http://www.horizons.or.kr/v01/download.php?filename=134200244058791.pdf&realname=Nam_In%20Lee.pdf&code=
Double post
I think Nam In Lee is right, not Barry Smith.
To think that something like the laws of supply and demand presuppose Aristotelian universals strikes me as missing the boat.
Nam shows how Menger can be translated to give innocuous meanings to the word essence that make much more sense than Aristotelean universal.
Why should Menger even bother with pointless philosophical abstractions? They are not essential [excuse the pun] to his laying out of the laws of economics. Occam's Razor is thus another clue that Nam is right.
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It's easy to refute an argument if you first misrepresent it. William Keizer
Lee’s main claim in the article is that “According to [Smith], essence or general essence in Menger is identical to essence in the Aristotelian sense of a universal.” But this isn’t what Smith claims. Here’s what Smith actually says in the cited article:
“There are in the world certain simple `essences' or `natures' or `elements', as well as laws, structures or connections governing these, all of which are strictly universal, both in that they do not change historically and in the sense that they are capable of being instantiated, in principle (which is to say: if the appropriate conditions are satisfied), at all times and in all cultures. The fact that the simple essences and essential structures do not themselves change or develop implies in addition that historical change is a matter, not of changes in the basic building blocks of reality, but of changes in the patterns of their exemplification and in the ways in which they come together to form more complex wholes. Propositions expressing universal connections amongst essences are called by Menger `exact laws'. Such laws may be either static or dynamic they may concern either the co-existence or the succession of instances of the corresponding simple essences or natures. It is exact laws, as Menger sees it, which constitute a scientific theory in the strict sense. The general laws of essence of which such a theory would consist are subject to no exceptions. In this respect they are comparable, say, to the laws of geometry or mechanics, and contrasted with mere statements of fact and with inductive hypotheses.” (Emphasis added).
In other words, Smith isn’t saying that every time Menger uses the term “essence” or “nature” (das Wesen) he is presenting us with an Aristotelian essence. Rather, it is only what Menger calls “exact laws” which is to be taken as a Universal. Lee spends half of the article showing that Menger’s “essence” isn’t the same as Aristotle’s “essence,” which is all well and good, but its isn’t what Smith is arguing. In fact, the only time the term “exact laws” appears in the paper is in a quote from Menger.
So sure, Lee may be right, but it doesn’t mean Smith is wrong.
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
Thanks for input!
I'll read the paper when I have time. I have always thought Smith and Younkins were correct and uncontroversial in their thoughts. I also remember Lachmann commenting several times on "the Aristotelian nature" of Menger's mind - if that's worth anything.
"As in a kaleidoscope, the constellation of forces operating in the system as a whole is ever changing." - Ludwig Lachmann
"When A Man Dies A World Goes Out of Existence" - GLS Shackle
Why should Menger even bother with pointless philosophical abstractions?
Because it is not pointless. Economics is different principles of philosophy applied; ontology, epistemology, logic, action, etc.
They are not essential [excuse the pun] to his laying out of the laws of economics.
Yes, they are.
Has anyone here ever read anything from Frege (Sinn and Bedeutung, Thought)? I think when people in the German tounge start talking about "essence" or "sense" you will be in for a ride.
What I meant was pointless when it comes to what he wrote about in his book. Everything he wrote there is equally true whether there exist Aristotelean essences or not.
It may be very important to know if there are little green men on Mars, but it has nothing to do with Menger's book. you get the idea.