I am currently reading David Friedman's The Machinery of Freedom. On page 88 Friedman criticizes natural rights theory by saying "the usual statements of libertarian principle imply conclusions that almost nobody, libertarian or otherwise, believes in." He gives an example of a situation that illustrates this:
Consider the following example. A madman is about to open fire on a crowd; if he does so numerous innocent people will die. The only way to prevent him is to shoot him with a rifle that is within reach of several members of the crowd. The rifle is on the private property of its legitimate owner. He is a well known misanthrope who has publicly stated on numerous occasions that he is opposed to letting anyone use his rifle without his permission, even if it would save hundreds of lives. Two questions now arise. The first is whether members of the crowd have a right to take the rifle and use it to shoot the madman. The answer of libertarian rights theory, as I understand it, is no. The owner of the rifle is not responsible for the existence of the madman, and the fact that his rifle is, temporarily, of enormous value to other people does not give them a right to take it. The second question is whether it is desirable that someone take the rifle and use it to shoot the madman—whether, to put it more personally, I wish that someone do so, or whether I would rather see the members of the crowd stand there and be shot down. The answer to this question seems equally unambiguous. If someone takes the rifle, there is a relatively minor violation of the legitimate rights of its owner; if no one does, there is a major violation of the legitimate rights (not to be killed) of a large number of victims— plus a substantial cost in human life and human pain. If asked which of these outcomes I would prefer to see, the answer is obviously the first. This result is not, in any strict sense, paradoxical. An outcome may be desirable even though there is no morally legitimate way of achieving it. Indeed, this possibility is implied by the idea (due to Nozick) of viewing libertarian rights as 'side constraints' within which we seek to achieve some objective; the constraints would be irrelevant unless there were some circumstances in which we could better achieve the objective by ignoring them. While not in any strict sense paradoxical, the result is, at least to me, an uncomfortable one. It puts me in the position of saying that I very much hope someone grabs the gun, but that I disapprove of whoever does so.
Consider the following example. A madman is about to open fire on a crowd; if he does so numerous innocent people will die. The only way to prevent him is to shoot him with a rifle that is within reach of several members of the crowd. The rifle is on the private property of its legitimate owner. He is a well known misanthrope who has publicly stated on numerous occasions that he is opposed to letting anyone use his rifle without his permission, even if it would save hundreds of lives.
Two questions now arise. The first is whether members of the crowd have a right to take the rifle and use it to shoot the madman. The answer of libertarian rights theory, as I understand it, is no. The owner of the rifle is not responsible for the existence of the madman, and the fact that his rifle is, temporarily, of enormous value to other people does not give them a right to take it.
The second question is whether it is desirable that someone take the rifle and use it to shoot the madman—whether, to put it more personally, I wish that someone do so, or whether I would rather see the members of the crowd stand there and be shot down. The answer to this question seems equally unambiguous. If someone takes the rifle, there is a relatively minor violation of the legitimate rights of its owner; if no one does, there is a major violation of the legitimate rights (not to be killed) of a large number of victims— plus a substantial cost in human life and human pain. If asked which of these outcomes I would prefer to see, the answer is obviously the first.
This result is not, in any strict sense, paradoxical. An outcome may be desirable even though there is no morally legitimate way of achieving it. Indeed, this possibility is implied by the idea (due to Nozick) of viewing libertarian rights as 'side constraints' within which we seek to achieve some objective; the constraints would be irrelevant unless there were some circumstances in which we could better achieve the objective by ignoring them.
While not in any strict sense paradoxical, the result is, at least to me, an uncomfortable one. It puts me in the position of saying that I very much hope someone grabs the gun, but that I disapprove of whoever does so.
When libertarians debate questions of rights--or justice, or political morality, or political ethics, or whatever you want to call it--they are debating whether certain uses of physical force are legitimate--or rightful or non-aggressive or whatever you want to call it--uses of force or whether such uses of physical force are illegitimate--or rights-violating or aggressive--uses of force.
There is a different kind of morality (a non-political kind) that some people talk about that is distinct from the concept of justice.
David Friedman strongly desires to say that using the rifle to stop the madman from committing mass murder is a very "moral" thing to do in this non-political moral sense. Friedman feels uncomfortable saying that it is "moral" to perform this act because this act involves violating the rights of the rifle owner. He suggests that his non-political moral convictions about this situation make him reject the conclusion of libertarian principles that the use of the rifle owner's rifle against his will is unjust.
