non-theft and even industriousness and diligence. Is there some "Thou shalt not steal" inscribed upon the fundamental particles of the Universe? I think not. But you're best off living your life as if there were.
Adam Knott:The problem for libertarian ethics and libertarian social science, is that no way has been found to demonstrate a necessary consequence of this type that results from actions such as lying, stealing, coercing, etc.
Really? It seems self evident that a necessary result of lying is that you are being dishonest. A necesary result of stealing is that you are taking that which doesn't belong to you. A necessary result of coercing is that you are being unjust.
I'm assuming that these aren't the kinds of answers you're looking for?
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
Mikachusetts:
"It seems self evident that a necessary result of lying (A) is that you are being dishonest (B). A necesary result of stealing (A) is that you are taking that which doesn't belong to you (B). A necessary result of coercing (A) is that you are being unjust (B).
"I'm assuming that these aren't the kinds of answers you're looking for?"
Yes, correct. What I mean is the necessary consequence of A + B in your example. The consequence of lying and being dishonest; the consequence of stealing and taking something that doesn't belong to you; the consequence of coercing and, as you assert, being unjust.
the praxeological result of A+B (where these are NAP violating acts/descriptions) seems always to be that the welfare analysis fails the pareto unanimity rule. see Rothbards welfare economics.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
I'm with Clayton here. The cost in fear, stress, calculation, precaution, measurement, and data acquisition necessary to keep a certain act of yours away from the eyes of other humans which may dislike it is, on average, far too large. The aura/energy of calmness, peace of mind, and wisdom that emanates from someone leading a "good" life attracts other humans and invites them to open up for interaction (division of labor, trade) easier.
So go ahead and steal a book when you think no one is watching. My bet is that not stealing it would yield you many more books (and other stuff) in the long run.
I'm not religious but "Give and you will receive" makes a ton of sense.
nirgrahamUK:
"the praxeological result of A+B (where these are NAP violating acts/descriptions) seems always to be that the welfare analysis fails the pareto unanimity rule."
The point that FlyingAxe raised was, what is the inhibition to the individual's act on an individual level?
"So, why shouldn't I steal the book (while encouraging the masses not to steal)? What principle on the individual level should prevent me?"
FlyingAxe will steal a book (an action). Then what consequence will befall him?
+1 z... BTW, welcome back (and where have you been?)
I think the word "heuristic" is very appropriate here. Lying would be a better example than stealing. It's not against any libertarian principles to lie. But the fact is, people hate to be lied to and they tend to ostracize people that they feel have lied to them. And the other fact is that there are those times you had better lie to prevent other, greater problems from arising. On balance, honesty is the best policy... but knowing when and how to tell "polite lies" is also a valuable skill. So there is no simple "thou shalt not lie" (something which, by the way, the Ten Commandments do not say!) Cultivating the virtue of honesty takes care of the 95% of the time when telling the truth is the right answer. Those few times you might need to lie, or abridge the truth, or misdirect... well, that's just 5% of the time anyway and you can think through those situations carefully when choosing the right course of action.
Note that there's a Misean argument for not killing someone on an island. Instead of killing them, you could enslave them, benefiting from their productive capacity, or trade with them, benefiting from both their productive capacity and their capacity for innovation/invention. In the long run, the satisfaction gained from the extra bounty this brings to you would likely make up for whatever satisfaction you lost by not killing them.
Clayton: 1) On the pragmatic/utilitarian level, you shouldn't steal the book because if you get caught, it will be a net loss, not only in material terms (the price of the book versus the cost of restitution), but also in social terms - stigma, lost opportunities, etc. etc. Epicurus makes an interesting argument that the guilty mind is its own punishment as the individual who has done wrong is never able to completely shake the anxiety that he might one day be discovered.
One shouldn't dim his car's window more than 30% in MA, because if a cop catches him, he will get a huge fine. Does this mean that tanning windows above some government-dictated level is immoral?
I.e., imprudent does not immoral make.
As I mentioned before, I can have a set of rules for different situations. "If you want something, steal it, unless you're likely to get caught." People have multiple rules in their heads all the time. I consider lying to my wife (e.g.) immoral, but I don't consider lying to a cop or a mugger immoral, if it's done in self-defense from potential aggression (or lying to save someone's life).
Nobody says: "You better not lie to a Nazi if he asks you if you're hiding Jews, since once you're used to lying, you will lie even in those situation when it may decrease your long-term satisfaction." That's just absurd. So, why should I say the same about stealing: "Don't steal when you cannot get caught, since you may get used to stealing and end up getting caught"? Something like this sounds nice on pages of a philosophical book by someone like John Searle, but in practice, it sounds silly.
Epicurus makes an interesting argument that the guilty mind is its own punishment as the individual who has done wrong is never able to completely shake the anxiety that he might one day be discovered.
