Given the fact/value dichotomy, why talk about when violence should be used, or how things should be? Can't we just accept that things are the way they are and will be the way they will, and talk only in terms of how to achieve progress and civility?
Why should we?
hashem: Given the fact/value dichotomy, why talk about when violence should be used, or how things should be? Can't we just accept that things are the way they are and will be the way they will, and talk only in terms of how to achieve progress and civility?
Re: "Given the fact/value dichotomy, why talk about when violence should be used, or how things should be?"
“Second, there is the logical gap between “is-” and “ought-statements” which natural rights proponents have failed to bridge successfully—except for advancing some general critical remarks regarding the ultimate validity of the fact-value dichotomy. Here the praxeological proof of libertarianism has the advantage of offering a completely value-free justification of private property. It remains entirely in the realm of is-statements and never tries to derive an “ought” from an “is.”
The structure of the argument is this:
(a) justification is propositional justification—a priori true is-statement;
(b) argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle—a priori true is-statement; and
(c) then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true is-statement.
The proof also offers a key to an understanding of the nature of the fact-value dichotomy: Ought-statements cannot be derived from is-statements. They belong to different logical realms. It is also clear, however, that one cannot even state that there are facts and values if no propositional exchanges exist, and that this practice of propositional exchanges in turn presupposes the acceptance of the private property ethic as valid. In other words, cognition and truth-seeking as such have a normative foundation, and the normative foundation on which cognition and truth rest is the recognition of private property rights.” — Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economics and Ethics of Private Property
Well here, I'm finally going to get around to challenge the concept of argumentation ethics, I've never liked the concept and I really don't understand why it has such a high standing in libertarian circles.
"argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle—a priori true is-statement; and"
No it doesn't. My actions imply what I want to occur, not what necessarily should occur, although if you're going to take my actions for what should occur in all cases, I'd be up for that.
You know something sucks when it can be refuted in a single sentence. :)
"argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle—a priori true is-statement; and" No it doesn't. My actions imply what I want to occur, not what necessarily should occur, although if you're going to take my actions for what should occur in all cases, I'd be up for that.
I think I see a contradiction in your post. If we accept that things "will be the way they will," then what is the point of talking about how to achieve progress?
In other words:
I dun get it
Re: "Well here, I'm finally going to get around to challenge the concept of argumentation ethics, I've never liked the concept and I really don't understand why it has such a high standing in libertarian circles."
LOL, that's probably because you've never actually understood it? Your "objection" makes that crystral clear.
Re: "No it doesn't. My actions imply what I want to occur, not what necessarily should occur, although if you're going to take my actions for what should occur in all cases, I'd be up for that."
You don't get it.
"For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a “political” ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not herewith concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression. Whether or not it is moral or immoral for “Smith” - the fellow excluded by the owner from the plank or the lifeboat - to force someone else out of the lifeboat, or whether he should die heroically instead, is not our concern, and not the proper concern of a theory of political ethics.[5]” - Rothbard, TEOL
Libertarianism is meta-normative, it establishes what you have a right to do. It does not say what you ought or should do. AE is the proof.
"My entire argument, then, claims to be an impossibility proof. But not, as the mentioned critics seem to think, a proof that means to show the impossibility of certain empirical events so that it could be refuted, by empirical evidence. Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible to propositionally justify non-libertarian principles without falling into contradictions." For whatever such a thing is worth (and I'll come to this shortly), it should be clear that empirical evidence has absolutely no bearing on it. So what if there is slavery, the Gulag, taxation? The proof concerns the issue that claiming such institutions can be justified, involves a performative contradiction. It is purely intellectual in nature, like logical, mathematical, or praxeological proofs." - Hoppe
Because:
"Whether or not something is true, false, or undecidable; whether or not it has been justified; what is required in order to justify it; whether I, my opponents, or none of us is right - all of this must be decided in the course of argumentation. This proposition is true a priori, because it cannot be denied without affirming it in the act of denying it. One cannot argue that one cannot argue, and one cannot dispute knowing what it means to raise a validity claim without implicitly claiming at least the negation of this proposition to be true." "With the a priori of argumentation established as an axiomatic starting point, it follows that anything that must be presupposed in the act of proposition-making cannot be propositionally disputed again. It would be meaningless to ask for a justification of presuppositions which make the production of meaningful propositions possible in the first place. Instead, they must be regarded as ultimately justified by every proposition-maker. And any specific propositional content that disputed their validity could be understood as implying a performative contradiction […], and hence, as ultimately falsified." "The law of contradiction is one such presupposition. One cannot deny this law without presupposing its validity in the act of denying it. But there is another such presupposition. Propositions are not free-floating entities. They require a proposition maker who in order to produce any validity-claiming proposition whatsoever must have exclusive control (property) over some scarce means defined in objective terms and appropriated (brought under control) at definite points in time through homesteading action. Thus, any proposition that would dispute the validity of the homesteading principle of property acquisition, or that would assert the validity of a different, incompatible principle, would be falsified by the act of proposition-making in the same way as the proposition 'the law of contradiction is false' would be contradicted by the very fact of asserting it. As the praxeological presupposition of proposition-making, the validity of the homesteading principle cannot be argumentatively disputed without running into a performative contradiction. Any other principle of property acquisition can then be understood - reflectively - by every proposition maker as ultimately incapable of propositional justification." "(Note, in particular, that this includes all proposals which claim it is justified to restrict the range of objects which may be homesteaded. They fail because once the exclusive control over some homesteaded means is admitted as justified, it becomes impossible to justify any restriction in the homesteading process - except for a self-imposed one - without thereby running into a contradiction. For if the proponent of such a restriction were consistent, he could have justified control only over some physical means which he would not be allowed to employ for any additional homesteading. Obviously, he could not interfere with another's extended homesteading, simply because of his own lack of physical means to justifiably do anything about it. But if he did interfere, he would thereby inconsistently extend his ownership claims beyond his own justly homesteaded means. Moreover, in order to justify this extension he would have to invoke a principle of property acquisition incompatible with the homesteading principle whose validity he would already have admitted.)"