I have felt uncomfortable calling certain "moral" actions l (i.e. certain actions that I strongly hope occur and that I believe will be "good" if they occur) unjust as well. I too have been hesitatant to accept the conclusions of libertarian principles in these extreme situations. I understand that it clear that it is unjust to take and use the rifle owner's rifle against his will according to the libertarian principles, but I have not wanted to accept this because of my moral convictions that it would be "good" to do this to save all the people from the gunman. Rather, I have been more inclined to say that the libertarian principles are flawed, that they do not always lead to the correct conclusions about justice, and that some actions that are unjust according to libertarian principles may actually be justified in my opinion do to the wonderfully amazing consequences.
Recently (now) I am considering the possibility that actions can be both unjust and moral, just as actions can be both just and immoral.
I am perfectly okay with accepting that there are actions that are just and immoral, as are most people. For example, I have every right not to take care of my parents in their old age, yet I would also say that I have a non-political moral obligation to take care of them since they were so kind to me and deserve some reciprocal treatment from me. I am perfectly fine with saying that it would be just, yet immoral for me to be a jerk and not love and care for my parents in their old age. I think most people would agree with me: an action can be just yet immoral.
So why are Friedman and I uncomfortable with the opposite situation? Why are we not fine with saying that certain actions are unjust yet moral? Can an action be both unjust and moral? Can it be moral to use the rifle to stop the gunman, yet unjust to do so?
I am beginning to think the answer is yes. If the answer is yes, would that mean that someone could be a libertarian while maintaining (both in actions and words) that it is perfectly "okay" (non-politically moral) to murder people or commit other acts of aggression?
What does it mean to be a libertarian? Must a libertarian always be "opposed" to aggression? What does it mean to "oppose" aggression? Believing that aggression is unjust and wishing that aggression doesn't occur are two different things. I think that libertarians must believe that aggression is unjust, but perhaps they need not necessarily believe that aggression should not occur.
Rather, a libertarian is someone who believes that there should be no legal possibility for aggression. A libertarian can believe that acts of aggression should occur. He just must also believe that those actions be punished by law. Is this a consistent view?
So perhaps Friedman and I can believe that someone should borrow the rifle owner's gun to stop the madman and still be complete libertarians in the sense of accepting even this most "extreme" conclusion of libertarian principle. We can accomplish this by simultaneously believing that whoever violates the rights of the rifle owner by taking and using his gun without his permission should be punished by law. He should be made to pay restitution to the rifle owner or otherwise properly punished. Further, we must believe that the gun owner has the right to defend himself and his gun even though we believe that he should let the gun be used to stop the madman.
So yes, I think I do believe that certain actions are unjust yet moral. I do not have to reject certain conclusions of libertarian principle. I am perfectly fine with accepting that it is unjust to take the rifle owner's rifle. Yet I still believe that someone should take his rifle to stop the madman. Any thoughts?
Absolutely, there is a difference between justice and morality. The main thing to remember is that libertarianism is a political ethic. For example, libertarianism says nothing about the morality of lying unless it is fraud. In the case of stealing a rifle in order to save yourself and/or others, you are absolutely wronging the legitimate owner. So long as you right that wrong, you are still a libertarian in my book. It's when people attempt to avoid righting that wrong that I would say that they are not a libertarian. Also, don't forget that the legitimate owner of the rifle might forgive you afterward. This would be a signal that even though you were using the rifle without his permission, the owner does not consider it to have been a criminal act.
That's a quite interesting post. Similar to what we dealt with in the question of pushing someone out of the way of an oncoming bus. Yes, it's an aggression to push them, but you're doing it in their interest and they can forgive you, or prosecute you, after the fact.
Similarly with grabbing the rifle. Anyone should feel free to grab the rifle as long as they are willing to accept prosecution for that act. Which, in most people's judgment, would be a heroic thing to do, as the punishment for theft and invasion of property is a better thing to accept than the deaths of many people, and you will know that if the owner of the gun aligns with your intention that he will forgive that act entirely.
Even should he not, you would have a much reduced sentence, since your act was to borrow the gun and return, unlike a thief that seeks to take it permanently. The actual damages to the gun owner might be the cost of a few bullets, since his gun was returned after the act, and had he not been told of the act he may never have realized his rights were violated. That's pretty minimal invasion.
