Here's the link to Scientific American's claim: http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?colID=1&articleID=000F1EDD-B48A-1E90-8EA5809EC5880000
Supposedly, in another universe, I am right now having sex with all of the Victoria's Secret models at the same time. On a king size bed made of diamond. In Donald Trump's back yard (he doesn't know). Surrounded by 21 penguins dressed in Louis Vuitton sweaters and Converse, the youngest of which is brandishing a Swastika tattoo on his left ass cheek. To my left, a newly-trim, 120-lb. Rosie O'Donnell is sitting on Nero's recently-refinished throne listening to Nirvana's new album, written after the band regrouped following Kurt Cobain's failed suicide attempt. Also, Elvis (he has Tourette's) just left the building.
In yet another universe, all of the above occurred just the same, but 8.6019 seconds earlier.
Give me a break. They can't possibly be serious about infinite parallel universes. Never mind the absurdity of my example (minus the VS orgy, because I could definitely pull that off), this would destroy any pretense for moral choice and, subsequently, justification for punishment. If I punch Bob Barker in the face, how can I be held accountable? After all, if one of the Me's (of which there are infinite) HAD to do it (and I did have to, for everything which can be done in infinity must be done in infinity) why punish me for it? Am I not compelled into my action with all of the immutable force of nature that a rock experiences when it is dropped? Should we punish rocks for responding as gravity compels them?
This is so unfathomably ridiculous that it almost pisses me off. And yet, I sit and wonder if, somewhere out there, those penguins are impressed.
"Melody is a form of remembrance. It must have a quality of inevitability in our ears." - Gian Carlo Menotti
You've nicely illustrated how difficult the reality of infinity is to grasp. If they really mean infinite, and not just very large, then all those cooperative Victoria Secret models must be out there. If they just mean very large, then perhaps not.
The idea has huge holes in it.
1. There's no proof that the universe's size in space or time is infinite, rather than finite. In fact, I've seen arguments in favor of finiteness.
2. Even an infinitely large universe could not contain events violating the laws of physics. Since the physics behind life and intelligence are scarcely understood, it seems a bit foolish to make predictions about what scenarios might and might not be physically possible regarding living, sentient beings. For example, it's possible that tomorrow on Earth every able human wakes up and spontaneously slits their own throats. I can't point out a law of physics being violated here, but given the inherent drive of living things to survive it seems rather unlikely. There might ultimately be a violation of physical law here. Note further that, besides just physical laws, events are also constrainted by boundary conditions - e.g. every structure is connected via a chain of events to the origin of the universe.
3. An infinitely large, completely random universe would contain all improbable events. However, this idea fails if there is any overall non-randomness, or pattern. Consider a universe consisting of exact duplicates of the same 1,000 galaxies repeated over and over. Or a universe that repeats all events every 20 billion years. These are crude examples of patterns. But because physical laws and boundary conditions are shared, there is no reason to rule out a subtle overall pattern that precludes many events from occuring.
4. In an infinite universe, it would be impossible to empirically prove that every possible event occurs somewhere - it would take forever and would take traveling an infinite distance to verify the claim. It would also be impossible to disprove the idea - you couldn't verify that some possible event isn't happening right now. Being unfalsifiable, the hypothesis is a matter of faith and not of science.
> this would destroy any pretense for moral choice and, subsequently, justification for punishment
Hmph.. I am a determinist, yet I have morals and make choices. I also don't mind accepting, or giving, punishment. Compensation, rehabilitiation, and deterance are all great reasons for punishment, and I don't see how determinism undermines these. Rocks obey the same physics as you and I, yet they are inanimate and fall below the threshold of being economic participants. They usually subject to punishment.
