If you are okay with someone stealing from you so that they can eat, and you forgive them after the fact, then there is no need to involve the law. Their explanation that they were starving was good enough to justify their behavior to you. So what's the problem?
gotlucky: Really? You have no opinions about someone's behavior when they try to justify their actions to you? If your wife cheated on you and tried to explain, you wouldn't know if it was justifiable or morally compelling one way or the other?
Really? You have no opinions about someone's behavior when they try to justify their actions to you? If your wife cheated on you and tried to explain, you wouldn't know if it was justifiable or morally compelling one way or the other?
I think different people would accept different explanations as justifiable or not. For instance, "well, I just got carried away in a moment of passion" may be justifiable to some and not to others. "I stole the TV because I needed to sell it to pay for my mother's medicine, and I figured this guy has a ton of money" may also sound as a just reason to a lot of people.
FlyingAxe: I think different people would accept different explanations as justifiable or not.
I think different people would accept different explanations as justifiable or not.
I'll just repost this again:
gotlucky: So why should you respect what the government says? As Bastiat said, "When law and morality contradict each other, the citizen has the cruel alternative of either losing his moral sense or losing his respect for the law." You are the only one who can ever truly know your own morality. You can't know what the law ought to be from a priori reasoning anymore than you can know what the correct price of apples ought to be. You can have your own opinions based on your own values as to what the price of apples should be, but prices aren't there for just you. Like prices, law is not there for just you. In fact, if it were just you, there would be no need for prices or law.
So why should you respect what the government says? As Bastiat said, "When law and morality contradict each other, the citizen has the cruel alternative of either losing his moral sense or losing his respect for the law." You are the only one who can ever truly know your own morality. You can't know what the law ought to be from a priori reasoning anymore than you can know what the correct price of apples ought to be. You can have your own opinions based on your own values as to what the price of apples should be, but prices aren't there for just you. Like prices, law is not there for just you. In fact, if it were just you, there would be no need for prices or law.
FlyingAxe: For instance, "well, I just got carried away in a moment of passion" may be justifiable to some and not to others. "I stole the TV because I needed to sell it to pay for my mother's medicine, and I figured this guy has a ton of money" may also sound as a just reason to a lot of people.
For instance, "well, I just got carried away in a moment of passion" may be justifiable to some and not to others. "I stole the TV because I needed to sell it to pay for my mother's medicine, and I figured this guy has a ton of money" may also sound as a just reason to a lot of people.
Well, if someone steals your TV and sells it in order to pay for their mother's medicine, and you forgive him and don't involve the law, then that is your choice.
different people would accept different explanations as justifiable or not
Precisely - and the relevant "people" in any particular legal dispute are the complainant/victim and/or his or her relatives. In particular, the moral opinions of kibitzers of current events and legal disputes - the busy-bodies - are wholly irrelevant. The only way in which they are relevant is in the very indirect sense that past all disputes have been decided between people so prevailing moral sentiments are reflected in case law to a greater or lesser extent. The beauty of law is that by slicing away the unvested opinions of disinterested third parties, it compels the disputants to focus on the moral principles that actually apply to their dispute, rather than appealing to mob or mass sentiment in order to bring to bear irrelevant moral principles and win an unjust outcome to the dispute. In my opinion, the history of the corruption of law is little else than this.
Clayton -
gotlucky: If you are okay with someone stealing from you so that they can eat, and you forgive them after the fact, then there is no need to involve the law. Their explanation that they were starving was good enough to justify their behavior to you. So what's the problem? I cannot be okay with someone stealing from me. Stealing by definition is taking from me something when I am not okay with giving it away. The question is why we should prefer homesteading of a TV over using it acquire medicine (through selling or barter) on the scale of justice. I.e., I am not okay with you taking the TV I homesteaded (which I thereby consider "my" TV). But I am willing to listen to you explain why you think it's just for you to take it. My neighbors are equally either inclined to forgive me for preventing you from taking the TV or forgiving you for taking the TV. You need to explain why you think it's just to take the TV. We can also think about this as some sort of communist-anarchist discussion, where someone lays a claim on resource X, and someone else does so too. The first person says: I have homesteaded it. The second person says: I need it to survive, while you need it for luxury. Why is the first person's claim more just? | Post Points: 20
FlyingAxe: I cannot be okay with someone stealing from me. Stealing by definition is taking from me something when I am not okay with giving it away.
I cannot be okay with someone stealing from me. Stealing by definition is taking from me something when I am not okay with giving it away.
The TV can be considered stolen property at the time of the theft, and after you pardon the thief the TV is his and he is no longer a thief. You pardoning the thief is done after the fact, that means that at the time he took the TV, he did so without your permission.
FlyingAxe: The question is why we should prefer homesteading of a TV over using it acquire medicine (through selling or barter) on the scale of justice.
The question is why we should prefer homesteading of a TV over using it acquire medicine (through selling or barter) on the scale of justice.
Who is this we? What does homesteading have to do with this? If the TV is already considered your property, then it is already your property. This new person has to take it away from you, something that is yours. If all he has to do is convince his neighbors, then it's might makes right, and they are all no different than thugs. After all, his neighbors could have helped him out, but instead they thought it would be better to rob you of your TV and sell it.