Yeah, I would say that it is more heroic to accept the punishment should there be any, rather than trying to get away without any consequences. In terms of punishment or restitution, it's not like the hero would owe the owner tens of thousands of dollars. Okay, I suppose if the hero had to do a lot of property damage to get to the rifle, then maybe it might cost that to fix the damage, but even $20,000 is not the end of the world. And of course, if the owner doesn't forgive the damage (if it's $20,000 he might not be willing to forgive the whole amount), it's not like the people the hero saved wouldn't chip in any money to help out, or maybe they would make the pyscho (or his estate if he's dead) pay for the damages, or maybe insurance would cover it. Who knows? However the damage is fixed, the hero would not end up in prison like he might in today's society, and he certainly wouldn't be in debt for long ($20,000 woudn't be a huge problem if people actually got to keep their damn income!).
The difference is that law arises from legal settlement of disputes - hence, legal norms are not the result of decisions made solely by an individual and solely determined by factors within the individual. Morality, on the other hand, can be thought of as "the art of choosing right ends" or "making the right choice in any given situation". Because the conditions for moral choice reside solely within the individual, moral norms are of a different character than legal norms.
However, both moral norms and legal norms are co-dependent - what is right depends on what is legal and vice-versa. The key is to understand what the moral criterion (individual satisfaction) is and what the legal criterion (justifiability) is and how these criteria are different from one another.
Clayton -
PeaceRequiresAnarachy,
The belief that some actions can be simultaneously moral and unjust, or immoral and just, requires a conception of justice that is entirely separate from morality. It entails that there is no essential connection between what is right and wrong (morality) and what is rights respecting or violating (justice).
The first problem with this view, if true, is that we should expect the overlap between moral actions and just actions to be entirely random. Yet this just isn't the case. If you could list every single action that you believed to be moral, and every single action you believed to be unjust, the number of items appearing on both lists would be FAR too low. In other words, from a statistics viewpoint, there is a strong correlation between morality and justice which suggests a relation between the two.
Another problem arises when we try to determine what to do in the cases when justice and morality seemingly conflict. Moral actions are actions that ought to be taken -- this is simply what it means for an action to be moral. It just wouldn't make any sense to say "when justice conflicts with morality, you should choose the former over the latter" -- whatever it is that you should choose IS what's moral. But if morality should always be chosen over justice, why should we concern ourselves with justice at all? Ther's just no reason to respect rights when it would be immoral to do so.
The solution then, is to understand justice as a component of morality. Starting from this point, when faced with a case where an action appears to be both moral and unjust (or immoral and just), we would re-examine our understanding of rights in order to create a coherent picture of morality and justice.
Returning to Friedman's rifle example, my natural inclination is to doubt that taking the gun from the misanthrope actually constitutes an unjust act. It might be a violation of the NAP, strictly speaking, but I believe justice is a respect for rights, and not the avoidance of every single rights violating act. This resolves a lot of the special case issues that libertarians struggle with.
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
I believe justice is a respect for rights, and not the avoidance of every single rights violating act. This resolves a lot of the special case issues that libertarians struggle with.
How can you respect rights by violating them? It seems that avoidance of rights violations is respecting those very rights.
how can you respect rights by violating them? It seems that avoidance of rights violations is respecting those very rights.
Yes, in most cases, avoiding rights violations constitutes repecting those rights. However, this isn't necessarily the case.
If you accidentally hit another car while driving, has a rights violation taken place? By NAP standards, yes, you have damaged someone's property. But that car accident doesn't really demonstrate a lack of respect for property rights -- its not an unjust action your part. Now maybe you were driving really recklessly, or it was a hit and run. In those cases, even though it was still an accident, you are acting unjust because the accident fits into a pattern of general disrepect for rights.
Another way to look at it is what we mean when we say "respect your elders." This doesn't mean do whatever an adult tells you to do. Rather, it's part of a whole set of attitudes and behaviors that we call respectful.
If you accidentally hit another car while driving,
I think we both agree that and unintenional act such as getting into a car accident does not demonstrate a lack of respect for rights. But we were discussing the issue in the context of an intentional act, such as deliberately taking the gun from its owner.
When you say the following:
Returning to Friedman's rifle example, my natural inclination is to doubt that taking the gun from the misanthrope actually constitutes an unjust act.
How can you claim to respect peoples rights and then intentionally violate someones rights?
I am assuming of course that an unjust act is an act that violates a persons rights and that you believe that the gun owner actually has a right to the gun.
An amoralist would / could just deny the category or intelligability of morality.
In so much justice can or does exist - morality simply doesn't, or is at least a non factor.
While I myself may be an amoralist, I did not bring that up due to my thoughts. I have seen David Friedman give amoral scenarios on justice, which may be relevant when trying to relate to David Freidmans writings.
"As in a kaleidoscope, the constellation of forces operating in the system as a whole is ever changing." - Ludwig Lachmann
"When A Man Dies A World Goes Out of Existence" - GLS Shackle
Southern:How can you claim to respect peoples rights and then intentionally violate someones rights?
