"It falls down completely as an ethical system. In this worldview, killing someone is legitimate for something as petty as a personal possession. Under the correct circumstances, your NAP could be used to justify almost any violent act as long as it was framed in terms of property."
Further thoughts?
This really has nothing to do with the NAP as libertarians understand it. And Hashem is right, the NAP is not an ethical or moral system. I have no idea who is offering these criticisms to you, but they are entirely baseless, and they strongly indicate that whoever is suggesting them has not done their homework on libertarianism.
Thanks GotLucky for understanding.
It seems OP is in a debate of sorts, where he is championing the NAP as a moral foundation.
But his opposition is wrong, also. The opposition says, "NAP could be used to justify almost any violent act as long as it was framed in terms of property."
The opposition is wrong because the NAP isn't about justice. It's merely a positive social norm about property rules. It isn't right or wrong, moral or immoral, just or unjust. It is a rule, and even then only to the extent that it has been A) suggested and B) accepted. The NAP doesn't justify any action.
But even on the face of it, the idea that the NAP could justify an action displays manifest ignorance of the NAP, because the NAP only defines what is to be considered aggression. It doesn't say what may be done in response to aggression.
"It seems OP is in a debate of sorts, where he is championing the NAP as a moral foundation."
Actually, I'm not. My opposition is just assuming that of me because they have probably ran into other libertarians who have done so.
My opposition is just assuming that of me because they have probably ran into other libertarians who have done so.
Then I am vindicated. It is obviously important for libertarians to stop muddying the waters with ignorance. We need to stop talking about "morals" or "morality" without being sure everyone knows what is meant by it. We need to stop conflating ideas like the NAP with concepts about morals. Morals are myths for the simple minded or evil. Everyone else can understand economics and can exhibit mature behavior patterns to let their unimaginably advanced brain calculate the cost and benefit of various behaviors in a social environment.
"Any ethical system worth applying in the real world must address the issue of justice (among other issues). The NAP does not."
Thoughts on this, hashem? You stated before that the "NAP isn't about justice." Could you just further explain the distinction?
In this worldview, killing someone is legitimate for something as petty as a personal possession.
TronCat:"Any ethical system worth applying in the real world must address the issue of justice (among other issues). The NAP does not." Thoughts on this, hashem? You stated before that the "NAP isn't about justice." Could you just further explain the distinction?
Sure. The NAP is just a positive rule. It can be used indifferently, or for righteousness, or for evil. It doesn't exist and has no truth, unless—and only to the extent that—people are aware of it and agree to support it. It's completely objective in the sense that it can be understood in no uncertain terms. By no means must it address or have any relation to justice or ethics.
Concepts like ethics and justice are anti-objective (unlike logic and math or rules, there is no natural, intrinsic, objective boundary that holds regardless of who acknowledges it), there's no telling if they're true. Bring such irrational concepts like ethics and justice into the fray, and the NAP may be invoked as foundation, but that doesn't mean the NAP always and necessarily exists to serve the purpose of the foundation of justice in an ethical system. You can fly a bicycle from an air balloon, but that doesn't mean the bike was manufactured for the sole purpose of being flown by an air balloon.
So, if I understand you right Hashem, the idea that aggression is wrong is the moral value judgment, but the NAP only defines when aggression has happened? Would you agree with that, why, why not?
Yes, that would seem about right. I would remark that aggression isn't "wrong" in this case, but rather "against the rules" or perhaps "evil" as opposed to "righteous".
Any behavior seems to be correct so long as a brain caused it, so it's misleading to say it is "wrong".
Personally I do like Rand's formulation of using life itself as an axiomatic value judgment and resulting ethical system.
If a person is alive while making an argument against life as an innate human value, they contradict themselves.
Thus all people can be said to be choosing to maintain life.
Thus, acts which contradict the value of being pro-life can be said to be immoral in an objective sense. This would include acts which are inherently parasitical rather than productive. Man can only live by production. Thus those trying to live as parasites--statists and those allied to them--are living in an anti-human, anti-life manner.
