Anenome:The standard of invasion is an objectively determinable standard.
Aggression isn't objectively immoral. It's aggressive, and that's objectively ascertainable. But whether it's immoral is based on what any given person feels (or doesn't) about immorality.
gotlucky:Instead of redefining moral/immoral, just talk about what actions ought to be considered right/wrong.
Well I'm trying to be honest, and there's no bridging the is/ought gap. So there's no saying any behavior ought to be considered right/wrong. Further, there's no objectively true standard for right/wrong except brain activity—unless the brain is malfunctioning, action is correct because it was output by a brain which defines its own algorithm of cost/benefit. What people seem to mean by "right" or "wrong" seems to come down to whether they believe the behavior deserves punishment or reward.
Punishments can be as innocent and nonaggressive as mere vocal criticism, or even silent criticism; rewards may be nonaggressive as well. But to me it seems sort of obvious that thinking in terms of punishment/reward in regards to morality is more realistic than so-called "right" or "wrong".
Anenome: I assumed we were talking about a political ethic, about how to define malum in se. I don't support the injection of any personal ethic, which is why a propertarian ethic provides a proper basis for a political ethic, because it's based on facts and reality rather than any subjective ethical system derived from past religions.
I assumed we were talking about a political ethic, about how to define malum in se. I don't support the injection of any personal ethic, which is why a propertarian ethic provides a proper basis for a political ethic, because it's based on facts and reality rather than any subjective ethical system derived from past religions.
If you are talking about a political ethic, then I would agree that the libertarian ethic is superior to all others. But I don't think it's useful to redefine the word morality in the process. If this is not what you were doing, then my post is only valid for hashem.
hashem: Well I'm trying to be honest, and there's no bridging the is/ought gap. So there's no saying any behavior ought to be considered right/wrong. Further, there's no objectively true standard for right/wrong except brain activity—unless the brain is malfunctioning, action is correct because it was output by a brain which defines its own algorithm of cost/benefit. What people seem to mean by "right" or "wrong" seems to come down to whether they believe the behavior deserves punishment or reward. Punishments can be as innocent and nonaggressive as mere vocal criticism, or even silent criticism; rewards may be nonaggressive as well. But to me it seems sort of obvious that thinking in terms of punishment/reward in regards to morality is more realistic than so-called "right" or "wrong".
I don't think it is better to think of morality necessarily in terms of punishment or reward, even if it is nonviolent and is rebuke or praise. People can engage in moral or immoral behavior without having others praise or rebuke them. Sticking with the standard definition of right versus wrong is the most useful. Not only because it is the most common definition, but because it is the simplest definition without limiting ideas. I can consider lying to be immoral without punishing those that do. I can simply just think that it is wrong to do it, that it ought not be done.
I'm not sure what your hangup is over right and wrong. Right behavior means that whoever is doing that particular behavior is acting in the right or rightly. Likewise, wrong behavior means that whoever is doing that particular behavior is acting in the wrong or wrongly. As others have pointed out, these may be personal opinions or they may be facts of societal mores. If I claim that lying is wrong, then I am saying that whoever lies is acting wrongly. I I claim that charitable donations are moral, then I am saying that whoever donates to charity is acting rightly.
There are two main problems that can occur when people talk about morality. The first is that some people claim that morality is objective. This is a mistake at best. Only subjects value. People can claim that an action is right or wrong, but the action itself does not value anything one way or the other. To claim that morality is objective is to claim that subjects do not value but that objects do. A joke is not objectively funny. The joke does not value humor. Subjects value humor. Subjects determine if the joke was funny to them or to what degree it was funny. It's the same with morality.
The second main problem is really just my opinion, that some people do not separate personal ethics from political ethics. Obviously, this is not a problem for the people who want to control the nonaggressive behavior of others with violence. But for those of us do wish to separate the two spheres, this is a serious problem. People start using morality in general to determine what ought to be the law. This creates muddled thinking in general, and I think that is a serious problem. But like I said, for those who wish to obfuscate, this is a desired outcome.
gotlucky:rebuke or praise. People can engage in moral or immoral behavior without having others praise or rebuke them.