FlyingAxe: I.e., I am not okay with you taking the TV I homesteaded (which I thereby consider "my" TV). But I am willing to listen to you explain why you think it's just for you to take it. My neighbors are equally either inclined to forgive me for preventing you from taking the TV or forgiving you for taking the TV. You need to explain why you think it's just to take the TV.
I.e., I am not okay with you taking the TV I homesteaded (which I thereby consider "my" TV). But I am willing to listen to you explain why you think it's just for you to take it. My neighbors are equally either inclined to forgive me for preventing you from taking the TV or forgiving you for taking the TV. You need to explain why you think it's just to take the TV.
If you are not okay with me taking the TV, why do you care about my explanation? Are you willing to change your mind? Again, if all that matters is mob rule, then it's just a might makes right system. How can a might makes right system be just?
FlyingAxe: We can also think about this as some sort of communist-anarchist discussion, where someone lays a claim on resource X, and someone else does so too. The first person says: I have homesteaded it. The second person says: I need it to survive, while you need it for luxury. Why is the first person's claim more just?
We can also think about this as some sort of communist-anarchist discussion, where someone lays a claim on resource X, and someone else does so too. The first person says: I have homesteaded it. The second person says: I need it to survive, while you need it for luxury. Why is the first person's claim more just?
Is this first person's claim more just? Right now you haven't provided much of a scenario to work with.
I really don't know what's not clear about my question. We (the people in dispute, the neighbors, the observers, the omniscient we, whatever) are trying to figure out what is just in a given scenario. We have two things on the scale of justice: homesteading vs. needing an item to survive. Based on which need is more just, we will assign property right to the item.
Bleeding-heart liberals argue that needing an item to survive is more important. Hence, it is not unjust to take the item away from its homesteader and give to someone who needs it to survive. A more abstract way of saying it is that the item you homesteaded was your property until someone who had a greater need for it laid a claim on it. Then it became his property.
Why are they wrong?
FlyingAxe: I really don't know what's not clear about my question. We (the people in dispute, the neighbors, the observers, the omniscient we, whatever) are trying to figure out what is just in a given scenario.
I really don't know what's not clear about my question. We (the people in dispute, the neighbors, the observers, the omniscient we, whatever) are trying to figure out what is just in a given scenario.
Those are some very different groups of people. Do you all get together to decide the price of apples too? Do orthodox Jews get together to decide what the price of pork ought to be?
FlyingAxe: We have two things on the scale of justice: homesteading vs. needing an item to survive. Based on which need is more just, we will assign property right to the item.
We have two things on the scale of justice: homesteading vs. needing an item to survive. Based on which need is more just, we will assign property right to the item.
Sounds like you guys support might makes right. Whatever your group decides will be the rule, and anyone who breaks from that will pay dearly.
FlyingAxe: Bleeding-heart liberals argue that needing an item to survive is more important. Hence, it is not unjust to take the item away from its homesteader and give to someone who needs it to survive. A more abstract way of saying it is that the item you homesteaded was your property until someone who had a greater need for it laid a claim on it. Then it became his property.
Well I'm glad the entire community came together to rob one person. Apparently it was too much trouble for them to be charitable.
FlyingAxe: Why are they wrong?
Wrong according to whom? According to the mob they are right, according to their victim they are wrong. Why would a victim not want his stuff stolen from him?
I am guessing from your answers that you do not believe in universal anything: morality, justice, etc.
Again: I am using "we" as a literary tool. I am not talking about any group of people in particular. For instance, imagine someone asks a philosophical question: "How do we know that 2+2 = 4? How do we know mathematical truths? How do we know that laws of nature are stable and are the same tomorrow as today?" Asking "who is we, and why are you guys trying to force your opinion on someone else" is ridiculous.
How does one know what is just? "One" as in "an abstract person".
What does price of pork have to do with it? Are you saying that what is just is what will come out from the negotiation? I feel like we are speaking past each other. My conception of justice is something that can be rationally figured out. Like a mathematical problem. If your conception is different (for instance, maybe you think that justice is equivalent to a Schelling point or some such concept -- i.e., some idea on which it makes sense for two subjective parties to agree according to game theory), please let me know so that we are on the same page.
Again, I will repost this:
gotlucky: As Bastiat said, "When law and morality contradict each other, the citizen has the cruel alternative of either losing his moral sense or losing his respect for the law." You are the only one who can ever truly know your own morality. You can't know what the law ought to be from a priori reasoning anymore than you can know what the correct price of apples ought to be. You can have your own opinions based on your own values as to what the price of apples should be, but prices aren't there for just you. Like prices, law is not there for just you. In fact, if it were just you, there would be no need for prices or law.
As Bastiat said, "When law and morality contradict each other, the citizen has the cruel alternative of either losing his moral sense or losing his respect for the law." You are the only one who can ever truly know your own morality. You can't know what the law ought to be from a priori reasoning anymore than you can know what the correct price of apples ought to be. You can have your own opinions based on your own values as to what the price of apples should be, but prices aren't there for just you. Like prices, law is not there for just you. In fact, if it were just you, there would be no need for prices or law.
I also like the typical libertarian rhetoric (which I, admittedly, also use) that one sees on the Facebook memes of libertarian groups: "you guys robbed someone". Robbed means deprived of his just property. But we are figuring out here what just property is; how one arrives at that concept. So, telling me that I robbed someone is either begging the question or ignoring that any question was asked.