While there are difficulties with infinite universe ontologies, I'm not certain that the precise problems brought up here are examples. For one, the description given simply assumes away the problem of cross-world identity. It's not obvious that there is a "you" in every universe, and if you assume that there is, it's not clear how you'd pick them out. If you do make the questionable assumption that each universe has the same population, and so "you" exist in each universe, recall that in each different universe, you'd have different attributes - which means you would fit infinitely many descriptions. So, if "you" - the you in this world - could somehow see into other universes, how would you find that universe's version of yourself? The whole idea of indexicals could be revised, removing all the problems you state - since we could instead have only one you, and simply infinite "people" across the universes, the vast majority of which you have no access to, and hence have no impact on your life.
baxter: Hmph.. I am a determinist, yet I have morals and make choices.
Hmph.. I am a determinist, yet I have morals and make choices.
A determinist who makes choices? Correct me if I'm wrong (because I very well might be), but don't determinists believe that choices are only apparent, rather than actual? As I've understood it, ethics hinges on action guided by purposeful choices. "Good" is only meaningful insofar as it is distinguishable from "evil," and we are expected to choose the former rather than the latter. Why reward a child for good behavior if that behavior was not qualitatively different from a honey bee's choice not to sting you? It seems to me that, lacking any real choice, all human behavior is totally arbitrary (unpurposeful), driven only by the immutable and impartial laws of nature, and is (sort of) pointless to talk about within a framework of ethics.
Maybe there are nuanced subcategories of determinism that I don't know of, or maybe I'm just way off. I look foward to your answer.
JAlanKatz: It's not obvious that there is a "you" in every universe, and if you assume that there is, it's not clear how you'd pick them out.
It's not obvious that there is a "you" in every universe, and if you assume that there is, it's not clear how you'd pick them out.
You're right. I almost replied, "What're you talking about? I never said that." But I checked first, and I did say that. I apologize. I really have no idea where I came up with that. I'm gonna blame that Japanese green tea!
in-determinists cant escape the arbitrariness of choice anymore than determinists can, in fact it seems worse....
if what you do 'isnt' determined by anything that came before it, or even you to any extent, how does that make it that you have choices?
at least determinists can say that the black box of their brian interpreting their surroundings and making decisions (in a mathematical/physically determined way) show where choices are being made and who is making then. there in the brain, and its your brain.
if the brain was not at all conscious, it would start to get difficult to blame brain holders for their actions. but you know that your brain makes you think that it chooses between things, and the way it decides is influenced by things like rewards for good behaviour etc, so actually...
to reward good behaviour you are implicity assuming that brains are determined, cause if they werent, there is no sense in which rewarding them would achieve anything. but because rewarding can influence the brains decisions its worth doing.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
One could always say the mind is capable of instantiating chains of action itself (downward causation), without denying determinism.
what does downward causation mean?
nirgrahamUK: if what you do 'isnt' determined by anything that came before it, or even you to any extent, how does that make it that you have choices?
Wow, I feel like I'm back in grad school, where this argument would indeed go on forever. I'm sure that it was passed on to the new classes, who continue debating it endlessly even today. The dichotomy is generally given: either determinism means that your choices are predestined, so you have no choices, or else choices are somehow random, so you also have no choice. The third option, as I've pointed out (and as Inquistor says much more eloquently) is human action - your choices are neither random nor determined by something outside you. What really makes the argument never end, though, is the following line of inquiry:
1-But if you're a determinist, don't you think I'm determined to believe in free will, so why are you arguing with me?
2-As if I had a choice...
http://www.enotes.com/science-religion-encyclopedia/downward-causation
That, basically. It's one possibility.
If it is true, it refutes the notion that everything is determined; but it in no way dismisses the idea of causality. My own view is that the mind can instantiate chains of action, but that it is limited by physical forces, and that from the point of view of a human that it is ultimately irrelevant, because from our POV we cannot help but choose. I haven't done enough reading on free will to know how to put this any better.
jalankatz lists 3 options
A) determinism means that your choices are predestined, so you have no choices
is it implicit that choices cannot be predestined? i think a choice makes more sense as a logical possible outcome from a set of logically possible outcomes that is the one that is adopted. there could be a mechanical law of nature responsible for its adoption. we certainly call a set of mechanical natural objects me you person brain. so its still personal. this option can be made to work... so to recap, a) a choice is possible b) an input factor that decides which choice is chosen is the bundle known as your brain.