I see what you did there. My definition was "characteristic of behavior felt to deserve punishment or reward". That doesn't mean anyone with such feelings (i.e. anyone with ideas about morality) is obligated to punish/reward any/all behavior.
gotlucky:right versus wrong is the most useful...it is the simplest definition without limiting ideas.
I challenged this idea already. I said there isn't an objectively true standard of "right" or "wrong" except brain activity, by which all action (purposeful behavior) is necessarily correct. So so-called "right" and "wrong" are neither simple nor useful.Otherwise, when people talk about their subjective feelings of what is "right", they mean behavior deserving to be rewarded, and "wrong" in terms of behavior deserving to be punished. It's baseless language like "right" or "wrong" which muddles everything and gives rise to a need for clarity.
gotlucky:Right behavior means that whoever is doing that particular behavior is acting in the right or rightly.
"In the right" or "rightly" according to whom? At best, that's just a tautology. At the most objective, all action is by definition "right", since each brain defines its own algorithms of cost/benefit.
gotlucky:As others have pointed out, these may be personal opinions or they may be facts of societal mores.
No. Others were confused or wrong (objectively wrong, not immoral) and I've pointed that out. It may be objectively true that someone acted, but whether they acted "in the right" or "in the wrong" from the perspective of a third party is up to the subjective judgment of that third party. From the actors perspective, his action is always right, it can be no other way, or else it isn't action.
gotlucky:If I claim that lying is wrong, then I am saying that whoever lies is acting wrongly. I I claim that charitable donations are moral, then I am saying that whoever donates to charity is acting rightly.
I don't know if this is circular reasoning, or just you acknowledging what I pointed out: that right and wrong are whatever a third party judges them to be.
gotlucky:There are two main problems that can occur when people talk about morality. The first...subjectivity and objectivity
OK then we agree...? But then I'm confused about what you're trying to say above. Was you're only point of contention that substituting the confusing word "right" for another word of equal confusingness "rightly or in the right" "the spaghetti monster" is more suitable than using a clarifying concept like "deserving of reward"?
gotlucky:People start using morality in general to determine what ought to be the law.
I don't believe anyone is justified in using violence against anyone. So please indulge me, how would you solve the is/ought dichotomy and say what should be punished with violence (law)?
Regardless, I can think that something is wrong without feeling the desire to rebuke someone.
No, they do not necessarily mean this. I might think it is wrong for people to insult me. I might also not care to rebuke them or care to see that they are punished in any fashion whatsoever. I can simply ignore them and choose to no longer engage in conversation with them. It is true that shunning is often a punishment, but it is not always. When parents tell their child to ignore a bully, they are not telling their child that this is punishing the bully.
And you cannot solve the is-ought gap by calling brain activity correct behavior. All it shows is that the subject in question considered the behavior to be right, else he wouldn't have done it. All that says is that he considered it right, whereas his victim or another third party subject considered it wrong. But there is no objective rightness about it, unless you are merely saying that it occurred. But that is also not what we were discussing.
According to the subject in question. I gave examples, that if I say that lying is wrong, that I mean that I consider lying is wrongful behavior. I am not saying that you consider lying to be wrongful behavior. But that is only one type. The other is that I could be saying that some other individual or society considers it wrong, but usually people clarify their statement with another subject when that happens.
But again, you are confusing objective and subjective. All action is not objectively right unless you mean to say it has occurred. This is not a standard definition of right or wrong. Wrong behavior is not behavior that has not occurred; it is behavior that a subject considers to have been wrongful.
You are confused here. A description of morality is either about a subject's opinion or a description about another subject's/subjects' opinion. There is no third option. But then you go on to describe exactly what I'm saying, that morality is subjective. It is up to the subject to decide what he considers to be right or wrong. So I have no idea why you would write "no" and then proceed to agree with me.