You are the only one who can ever truly know your own morality. You can't know what the law ought to be from a priori reasoning anymore than you can know what the correct price of apples ought to be. You can have your own opinions based on your own values as to what the price of apples should be, but prices aren't there for just you. Like prices, law is not there for just you. In fact, if it were just you, there would be no need for prices or law.
So, should the law be based on morality? Or should it be based on something extra-moral?
In other words, when you just said that "you guys robbed him", you meant "according to my [gotlucky's] morality". But according to "us guys'" morality, needing to pay for medicine trumps needing to have a fifth TV in one's house. So, we didn't rob him, we re-evaluated whom the TV belongs to.
My idea (based on the ideas of a few people whose posts I read here) was that law should not just be based on one's personal moral views, but on some other considerations as to what should be the set of rules in a society based on which the society can achieve peaceful conflict resolution. (Although, admittedly, there are many holes in my understandingof this. E.g.: why should peaceful resolution trump all other social goals?)
So, your answer to my question re: radio frequency is: either look at what your moral views say or see what the state says (because that's the current law in the society)?
FlyingAxe: I also like the typical libertarian rhetoric (which I, admittedly, also use) that one sees on the Facebook memes of libertarian groups: "you guys robbed someone". Robbed means deprived of his just property. But we are figuring out here what just property is; how one arrives at that concept. So, telling me that I robbed someone is either begging the question or ignoring that any question was asked.
Property and rights emerge from the resolution of disputes. I prefer a certain system of law. That does not mean that I believe all resolutions of that system are correct. It just means that I think that system is the most moral system. As I said before, several times without getting a response:
gotlucky: You can't know what the law ought to be from a priori reasoning anymore than you can know what the correct price of apples ought to be. You can have your own opinions based on your own values as to what the price of apples should be, but prices aren't there for just you. Like prices, law is not there for just you. In fact, if it were just you, there would be no need for prices or law.
You can't know what the law ought to be from a priori reasoning anymore than you can know what the correct price of apples ought to be. You can have your own opinions based on your own values as to what the price of apples should be, but prices aren't there for just you. Like prices, law is not there for just you. In fact, if it were just you, there would be no need for prices or law.
FlyingAxe: So, should the law be based on morality? Or should it be based on something extra-moral?
Everything you do is based on your own morality and values. What else could your opinion of law be based on if not your values?
FlyingAxe: In other words, when you just said that "you guys robbed him", you meant "according to my [gotlucky's] morality". But according to "us guys'" morality, needing to pay for medicine trumps needing to have a fifth TV in one's house. So, we didn't rob him, we re-evaluated whom the TV belongs to.
Do you have any idea of what law is? Do you know what the purpose of law is?
FlyingAxe: My idea (based on the ideas of a few people whose posts I read here) was that law should not just be based on one's personal moral views, but on some other considerations as to what should be the set of rules in a society based on which the society can achieve peaceful conflict resolution. (Although, admittedly, there are many holes in my understandingof this. E.g.: why should peaceful resolution trump all other social goals?)
What else could you base your opinions on law on if not your own values and morality? What do you base your decisions on when you buy or do not buy food, clothes, entertainment, etc.?
FlyingAxe: So, your answer to my question re: radio frequency is: either look at what your moral views say or see what the state says (because that's the current law in the society)?
The question of "what [the] libertarian view of radio wave frequency as property is/should be?" I would think whatever the state says is irrelevant to what a libertarian's opinion should be.
So, if a fundamentalist Christian believes that homosexual acts are immoral (not just unvirtuous for the people involved, but immoral objectively; for the whole world if you wish), would you say that he must believe that the law should outlaw such acts? Perhaps Christians cannot be libertarians, at least deontological libertarians (who believe in libertarians ends because of certain ideals, as opposed to a desire of specific consequences)?
Roderick Long gives a good definition:
Law may be defined as that institution or set of institutions in a given society that adjudicates conflicting claims and secures compliance in a formal, systematic, and orderly way.
Clearly, our TV "thief" (taker, whatever) and our TV "owner" (homesteader) have a conflict over the TV. Both claim that they ought to own the TV (or that they ought to be assigned property rights over the TV). One claims it based on homesteading principle. Another claims it based on "urgency for life functions" principle (or something like that), claiming that his mom's life is more urgent than the TV owner's luxury from owning the TV.
What you're saying is that there is no a priori way to resolve this conflict?
FlyingAxe: So, if a fundamentalist Christian believes that homosexual acts are immoral (not just unvirtuous for the people involved, but immoral objectively; for the whole world if you wish), would you say that he must believe that the law should outlaw such acts?
So, if a fundamentalist Christian believes that homosexual acts are immoral (not just unvirtuous for the people involved, but immoral objectively; for the whole world if you wish), would you say that he must believe that the law should outlaw such acts?
1) Even if a fundamentalist Christian believed that homosexual acts are immoral, it does not follow that he must necessarily believe it is moral to use violence to prevent people from pursuing these acts.
2) A fundamentalist Christian believes that homosexual acts are immoral subjectively, not objectively. The fundamentalist Christian is the subject, and only subjects can value.
FlyingAxe: Perhaps Christians cannot be libertarians, at least deontological libertarians (who believe in libertarians ends because of certain ideals, as opposed to a desire of specific consequences)?
Perhaps Christians cannot be libertarians, at least deontological libertarians (who believe in libertarians ends because of certain ideals, as opposed to a desire of specific consequences)?