B) choices that are random so you have no choice.
still, im in danger of having this wriggle out on me, cause you might follow and say well, there are logical possible outcomes and the deciding factor is random. therefore its a choice at least as good as the one you ended up with in 1, but of course its not. because it doesnt allow any room for b) an individual as an input factor. so it does put a barrier between chooser and choice.
C) choice is not random and also choice is not determined by something outside you.
therefore, choice is determined, and also choice is determined by something in you. well, isnt that A) just repeated back ?
on 1- as a determinist i believe that your brain which a has a self model, and can modify its beliefs, might on considering the information i provide, change course and agree with me. if i was not a determinist, then i couldnt hope to reach you having any effect
if it turns out that even after hearing my argument, you didnt change your mind, then i can still believe that that outcome was determined,(it just means i was mistaken earlier when i thought it was worthwhile trying to exert an influence)
it may however turn out that you begin to agree with me. furthermore, it will have been determined, that at t1 we disagreed but that later t2 you disagreed.
so always on forever, i choose what seems to me to be choices i think are right. but thinking and choosing is determined. no contradiction.
on 2)
as a determinist i say you do have a choice. certainly and i hope you agree there are logically possible things that might happen. eg. you may agree, you may disagree. you were determined at t1 to do one or the other. but the choices that i make in interacting with you, and the cohices that you make henceforth (choices that you were determined to make) might determine you to think something else at time t2.
i find the downward causation to be useless and silly.
useless because it just pushes the problem furtheraway.
so human actions arent decided (be it determindly are randomly) on the pyshical plane, but on some other mental plane.
that just begs the question what is at work on that plane, is it randomness or determined? (which was our original question on manifestation on the physical plane)
its also silly because its cartesian dualism, and it needs some kind of cartesian pineal gland to do the job of mind-body interface. why make matters more complicated. ocamz razor and all that science junk.
And so we're back in the never-ending discussion:
nirgrahamUK:is it implicit that choices cannot be predestined? i think a choice makes more sense as a logical possible outcome from a set of logically possible outcomes that is the one that is adopted. there could be a mechanical law of nature responsible for its adoption. we certainly call a set of mechanical natural objects me you person brain. so its still personal. this option can be made to work... so to recap, a) a choice is possible b) an input factor that decides which choice is chosen is the bundle known as your brain.
Most arguments for determinism rest on this very assumption - that the brain simply is the mind. This is why my choice C denies.
nirgrahamUK:therefore, choice is determined, and also choice is determined by something in you. well, isnt that A) just repeated back ?
No, this only follows if there must be some physical account of decision-making, i.e. the brain is the mind.
nirgrahamUK: that just begs the question what is at work on that plane, is it randomness or determined? (which was our original question on manifestation on the physical plane)
I'd argue you only have that dichotomy when you're discussing physical events. Mental events with no physical instantiation are neither. The idea is not just to push it back to something we don't understand, but to deny that choice behaves like a physics experiment.
No, what it means is that human minds can instantiate chains of action. It may not be determined at all. In humans perhaps physical limitations do place limits on this otherwise pure will. And it need not even rest on another plane. This is a very Kantian view of the will, and one I find more plausible than humans being mere biological machines. Our entire understanding of cause-effect and choice is antecedent to all scientific observation; I am not sure why it should follow naturally that everything in the world is determined, when this cannot even be reconciled with our own subjective POV.
If you can elect amongst a series of possible outcomes, you are choosing, and not in a manner that a hard determinist (or even a soft one) would be willing to concede.
'Random' and 'determined' are not the only two options here. For something to be an effect, it has to be caused by something else. Volitional entities might be able to instantiate chains of causation, which are then neither random nor determined by anything else.