All I was doing was describing what people mean when they say "right" and "wrong". I did this because you seem to have a problem with morality (you call all morality bullshit and controlling) and "right" and "wrong". Further, you keep stating that rightness can be objectively determined (if someone did it, then the brain says it's objectively right).
But right and wrong are not only whatever some third party judges it to be. Rightness and wrongness can be measured by any subject. It does not have to be a third party.
You are the only person who seems to be confused by the word right. You seem to be confused because people disagree about what ought to be considered right. But so what? The concept right is understood by people in general. They do not have to agree as to what ought to be considered right, merely the concept that some things are right and others wrong. I might say that taxation is wrong, and Obama might say that taxation is right. We both understand and are using the words right and wrong in the same manner, we are just disagreeing about what ought to be classified as right and what ought to be classified as wrong.
My point of contention is that rightness and wrongness is not about feelings of punishment. Rightness and wrongness are about who was acting rightly and wrongly in any given situation. If you and I are in a car accident, the first thing we look to (or the judge or whoever) is who had right of way. Who was acting rightly in that situation, and who was acting wrongly? It doesn't matter if it's a car accident or a dispute over insults or a dispute over ownership. Right and wrong have to do with which person is in the right. Was I acting rightfully when I took the watch you had in your possession?
The libertarian answers this question by measuring the situation against the NAP and just property. If it was really my watch, then I was acting rightfully when I took it from you. If it was really your watch, then it was theft and was wrong. Libertarians also throw the variable of proportionality into the equation. Perhaps I would have been right to reclaim my watch, but I might have been wrong in the amount of force I used.
If the question were about prostitution or drugs, the libertarian says that so long as there was no initiation of violence or coercion, then in terms of the law these actions are rightful. In other words, whoever stops prostitutes from voluntarily practicing their trade (sounds almost legitimate now, eh?) would be acting wrongfully. But some libertarians might say that they find this behavior distasteful anyway. They might say that in terms of personal behavior, it is wrong. That is why Rothbard distinguished between a personal ethic and a political ethic. A libertarian can simultaneously believe that prostitution is rightful in terms of the law but wrongful in terms of personal behavior. Your definition of moral rightness would disallow for such a belief. If we measure rightness and wrongness in terms of feelings of punishment and reward, then we are left with whether or not the libertarian feels prostitution should be punished or rewarded. It eliminates the distinction between the two spheres. Either the libertarian feels like he should rebuke or imprison the prostitute, or he feels like he should praise the prostitute.
Why would I want to solve the is-ought problem? I have my personal beliefs, and I recognize that not all others (okay, most people) don't agree with them and have their own. I believe that their are certain actions that ought to be punished with violence or at least threatened with violence in order to coerce restitution. Apparently you disagree with that, but so what?
Fine, but that's a red herring. I wasn't arguing that anyone needs to feel obligated to punish, just that from any judging third party's perspective, the behavior is felt to deserve punishment. Interestingly, I already said this almost ver batim in another response to an almost identical statement from you.
And you cannot solve the is-ought gap by calling brain activity correct behavior. All it shows is that the subject in question considered the behavior to be right, else he wouldn't have done it. All that says is that he considered it right
I think you're misunderstanding me. Action, being the output of a cost/benefit algorithm of a brain, is by definition objectively correct, since a brain defines its own cost/benefit algorithm. The objective correctness of the behavior isn't modified if someone chooses to label their feelings with words like "right" or "the spaghetti monster".
if I say that lying is wrong, that I mean that I consider lying is wrongful behavior
And if I say lying is spaghetti monsterish, what I mean is that I consider lying to be spaghetti monsterish behavior. Oh wait, using a word to define itself doesn't get us anywhere...
All action is not objectively right unless you mean to say it has occurred.
No it's objectively right because it was caused by a brain.
Wrong behavior is not behavior that has not occurred
Red herring. I don't claim to be calling any lack of action or failure to act objectively wrong. Anyway, I agree, that wouldn't make sense.