The great value of such a system is that it is divorced from religion and can be used as a non-partisan ethical system generally. I may be a christian, but I don't want to force my moral judgments and choices on others using a political system. With an objective system however we can reach a base necessity of judgments.
Ultimately law is indeed the expression of an ethical system into rules of behavior. Law is always going to be someone's ethical system, even if it's not forced on a society. Even in a free society of emergent law this will be true. We cannot say it is completely illegitimate, for instance, for the new rulers of Egypt to choose to live by Sharia. Where I, and assuredly other libertarians, object is that the muslim majority has decided to us the organs of state power to force that ethical code on everyone else too.
Each person should choose their code, when it comes to malum prohibitum. I think Rand's ethical formulation can be the basis of a broad malum in se. And the rubric of it should be the NAP.
How is the NAP not an ethical or moral system?
The NAP itself is just a statement that if you initiate coercion against another person or his rightful property, then you have wronged him. Libertarianism is the result of the NAP. Libertarianism is the system. The NAP is a standard to measure whether an action is consistent with libertarianism. You will find few libertarians who will have no opinion on the rightness or wrongness of lying, blackmail, prostitution, drug use, etc. But to the libertarian, it doesn't matter if he personally considers it wrong to lie or use drugs, he believes that legally you may do these things - with the one exception being that in doing these actions, you do not violate another's rights.
So you can end up with a person like Ron Paul who considers drug use to be wrong, but at the same time he believes that it ought to be legal, whereas using force to prevent or punish someone for using drugs ought to be illegal. Libertarianism is a political ethic. Of course, you might find someone whose personal ethic matches his political ethic, but even then I don't think it will match 100%. After all, even if you found a libertarian who thought lying was right, I doubt he would say that if someone was lying to him. He'd probably just say that it was wrong, but that it ought not be punished with violence.
Cortes: How is the NAP not an ethical or moral system?
It is. It is defined as the moral stance that aggression is illegitimate.
Therefore the definition of aggression and limits thereof become important, and only a propertarian view of ethical limits can make any sense out of the field. The idea that 'your freedom to swing your fist ends where my nose begins' is perfect in its propertarian delineation of exactly where your rights end and mine begin. Any attempt to make ethical sense out of the world without using property ends up based on fuzzy whim and feeling.
hashem:But even on the face of it, the idea that the NAP could justify an action displays manifest ignorance of the NAP, because the NAP only defines what is to be considered aggression. It doesn't say what may be done in response to aggression.
The NAP does not define what is to be considered aggression. It is merely a "rule", as you say, prohibitting it. What constitutes aggression and therefore breaks the rule, is often debated. As for not saying what may be done in response, that's true to a point, however, if the reponse escalates to the point that it is itself aggression, the NAP as as much or as little to say about it as the initial aggression.
faber est suae quisque fortunae
You're exactly right, that was my mistake. In fact I understand that, I don't know why I what I was thinking when I wrote that lol.
So if someone were to attempt to defend Osama bin Laden for not initiating violence--merely retaliating--how would you respond?
I ask because I'm curious about the arbitrary lines drawn around the NAP, to what extent is violence morally permissible once violence is initiated against you?
Another difficult question is what can be done with someone who is mentally unstable who is attempting to harm themself or others? May we initiate force against him to restrain him?
Re: Osama, I'd need you to make the question more specific.
Willy Truth:[Re:] the NAP, to what extent is violence morally permissible once violence is initiated against you?
A few different responses, again to a question that's not as specific as it should be. In the first place, the NAP isn't about morals, it's just a rule. In the second place, the NAP doesn't permit action, it just says what sort of action won't be tolerated.
Re: morality, I don't think permission to use violence, or justification for the use of violence, depends on environmental circumstances. Rather, a brain simply does, as a matter of fact, decide to use or not to use violence—the choice is utterly independent of third-party or mystical permission or justification.