Tell that to Bob Murphy and Tom Woods.
FlyingAxe: Roderick Long gives a good definition: Law may be defined as that institution or set of institutions in a given society that adjudicates conflicting claims and secures compliance in a formal, systematic, and orderly way.
That looks to be consistent with "law is the nonviolent process of dispute resolution". So I don't know why you don't apply this to your question.
FlyingAxe: Clearly, our TV "thief" (taker, whatever) and our TV "owner" (homesteader) have a conflict over the TV. Both claim that they ought to own the TV (or that they ought to be assigned property rights over the TV). One claims it based on homesteading principle. Another claims it based on "urgency for life functions" principle (or something like that), claiming that his mom's life is more urgent than the TV owner's luxury from owning the TV.
Okay, so they have a conflict, and they will either
1) Resolve it through violence
2) Resolve it through argumentation
3) Drop the conflict and the TV remains with whoever is currently possessing it
FlyingAxe: What you're saying is that there is no a priori way to resolve this conflict?
Clearly there isn't. You have no way of knowing what the resolution will be without observing it. That completely flies in the face of what a priori knowledge is.
gotlucky: FlyingAxe: So, if a fundamentalist Christian believes that homosexual acts are immoral (not just unvirtuous for the people involved, but immoral objectively; for the whole world if you wish), would you say that he must believe that the law should outlaw such acts? 1) Even if a fundamentalist Christian believed that homosexual acts are immoral, it does not follow that he must necessarily believe it is moral to use violence to prevent people from pursuing these acts. 2) A fundamentalist Christian believes that homosexual acts are immoral subjectively, not objectively. The fundamentalist Christian is the subject, and only subjects can value. FlyingAxe: Perhaps Christians cannot be libertarians, at least deontological libertarians (who believe in libertarians ends because of certain ideals, as opposed to a desire of specific consequences)? Tell that to Bob Murphy and Tom Woods.
1) That's true, but assume that he believes it moral to use violence to stop an objectively immoral act (such as murder).
2) No, he believes it is objectively immoral. He believes that there are objects (or events) that have properties independent of the observer. Whether they are good or evil is one such property. Murder is objectively immoral, not only subjectively unpleasant for the victim and her relatives (and damaging the murderer's virtue). It is an event that everyone "on the side" can see as evil. Just like they can see that an orange is round or that sky is blue. (This is different from them perceiving orange as tasty: that's not an objective characteristic of an orange, but a subjective reaction of their mind.)
A fundamentalist Christian believes the same about a homosexual act -- that it's objectively wrong..
3) I don't see any reason to believe they would disagree with what I wrote. It's a fairly standard interpretation of morality of homosexuality. Furthermore, Bob Murphy told me himself that he's never read anything about rights, etc., that he fully agreed on, outside of New Testament.
Be it as it may, as a Jew, I see a good reason for not supporting a law that pushes one's views of morality on everybody else: I don't want others to push their views of morality on me. I am willing to sacrifice support of enforcement of what I consider moral in order to live in a society that respects people's choices. Of course, the society must be a society, not a jungle; as a result, I am willing to agree to a basic set of rules that prevents aggression.
I.e., although I may reject contractarian approach to morality (such as Jan Sterveson's) -- I think it's nonsensical -- I can accept contractarian approach to law.
This is just one example.
Observing what? The resolution? I may have an a priori way of determining what kind of resolution will be just. I.e., what natural law should say on this.
(Note: I am using "natural law" a little differently from others. I am not using it as "deriving from nature of people", but "a just way of conflict resolution that can be discovered naturally; i.e., rationally".)
FlyingAxe: 1) That's true, but assume that he believes it moral to use violence to stop an objectively immoral act.
1) That's true, but assume that he believes it moral to use violence to stop an objectively immoral act.
For someone who has claimed to be familiar with David Friedman, you seem to forget many of his answers to your questions. Even if a fundamentalist Christian believes it is immoral to pursue homosexual acts, what is the price he is willing to pay to prevent and punish those that do pursue them? Is it more than what homosexuals are willing to pay to defend themselves?
FlyingAxe: 2) No, he believes it is objectively immoral. He believes that there are objects (or events) that have properties independent of the observer. Whether they are good or evil is one such property. Murder is objectively immoral, not only subjectively unpleasant for the victim and her relatives (and damaging the murderer's virtue). It is an event that everyone "on the side" can see as evil. Just like they can see that an orange is round or that sky is blue. (This is different from them perceiving orange as tasty: that's not an objective characteristic of an orange, but a subjective reaction of their mind.) A fundamentalist Christian believes the same about a homosexual act -- that it's objectively wrong..
No, the only inherent qualities to homicide are the things that make it homicide, i.e., the actual killing of another person. What makes a homicide murder is one's subjective view of the homicide. For some, any homicide is murder. For others, only homicides that are not done in self defense are murders. But the only inherent qualities to the killing of another human being is the killing of another human being. You believing it wrong is not inherent to the action itself.
It's the same with homosexual acts.
FlyingAxe: 3) I don't see any reason to believe they would disagree with what I wrote. It's a fairly standard interpretation of morality of homosexuality. Furthermore, Bob Murphy told me himself that he's never read anything about rights, etc., that he fully agreed on, outside of New Testament.