So I have no idea why you would write "no" and then proceed to agree with me.
Tracing it backward, neither do I. So I apologize for the confusion and you win this one. Clearly we agree: whether the label is "the spaghetti monster" or "right" or "a flying carpet" is irrelevant, what matters is that the label refers to the feelings of subject.
Further, you keep stating that rightness can be objectively determined (if someone did it, then the brain says it's objectively right).
A brain's output—action, in some cases—isn't erroneous. Since a brain defines its own cost/benefit algorithm, then if the output was action, the action was necessarily right.
But right and wrong are not only whatever some third party judges it to be.
But the spaghetti monster and the great ju ju are not only whatever some third party judges it to be.
You are the only person who seems to be confused by the word [the spaghetti monster].
No, the spaghetti monster is confusing. Right now I'm the only one reasonable enough to point it out consistently.
The concept [the spaghetti monster] is understood by people in general.
No, it's not.
They do not have to agree as to what ought to be considered [the spaghetti monster], merely the concept that some things are [the spaghetti monster] and others [the great ju ju].
Well it makes sense, now that you put it that way...
who had right of way. Who was acting rightly in that situation
This is misunderstanding on your part, and it verifies that you are confused. Who has the right of way on a road is an objectively verifiable fact (assuming a law exists). Whether someone was acting "rightly" or acting "the spaghetti monster", however, isn't dependent on local positive rules.
Alternatively, who is higher up in a tree is an objectively verifiable fact. Who is the spaghetti monster for being higher, however, has nothing to do with positions on a tree.
Malachi:Property isnt any more objective than personhood. Property is a social arrangement, it occurs entirely within people's heads.
I've never quite agreed with your formulation on this.
It's not a social arrangement that I own the atoms of my body, sovereignly, as property. It is not mere social arrangement that without property I die, and so does everyone else.
Furthermore, animals act within species as if they owned property as well.
Rather, I think it is the idea that we respect property as legitimate that is the social arrangement, but property is in the nature of man and not socially determined at all. If it were a mere subjective social arrangement, then we'd find societies that lived without property, but that is impossible. If you don't eat and drink, you die.
gotlucky:Most people would be grateful, but even if we get a few jerks who want to sue for being shoved, so what? How much money are they really going to receive in restitution? Would the "restitution" even be worth the cost of court?
Great points, GotLucky. I'd also note that we shouldn't ignore societal pressures.
Let's say you do push a guy out of the way of a bus, obviously saving his life, but in your attempt to save him, your push results in a broken arm. Let's also assume that this man is one sleazy opportunist who sees this as his chance to get some quick cash out of your selfless act. While he may be within his rights to sue you, and might even be able to win, lets consider this from the perspective of non-involved parties, especially their role in a free society.
Given this scenario, I think there are some realistic assumptions we can make based on the argument for the overall moral goodness of man. Specifically, what I mean is that if so many people are worried that a man who pushes another out of the way of a bus could be rightfully charged with aggression, this tells us that most people find the act of saving the man from the bus to be good from a personal standpoint. If so, I think we can surmise two likely facts:
(1) If you were the one saved, you would most likely forgive the aggressor/life saver who pushed you out of the way, and this would apply to most people. If so, then this isn't much to worry about.
(2) If the sleaze ball does sue you, it is true that non-involved parties to the aggressive act still have no right to directly hamper the sleaze ball's ability to seek reparations for the act. However, based on the argument for the overall moral goodness of man, we could expect that many producers could and would refuse to do business with the man by denying him their goods and services out of protest for his sleazy actions. I imagine that news agencies would be all over this, naming the sleaze ball and showing pictures of him everywhere, making it easier for producers to black list him. Hell, even large companies that currently provide electricity, water, internet, phone, and cable TV services to the sleaze ball could be petitioned by their other customer's to drop him from their client base at the threat of moving to other service providers. People could start a collection organization that would raise money to pay for the life saver/ aggressor's lawyer fees and court costs, affording him the best in the biz.