Willy Truth:Another difficult question is what can be done with someone who is mentally unstable who is attempting to harm themself or others? May we initiate force against him to restrain him?
Quite literally, you can do anything within your power. Should you? That's up to your brain. Will you? That's up to your brain. It has nothing to do with the NAP or the subjective morality of others or some alleged justification.
hashem: Thanks GotLucky for understanding. It seems OP is in a debate of sorts, where he is championing the NAP as a moral foundation. But his opposition is wrong, also. The opposition says, "NAP could be used to justify almost any violent act as long as it was framed in terms of property." The opposition is wrong because the NAP isn't about justice. It's merely a positive social norm about property rules. It isn't right or wrong, moral or immoral, just or unjust. It is a rule, and even then only to the extent that it has been A) suggested and B) accepted. The NAP doesn't justify any action. But even on the face of it, the idea that the NAP could justify an action displays manifest ignorance of the NAP, because the NAP only defines what is to be considered aggression. It doesn't say what may be done in response to aggression.
Aren't things morally justifiable with respect to accepted rules of conduct?
And isn't the NAP an attempt to a one-size-fits-all principle for rules of conduct?
I suspect at least one of us is very confused.
ToxicAssets:Aren't things morally justifiable with respect to accepted rules of conduct?
Yes, subjectively. From your perspective, you can justify, to yourself, something based on your subjective view of morality. That has no bearing on whether it's actually justified, objectively, and has no bearing on whether it's justified to other people.
But justice is a concept. Whether something is justified is necessarily a subjective matter, potentially different for each individual. So I can say, "justice was served," but that doesn't mean you necessarily believe justice was served.
ToxicAssets:And isn't the NAP an attempt to a one-size-fits-all principle for rules of conduct? I suspect at least one of us is very confused.
Yes, the NAP is a rule. I already said that...
hashem: ToxicAssets:Aren't things morally justifiable with respect to accepted rules of conduct? Yes, subjectively. From your perspective, you can justify, to yourself, something based on your subjective view of morality. That has no bearing on whether it's actually justified, objectively, and has no bearing on whether it's justified to other people. But justice is a concept. Whether something is justified is necessarily a subjective matter, potentially different for each individual. So I can say, "justice was served," but that doesn't mean you necessarily believe justice was served. ToxicAssets:And isn't the NAP an attempt to a one-size-fits-all principle for rules of conduct? I suspect at least one of us is very confused. Yes, the NAP is a rule. I already said that... I think I get what you've said now. Correct if I'm wrong though. You are saying that a rule cannot be justified itself. A rule is (part of) the criterion used to justify or denounce a given situation. And this justification will be valid insofar as the rule used as criterion is accepted by the people engaged in judging the righteousness of the situation. Is that right? "Blood alone moves the wheels of history" - Dwight Schrute | Post Points: 20
I think I get what you've said now. Correct if I'm wrong though.
You are saying that a rule cannot be justified itself.
A rule is (part of) the criterion used to justify or denounce a given situation.
And this justification will be valid insofar as the rule used as criterion is accepted by the people engaged in judging the righteousness of the situation.
Is that right?
Not that either of our explanations are incredibly graceful, but I think we're understanding each other. Yes then, that seems to be what I'm saying.
A concept by definition can't be objective justification. As a concept, justice and justification are always subjective.
A rule may be used by a person to decide whether he thinks something is just. And something may be said to be just only from the perspective of people who feel that way.
