So I'm trying to understand the Objectivist POV on sense perception, but I'm having some trouble here. I was reading Leonard Peikoff's book about Objectivism, and in it, he stated that our sense perceptions are correct as an axiom.
How can this be? If humans can have dreams and hallucinations where they can see, touch, and even smell and taste figments, how can we know for sure that the "physical" world around us is actually physical and not just a kind of dream or hallucination?
Isn't it possible that we're just a bunch of brain cells in a petri dish somewhere? I'm not saying that that's necessarily true, but that it is impossible to prove beyond doubt the existence of the world and the universe as we know it.
As for Objectivist ethics, I don't quite understand why we should follow our own "rational self interest." As I understand it, Rand's argument was that since survival/life is a universal value, we should follow it as well, which leads us to rational self interest as the primary ethical goal. However, isn't this just a naturalistic fallacy? Only because all organisms try to survive, does that mean we should do the same?
I understand that it is rational to act in your own self interest, but I don't understand how it is ethical. In other words, it makes sense that one should improve oneself, but it doesn't make sense why not doing so would be unethical.
Furthermore, doesn't Rand's ethics depend on her epistemology/metaphysics? If one cannot prove that the physical world, and therefore the organisms within it, exist, can one really say that we should follow our own self interest because it is, in a sense, a universal value?
So wouldn't a more rational approach to ethics try to determine if there is some basis for ethics a priori instead of a posteriori?
Please correct me if I'm wrong in anything I've written, and please help me understand the Objectivist view on senses. Thanks. :)
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krazy kaju: So I'm trying to understand the Objectivist POV on sense perception, but I'm having some trouble here. I was reading Leonard Peikoff's book about Objectivism, and in it, he stated that our sense perceptions are correct as an axiom. How can this be? If humans can have dreams and hallucinations where they can see, touch, and even smell and taste figments, how can we know for sure that the "physical" world around us is actually physical and not just a kind of dream or hallucination?
Dreams and hallucinations don't involve sense-perception.
krazy kaju:Isn't it possible that we're just a bunch of brain cells in a petri dish somewhere? I'm not saying that that's necessarily true, but that it is impossible to prove beyond doubt the existence of the world and the universe as we know it.
Well, if we are, that's for the person who believes it to prove. The only reasonable default position is that the world we see around us exists as we perceive it.
krazy kaju:As for Objectivist ethics, I don't quite understand why we should follow our own "rational self interest." As I understand it, Rand's argument was that since survival/life is a universal value, we should follow it as well, which leads us to rational self interest as the primary ethical goal. However, isn't this just a naturalistic fallacy? Only because all organisms try to survive, does that mean we should do the same?
The survivalist interpretation of Rand is a mistaken one, in my opinion. As for the naturalistic fallacy, it's bogus. See Rand, Veatch, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl's arguments against Hume and Moore.
krazy kaju:I understand that it is rational to act in your own self interest, but I don't understand how it is ethical. In other words, it makes sense that one should improve oneself, but it doesn't make sense why not doing so would be unethical.
Why would it not make sense for it to be ethical to pursue one's own flourishing and unethical not to?
krazy kaju:Furthermore, doesn't Rand's ethics depend on her epistemology/metaphysics? If one cannot prove that the physical world, and therefore the organisms within it, exist, can one really say that we should follow our own self interest because it is, in a sense, a universal value?
The burden of proof is on he who thinks we do not exist. Good luck with that one.
krazy kaju:So wouldn't a more rational approach to ethics try to determine if there is some basis for ethics a priori instead of a posteriori?
Rand rejects this dichotomy as false.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct Instructor, Buena Vista UniversityWebmaster, LibertarianStandard.comFounder / Executive Editor, Prometheusreview.com
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:Dreams and hallucinations don't involve sense-perception.
But you believe that you are seeing, touching, tasting, hearing, and/or smelling an object. Couldn't the same apply to the real world (that we percieve that something exists, but nothing does)?
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:Well, if we are, that's for the person who believes it to prove. The only reasonable default position is that the world we see around us exists as we perceive it.
That's kinda my point. Somebody needs to prove that our senses are indeed valid and that, therefore, the physical world exists. The "default position" is that your mind (not your physical brain) exists.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:The survivalist interpretation of Rand is a mistaken one, in my opinion.
Then what is the basis for Rand's ethics?
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:As for the naturalistic fallacy, it's bogus. See Rand, Veatch, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl's arguments against Hume and Moore.
Could you explain?
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:Why would it not make sense for it to be ethical to pursue one's own flourishing and unethical not to?
The question is why would it make sense for it to be the overlying ethical goal to pursue your own interests over that of others or something else entirely.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:The burden of proof is on he who thinks we do not exist. Good luck with that one.