You better clarify some more, because you are rapidly losing credibility by claiming that Bob Murphy and Tom Woods would agree with you about Christians not being able to be libertarians. Both are Christians, and both are libertarians.
FlyingAxe: Be it as it may, as a Jew, I see a good reason for not supporting a law that pushes one's views of morality on everybody else: I don't want others to push their views of morality on me. I am willing to sacrifice support of enforcement of what I consider moral in order to live in a society that respects people's choices. Of course, the society must be a society, not a jungle; as a result, I am willing to agree to a basic set of rules that prevents aggression.
That is an example of consequentialist libertarianism.
FlyingAxe: Observing what? The resolution? I may have an a priori way of determining what kind of resolution will be just. I.e., what natural law should say on this. (Note: I am using "natural law" a little differently from others. I am not using it as "deriving from nature of people", but "a just way of conflict resolution that can be discovered naturally; i.e., rationally".)
This is why I asked you if you knew what law is and its purpose. It doesn't matter what you think the price of apples ought to be. The price emerges from the various voluntary exchanges in society. If you think that a price for a Fuji apple should be $0.50 instead of $0.75, that's great. If you think that is the correct price, so be it. But guess what? Prices don't exist for you and you alone. They exist so that everyone can measure their values and decide whether it's worth it to exchange for the apples or not.
It's the same with law. You can have whatever opinion you want about what is moral or what you think the law ought to be. But the law does not exist for you and you alone. Other people want to get along and resolve their conflicts too. Who are you to decide for them?
1) Who cares?
2) People can disagree that a certain act is murder. Just like they could disagree that a certain animal is a mammal. But people believe that murder is immoral, objectively. (At least the people who believe in objective morality.)
It is possible that whatever it is makes it murder also makes it immoral. I.e., some people believe that taking of life in an of itself is evil. Under all circumstances. Others believe that taking life in self-defense is not evil. Some believe that taking life during a war is evil. Others disagree.
But all these people in question can agree that either those acts are objectively evil -- have an objective property of evil -- or not. They perceive evil in those acts through their intuition, which, admittedly can give conflicting results (but the same is true regarding people's perceptions of objective properties through senses or logic).
3) I am not saying what they are. I am saying that according to your logic, when one's moral views must be the only source of what one believes must be (or "is", in natural sense) the law, Christians cannot be libertarians, at least deontological ones. Maybe Tom Woods and Bob Murphy are consequentialist libertarians. I have no reason to believe the opposite.
4) Yes, my argument is consequentialist. But so are all the so-called deontological arguments that I have heard so far (except Hoppe's AE which in my opinion is wrong). Here is a typical deontological argument that I have heard from libertarians (e.g., Kinsella, etc.):
-- it is our groundnorm that aggression is wrong
-- but aggression depends on one's definition of property (i.e., it's not aggression if the property is not yours)
-- our concept of property is based on homesteading
-- why homesteading?
-- because the purpose of the law is to resolve conflicts, and homesteading provides the clearest way to resolve conflicts
-- this is a consequentialist argument; there could be a number of other ways to assign property; for instance, based on urgency of need to use, desire to promote creativity, etc. those could be based on one's moral views, for instance.
-- the purpose of the law is not to promote creativity; it's to resolve conflicts over property
-- but what motivates you to define property one way or another remains unclear, unless you prefer homesteading over other methods based on some religious values, which seems unlikely
-- NAP! NAP! NAP! You can't rob people to promote creativity!
(OK, Kinsella did not say the last line. :) That would be in a Facebook conversation.)
I.e., the argument is somewhat circular, and the punchline is basically that libertarians prefer clear conflict resolution over more subjective kinds (like urgency of use, etc.) -- which is a consequentialist argument.
gotlucky: FlyingAxe: Observing what? The resolution? I may have an a priori way of determining what kind of resolution will be just. I.e., what natural law should say on this. (Note: I am using "natural law" a little differently from others. I am not using it as "deriving from nature of people", but "a just way of conflict resolution that can be discovered naturally; i.e., rationally".) This is why I asked you if you knew what law is and its purpose. It doesn't matter what you think the price of apples ought to be. The price emerges from the various voluntary exchanges in society. If you think that a price for a Fuji apple should be $0.50 instead of $0.75, that's great. If you think that is the correct price, so be it. But guess what? Prices don't exist for you and you alone. They exist so that everyone can measure their values and decide whether it's worth it to exchange for the apples or not. It's the same with law. You can have whatever opinion you want about what is moral or what you think the law ought to be. But the law does not exist for you and you alone. Other people want to get along and resolve their conflicts too. Who are you to decide for them? I am not sure what the last question means. (I.e., I could answer that I can decide for them because I am right. I have figure out how to figure out whether something is just or not.) We can rephrase it as "why should they care what I think?" Because I can demonstrate a way to figure out a just resolution of a conflict. Presumably. But I don't know what libertarians think that means, unless, as you mentioned, one relies on one's morality. I.e., I understand your answer; I am just trying to see if there is another one. Anyway, thanks for the discussion. I do think it cleared up some issues. | Post Points: 20
FlyingAxe: 1) Who cares?
About what?
FlyingAxe: 2) People can disagree that a certain act is murder. Just like they could disagree that a certain animal is a mammal. But people believe that murder is immoral, objectively. (At least the people who believe in objective morality.)