What gives me hope in this is a relatively recent kick starter type thing that started from a simple cell phone video of some young kids taunting a school teacher (I think) for her weight, saying extremely nasty things like, "You should just go commit suicide." The video went viral, and in a couple of days, over 100 grand was raised just to send the lady on one hell of a vacation. Without taking away from this lady's experience, it is really nothing compared to a guy getting sued for saving another man's life. If the public is capable of raising 100 grand in two days for an over-weight woman just to go on vacation due to a few mean words, think of how much bigger it would be for the aggressor/life saver being sued for it.
It is acts like these that make me think even the sleaze ball would think twice before suing a man who saved his life. I don't think he would find it in his long-term interest. If he did, I think he would still pay for it, and the lifesaver/ aggressor would come out victorious. This is why we need the kind of law that Clayton (I think) once outlined so eloquently in his Law Expained (couldn't find the link - maybe Clayton can provide it?), one where the nuances of the law can change as the nuances of the market's moral opinions change.
"If men are not angels, then who shall run the state?"
If you pushed someone out of the way of a bus and saved their life, and could prove this, but broke his arm in the process, and he sued, then I think the court would take that fact of having saved his life into account when deciding how much compensation to demand. And the just judgment would be zero compensation, as the man may have lost temporarily a good arm, but by that he's prevented from losing everything.
Anenome: It's not a social arrangement that I own the atoms of my body, sovereignly, as property. It is not mere social arrangement that without property I die, and so does everyone else.
Property and ownership are social arrangements. Property is about the right of exclusive use. Of course, that doesn't mean that only one person might own any given object. There could be two or more owners. But the point to take away from this is the right of exclusion. Rights require more than one person.
Furthermore, just because you believe that you ought to have the ultimate say about your body does not mean that others will believe the same. Slave owners own their slaves.
Anenome: Furthermore, animals act within species as if they owned property as well.
Certainly. The concept of mineness is inherent to many animals, not just humans. But that concept alone does not make something property. Property is about what belongs to whom, or who is right when there is a dispute about the thing in question. Does the shirt you are wearing belong to you or me? That is a social arrangement. Now, a libertarian might say that it belongs to whoever homesteaded it or traded for it legitimately or whatever I might be forgetting. But a communist might say that you have too many shirts, and you ought to give that shirt to someone who really needs it.
Either way, someone owns that shirt. Libertarians consider the communist theory of property to be unjust, and communists consider the libertarian theory of property to be unjust.
Anenome: Rather, I think it is the idea that we respect property as legitimate that is the social arrangement, but property is in the nature of man and not socially determined at all. If it were a mere subjective social arrangement, then we'd find societies that lived without property, but that is impossible. If you don't eat and drink, you die.
Crusoe, Morality, and Axiomatic Libertarianism
hashem: Fine, but that's a red herring. I wasn't arguing that anyone needs to feel obligated to punish, just that from any judging third party's perspective, the behavior is felt to deserve punishment. Interestingly, I already said this almost ver batim in another response to an almost identical statement from you.
Like I said before, I can think something is wrong without feeling the desire to punish someone. It doesn't matter if I'm the victim or a third party. But, if you would prefer, I will amend my statement to: I can think something is wrong without thinking that the wrongdoer deserves punishment.
Example: I watch a teacher ridicule his student. I shake my head in disgust. Notice how I'm not thinking that the teacher ought to be punished, or that he "deserves" punishment. I merely find it to be wrong, disgusting, in poor taste, or whatever.
hashem: I think you're misunderstanding me. Action, being the output of a cost/benefit algorithm of a brain, is by definition objectively correct, since a brain defines its own cost/benefit algorithm. The objective correctness of the behavior isn't modified if someone chooses to label their feelings with words like "right" or "the spaghetti monster".
No, you are simply wrong on this point. The subject doing the acting considers his actions to be right (at least at the time of action), else he wouldn't have done them. The actions are not objectively right, as objects do not value. This is a pretty good article on objectivity and subjectivity.
hashem: And if I say lying is spaghetti monsterish, what I mean is that I consider lying to be spaghetti monsterish behavior. Oh wait, using a word to define itself doesn't get us anywhere...