"We are not herewith concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression."
How are we going to prove the "proper role" of something with out defining what this "should be" exactly? Even if this were done, then so what? This would mean nothing unless it crossed the is-ought gap which cannot be done except through external values, and the very point of ethics is to circumnavigate this, not to appeal to existing values, for in this case we would be just stating facts about the universe, a real science, and this would be in no way ethics, just statements of relationships between things.
"Libertarianism is meta-normative, it establishes what you have a right to do. It does not say what you ought or should do. AE is the proof."
... What? How are you going to have a right to something without invoking what you ought to do? What the hell is a "right" anyway? It's just a claim to be able to do something. You can talk about what you think people should be able to do, or what they actually are able to do, one necessarily requires some sort of ethics, the other one doesn't and it is, of course, not what Rothbard is talking about. If we take the Oxford definition:
"a moral or legal entitlement to have or do something"
Then this would obviously imply what men should be able to do if put into Rothbard's context.
"Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible to propositionally justify non-libertarian principles without falling into contradictions."
Alright, well see what contradictions there are which argumentation ethics display.
"They require a proposition maker who in order to produce any validity-claiming proposition whatsoever must have exclusive control (property) over some scarce means defined in objective terms and appropriated (brought under control) at definite points in time through homesteading action."
No, arguments do not require this. They do not require the libertarian understanding of property, they only require that I am at a specific point in time. This implies the existence of some sort of property, something which no one (to my knowledge) has ever attempted to deny. It does not imply that which I should do, or what others should do. You have indeed proven the existence of property in the case of argumentation, now so what? This implies nothing. I could believe in no theory of "free property", I could believe that he who can command control of these resources should command them, or, more importantly, I could believe in my right to do this, not your right.
Anyway, this says nothing about the acquisition of property, how property is defined, or what should happen, only what is. Most importantly however, it says nothing about homesteading, except insofar as this must occur, not how it could occur. You could go out into the woods, clear out a large plot and then build a skyscraper and I could consider this as a homesteaded piece of land for the U.S government.
"the validity of a different, incompatible principle, would be falsified by the act of proposition-making in the same way as the proposition 'the law of contradiction is false' would be contradicted by the very fact of asserting it. As the praxeological presupposition of proposition-making, the validity of the homesteading principle cannot be argumentatively disputed without running into a performative contradiction. Any other principle of property acquisition can then be understood - reflectively - by every proposition maker as ultimately incapable of propositional justification."
I think I just showed that it isn't.
Could you show exactly where Hoppe's supposed devastating point is? He simply asserts that argumentation presupposes a set amount of baggage of ethics, something he doesn't prove, and that therefore this means that it must be the case. It's ridiculous, why do you believe in this when it more or less implies the same bunk which Molyneux's UPB employs.
"They require a proposition maker who in order to produce any validity-claiming proposition whatsoever must have exclusive control (property) over some scarce means defined in objective terms and appropriated (brought under control) at definite points in time through homesteading action." No, arguments do not require this. They do not require the libertarian understanding of property, they only require that I am at a specific point in time. This implies the existence of some sort of property, something which no one (to my knowledge) has ever attempted to deny. It does not imply that which I should do, or what others should do. You have indeed proven the existence of property in the case of argumentation, now so what? This implies nothing. I could believe in no theory of "free property", I could believe that he who can command control of these resources should command them, or, more importantly, I could believe in my right to do this, not your right.
you are correct that this does not imply a "should" or a "shouldnt." it remains purely factual. The question of whether a proposition is justifiable or not is a factual matter.