People can certainly choose to classify animals however they want. Someone can classify a bat as a bird if they want to. But the thing is, that doesn't change what makes a bat a bat. Murder is a wrongful homicide. Guess what? The only inherent quality there is the homicide. The rightness and wrongness is a value of a subject. The rightness or wrongness of a homicide is not inherent to the actual action that takes place.
So sure, someone can say they believe that murder is objectively immoral, but it's a nonsensical phrase under scrutiny.
FlyingAxe: It is possible that whatever it is makes it murder also makes it immoral. I.e., some people believe that taking of life in an of itself is evil. Under all circumstances. Others believe that taking life in self-defense is not evil. Some believe that taking life during a war is evil. Others disagree. But all these people in question can agree that either those acts are objectively evil -- have an objective property of evil -- or not. They perceive evil in those acts through their intuition, which, admittedly can give conflicting results (but the same is true regarding people's perceptions of objective properties through senses or logic).
You are very confused.
FlyingAxe: 3) I am not saying what they are. I am saying that according to your logic, when one's moral views must be the only source of what one believes must be (or "is", in natural sense) the law, Christians cannot be libertarians, at least deontological ones. Maybe Tom Woods and Bob Murphy are consequentialist libertarians. I have no reason to believe the opposite.
I asked you where else the source of your beliefs about anything can come from, and I have yet to get a response. Your values and morals are what inform your decisions about anything you do and believe. I never claimed that Christians couldn't be libertarians, nor does "my" logic imply it. You, however, are the one that offered the idea Christians could not be libertarians, and then you went on to claim that Murphy and Woods would agree with what you wrote.
From what I remember, neither Murphy nor Woods are consequentialist libertarians. Maybe you would like to start offering evidence of your claims about them.
4) What an unbelievable misrepresentation of deontological libertarianism. I may disagree with Rothbard and Block on many things, but I would at least try to frame their deontological arguments accurately. And I have never read a Kinsella argument like that.
FlyingAxe: I.e., the argument is somewhat circular, and the punchline is basically that libertarians prefer clear conflict resolution over more subjective kinds (like urgency of use, etc.) -- which is a consequentialist argument.
You might want to portray the deontological libertarian argument accurately before you accuse it of anything. And the beauty of a consequentialist libertarian argument is that people can agree with you even if they don't share your morality exactly. It's all about mutual respect.
FlyingAxe: I am not sure what the last question means. (I.e., I could answer that I can decide for them because I am right. I have figure out how to figure out whether something is just or not.) We can rephrase it as "why should they care what I think?" Because I can demonstrate a way to figure out a just resolution of a conflict. Presumably. But I don't know what libertarians think that means, unless, as you mentioned, one relies on one's morality.
I am not sure what the last question means. (I.e., I could answer that I can decide for them because I am right. I have figure out how to figure out whether something is just or not.) We can rephrase it as "why should they care what I think?" Because I can demonstrate a way to figure out a just resolution of a conflict. Presumably. But I don't know what libertarians think that means, unless, as you mentioned, one relies on one's morality.
If you are right, then you don't need to decide for them. If your answer is right for them, they will agree to it without you forcing it upon them. If you have to force it upon them, then it is clearly not right for them.
The rightness and wrongness is a value of a subject. The rightness or wrongness of a homicide is not inherent to the actual action that takes place. So sure, someone can say they believe that murder is objectively immoral, but it's a nonsensical phrase under scrutiny.
A lot of philosophers would disagree. Including, for instance, David Friedman. Or Michael Huemer:
Moral values are objective. That is, they really exist, and are independent of observers. I have discussed this issue at length elsewhere and do not wish to repeat myself (at least not very much), so I will just review briefly two general reasons for this opinion. First, and most importantly, I think it is essential to our common sense conception of morality. When we contemplate or discuss moral issues, we normally experience ourselves as exploring a subject, debating matters of substance, and trying to make the correct judgements about them. Nor do we think that our obligations (etc.) depend on our or anyone's beliefs about them. We do not, for example, think that one way to solve all the world's problems would be for everybody to get together and agree not to consider anything bad anymore. We don't think, for instance, that one way to eliminate all oppression would be for a sufficient number of people to say, "There's no oppression." Therefore, we think that the evil (and of course the same would be true of good) exists independently of what observers say or think. And I think that one always ought to assume that things are the way they appear, until they can be proven otherwise. Second, moral objectivism (like objectivism in general) seems to be entailed by the law of excluded middle and the correspondence theory of truth, along with a couple of what seem equally obvious observations about morality: (1) There are moral propositions. (2) So they are each either true or false. (by law of excluded middle) (3) And it's not that they're all false. Surely it is true, rather than false, that Josef Stalin's activities were bad. (Although some communists would disagree, we needn't take their view seriously, and moreover, even they would admit some moral judgement, such as, "Stalin was good.") (4) So some moral judgements correspond to reality. (from 2,3, and the correspondence theory of truth) (5) So moral values are part of reality. (which is objectivism) I don't know if a typical subjectivist would try denying (3), but if so, then to resolve the dispute, what we have to do is weigh the plausibility of the most plausible moral judgement there is (since he claims it is false) against the plausibility of whatever argument he produces (assuming he has one). For instance, suppose that the most plausible moral judgement you can think of is "It is wrong to torture people just for the fun of it;" and suppose that the subjectivist claims that this is not true; and suppose he claims it on the basis that the existence of moral values is incompatible with logical positivism. Then what we have to ask is: Which do we find more plausible, that it is wrong to torture people just for the fun of it, or that logical positivism is true? This is just an example of the sort of difficulty the subjectivist or skeptic will get into, which convinces me that no argument against objectivism could possibly discharge its burden. See more in this essay: http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/objectiv.htm | Post Points: 50
And others would disagree with that post there. So what? You posted a flawed argument and are appealing to authority. All I can see from you is that you do not understand the price system or subjectivism.