I don't much care what words you use so long as you define them. Read the link I posted to Anenome above. Nielsio explains right/wrong in terms of acceptable behavior. But if you want to place lying into the category "spaghetti monsterish behavior", so be it.
hashem: But the spaghetti monster and the great ju ju are not only whatever some third party judges it to be.
Certainly. I would imagine that the spaghetti monster and the great ju ju are also what first parties would judge it be. I agree that we should not limit the definitions of the spaghetti monster and the great ju ju to just whatever some third party judges it to be.
hashem: No, the spaghetti monster is confusing. Right now I'm the only one reasonable enough to point it out consistently.
I disagree. Malachi and I are able to communicate with each about morality quite effectively. Also, Autolykos uses a different and nonstandard definition of morality, but since he defines what he means, we are able to effectively communicate about what he considers to be moral and what I consider to be moral.
He considers what I call moral to be what he calls ethical. So whenever the two of us talk about the subject, so long as we keep that in mind, we are able to effectively communicate about the subject.
And those are not the only two people that I am able to discuss morality with meaningfully.
hashem: No, it's not.
Well, if you are referring to the flying spaghetti monster, then I would have strongly disagree with you. But, if you are referring to something else, then you are correct. No one knows what you are talking about.
hashem: Well it makes sense, now that you put it that way...
Naturally.
hashem: This is misunderstanding on your part, and it verifies that you are confused. Who has the right of way on a road is an objectively verifiable fact (assuming a law exists). Whether someone was acting "rightly" or acting "the spaghetti monster", however, isn't dependent on local positive rules.
No, it is not necessarily an objectively verifiable fact. It depends on how you are referring to morality. If you are referring to what the norm is, then you may objectively verify the intersubjective norm. If you are reffering to my opinion on what the right of way should be, or what the standard libertarian opinion on what the right of way should be, then again, you may objectively verify what my subjective belief is or what the standard libertarian subjective belief is. That is, presuming that we were telling the truth at the time.
The actions are not objectively right, as objects do not value.
If you input 1 + 1 into a calculator, it will output the answer, 2. The answer is correct. So also the brain calculates input, and some of its output is action. The output is always the correct answer. Pardon me for failing to comprehend why you deny this. It has nothing to do with subjective opinions of the output.
I don't much care what words you use so long as you define them.
Then you agree. Apology accepted.
gotlucky: gotlucky:But right and wrong are not only whatever some third party judges it to be. hashem:But the spaghetti monster and the great ju ju are not only whatever some third party judges it to be. gotlucky:Certainly.
gotlucky:But right and wrong are not only whatever some third party judges it to be.
hashem:But the spaghetti monster and the great ju ju are not only whatever some third party judges it to be.
gotlucky:Certainly.
Again, apology accepted.
Like you said, they do have to define their terms, because otherwise the word "right" is confusing, since it doesn't actually have anything to do with what right actually means. My point is that they might as well be saying "the spaghetti monster", since it also doesn't mean anything except what its user means by it.
If you are reffering to my opinion on what the right of way should be
Again, you're confused. Your opinion on who is acting "in the right" or "in the spaghetti monster" has no bearing on the who actually had the right of way. The whole concept of the right of way is out of place, because it's an objectively verifiable truth, whereas we agree morality is subjective.
Since morality is subjective, I'm saying words like "right" or "wrong" are confusing, especially since most people don't bother to define their terms (which was my original problem with morality, if you forgot). The only universal standard for right behavior is whether it was caused by a brain, because brains define their own algorithms and the output is always correct.
Finally, you're not relaying your contention clearly because we obviously agree A) that morality is subjective and, B) that "right" and "wrong" or "the spaghetti monster" aren't inherently moral concepts and in the realm of morality they are confusing unless defined by their users.
but since he defines what he means, we are able to effectively communicate
Exactly.