I don't know how this applies to my example. I am trying to figure out why stealing a book in a store (if you cannot be observed) is wrong. If there is no obvious reason why it's wrong, why should I have a guilty mind? Of course, I can feel bad for the storeowner, but that is a reason enough to prevent me from stealing a book -- but not a good enough general rule to make it immoral (just because I dislike something emotionally, it's not yet immoral; for instance, I dislike split-pea soup, while my wife things salmon is disgusting; neither of us thinks that the other eating the mentioned food is immoral).
One shouldn't dim his car's window more than 30% in MA, because if a cop catches him, he will get a huge fine. Does this mean that tanning windows above some government-dictated level is immoral? I.e., imprudent does not immoral make.
Well, when you're dealing with a corrupting element within the social order (the State, a mafia gang, a bully, etc.), things get turned on their head. But I think that the difference between prudence and moral behavior is very small - morality (in regards to decision-making) is just prudence.
I think what you're trying to get at is more of a philosophy of morality, which is of course independent of particular nettling issues like window-tints. My view is that we get to a philosophy of morality through the study of virtue. Moral philosophy - in my view - is just an exposition of virtue.
Hey, don't knock Searle.
And you're making my point. The only reason a person might even reflect for a moment before lying to the Nazis is precisely because he probably lives by the rule that honesty is the best policy in all other areas of his life. It is only when confronted with an extraordinary situation that he stops to reflect whether this heuristic moral principle applies to this particular situation.
And as for stealing, you've strawmanned my view - "Don't steal (unqualified)... since you may get used to stealing and end up getting caught." There's nothing silly about this at all. Once, when I was really little, I stole a couple candybars from a grocery store. I felt bad about it but it also gives you a high... there's definitely an addictive potential to stealing. Many thieves describe stealing as an almost orgasmic experience. Why would a very wealthy person like Winona Ryder do it? So, you're playing with fire, on this particular issue.
Finally, I think the "capstone" of virtue is self-image - can you live with yourself? Even if I knew I could 100% scot-free get away with it, I would still feel bad unless the person was my mortal enemy or something. Sympathetic reflex. It's just not right to take what isn't yours and I wouldn't want to go through life with that icky feeling that I've gotten ahead through a very conscious and purposeful exploitation of another. A lot of people don't seem to have this conscience problem... oh well. That's their loss, in my view. I think a robust capacity for sympathy is a key component of being human. Those who don't have that are, well, soulless.
I think the big issue with this question, and a roadblock in a lot of these threads about morality, is that its framed as if its looking for one answer, but it's really searching for something else. As a result, the answers provided are sort of odd half answers addressing both expectations.
I don't think you want to know why you shouldn't steal the book. That question assumes an agreed upon conception of morality that we can point to for justification. In other words, the kind of answer one would give to a question like that would be: stealing violates the rights of others, and as such, is an unjust act. It's a simple answer for a simple question.
And the second question doesn't fare any better. It's phrased as if there is an agreed upon framework already in place. A perfectly good response might be that the unity of virtues requires that you can't fully posses any virtue with aiming to posess them all. But what you want to know is why you should aim for any virtue in the first place. What you really want is for Clayton to essentially put forth the entire case for natural law and virtue ethics.
A while back, someone pointed out that you can't win a debate arguing in favor of anarcho-capitalism because the burden of proof is too much -- the amount of groundwork that needs to get laid down and agreed upon is tremendous (just think how long it takes to explain what money is to some people). I think the same problem applies to debating ethics. Putting forth a positive ethical theory not only requires laying out all the framework, but then filling it in with the content as well. Subjectivists and nihilists have an argumentatively simpler position which works to their advantage in the setting of an internet forum.
Subjectivists and nihilists have an argumentatively simpler position
I've been thinking about this lately and I think it's not as true as it might at first seem. One of the crucial issues with moral nihilism is that it tends to isolate a specific act and ask, point-blank: Is this act, in isolation from all other considerations, right or wrong?
The root problem here is a denial of causality, something that every form of nihilism is guilty of. The counterpoint is illustrated by these priceless quotes:
“What we do in life ripples through eternity” - Marcus Aurelius.
"No man ever steps in the same river twice" - Heraclitus.
Every action, every thought, every word, every condition, every state of affairs which swirls out from each and every choice we make in life has latent within it the million consequences which will revisit ourselves and countless others. Some of these consequences are administered by our own, often treacherous brain: feelings of guilt, remorse, regret, shame, grief. Some of them are administered by others in the form of revenge, ostracism, oppression, and so on. Some of them are administered by indifferent and implacable Nature herself. Judging choices without regard to their causal antecedents and consequences - as moral nihilism and deontological morality both do - is useless, at best.
So, the key point here is that moral nihilists need to be challenged on the issue of causality. How do they go about living their life while denying causality? Don't they perceive any kind of contradiction in this?