(3) And it's not that they're all false. Surely it is true, rather than false, that Josef Stalin's activities were bad. (Although some communists would disagree, we needn't take their view seriously, and moreover, even they would admit some moral judgement, such as, "Stalin was good.")
What a laughable proposition.
I would also like you to source your claim that David Friedman believes in objective morality. I have never encountered this, and I just did some searching and found nothing to support this claim.
Please support this or retract it. If it exists, I would very much like to read what Friedman wrote. But I highly doubt he did in fact say this. You are making some very bold claims regarding Bob Murphy, Tom Woods, and David Friedman. And so far these claims appear to be baseless.
your claim that David Friedman believes in objective morality
Yeah, I'm 99% sure it's false that Friedman holds moral propositions to be objectively true or false.
1) That link does not support your statement about Friedman.
2)
FlyingAxe: I did not make any claims about either Murphy or Woods.
I did not make any claims about either Murphy or Woods.
My goodness, all we have to do is scroll up to read what you said:
gotlucky: Tell that to Bob Murphy and Tom Woods.
FlyingAxe: I don't see any reason to believe they would disagree with what I wrote. It's a fairly standard interpretation of morality of homosexuality. Furthermore, Bob Murphy told me himself that he's never read anything about rights, etc., that he fully agreed on, outside of New Testament.
I don't see any reason to believe they would disagree with what I wrote. It's a fairly standard interpretation of morality of homosexuality. Furthermore, Bob Murphy told me himself that he's never read anything about rights, etc., that he fully agreed on, outside of New Testament.
gotlucky: You better clarify some more, because you are rapidly losing credibility by claiming that Bob Murphy and Tom Woods would agree with you about Christians not being able to be libertarians. Both are Christians, and both are libertarians.
FlyingAxe: I am not saying what they are. I am saying that according to your logic, when one's moral views must be the only source of what one believes must be (or "is", in natural sense) the law, Christians cannot be libertarians, at least deontological ones. Maybe Tom Woods and Bob Murphy are consequentialist libertarians. I have no reason to believe the opposite.
I am not saying what they are. I am saying that according to your logic, when one's moral views must be the only source of what one believes must be (or "is", in natural sense) the law, Christians cannot be libertarians, at least deontological ones. Maybe Tom Woods and Bob Murphy are consequentialist libertarians. I have no reason to believe the opposite.
You made many claims about Bob Murphy and Tom Woods during that exchange. I hate to have to quote like that, but you need to own up to what you said. This is an internet forum. Everything is still on the page.
FlyingAxe: I was just examining logical implications of your statement that one cannot base one's deontological preferences for the law except on one's morality.
I was just examining logical implications of your statement that one cannot base one's deontological preferences for the law except on one's morality.
You know, this is actually getting kind of boring at this point. I said this in response to this accusation earlier:
gotlucky: I asked you where else the source of your beliefs about anything can come from, and I have yet to get a response. Your values and morals are what inform your decisions about anything you do and believe. I never claimed that Christians couldn't be libertarians, nor does "my" logic imply it. You, however, are the one that offered the idea Christians could not be libertarians, and then you went on to claim that Murphy and Woods would agree with what you wrote.
But you chose to ignore it. You have been consistently ignoring key pieces of my arguments throughout this thread. I have had to repost whole sections of my arguments several times in order to finally get some kind of response. I don't think you are arguing in good faith.
FlyingAxe: Proposition about Stalin was from phenomenological conservatism. My point was not to appeal to authority, but to show that plenty people believe in objective morality. Including many Christians.
Proposition about Stalin was from phenomenological conservatism. My point was not to appeal to authority, but to show that plenty people believe in objective morality. Including many Christians.
It's a laughable proposition on so many levels, and you posted it as evidence of an argument for objective morality. Sure, plenty of people believe in a lot of wrong things, of which the objective morality you are describing is one of them.
FlyingAxe: The assertions I made have a part in philosophical discussion about morality. I do understand subjectivity. I just find it wrong.
The assertions I made have a part in philosophical discussion about morality. I do understand subjectivity. I just find it wrong.
You have never demonstrated an understanding of subjectivity. Your denial of subjectivity leads to a denial of Austrian Economics. Have you read at least the beginning of Human Action? If not, go read it. If yes, go read it again. Also, I will take your views on objective morality seriously when:
1) You provide an argument without a laughably false premise, and
2) You show me what combination of atoms constitutes the characteristics known as "rightness" and "wrongness".
While we're at it, I'd love to read your summary of what you think subjective morality is, because as far as I can tell, you either outright ignore what I write or it just goes over your head. Hint: Start with subjective value.