In my opinion consent > NAP.
hashem: Not that either of our explanations are incredibly graceful, but I think we're understanding each other. Yes then, that seems to be what I'm saying. A concept by definition can't be objective justification. As a concept, justice and justification are always subjective. A rule may be used by a person to decide whether he thinks something is just. And something may be said to be just only from the perspective of people who feel that way. Ok cool, I don't dispute that. But then I don't understand why the NAP cannot be used to "justify action". I mean, you are saying that any justification is an intersubjective assessment of a given situation based on commonly accepted rules of conduct. I also think that, so there's no problem for me here. But what if the parts judging the situation feel they subscribe to a mutual understanding of the NAP and that this understanding applied to the particular occasion is such that some perpetrated action is indeed justifiable? Where's the problem with that? That's one point. But I think my troubles with what you've said before are maybe more related to you saying that the NAP merely "defines" aggression. What does that mean exactly? That the NAP has some embedded list of situations that are to be considered aggression? Or that this list is implicitly defined and can be precisely accessed by rational and careful application of the NAP? This smells like circular reasoning to me. What I think is that it is impossible to define aggression, due to the infinite possibilities of its manifestation, and even more infinite possibilities of its interpretation by the different people involved. You can only list so many instances of what you consider aggression and what you consider justifiable reaction to such aggressions. And people usually have different ideas concerning specific instances, but their overall agreement on most items allow for some intersubjective assessments of justice. But I want to hear what you think. "Blood alone moves the wheels of history" - Dwight Schrute | Post Points: 20
Ok cool, I don't dispute that.
But then I don't understand why the NAP cannot be used to "justify action".
I mean, you are saying that any justification is an intersubjective assessment of a given situation based on commonly accepted rules of conduct.
I also think that, so there's no problem for me here.
But what if the parts judging the situation feel they subscribe to a mutual understanding of the NAP and that this understanding applied to the particular occasion is such that some perpetrated action is indeed justifiable? Where's the problem with that?
That's one point.
But I think my troubles with what you've said before are maybe more related to you saying that the NAP merely "defines" aggression. What does that mean exactly?
That the NAP has some embedded list of situations that are to be considered aggression? Or that this list is implicitly defined and can be precisely accessed by rational and careful application of the NAP?
This smells like circular reasoning to me.
What I think is that it is impossible to define aggression, due to the infinite possibilities of its manifestation, and even more infinite possibilities of its interpretation by the different people involved.
You can only list so many instances of what you consider aggression and what you consider justifiable reaction to such aggressions.
And people usually have different ideas concerning specific instances, but their overall agreement on most items allow for some intersubjective assessments of justice.
But I want to hear what you think.
ToxicAssets:you are saying that any justification is...intersubjective
I think that's the diametric opposite of what I'm saying. Justification is individually subjective. It doesn't mean anything except to the extent that someone acknowledges it, and even then it doesn't have any value in communication except to the extent that others acknowledge it. Still, the primary point is that it's subjective, not objective.
ToxicAssets:But what if the parts judging the situation feel they subscribe to a mutual understanding of the NAP and that this understanding applied to the particular occasion is such that some perpetrated action is indeed justifiable? Where's the problem with that?
There's no problem. My point is that everyone needs to recognize that the action wasn't actually justified, it just seemed to be justified from the individual perspectives of several people. The corrolary point is that, from the perspectives of other individuals, the action may not be justified.
ToxicAssets:But I think my troubles with what you've said before are maybe more related to you saying that the NAP merely "defines" aggression. What does that mean exactly?
I can't fault you for failing to read the entire thread. But I'd remarked that I didn't mean to say the NAP "defined" aggression. Rather, the NAP is a rule about boundaries on violence.
ToxicAssets:And people usually have different ideas concerning specific instances, but their overall agreement on most items allow for some intersubjective assessments of justice. But I want to hear what you think. I acknowledge the possibility for agreement (what I think you mean when you say "intersubjective assessment"). As far as what I think, my contribution would be to clarify that activity isn't actually (read: objectively, necessarily, indisputably) justified as a matter of fact simply because several people agree about their feelings. Whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority, it's time to pause and reflect. —Mark Twain | Post Points: 5
I acknowledge the possibility for agreement (what I think you mean when you say "intersubjective assessment"). As far as what I think, my contribution would be to clarify that activity isn't actually (read: objectively, necessarily, indisputably) justified as a matter of fact simply because several people agree about their feelings.