I'm saying you can respect rights (in general) while violating a right (in specific).
Well, here's what I said about justice: "justice is a respect for rights, and not the avoidance of every single rights violating act."
Likewise, an unjust act isn't solely a violation of a person's right, it is doing it within a general pattern of disrepect for rights.
You could say respect for rights is ordinal. I'd rather a few people not die than respect the right of the firearm owner not to have his right momentarily violated, since the situation proposes that choice, and because I'd rather do something than nothing.
Similarly with the example of pushing someone out of the way of an oncoming bus. You must violate their right not to be invaded by a push in order to save their far more important right to life.
I think this makes perfect ethical sense.
Clayton said,
The key is to understand what the moral criterion (individual satisfaction) is and what the legal criterion (justifiability) is and how these criteria are different from one another.
I agree. Unfortunately I don't have a great understanding of either the moral criterion or legal criterion yet. :-)
mikachusetts:I'm saying you can respect rights (in general) while violating a right (in specific). .... Likewise, an unjust act isn't solely a violation of a person's right, it is doing it within a general pattern of disrepect for rights.
....
But how do we determine which specific rights violations are justified? If I go into the grocery store, pick up something and walk out without buying it there isn't any general pattern of disrespect for property rights, yet my single specific rights violation (act of theft) would be unjust. How would we determine which rights violations aren't unjust in your view?
mikachusetts:The solution then, is to understand justice as a component of morality. Starting from this point, when faced with a case where an action appears to be both moral and unjust (or immoral and just), we would re-examine our understanding of rights in order to create a coherent picture of morality and justice.
Are you saying that everything that is unjust is immoral and everything that is immoral is unjust? What then would be the point in having the two concepts?
@Peace: Here's my take. I think, all in all, my view is a cobbling of several heterodox views but doesn't fit exactly into any existing framework.
But how do we determine which specific rights violations are justified?
Well, it depends. If you're asking how we can determine which specific rights vilations are justified beforehand, I'd say we just can't. There is just too much tacit knowledge of time and place and custom, etc. required to make such a judgement. For this reason, I don't think we can come up with a complete picture of law when we're talking about justice.
But if you're asking how we can determine which specific rights violations are justified after the fact, then I'd say its a matter of practical wisdom and experience. It takes a kind of "on the ground" knowledge and a familiarity of justice as well as a strong theoretical understanding. This is essentially why a libertarian legal system would have judges at all. If all we needed to know regarding guilt can be known already, then we could simply program For a New Liberty and a bunch of Walter Block's articles into a computer and let it spit out verdicts.
No. Everything that is unjust is immoral, but not everything that is immoral is unjust. Justice is part of morality, but not all of morality. For example, it would be immoral to treat animals with cruelty, but not unjust (unless, of course, it was someone else's property).
If you're asking how we can determine which specific rights vilations are justified beforehand, I'd say we just can't.
This seems like a recipe for an arbitrary justice system.
This is essentially why a libertarian legal system would have judges at all.
I dont think the judges would be there to neccessarially decide what is just or unjust (was it ok to take the gun), but to mediate the two parties to determine what actually took place and give an opinion on whether an actual rights violation occured (whose gun was it / was it actually taken without permission).
But I suppose you are right in the sense that a judge could rule that no rights violation occured (that it is ok to take someone elses property given the circumstances) and if that view is popular with the community then that would become the new law. But once we begin to erode peoples rights to their property for this exception or that exception would it really be a libertarian society based on non-aggression?
It would not be too far a leap for those same people that accepted a minor violation of property rights (taking the gun) to save the lives of a handful of people to accept a major violation of property rights (maybe the taking the life of one person) to save the lives of thousands of people.
Clayton, thank you for directing my to your take.
mikachusetts said, "Everything that is unjust is immoral, but not everything that is immoral is unjust. Justice is part of morality, but not all of morality." This is the view that I held until I questioned the view that all things that are unjust are also immoral. Now I am unsure whether the view is correct or not.
Southern said, "But once we begin to erode peoples rights to their property for this exception or that exception would it really be a libertarian society based on non-aggression?" I had that thought too. My view is that a completely libertarian society is a society in which all acts of aggression are illegal. Even if the vast majority of people say that certain acts of aggression are moral, as long as those acts are still punished in the legal system as aggressive, unjust acts then I think it's still a libertarian society.
Thanks for the thoughts everyone. I finished The Machinery of Freedom and am now going to start Gerard Casey's book Libertarian Anarchy: Against the State.