Cogito ergo sum. The burden of proof lies on you to prove anything beyond that.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:Rand rejects this dichotomy as false.
Yes, I am aware. What does she say about analytic statements?
Cogito ergo sum barely even proves thoughts exist. Why is the burden of proof on me to prove that the fancies of the skeptic are not true? If someone claims we're brains in vats, well that's cute, but the burden is squarely on their shoulders.
-Jon
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Geoffrey:Dreams and hallucinations don't involve sense-perception.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Jon Irenicus: Cogito ergo sum barely even proves thoughts exist. Why is the burden of proof on me to prove that the fancies of the skeptic are not true? If someone claims we're brains in vats, well that's cute, but the burden is squarely on their shoulders. -Jon
I'm not a skeptic. When you or GAP say that our sense perceptions are right as an axiom, you are effectively evading debate as to whether or not our senses are actually real. The burden of proof doesn't fall on me or anyone else who doubts the existence of the physical world, God, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster, since you cannot prove a negative. The burden of proof rests on you to prove that those senses that tell us about the physical world are valid.
Why is this repeated as if it's actually correct? You can't prove a negative? I can't prove that I don't have green hair or that --p = p (this is a basic logical transformation)? No, the burden of proof is on anyone making an assertion, negative or positive in nature - all the more so in the case of incredible arguments (e.g. we're all brains in vats, solipsism &c.)
As for Peikoff's argument, I'd need to see it fully elaborated to see whether I agree with it or not.
Austin addressed optical illusions when dealing with the "argument from illusion" - they're exactly what one ought to perceive under certain circumstances. What is typically done is that delusions are conflated with optical illusions. Skeptics often try equivocate, because their case would be stronger if optical illusions were the same as delusions. Optical illusions in fact are consistent with proper sense-perception. Delusions, dreams &c. do not involve it.
Optical illusions in fact are consistent with proper sense-perception.
Given our knowledge of science, what exactly is fascinating about this? The construction of the sensory organs, circumstantial facts and the thing being perceived should all lead to the mind perceiving these things the way it does - it is if it didn't that there would be something to worry about. Another infamous example is the stick which when submerged looks "bent". Big whoop. It's what one would expect given the laws of physics, and not sense-perception malfunctioning. As I said, Austin dealt with this stuff; it's about as interesting as party tricks are. I'm not sure what Peikoff means or what his proof is, but even in the case of optical illusions sense-perception is functional.
Another infamous example is the stick which when submerged looks "bent"
And that doesn't need to be proved?
Lack of proof doesn't nessesitate truth in the opposition, just that the positive claim is unsupported.
Also, such a position would support solipsism, not realism.
Juan:Another infamous example is the stick which when submerged looks "bent" Sorry, but that's not an optical illusion, just like seeing pink when wearing pink colored glasses is not an optical illusion.Anyway, the point is, the naive assumption that senses always provide correct information is wrong.
Yea, I do think there is a danger of accepting a sort of naive empiricism in which all sense data is assumed to be absolute truth. To me this places too much trust in the senses. People can claim to sense all sorts of absurd things, but that wouldn't make it true. It makes no sense to assume that all sense data is 100% accurate, or at least that the conclusions derived from such sense data is 100% accurate. Perhaps that helps clarify - perhaps it's the conclusions or abstractions people derive from their sense data that is really at issue; the ex-post-facto judgements or reflections of one's perceptions can often be quite inaccurate.
But also the mere limits of perception would seem to indicate that sense data itself is not necessarily fully representative of the thing being percieved, since one cannot percieve something from all perspectives at once. Often "the thing in itself" simply cannot be directly percieved as a coherant whole, but rather all one can do is make educated inferrances from the limited data and to compile data from the widest variety of sources possible as to create the closest thing to an all-encompassing picture of the coherant whole possible. That being said, I think we can reasonably infer some fairly certain things about that which we percieve, for the most part; especially if we put our noggins together and learn as best we can from eachother's experiences.
In short, I do tend to think that the epistemological approach of Objectivism has often represented a sort of naive realism that maintains no meaningful skepticism whatsoever with regaurd to sense data. Some kind of "skeptical realism" seems more well-rounded to me. I think it's erroneous to create a false dichotomy between something like solipsism or some kind of radical skepticism and the defacto absolute acceptance of all sense data or all things deriving from sense data. I don't see why I can't reject both objectivism and post-modern uber-relativistic bullcrap at the same time.
Do you mean like in the case of that image you showed, where according to scientific principles one is seeing exactly what they ought to be seeing? Right, because that'd mean it's no different from the submerged stick.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, why exactly ought one doubt that we perceive reality more or less as it is? I am open to proof to the contrary, but I've yet to see a skeptic mount something even coming close, other than elaborate thought experiments.