You are right, this doesn't mean that Friedman believes that moral truths are objective (emphasis mine):
Let me suggest an analogy that I find informative. Think of moral intuitions as playing the same role in our knowledge of normative propositions that sense data play in our knowledge of positive propositions. [...] For me, at least, the crucial step to making this account plausible was realizing how shaky the basis is on which we accept our senses' account of the physical world (to the extent that we do). While the grounds for belief in physical objective reality--more precisely, in an objective reality reasonably close to what our senses report--are not as strong as they might at first seem, they are, in my view strong enough. The grounds for belief in a normative objective reality are not, in my view, enormously weaker. [...] >:Why do you keep talking about morality as if it was perceived through a sixth >:sense? > >Because I can't think of a better analogy. Very good. Neither can I. But you are now abandoning the "my morality is rational because it works for me" variant of rational egoism, and I am not sure you are replacing it with the individualist alternative you suggested earlier. If you take the sixth sense analogy seriously, the next step is to ask why you believe the other five senses. The answer is not "because I understand how they work." To begin with, you probably don't, and even if you do, Aristotle certainly didn't--and none of us are willing to argue that he ought to have denied the evidence of the senses. You believe your five senses because you have imposed on them all the consistency tests you can think of, and they have mostly passed. You see something, your eyes tell you an object is there, you reach out and sure enough you can touch it. The thing is a bell. Last time you tried hitting a bell your ears told you there was a sound; you try it again and it still works. Occasionally there is an apparent contradiction--you can't touch a holographic image, and when you hit a holographic image of a bell it doesn't make a noise. But as you get farther and farther into the structure of the physical world revealed by your senses more and more of those contradictions turn out to make sense after all. A second set of tests occurs to you. Your senses tell you that other people are very much like you. If so, they should perceive the same physical universe. You ask them, and sure enough they almost always do--again with very rare exceptions such as color blindness, exceptions that turn out, on further examination, to make sense. Note, however, that what you are finding to be consistent is observation of very primitive facts--there is a table there, there is not a lion sitting on the table. About the patterns implied by those facts--for example, whether capitalism or socialism results in higher standards of living, or whether the earth goes around the sun or the sun around the earth, or whether paying enough money to the Church of Scientology will turn you into a superman--there is lots of disagreement. You conclude that your senses give you a reasonably accurate picture of the base facts of physical reality, consistent with that of almost everyone else, but that reasoning up from there is sufficiently hard, and/or depends sufficiently on the particular subset of facts observed, so that people disagree a good deal--and your confidence about your beliefs on that level should be appropriately weaker. You accordingly conclude that the physical universe is really out there, and the parts you have observed really have about the characteristics you observe. If someone tells you that there is a lion on the table you conclude he is a lunatic. If he is very convincing, you ask a few other people first and then conclude he is a lunatic. Now apply the same approach to moral reality. Replace sense perceptions with moral judgements--not grand theories such as "you should never violate rights" but "perceptions" such as "in the following well described situation, person X acted wrongly." Checking with other people you find, pace the ethical relativists, a very high degree of agreement. The disagreement either involves the sort of situation that, on consideration, you find morally difficult or (far more often) disagreement about the assumed facts, not the judgements. Some people will find this claim implausible. I offer as one of my reasons for it the following observation: I have been arguing politics for a long time. In arguing with people on the left, I find it is very hard to come to an agreement on the assumed facts surrounding the situations we are judging. My imaginary capitalist has capital because he worked hard clearing part of the boundless forest while his employee to be was being lazy and living on what he could gather--so it is entirely just that the capitalist gets part of the output of his land and his employee's labor. But the leftist doesn't like that hypothetical. His imaginary capitalist inherited his capital from a father who stole it. I don't like that hypothetical. I conclude that our moral intuitions are similar enough so that the same assumed facts push both of us in the same direction--and since we want to go in opposite directions we want so assume different facts. My (very tentative) conclusion is that the normative universe, like the physical universe, exists. Certain ought statements are true, certain ought statements are false. Torturing small children for the fun of it really is wicked. I cannot go behind that and explain "ought" as derived from "is"--or "is" from "ought." Both are undefined terms, which I am confident that normal human beings understand. I can observe "normative facts" and try to form theories about them, just as I can observe physical facts and try to form theories about them. But I should not be surprised if other people form other theories in both cases. | Post Points: 20
>:Why do you keep talking about morality as if it was perceived through a sixth
I read that. Did you read the words "very tentative" or even the last two sentences?
What you quoted me saying about Murphy and Woods does not say anything about what I believe their views on deontological libertarianism actually are. (Except a quote of what Murphy told me personally -- which I didn't make up.)
Because you start claiming that they might be consequentialists instead, and that you have no reason to believe otherwise.
How about you stop speculating into what these people believe? Maybe you just source them when you want to speculate?
I'm going to stop wasting my time here until you start to take debating seriously. Source your shit. Reply to my arguments. Don't make me repost entire passages several times.
Until you do that, we're through in this thread. I have other things to do with my time, and I'm not going to waste it with someone who only pretends to want to discuss a topic.
gotlucky: I read that. Did you read the words "very tentative" or even the last two sentences?
Yes. So?
OK, I feel like this discussion doesn't actually contribute anything to the topic. I am sure others don't care about the back-and-forth bickering.
Re: deontological: my somewhat unclear tangent's point was that I have read other deontological discussions of libertarianism. They usually rest on arguments reducible to consequentialism (except Hoppe, who, as I said, I think is logically wrong). No different from my account of contractarian expectations from law.
(By the way, Kinsella admits that he is a consequentialist. So, I take the reference to him back.)